It is both heartening and humbling to be reviewed so meticulously by the Philippines' foremost scholar on Rizal and Burgos, John N. Schumacher, S.J. I am grateful for his call for a new edition of my book, if only to rectify, as he kindly puts it, "the errors of proofreading and of fact which mar this major contribution to the intellectual biography of Rizal."

I did not, however, expect him to be so irked by what he sees as my dependence on Marxist sources. He finds that "the Gramscian Marxist jargon distracts more than it illuminates" and declares that because he "[has] been able to come to similar conclusions without its aid," "the complex terminology" coming from Gramsci is irrelevant to an understanding of Rizal." But there's the rub—we have not arrived at similar conclusions. Except for my critique of Agoncillo, Constantino and Anderson, and my explication of Rizal's concept of the nation, Schumacher disagrees with most of my main argument about Rizal and Filipino nationalism.

I shall address these disagreements in the following order: first, sources and interpretations; second, the political visions of Burgos, Del Pilar, Rizal and Bonifacio; third, the ideological currents in the nineteenth century nationalist movement; and fourth, the failure of the Revolution and the impact of American conquest. A postscript clarifies some of Schumacher's erroneous assumptions.

This article is a reply to John N. Schumacher's review article, "Rizal and Filipino Nationalism: A New Approach" (Philippine Studies 48, no. 4 [2000]: 549-71), on my book, A Nation Aborted: Rizal, American Hegemony, and Philippine Nationalism (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999).
Schumacher’s Not So Obvious Fallacy

To prove his claim that Rizal’s edition of Morga “was also propaganda,” that is to say, fallacious in some parts, Schumacher argues:

[The propaganda] can be seen from certain arguments, such as the assertion, cited by Quibuyen, that the wealth of the towns owned by the friars was not due to the latter’s management, but because through their power and influence they have acquired “the best towns with the most fertile plains and well-irrigated fields” (204). The obvious fallacy lies in the fact that before the friar haciendas were set up, e.g., Calamba, there were no towns at all in those places, much less well-irrigated [by whom?] fields (557; emphasis mine).

This is a serious claim because Rizal had always avowed that he wrote to get the truth out and to expose the lies of power. Now, Schumacher is telling us that Rizal at times lied and obscured the truth. The deviousness of Schumacher’s argument becomes apparent when checked against Rizal’s text and the obvious evidence. Schumacher surely knew that I was citing Rizal’s essay, “La indolencia de los Filipinos,” but he conveniently ignored the crucial text cited (204–5): “in some provinces, where [the friars] have not succeeded to get possession of the best tracts of land for one reason or another, their estates, Baurang and Liang [Lian?], are inferior to Taal, Balayan, and Lipa, regions cultivated entirely by Filipinos, without any monkish interference” (Political Writings, 255).

Note that Rizal was comparing two types of haciendas in Batangas: the secular haciendas owned by Filipinos, such as Taal, Balayan, and Lipa, and the ecclesiastical haciendas owned by religious orders, such as Lian (Jesuit). The secular haciendas emerged from the consolidation of land grants (awarded to the conquistadores by the Spanish Crown in the sixteenth century) and lands purchased from the Filipino chiefs (principales). Whether by grant or purchase, some of these lands were already settled and cultivated at the time of conquest. The ecclesiastical haciendas, on the other hand, emerged when the religious orders acquired land—either by sale or donation—from Spanish and Filipino hacenderos in the seventeenth century. Some Filipino principales donated vast tracts of land. For example, in 1678, a principal of Orion, Bataan, gave “more than two thousand hectares of uncultivated land to the Dominicans in exchange for perpetual masses for him and his direct descendants” (Roth 1977, 43). The Jesuits and the Augustinians
were the first religious orders to begin accumulating haciendas, followed by the Dominicans and the Augustinians (39–66).1

Rizal was commenting on this accumulation process when he wrote that "the Philippine monks have known how to select the best towns, the beautiful plains, the well-irrigated fields to make of them very rich estates" (Political Writings, 255). Thus, Rizal argues, the wealth of the friar-owned haciendas was due primarily to the friars' acquisition of "the best tracts of land," "the best valleys," "the best uplands," and not to their alleged superiority over the Filipinos in managerial skills or agricultural know-how. Rizal was thus countering what he and like-minded ilustrados believed was friar propaganda.

All that is needed to refute Rizal's argument is to prove that the friars were primarily responsible for transforming unproductive lands into prosperous haciendas. Instead of doing this, however, Schumacher pounced on my expression [not Rizal's]—"the friars have acquired the best towns with the most fertile plains and well-irrigated fields" (204)—with this argument:

Premise 1: "Before the friar haciendas were set up, e.g., Calamba, there were no towns at all in those places."
Premise 2: Before the friar haciendas were set up, e.g., Calamba, there were no irrigated fields at all in those places.
Ergo: the Morga "was also propaganda" [that is to say, Rizal was lying].

Some comments are in order. First, even if we grant the truth of premise 1, it is irrelevant to Rizal's crucial point, namely, the religious orders' capacity to acquire the best tracts of land. Second, premise 2 could mean either of two false propositions. It could mean what Pedro Calderon, the judge of the Audiencia, had declared while pacifying the agrarian revolt of 1745: "it is well known that when the Spaniards arrived here [the lands] were not cultivated and the people of the Philippines lived like Aetas while the Spaniards were industrious in opening up the lands" (cited in Roth 1977, 113). Surely, Schumacher could not have subscribed to this view, for there were well-irrigated fields long before the haciendas were set up, or long before the towns were created, indeed long before the arrival of Magellan—who has not heard of the Ifugao rice terraces, for example? The Spanish chronicler Fr. Chirino saw the irrigated fields of Laguna, and was impressed by the wide variety of palay being planted there. In Bulacan, the irrigation system or tubigan made possible two harvests—in the rainy season and in summer.2
Thus, Schumacher must be asserting that the well-irrigated fields around Manila (Bulacan, Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Bataan) were deliberately avoided when the friar haciendas were being set up. Indeed, as Roth noted, it was colonial policy that only unoccupied land could be given away as grants, and that only the uncultivated lands could be sold—to protect the interests of the natives. Roth pointed out, however, that the stricture was not always followed, and thus, in some cases, cultivated land formed part of the hacienda being set up (Roth 1977, 39–43). Therefore, the second interpretation of premise 2 is also false.

But let’s grant that it is true. Would it refute Rizal’s argument? By no means! For Rizal was referring not only to the creation of haciendas but also to their expansion, either by additional land purchases or donations, or outright usurpation—as dramatized in the story of Cabesang Tales in *El Filibusterismo*. Land usurpation by the haciendas was one of the causes of agrarian unrest during the colonial period. For example, the Revolt of 1745—involving the provinces of Cavite, Tondo (now Rizal), Bulacan, and Batangas—was provoked by the usurpation of the communal lowland rice fields in the town of Silang, Cavite by the Dominican hacienda of Biiian (see Roth 1977, 100–116).

Although not so obvious, Schumacher’s argument against Rizal is irrelevant, if not fallacious.

**The Calamba Hacienda Case**

Schumacher tends to misrepresent me when he declares:

I do not see that the Calamba Hacienda case of 1887–88 (which Quibuyen misunderstands) was the turning point. I would rather see Rizal as a separatist at least from the time he wrote the *Noli*. (550)

I did not say that the Calamba Hacienda case caused Rizal to become a separatist. I wrote, “The Calamba tragedy led Rizal to assume a more radical separatist position in the second phase of his political career, 1888–1892” [p. 30; in my book, “to assume” is misprinted as “to make” and 1888 is misprinted as 1882].

Schumacher is keen on showing the inaccuracies and errors in my account, but he assumes a completely biased and defensive view of the Calamba hacienda case. Firstly, he upholds the legalistic argument that the historical fact of rental payment “created a legal presumption in favor of the Dominicans.” That is, if neither the Dominicans nor the tenants could show titles to the disputed lands, and the tenants had
been paying rent, then the rightful owners were the Dominicans! And because they owned the land, they had the right to evict tenants who refused to pay rent. Ergo, the forcible eviction of the tenants of Calamba was lawful and just.

Having upheld the colonialist framework, Schumacher then conjures an image of Dominican generosity: "Paciano had earlier cautioned Rizal against attacking the Dominicans, who had been so generous to the Rizal family in giving them extra land, even without having to pay rent immediately" (566).

Schumacher, unfortunately, ignores Paciano's subsequent correspondence. In his 26 May 1883 letter, Paciano reports that contrary to the general custom, the rent collectors of the hacienda "accept money without issuing receipts." (Letters between Rizal and family members, 99). Then in his 16 July 1885 letter, Paciano wrote that, on account of the failure of the tenants to pay their rents promptly, the administrator of the hacienda declared all the lands of the Estate vacant and invited outsiders to take over all the vacant lands. Because few outsiders responded to the invitation to apply for these vacant lots, most of the tenants were spared eviction, except four or five who were really "victimized by the comedy" (ibid, 181).

Also ignored by Schumacher is the 1887 petition of the Calambeños, drafted by Rizal, which complained of the non-issuance of receipts, rental increases that were arbitrary and unaffordable (in one case, a rent of 45 pesos increased to 900 pesos in a few years), and charges that were simply irrational (e.g., a rent was charged on a bamboo grove growing naturally on the land, or on any improvement the tenant made, such as building a wooden house or replacing the bamboo fence with a stone one). The petition called on the government to intervene by authorizing and supervising the drawing up of a new contract between the people of Calamba and the Dominican landowners (see "Petition of the Town of Calamba," in Political and Historical Writings, 37–41).

Schumacher may prefer to dwell on the technicalities of the case—legal niceties that I apparently misunderstand—but the fact of oppression cannot be denied: The refusal of the Calamba lessees to pay rent (which they considered unjust) to the Dominicans (whose ownership of the land they questioned) elicited a violent response from the Dominicans and the State. The evictions and deportations caused untold suffering to many families. Also undeniable is the fact that such violence convinced many Filipinos, both in the Philippines and abroad,
that justice was not possible within the Spanish theocratic colonial state, and that, indeed, oppression was the direct consequence of colonialism.

And need Schumacher be reminded that the Calamba hacienda case was not the first time that the Dominicans refused to show titles to their lands or stirred unrest among the natives? The Revolt of 1745—caused by another horror story of Dominican greed—could have grown into a full blown Revolution had the necessary conditions existed, as in Rizal’s time.

The “errors of fact” noted by Schumacher (for which I am grateful) do not detract from my basic contention:

The consequences of the Calamba hacienda case were momentous. Indeed one can argue that this blatant travesty of justice, perpetuated by both Church and State, precipitated a more militant separatist movement in the Philippines. After the Calamba incident, financial support from the Philippines for *La Solidaridad* began to wane. This, plus Rizal’s withdrawal from del Pilar’s assimilationist campaign, spelled the decline of the Propaganda Movement in Madrid. (29)

Instead of downplaying the impact, or worse, denying the injustice of the Calamba hacienda case, eminent scholars like Fathers Schumacher and Villaroel should be calling on the Dominican Order to apologize to the Filipino people. In recent times a number of Christian churches have publicly apologized to the Hawaiians and the Australian aborigines for injustices committed in the past, an act of reconciliation that all the more endeared them to the communities they continue to serve. The Roman Catholic Church had followed suit—on 12 March 2000, during the Day of Pardon Mass in St. Peter’s Basilica, Pope John Paul II asked God’s forgiveness for the sins of the Roman Catholics through history. The mass was part of the Catholic Church’s celebration of Jubilee 2000 and the holiday of Lent.

A Dominican apology, albeit long overdue, would be in keeping with this spirit of Christian humility and reconciliation.

**Rizal’s December Manifesto**

Schumacher misrepresents my argument when he writes: “With regard to the manifesto of Rizal, there is no need to take refuge in Quirino’s flimsy excuse that he was under duress, and therefore wrote it to save his life” (551). When I cited Quirino, I was not referring at all to Rizal’s December manifesto but to Valenzuela’s prison testimonies. This is what I wrote (55–56):
We have seen that the two postprison testimonies of Valenzuela agree that Rizal strongly supported the Revolution. Moreover, Valenzuela personally informed historian Gregorio Zaide that he knew Rizal to be for the Revolution. The one exception which, instead of being used as the definitive evidence, needs to be explained is the 6 October 1896 prison testimony of Valenzuela which depicts Rizal as categorically distancing himself from any violent enterprise. About this, the historian Carlos Quirino writes: "Since these declarations were made under duress, they cannot be relied upon implicitly; specially those parts relating to Dr. Jose Rizal and other Katipuneros whom Dr. Valenzuela later admitted he did not want to incriminate because of the natural fear that his statements would harm them" (Quirino 1978, iii).

Schumacher explains Rizal’s December manifesto thus (551):

He did not condemn revolution, but this revolution at this time, for which the country was not yet prepared. . . . He was not, of course, in a position to know that Bonifacio, who as I have tried to show in volume five of Kasaysayan (probably too late for Quibuyen to have read it), also knew that the time for revolt had not come Guerrero and Schumacher 1998, 145), but had his hand forced by the discovery of the Katipunan.

But, as I make clear on pages 53–55, citing Valenzuela’s 1917 court testimony, this contingency was in fact foreseen by Rizal and the Katipunan—with the latter unanimously adopting Rizal’s counsel, namely, that in the event of a discovery before full military preparedness, the Katipunan would have no alternative but to fight. I reiterate this point on p. 250: "[Rizal’s] advice was unanimously adopted, thus settling the question of what was to be done. But the regime’s sudden crackdown on the Katipunan forced the latter’s hand before the necessary preparations could be made. The revolution had to start prematurely.” I said this in my 1996 dissertation (the basis of my book)—two years ahead of volume five of Kasaysayan.

If we take Valenzuela’s word—and I see no reason to doubt it as it is consistent with all of his postprison statements—then Rizal’s December manifesto requires some other explanation. I provide a hypothesis on page 251:

However, Bonifacio’s method of neutralizing the uncooperative native elite strayed from Rizal’s ethical strictures. Bonifacio fabricated a roster of alleged financial contributors to the Katipunan and made sure that the list fell into the hands of the authorities, thereby leaving the compromised gentry no choice but to join the Katipunan. But rather than seeking refuge in the Katipunan, they either surrendered or allowed
themselves to be arrested, a move which proved suicidal. Thus a number of wealthy ilustrados . . . were executed. This incident came to Rizal's knowledge when he was already on his way to Cuba (see his 27 September 1896 diary entry) and may have been a factor in the writing of his denunciatory 15 December manifesto.

Pio Valenzuela's Alleged Untrustworthiness

Because some of my conclusions rely on Valenzuela's testimony, Schumacher's blanket dismissal of Valenzuela needs to be addressed. He writes: "to my mind [Glenn May] has shown conclusively that Valenzuela's word, even under oath, may not at any time be trusted. Not only is this true in his interrogation at Fort Santiago, but in his later memoirs, the Sotto case, and in his communications with Teodoro Agoncillo (May 1996, passim)" [Schumacher 551; emphasis mine].

I don't think that Glenn May has shown conclusively in Invent Ing a Hero that Valenzuela may not at any time be trusted. May's tactic in dismissing sources he doesn't like (i.e., "nationalist" historians) is itself dubious: (1) he exposes the errors of fact in their testimonies; (2) he insinuates that their character is flawed (the Santoses apparently fabricated documents to promote a hidden agenda); (3) ergo, they are not to be trusted at any time. For his part, Schumacher declares that Valenzuela "surrendered to the Spaniards and offered to give information, no doubt to save his skin." We can grant the innuendoes, but logically, proposition (3) does not follow from propositions (1) and (2). That is to say, we can't infer that someone lies all the time, from the first two premises.

All that May has shown is that Valenzuela had lapses of memory, that is, with respect to details. Long before May, Arsenio Manuel (1934) had already shown this in his critique of Zaide. But, except for his prison testimony, Valenzuela had been consistent in his assertion that Rizal was supportive of the Katipunan's aims—in his 1914 memoir, his 1917 court testimony, and his interview with Agoncillo. Why should we dismiss Valenzuela's declaration regarding Rizal's support for the Katipunan—upheld, I repeat, consistently in all his postprison statements—simply because he (1) said the opposite while in prison, and (2) is at times untrustworthy when it comes to small details, such as dates? That he "surrendered to the Spaniards and offered to give information, no doubt to save his skin" demonstrates Valenzuela's flawed character, but this by no means establishes the untrustworthiness of his postprison statements.
Buencamino’s Liberal Party

Schumacher dismisses Felipe Buencamino’s claim of the existence of a Burgos-led Liberal Party, and accepts as “more likely” Manuel Artigas y Cuerva’s 1911 account (cited in Villaroel 1984, 6–7) of two politically active groups during Burgos’s time, namely, the Comité de Reformadores (Committee of Reformers), consisting of priests, professors and businessmen; and a student front called Juventud Escolar Liberal.

Schumacher, however, rejects the notion of a unified movement, and dichotomizes between two ideological groupings: the liberals (professors, lawyers, businessmen, and students) on the one hand, and on the other, secular priests led by Burgos. He asserts that the inspirations and goals of the liberals and the secular priests were quite distinct; that Burgos’s idea of a national community was not shared by the liberals; and that the only thing that brought the two groups together was the fact that “they all sought to take advantage of the reputedly liberal atmosphere under Governor-General Carlos Ma. de la Torre” (554). Underlying all these propositions is Schumacher’s assumption that ideological perspectives cannot intermingle, even at a time of social upheaval.

I proceed from a different perspective. From the fact that Buencamino’s so-called “Liberal Party” was “a term used by no one else,” it does not follow necessarily that there was no political movement linking both the liberals and the secular priests to a common agenda. We can dismiss the “Liberal Party” as a misnomer, for there was indeed no party in the sense of something formally constituted like the Liga or the Katipunan. Nevertheless, it is significant that both the liberals and the secular priests became the inevitable suspects after the Cavite mutiny, and that the majority of those who survived their imprisonment and exile continued to be involved politically up to the time of the Revolution.

What emerged in Burgos’s time may be more aptly called the first liberal movement in the Philippines—involving a loose alliance of liberals and secular priests around the common agenda of “Filipinization.” Although its main catalyst was the discontent of the Filipino secular priests over the control of the parishes by the friars, the movement eventually went beyond promoting the interests of the secular clergy. Two other sectors became involved: the Filipinos in the military and those in the civil government, both of whom also felt discriminated against by the politically dominant peninsulars.
Thus, the liberal movement (sometimes called the Filipinization campaign) was broader in scope, for it aimed at securing equality for the Filipinos in the three sectors of the colonial regime: the Church, the military, and the government. The term “liberal” (as contraposed to “conservative”) may be justified by the fact that, as Buencamino observes, in fighting for their equality with the Spaniards, the Filipinos presupposed the basic principles of the Enlightenment: freedom, human rights, and the dignity of man.

Lest we lapse into Schumacher's obfuscating dichotomy, it is important to realize that these liberal principles are not opposed to the moral philosophy of Catholicism. Thus, it is not surprising that a brilliant and progressive priest like Burgos—who could be called a Catholic liberal (or liberal Catholic, depending on which term was emphasized)—became the movement's de facto leader and spokesman.

Although Buencamino's account is flawed in part, I see no reason why it should altogether be thrown out simply because Schumacher labels him anti-Catholic and antinationalist. Buencamino's Protestant affiliation could not have made him any less Christian than a Catholic, nor could his Federelista Party membership have made him any less patriotic than Manuel L. Quezon of the Nacionalista Party. Schumacher, who subscribes to Glenn May's empiricism, of course knows that being Catholic or nationalist is not the sine qua non for historical truthfulness.

The Cavite Mutiny

Schumacher chides me for citing Nick Joaquin's account of the testimonies of two friars who were captured and tried in Cavite by Aguinaldo's troops in 1897—Fr. Agapito Echegoyen, a Recollect, and Fr. Antonio Piernavieja, an Augustinian. Both friars testified to a conspiracy of the Augustinian, Recollect, Dominican, and Franciscan provincials to destroy Burgos and other leaders of the native clergy by implicating them in a seditious plot (Joaquin 1977, 21). This is "totally imaginary," protests Schumacher, for "Nick Joaquin based himself on the twentieth-century malicious forgeries of Jose Marco" (554).

Granted, but are the forgeries of Marco "totally imaginary?" General Artemio Ricarte relates in his memoir that the rebel forces in Cavite held five prisoners—two friars, one lay brother, one Spanish corporal, and one native corporal—who were tried and executed in March 1897. According to Ricarte, the charges brought against the two
friars included "the execution of the three native priests Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora." Ricarte names the two priests as Agapito Echevarria and P. Piemavieja (1963, 11-12). Could they be the same friars Agapito Echegoyen and Antonio Piernavieja in Joaquin's account? Might the discrepancy have been due to some lapse of memory in Ricarte, writing without the aid of notes while a prisoner at Bilibid?

The Antonio Piernavieja in Joaquin's account is the same Padre Piernavieja singled out by Rizal in his footnote to Basilio's nightmare of the murder of Crispin by Padre Salvi in Chapter 17 of the Noli—"Dream or reality, we do not know whether this may have happened to a Franciscan, but something similar is related to the Augustinian Padre Piernavieja" (The Social Cancer, 2d ed. revised, 93). Rizal alludes to a conspiracy of the reactionary elements among the friars and State authorities in creating the tragedy of 1872 in at least three writings—the Noli (the conspiracy between the alferes and Padre Salvi to destroy Ibarra), and two articles, "Reflections of a Filipino Student" (1884) and "The Truth For All" (1889). He writes in the latter article:

Our enemies can preach from their pulpits, go to the extremes in all kinds of measure—imprisonment, banishment, censorship, prohibitions, investigations, searches, etc—but they will not attain their objective. . . . They could simulate another uprising, like that of Cavite, and cut off the throats of so many educated heads, but from the blood thus spilled will sprout more numerous and fresher shoots (Political and Writings, 91, emphasis mine).

Could Marco have based his forgeries on Ricarte's memoir, as well as on what Rizal insinuates in his Noli and two articles? We will never know of course, but one thing is certain—the complicity of some friars was never seriously doubted by the revolutionaries, nor by Rizal.

One wonders which is more malicious: the forgeries of Marco, or the Spanish authorities' standing refusal to permit a public re-examination of the evidence against Burgos et al (Schumacher 1972, 31) or release the proceedings of their courts-martial, which remain hidden "presumably in the Archivo General Militar in Segovia" (Schumacher-Cushner 1969, 457)? Which, indeed, must be denounced by all honorable scholars?

Josephine Bracken and the Revolution

In my discussion of Josephine's entry into the rebel territory of Cavite, I cited a number of contemporary authors who were in Cavite
at the time (revolutionary generals Alvarez and Ricarte) or who heard reports or rumors about it (Foreman and Youngblood). Schumacher writes parenthetically that "the romantic journalistic portrayal by Foreman and other contemporary and later newspaper accounts [65–68] lack any credibility in themselves. Foreman is totally untrustworthy in his post-Revolution editions, where his creative imagination was at work to sell his book, amid the interest aroused by the American intervention [sic] in the Revolution" (552).

Note again the sweeping rejection—"totally untrustworthy." Schumacher's criticism is a minor one, but it highlights the difference between his empiricist approach and my critical hermeneutic perspective. In my view, even biased accounts can be instructive or revealing. This is particularly true of the racist accounts of the American journalist Katherine Mayo and the British traveller Elizabeth Dauncey, whose observations unwittingly reveal much of what was going on in the public culture under American rule (see my chapter 10). In the case of Forman, Alvarez, Ricarte, and Major G. J. Youngblood, I was citing their respective accounts not so much for their factual content (which Schumacher finds untrustworthy) as for what they revealed of popular perceptions, in particular, how the revolutionary masses perceived Josephine's entry into their ranks. I meant to compare and contrast these contemporary accounts with popular historian Ambeth Ocampo's cynical, and even more dubious view that "like Rizal, Josephine was a reluctant heroine and placed in a position she did not seek or want." This line, which reproduces the myths of Nick Joaquin and Renato Constantino, is based on the anti-Josephine gossips of Austin Coates (who is also the source of Isagani Cruz's acclaimed play, Josephine).

In linking Josephine's involvement in the Revolution with, as Mabini puts it, Rizal's voluntary martyrdom, I never used, as Schumacher complains, Gramscian categories. It would have been fairer for Schumacher to say that I was deploying my critical hermeneutic method (this time without drawing on Gramsci) and extending Illetó's categories—going beyond, rather than oversimplifying, his thesis.

2

Burgos and Rizal

Schumacher finds "dubious [my] dependence on Craig and Laubach . . . and ultimately Retana, for finding in Rizal's youthful poetry precocious signs of his nationalism" (555). But why should
patriotic stirrings be considered too precocious for Rizal, who was, after all, already eighteen years of age when he wrote *A La Juventud Filipina*? By that time he must have heard all that Paciano knew about Father Burgos and 1872. At that age Emilio Jacinto and Gregorio del Pilar had become involved in the revolutionary movement. Boys at a much younger age are known to have fought and sacrificed their lives for their nation, for example, in the Algerian revolution, and, currently, in the Palestinian Intifada.

With regard to "Sa aking mga kabata," we may follow Schumacher’s directive to "suspend judgement as to whether this is a genuine work of Rizal." However, given Rizal’s precocity, Paciano’s influence and the rich cultural atmosphere of the Rizal home, I feel certain that the eight-year old Rizal was capable of conceiving the ideas expressed in the poem. At that age, to cite but two examples from a long list of child prodigies, Mozart was already composing noteworthy music, and the Italian mathematician Maria Gaetana Agnasi was already writing her Latin treatise in defense of higher education for women, which became her first published book at age nine.

What I find dubious is Schumacher’s stress on Burgos’s primordial influence on the development of Rizal’s national consciousness. He writes, “It is necessary to go back to the ideals of Burgos and his influence on Paciano, and through him, on Jose, to find the goal the two brothers shared—to create a sense of nationhood among their people” (556; emphasis mine).

But to reduce Rizal’s vision to “the ideals of Burgos” is to misrepresent Rizal, for it disregards what Rizal had thought of Burgos’s vision—as expressed in his 22 June 1889 letter to del Pilar (cited in page 173 of my book):

> The men who had preceded us fought for their own interests and so God did not support them. Novales for the question of his promotion, Cuesta for revenge, Burgos for the curacies. We, on the other hand, fight so that there may be more justice and more liberty and for the sacred rights of man. We ask nothing for ourselves, we sacrifice everything for the common good, what have we to fear? (Rizal’s Correspondence with Fellow Reformists, 353)

Clearly, Rizal does not share Schumacher’s view of Burgos. However, it is not farfetched to assume that Schumacher knows Burgos better than Rizal ever did (Paciano notwithstanding). Rizal may not have read all the works of Burgos, which Schumacher has. But what do all the writings of Burgos tell us? Here is Schumacher’s answer:
A comparison of the polemic writings of Burgos with those of Rizal and Del Pilar makes clear the nationalist legacy of Burgos. Not only do the commonplaces of the anti-friar polemic of La Solidaridad in very large part evidently find their source in the writings of Burgos—the accusations of being anti-Spanish and of preventing the spread of the Spanish language, the oft-repeated citation of the Bustamante and Salcedo cases, the denunciations of Friar wealth, the strategy of proposing the substitution of Peninsular secular clergy for the Friars, the appeal to the earlier anti-Friar polemics of Anda and Sancho de Santa Justa. Much more important and of lasting value were the appeal to the Filipino past, the impassioned defense of the ability of the Filipino against the insinuations from Spanish racism, the demand for equality before the law, all these later themes of Filipino nationalist thought of the last two decades of the century find their expression first in Burgos (1972, 34).

I have problems with this argument. Firstly, it would be a non-sequitur to conclude that the propagandists derived their ideas from Burgos from the observation that similar ideas can be found in the writings of both—unless one assumes that Burgos could have been the only source for those ideas, which is false. The similarity in ideas can be explained by the fact that both felt oppressed by the same pernicious reality—called fraileocracia or la soberanía monacal in the propaganda literature.

Secondly, Schumacher’s lumping of Burgos, Rizal, and del Pilar into one ideological camp is dubious. The Propagandists were divided between two perspectives—Rizal’s and Del Pilar’s. Whose perspective was closer to the ideals of Burgos? Schumacher seems oblivious to this question.

Thirdly, even if we grant, contrary to Rizal’s view, that Burgos’s campaign for equality encompassed all Filipinos, and not just the Filipino clergy, it does not necessarily follow that Burgos had envisioned a Filipino nation separate and independent from Spain. In fact Burgos unequivocally affirmed Spanish sovereignty over the Philippines in his Manifiesto que a la noble nación española dirigen los leales Filipinos en defensa de su honra y fidelidad gravemente vulneradas por el periódico “La Verdad” de Madrid [“Manifesto which the loyal Filipinos address to the noble Spanish nation in defense of their honor and loyalty gravely wounded by the newspaper La Verdad of Madrid”]:

We know and understand very well that away from the Spanish name and from the flag which waves over us, we will be nothing and perhaps worse than nothing. For we are not ignorant that once emancipated from the magnanimous and generous Spanish nation, this country would be handed over to the most complete anarchy or would be a
slave of the harsh rule of a foreigner. . . . It is to our own interest to maintain Spanish rule, sheltering ourselves under its great shadow, a source of protection and of the highest culture. (Schumacher 1972, 93)

Burgos could not have thought otherwise, for he was, in Father Villaroel's words, "a good priest, loyal to the Church and dedicated to the duties of priesthood" (Villaroel 1971, 117).

Fourthly, it would be terribly unfair for Rizal to say that he was simply bringing to fruition what Burgos had sowed. Burgos would have had to go through the learning experiences, much of it painful, of Rizal to have been able to arrive at the latter's perspective. Even if Burgos had survived the garrote, he would have had to go through the Calamba hacienda crisis, read all the volumes that Rizal poured over in the British Museum (not to mention the 38 volumes of Herder), met all the scholars and activists with whom Rizal conversed, to have been able to access all the information and ideas and sentiments that formed Rizal's vision.

It is crucial to specify the differences between Burgos and Rizal, as much as between Rizal and Del Pilar. As we shall see, Rizal stands apart from either Burgos or Del Pilar.

Del Pilar and Rizal: Autonomy or Independence?

Schumacher argues (550), "I would not classify Del Pilar as a mere reformist or assimilationist. . . . For him too, the goal was eventual independence, but, unlike Rizal, he believed that the effective strategy was to aim first at assimilation. . . . Del Pilar thought to work through the Spaniards; Rizal and Bonifacio, only through Filipinos—there is the difference (Schumacher 1997, 131, 258; Guerrero and Schumacher 1998, 72-73)." Further on Schumacher is more categorical: Del Pilar was "a separatist, but one who envisaged a different strategy than Rizal" (560).

Did Del Pilar actually say that "the effective strategy was to aim first at assimilation"? Or is this Schumacher's extrapolation? Consider Schumacher's evidence (1973, 133):

In March 1889, for example, [Del Pilar] was already discussing with Rizal, Ponce, Apacible and Lopez-Jaena whether the future language of the Philippines ought to be Spanish or Tagalog. He felt strongly too about the "great destiny reserved by Providence for our race" and the need for keeping the Filipino people from being tainted by the customs of the Spaniards, for which he expressed contempt.
We can grant that Del Pilar was not under the romantic spell of Hispanic culture, and that he preferred the simplicity and refinement of his Tagalog values, customs, and traditions to what he saw as the vulgarity of the Spaniards in the Philippines and in the Iberian Peninsula, and that he even wanted Tagalog to be the Philippines' future language. Do all these make him a separatist? All that can be established from Schumacher's description is that Del Pilar espoused what we now call "ethnic nationalism." But this is compatible with the idea of Philippine autonomy under the jurisdiction of Spain—the objective of Del Pilar's assimilationist campaign.

The issue of separation or assimilation has always bedeviled nationalist movements in colonized territories. Irish nationalists who fought together against the British in the Easter Rising of 1916 ended up killing each other in the 1920s when confronted with the choice between a Free State (autonomous Ireland under British rule) and an independent Irish Republic. The Muslim problem in the Philippines poses a choice between (a) an autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao, which would be subject to the constitution of the Philippine Republic, an arrangement that Nur Misuari's MNLF had agreed to, or (b) an independent Muslim nation-state, the goal pursued by other radical groups. Hawaiian nationalists fighting for Hawaiian sovereignty are divided over (a) the position advocated by the Ka Lahui—"a nation within a nation," or (b) the platform of Kanaka Maoli—an independent Hawaiian nation outside the jurisdiction of the U.S.A. Both organizations are strongly committed to the preservation of Hawaiian culture, especially the revival of the Hawaiian language. Both are contemptuous of what they call haole (white) culture. Yet one is assimilationist, and the other separatist, and no one claims that the former is less of a nationalist than the latter. Thus, assimilationists affirm a cultural identity distinct from the larger nation-state they wish to join [endorsed as "multiculturalism" in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and U.S.A].

We can apply these considerations to Del Pilar. I think it is more correct to refer to Del Pilar as an assimilationist (one advocating an autonomous Filipinas under the jurisdiction of the Spanish constitution), but one who did not advocate Hispanization. That is to say, his platform is much like Ka Lahui's "a nation within a nation." Like the Ka Lahui, Del Pilar must have felt that separation was impracticable, if not impossible. How else could we explain his dogged insistence on
the assimilationist path in the face of the Calamba hacienda tragedy (which convinced many ilustrados to take the separatist position)?

Unlike Rizal, Del Pilar believed that Filipinas can attain progress within the constitutional framework of Spain. In this sense, he, and not Rizal (as Constantino would have us believe) antedates the Filipino elite’s peaceful parliamentary struggle for independence during the American colonial period. If anything, Del Pilar was the precursor of the modern “bi-nationalist” Filipino—exemplified by the American-sponsored nationalist President Manuel L. Quezon. Thus, the staunch advocate of Philippine independence who famously thundered, “My loyalty to my party ends where my loyalty to my country begins,” could also solemnly swear “to myself and to the God of my ancestors that as long as I live I would stand by America regardless of the consequences to my people and to myself” (Quezon 1946, 275).

The affirmation of the Filipino’s cultural identity is shared by both assimilationists and separatists and therefore cannot be used as basis for differentiating the two. Something else separates Rizal from Del Pilar, and even Burgos. Unlike Rizal, both Del Pilar and Burgos shared the illusion that once the rapacious friars were reigned in or expelled, equality, and therefore progress for the Filipinos would ensue, even under the jurisdiction of Spain. This was premised on the belief that, without the influence of the friars, Spain would be reasonable. That’s why Burgos felt so betrayed when he was garroted—I can find no kinder explanation for his weeping like a child on the execution platform. Unfortunately, missing in Burgos’s consciousness was Rizal’s deeper understanding of the Spanish colonial state: as Rizal cryptically put it, *quos vult perdere Jupiter; dementat prius* (used in Chapter 9 of *The Social Cancer*, 55).

As his own correspondence attests, Rizal saw himself as breaking away from the narrower visions of Del Pilar and Burgos. The Spaniards had a good reason for executing Rizal, but it was not the same reason for which they had executed Burgos.

**La Liga Filipina**

I am happy that Schumacher accepts my distinction between *nation* and *nation-state* when he writes, “Prior to independence must come education, not simply years spent in school, but the formation of an ethical community—a nation—before a nation-state” (556). However,
I am afraid that this is Schumacher's understanding of Rizal's project, not mine. I don't think that the "arduous" task, as Rizal described it, of forming the nation boils down simply to education, formal or otherwise. Burgos may have subscribed to this naive notion, but not Rizal.

Rizal was well aware that education does not automatically lead to a people's emancipation, and would have agreed wholeheartedly with Paolo Freire's view, "Education is not the key to transformation, but transformation is in itself educational" (Gismondi 1999). The Liga of course sought to promote the sort of education that would raise a people's sense of justice and commitment to the common good—a process that Freire aptly termed "conscientization." But this educative effort was but a part, albeit a crucial one, of the Liga's project to organize and mobilize the people towards creating, at the community level, structures of defense, mutual help, and self-reliance. Thus, the Liga was to set in motion a process by which the people would be actively learning and transforming themselves, instead of passively waiting for someone like Rizal to educate them. If this process—driven by a passion for the common good (Rizal's "el sentimiento nacional")—can proliferate throughout the Archipelago, then an ethical national community would become a reality, and the Filipinos would, in Rizal's felicitous words, "again become lovers of peace, gay, lively, smiling, hospitable, and fearless."

Thus, Rizal had envisioned the Liga to create the structures that would resist, challenge and eventually replace the theocratic colonial system. In this respect, Rizal's La Liga and Bonifacio's Katipunan were fundamentally the same—both were radical programs of conscientization and social transformation. As I had repeatedly stressed, Rizal never precluded the resort to arms, and, for his part, Bonifacio had modeled his Katipunan after the ideological and constitutional structure of the Liga. To modify slightly a claim I made in the book, Rizal was ideologically closer to Bonifacio than to either Burgos or Del Pilar. I never of course implied that Rizal and Bonifacio actually worked together.

3

Was 1892 "Only a Beginning"?

Schumacher declares (560): "I do not find that Quibuyen has given facts to show that 'by 1892, the youth had responded [to Padre Florentino's exhortation at the end of the Fili], and the Revolution to
realize the imagined community that the master narrative of the *Pasyon* had promised was under way” (245). Then he argues, “The failure to accept the fact that 1892 was only a beginning, and one frustrated in the case of Rizal, lies at the basis I believe, of the unsatisfactory portrayal of ‘The Revolution That Never Was’ in chapter nine” (560).

One may wonder what Schumacher is driving at, for at first glance, my expression, “by 1892 the youth had responded, and the Revolution . . . was underway,” looks quite similar to his preferred line, “1892 was only a beginning.” But there is a subtle nuance. If 1892 was only a beginning, then what was 1872? To call 1892 just a beginning is to beg the question, what was happening before? That’s why I used the word “underway” to imply that 1892 was a new stage in a process that had been going on for some time.

Using my Gramscian terms, Schumacher declares that when the revolution broke out (prematurely) in 1896,

\[
\text{there was not yet a historic bloc ready for the counterhegemonic struggle. Hence the internecine conflicts which rent the Filipino struggle, differently conceived and differently motivated by different persons, different factions, and different classes (560).}
\]

This was how I put it:

The historic bloc that was forming from the founding of the Liga and the Katipunan in 1892 to the heyday of the Revolution in 1898 collapsed. The vital link between the elite and the masses was severed, and the counterhegemonic movement crumbled. Once again, the elite and the masses went their separate ways. (273)

**The Enlightenment and the Pasyon: Opposed Traditions?**

Like the elite and the masses, I see the Enlightenment and the Pasyon as inextricably linked in a structure of power. Schumacher disputes this (560): “I would rather agree with Ileto, cited unfavorably by Quibuyen, that [they] are ‘two separate non-intermingling, and even opposed currents’” (220). The dichotomy goes back to the Great and the Little Traditions in the anthropological perspective of Robert Redfield. Secular and religious traditions are, of course, separate and, in some cases, opposed—but they intermingle and even fuse in times of crisis or social upheavals, such as revolutions. For example, in the French Revolution, the secular Enlightenment tradition intermingled with Jansenism, the Catholic heresy of the eighteenth century. Recent
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studies have underscored the crucial role (hitherto unappreciated) of Jansenism in both the origins and course of the French Revolution: it was the device that delegitimized the absolute monarchy of France and the Ancien Regime generally. In the Irish nationalist movement, the liberal tradition intermingled with Catholicism. As noted by David Cairns and Shaun Richards (1988, 106-11), a “redemptionist ideology” and the trope of the crucifixion and resurrection of the chosen people are basic features of Irish nationalist writing. There is nothing strange about this—religious and ideological traditions, especially those emerging out of social upheavals, are syncretistic.

I think that this intermingling and fusion of elements from various ideological strands or currents occur as a result of the formation of a historic bloc. A historic bloc is formed when various groups and class fragments coalesce through the intellectual and moral leadership of a particular group or class fragment, e.g., the Jacobins in the French Revolution, the letrados in the Latin American revolutions, or the radical ilustrados in the Philippine Revolution. This coming together of various groups and classes make possible the mingling of a variety of ideological currents—all deployed in the service of one overarching political agenda.

Schumacher questions whether the Pasyon is “applicable to the [Filipino] people as a whole” (559). But which ideology is applicable to “a people as a whole”? Who can ascertain, for example, what percentage of the Americans or the French population in the eighteenth century espoused the Enlightenment ideology of their revolutionary leaders? When I speak of nationalist traditions, I am referring to the key ideas, themes and sentiments expressed in the writings of the leaders, or in the oral tradition, but there is no way we can empirically verify how much of these is really shared by “the people as a whole.” Thus, I question how Schumacher knows that “the vast majority of Filipinos, even of Tagalogs, thought in various other, more simple, categories” (559).

When Schumacher says that the Enlightenment and the Pasyon tradition were not the only ideological currents in the Filipino Revolution, he seems to imply that Catholicism was a third current. I agree. However, I don’t make a distinction between Catholicism and the Pasyon with regard to their eschatology. Both traditions share the master narrative—Paradise, the Fall, and Redemption. Corresponding to this eschatology is the Morga’s [referred to as “the Rizal-Morga” in my
book] tripartite view of history—pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. Schumacher presumes that the Morga's secular view of history cannot fuse with the escathology of the Pasyon because he assumes a fundamental dichotomy between the Enlightenment and the Pasyon. He applies this dichotomy to Rizal, Bonifacio, and the Katipunan. Thus, he doubts “the extent to which Bonifacio was influenced by the Pasyon,” seeing him “as more secular, influenced by the Enlightenment ideas of Rizal and of Masonry” (559). Schumacher disputes my claim that Bonifacio read Rizal’s novels from the perspective of the Pasyon, but does not refute my argument (237-42) that the Noli-Fili are suffused with tropes from the Pasyon. Then he asserts, “As one can see from Quibuyen’s own analysis, it was the Morga, and not the novels which are explicitly at the basis of the interrogation in the Katipunan initiation rite, as well as Bonifacio’s article in Kalayaan” (559).

Unfortunately, Schumacher’s dichotomous mind-set prevents him from carefully reading what I have written. My own analysis shows that, first, Ang Dapat Mabatid ng Mga Tagalog “recasts [the Morga] in the idiom of the Pasyon” (224-29), and, second, the Katipunan initiation rite was similar to the ritual of pilgrimage in Mt. Banahaw during the time of Hermano Pule (229-30). The last stage of the initiation appropriates images of the “holy gate” and of Mount Calvary. The neophyte was required to pass through the “gates” of the society at the “summit” of a symbolic mountain by “climbing” from the kapatagan (valley) to the karurukan (mountain peak). He must answer correctly a set of questions that recall themes from the Pasyon (and therefore are quite different from the Morga-based questions of the first stage) before he is allowed through the “holy gate.” Upon crossing this threshold, he enters the Katipunan’s sacred domain, whereupon he is reborn a new man, willing and able to sacrifice his life for Kalayaan (230–31).

Both Enlightenment and Pasyon themes informed and inspired Bonifacio’s Ang Dapat Mabatid ng Mga Tagalog, as well as the Katipunan’s initiation rites.

Rizal, the Tagalog Christ?

Schumacher argues that “at the time of the Revolution Rizal was not looked upon by Filipinos as a whole for their aspirations, only by certain number of Tagalogs, mostly among the colorums.” Rizal was a symbol of resistance only to “such fringe groups as the Rizalistas of
Mount Banahaw and San Cristobal, the Pulahanes of Samar, and later, the Colorums of Surigao." He began to become well-known throughout the country through American government-sponsored celebrations and the public school system. Thus, "it was the American image of Rizal rather than that of the Filipino resistance that prevailed" (562-63).

Schumacher, unfortunately, ignores the important question—How did Rizal become the symbol of resistance among the "fringe groups"? Why did rebel leaders prefer to pose as "Dr. Rizal" rather than as Bonifacio or any other hero who died during the Revolution? Why should peasant followers give their trust to leaders who invoked the name of Rizal? Why should a simple folk in Iloilo, ca. 1904, have a portrait of Rizal hanging in his kitchen as "a sort of little shrine"? If only "a certain number of Tagalogs, mostly among the colorums" looked upon Rizal for their aspirations, then how, in Heaven’s name, did the non-Tagalog peasant leaders and their followers from as far as the hinterlands of the Visayas learn of "Dr. Rizal, The Filipino Christ"? Who had given them this image? Who had taught them about Rizal? The invading American forces they were fighting against?

Instead of addressing my questions (on page 284 of my book), Schumacher simply accuses two of my sources as being "poorly informed," "racist," and "paid hack of American business interests" (562).

Schumacher finds no evidence to my claim that it was the "subversive reading of Rizal as Tagalog Christ that was commemorated" on the second anniversary of his martyrdom (562). This is surprising, for the 1898-99 issues of the revolutionary newspapers La Independencia and El Heraldo de la Revolucion are replete with descriptions of the commemoration of Rizal’s death in various towns. The whole town of Batangas, for example, is reported as having gathered, in tearful wailing, before a portrait of Rizal which made the folk recall "the desert of sorrows traversed by the Christ of our pueblo" (from La Independencia, 11 January 1899; cited in Ileto 1982, 320). The Republican government’s 1898 pamphlet, Mahalagang Kasulatan [Highly Important Writings], was even more explicit in its commemoration of Rizal’s martyrdom:

The WORD named Jose Rizal [Ang Verbong nagngangalang Jose Rizal], sent down by heaven to the land of Filipinas, in order to spend his whole life, from childhood, striving to spread throughout this vast Archipelago, the notion that righteousness must be fought for wholeheartedly. (Cited in Ileto 1982, 319–20).
Why Did the Revolution Fail?

Regarding my argument on the failure of the Revolution, Schumacher writes: “Consequent upon Quibuyen’s overestimation of the might of the revolutionary forces, he deems in a somewhat contorted argument that had Aguinaldo not agreed to the Pact of Biak-na-Bato, the Revolution of 1896 could have succeeded, and established a government before the Americans ever came” (561). What I actually said was: “the truce signed at Biak-na-Bato was unnecessary, if not detrimental to the cause of the Revolution” (253). Significantly, Generals Miguel Malvar and Paciano Rizal opposed the truce.

Schumacher justifies the Truce by first downplaying Makabulos’s revolutionary activities in Central Luzon as nothing more than “guerilla activities on a hit-and-run basis, as shown by the fact that nowhere else in the Philippines did this happen, and most friars felt safe enough to return to their parishes, and thus many were taken prisoner in 1898.” Then he argues that “having lost all of Cavite to the Spaniards” and “trapped with a handful of men in Biak-na-Bato,” Aguinaldo “had no choice but to accept the best Spanish offer he could get” (561).

Note that Schumacher does two things: (1) he dichotomizes between “hit-and-run” guerrilla action and conventional warfare; and, (2) he implies that a hit-and-run guerrilla action is not an effective form of revolutionary warfare. The fact is, wars of national liberation in the Third World have always been waged through guerrilla campaigns occurring on many fronts. The reason for this is basic: the occupying power has overwhelming advantage in logistics and firepower. And the only way to counter this advantage is by resorting to hit-and-run guerrilla warfare. When these are successful, and the revolutionary effort gains momentum and strength, then, and only then, are full scale frontal assaults undertaken. This was the strategy of both the Castro-led Cuban revolution and the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese war of national liberation.

In fact, Aguinaldo should have adopted guerrilla tactics right from the beginning of the war against the Spanish forces. But, and this is a crucial point, even if Aguinaldo had made the mistake of waging conventional warfare at the start, he should have resorted to hit-and-run guerrilla campaigns when his army started suffering setbacks. After
all, the Spaniards were themselves exhausted, and the war had proved
too costly for them—that’s why they offered the truce. And let us not
forget that the Spaniards would soon get embroiled in a war with the
U.S. Time was on the side of Aguinaldo. Under the circumstances, hit-
and-run guerrilla campaigns posed the best strategy. Instead,
Aguinaldo chose to retreat to Biak-na-Bato, only to end up agreeing to
a truce and going on exile in Hongkong.

Despite the loss of all Cavite and the departure of Aguinaldo,
Makabulos was able to engage in effective guerrilla activities. If
Aguinaldo did not agree to a truce, what would have prevented him
from doing what Makabulos did? Wouldn’t it have contributed im-
mensely to the revolutionary effort if more Makabulos-type guerrilla
activities were undertaken? That’s why I enthuse, “Imagine what else
could have been accomplished if Aguinaldo had not agreed to a truce
and had not left the country!” (253).

But Aguinaldo learned his lessons very slowly and too late. At the
start of the war against the militarily more powerful and better trained
Americans, he again waged conventional warfare. It was Antonio
Luna who learned quickly—when he saw that the revolutionary forces
were no match to American firepower, Luna proposed to Aguinaldo
that they shift to guerrilla warfare. But instead of listening, Aguinaldo
distanced himself from Luna, who ended up being assassinated by
Aguinaldo’s men. Later, with his forces destroyed, but unwilling to
surrender and wishing to prolong the war, Aguinaldo and his officers
reverted to hit-and-run guerrilla campaigns—but it was too late.

Schumacher again misrepresents my argument when he writes:
“From here on, Quibuyen concentrates on the naivete and erroneous
judgments of Aguinaldo, as if it were only the deficiencies of the lat-
ter which led to the war and the American occupation” (561). None of
my statements implied that only the deficiencies of Aguinaldo “led to
the war and the American occupation.” The war with the Americans
would have happened regardless of Aguinaldo’s actions—not only
because of the Spanish-American War, but also because the taking of
the Philippines was an imperative in America’s imperialist designs.

Missed by Schumacher is a crucial premise in my argument: the
collapse of the historic bloc led to the failure of the revolution. We
need to look at how the historic bloc fell apart in order to understand
how the revolution failed. A combination of specific events, actions,
and decisions contributed to the collapse of the historic bloc, which, in
turn, weakened the revolutionary resistance (both politically and mili-

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tarily), and eventually led to the failure of the Revolution and the triumph of the Americans.

The pact of Biak-na-Bato and Aguinaldo’s deficiencies and bad judgements were crucial factors in the defeat of the Revolution, but they should be situated in a whole series of fateful and fatal events and decisions leading to the Revolution’s tragic end—all of which I discuss in my book, to wit:

1. The arrest and execution of Bonifacio—demoralized the ranks of the revolutionary forces outside of the province of Cavite. As Mabini explains in his memoir, “this tragic event . . . hastened the collapse of the insurrection in Cavite, because many from Manila, Laguna and Batangas who had come to fight for that province went home in disgust. Soon afterwards the so-called central government was forced to transfer its headquarters to the mountains of Biak-na-bato in Bulacan” (cited in De la Costa 1965, 238). This, in turn, led to the Pact of Biak-na-Bato.

2. The Pact of Biak-na-Bato—led to the revolutionary leadership’s exile to Hongkong, which in turn, led to its dependence on US sponsorship for its return to the Philippines.

3. US sponsorship of Aguinaldo’s return—made Aguinaldo beholden to the Americans, and, consequently, undermined his judgment in dealing with them. In the month of July 1898, just after Philippine independence was proclaimed by Aguinaldo, four successive waves of American troop reinforcements arrived in Manila, eventually reaching the awesome total of about 74,094 well-trained and well-armed soldiers (Corpuz 1989, 632, n.11). I can think of no kinder reason why Aguinaldo did nothing to counteract the Americans’ strategy of reinforcing and consolidating their position in Manila after their arrival in 1898, and why he failed to seize Intramuros before the Americans did.

4. The entry of conservative elements—undermined the revolutionary effort and led to the ouster of Mabini, who had warned the Filipinos of America’s imperialist designs.

5. The assassination of Antonio Luna—meant the loss of an able general who could have provided the military strategy and discipline that the revolution sorely needed. Even the Americans recognized this.9

6. All of the above (1–5) contributed to the breakdown of the historic bloc—which aggravated the internal divisions and the revolutionary

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9. The assassination of Antonio Luna is a significant event in the history of the Philippine Revolution, and it is often discussed in the context of the failures and strategic decisions of the revolutionary leaders.
army’s lack of discipline, organization, and logistics, thus making it easier for the Americans to defeat the Revolution.

Mabini sums it up more poignantly in his memoir (how uncanny are the parallels with two disgraced Filipino leaders of more recent times!):

The Revolution failed because it was badly led; because its leader won his post by reprehensible rather than meritorious acts; because instead of supporting the men most useful to the people, he made them useless out of jealousy. Identifying the aggrandizement of the people with his own, he judged the worth of men not by their ability, character and patriotism but rather by their degree of friendship and kinship with him; and, anxious to secure the readiness of his favourites to sacrifice themselves for him, he was tolerant even of their transgressions. Because he thus neglected the people, the people forsook him; and forsaken by the people, he was bound to fall like a waxen idol in the heat of adversity. God grant that we do not forget such a terrible lesson, learnt at the cost of untold suffering. (Guerrero’s translation 1969, 63–64; emphasis mine)

In an article that supports my thesis on Aguinaldo’s incompetence, Glenn May raises the same point:

Rather than attempting to win over the masses by introducing programs they favored, Aguinaldo, a member of Cavite’s economic elite, merely pursued policies palatable to his own social class. Hence, his decrees restricted suffrage to the wealthy and educated, and thereby placed municipal and provincial governments in the hands of local magnates. Moreover, his government allowed landowners to consolidate and even increase their holdings, while it did almost nothing for tenants and the landless. (1983, 365)

Had there been no Pact of Biak-na-Bato and had the Americans not invaded, the Filipino Revolution against Spain could have been won—just like all the revolutions in Hispanic America in the early nineteenth century. But even with the arrival of the Americans, defeat was not a foregone conclusion. I agree with May (1983) that, at least in the beginning, the invading American forces were not that overwhelming. Had Aguinaldo shunned the influence of conservative elements, had he provided the correct leadership and worked closely with the likes of Mabini and Antonio Luna, and, most crucially, had the majority of the Filipinos rallied wholeheartedly around that leadership (as in the case of Cuba or Vietnam), the Revolution could have succeeded. This is the gist of my argument.
In defense of Aguinaldo, Schumacher writes:

A good case could be made for his having gone along with the Americans because it was the best choice available, given his lack of arms, and the very possibility that the agitation in the United States by a sizable number of American anti-imperialists might prevent a permanent American occupation. (The Treaty of Paris passed the US Senate by only one vote). It likewise does not seem true that he regarded the war as unwinnable from the beginning, as the hope placed by Filipinos on the possibility that anti-imperialist Bryan might win the American election of 1900, was general. It was only after Bryan's defeat that the widespread surrender of Filipino leaders began. (561-62)

Schumacher's "good case" for Aguinaldo assumes three questionable propositions: (1) had the Treaty not been ratified, the McKinley administration would have withdrawn US troops from the Philippines; (2) Bryan was an anti-imperialist; and (3) had he won the Presidency, he would have supported Philippine independence. What are the facts? Bryan supported the Treaty of Paris. Indeed, the Treaty of Paris passed by only one vote in the US Senate, thanks in part to Bryan's support. Bryan never joined the Anti-Imperialist League, unlike many of his colleagues in the Democratic Party. Notwithstanding his stringent anti-imperialist speeches, his policies towards Latin America from 1900 to 1920 were imperialistic (Kaplan 1998). Bryan, as Luzviminda Francisco observes, "was a rank political opportunist. . . . When he began to see that his anti-colonial position was hurting his campaign rather than helping, he backpedaled furiously and quickly compromised himself, arguing now for a vaguely defined Philippine protectorate for the Philippines" (Francisco 1973, 7).

No good case could be made for Aguinaldo's going along with the Americans, especially in view of America's track record in the Pacific—the colonization of Samoa during Harrison's term (mentioned by Rizal in Filipinas dentro de cien años), and the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in January 17, 1893 by the US marine—backed sugar bloc, and the formal annexation of Hawaii in July 7, 1898. Note that the annexation happened despite opposition by conscientious Americans, and despite President Cleveland's apology to the Hawaiians and appeal to the US Congress for the recognition of Hawaii's sovereignty (Osborne 1981; 1998). Bryan's election to the US presidency would have been as inconsequential as President Cleveland's appeal to Congress.
All this underscores the problem with Aguinaldo’s stance. How could Aguinaldo have continued pinning his hope on the goodwill of America’s leaders, given Rizal’s and Mabini’s warnings, and the Hawaiian tragedy? In fact, the annexation of Hawaii is mentioned [Hawaii is referred to as “Sandwich Islands”] in the second paragraph of an Aguinaldo circular entitled, “General Outline of Means for Providing Against Yankee Deceit” (Exhibit 181, Taylor III). That Aguinaldo was naïve is the kindest explanation, but Mabini’s harsher judgement might be closer to the truth.

“Genocidal American Conquest” or “American Intervention in the Revolution”?

I am stunned by Schumacher’s use of the phrase—“the American intervention in the Revolution” (552)—instead of “the American invasion” or “the American conquest.” Schumacher rejects my phrase, “genocidal American conquest”—“genocidal,” he says, is “a gross exaggeration,” especially when compared to the “recent internecine wars of the former Yugoslavia or of Rwanda” (553). “No one will ever know the number with any certainty,” declares Schumacher (562), “but the most scientific approach so far, by John Gates, concludes that with the available methods, the number could vary from a lowest possible one of 127, 000 to a highest of 360, 000 [Gates 1984, 367–78].”

Gates’s estimates cover the 1899–1903 period, based on the 1903 census. His method was to subtract the estimated Christian population in the 1903 census—i.e., 6, 987, 686—from a projected population growth had war not occurred (based on the 1898 Spanish census), which ranges from 7, 115, 279 (estimated on an annual growth rate of 1.2 percent) to 7, 350, 345 (1.86 percent a.g.r.). The difference—from 127, 593 to 362, 659—“represents the potential range of war-related deaths among the Filipino population” (Gates 1984, 374). Even granting the “scientific” validity of Gates’s method, the problem is that his figures cover only the period from 1899 to 1903. The U.S.’s pacification campaign continued way beyond 1903, and included the Muslims of Mindanao, where the fighting lasted until 1916.

President Roosevelt officially declared the war ended on 4 July 1902. Yet, in the following year, 357 separate engagements with the guerrillas were recorded by the U.S. military command (Francisco 1973, 11). In Samar, fighting broke out again in 1904 and continued up to 1906. In late 1904 and early 1905 guerrilla activity was at its peak, with fight-
ing erupting in Rizal, Taal and Malabon. Thus, in January 1905, the<br>writ of habeas corpus was suspended and a state of insurrection was<br>declared. By March, the US military command again resorted to the<br>dreaded *reconcentrado* [called hamletting in Vietnam] in Batangas and<br>Cavite, and in some parts of Laguna and Rizal on account of intense<br>guerrilla activity. Similar disturbances occurred in Pangasinan, Albay,<br>and Camarines. In Negros, fighting continued between 1906 and 1907.<br>In Mindanao, Muslim resistance led to the massacre by American<br>troops of 600 men, women, and children at Mount Dajo in March 1906.<br>Sporadic fighting continued in Mindanao until 1916 (Francisco 1973,<br>11–13). Thus, if we include all these "post-war" incidents, the total fig-<br>ure would certainly exceed Gates's "scientific" estimates.

Schumacher notes that I did not indicate my source for the half-a-<br>million death toll. I should have written "over half-a-million," as foot-<br>note 6 of chapter 1 of my 1996 University of Hawaii dissertation reads:<br>

General Bell of the U.S. army estimated in a *New York Times* interview<br>in May 1901 that in Luzon island alone, 600,000 Filipinos died. . . .

Luzviminda Francisco (1973, 14) writes that Bell's estimate "did not<br>include the effects of the Panay campaign, the Samar campaign, or his<br>bloodthirsty Batangas campaign (where at least 100,000 died), all of<br>which occurred after his 1901 interview. Nor could it include the "post-<br>war" period, which saw the confinement of 300,000 people in Albay,<br>wanton slaughter in Mindanao, and astonishing death rate in Bilibid<br>prison, to name but three instances where killing continued.

Gates dismisses the 600,000 estimate, on the basis of James LeRoy's<br>observation that it was "based on an unverified newspaper interview,<br>not with the well-known Gen. James F. Bell [J. Franklin Bell], but with<br>Gen. James M. Bell . . . whose personal experience was practically<br>confined to the three southernmost provinces of Luzon, where there<br>was comparatively little fighting" (LeRoy 1906/1970, 303). Gates adds<br>that James M. Bell was no longer on active duty by the time of the<br>interview (Gates 1984, 369).

Very well, let us follow Schumacher's lead in believing only the fig-<br>ures provided by Gates. Or better yet, let us even go by the much<br>lower estimate of David Lawrence Fritz (1977)—57, 289 Filipino deaths<br>caused directly by United States military action (as against the 5,000<br>dead Americans). This is not genocide? What number should we at-<br> trách to the term "genocide"? A million dead, as in the case of<br>Rwanda? The number of Albanians killed in Kosovo as a result of Serb<br>atrocities—which the US and Great Britain had branded as "geno-
cidal” and which incited NATO to bomb Yugoslavia—had not even reached 10,000. The recent killings perpetrated by the TNI-backed militias in East Timor—which so horrified the U.N., and prompted Australia to supply the main force of a UN peacekeeping mission—had not even reached 5,000. Yet it was called “genocidal” by the Vatican and human rights organizations.

Article II, of the 1948 Genocide Convention stipulates that “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such [emphasis mine]:

a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

As early as April 1899, General Shafter declared, “It may be necessary to kill half the Filipinos in order that the remaining half of the population may be advanced to a higher plane of life than their semi-barbarous state affords.” He repeated this in January 1900, “My plan would be to disarm the natives of the Philippine Islands, even if we have to kill half of them to do it.” Overall commander Gen. Arthur McArthur (father of the more famous Douglas) estimated that it would take “ten years of bayonet treatment” to subdue the Filipino people. Major General Adna Chaffee, McArthur’s replacement, wrote to General Hughes (30 September 1901), “we are dealing with a class of people whose character is deceitful, who are absolutely hostile to the white race and who regard life as of little value, and, finally, who will not submit to our control until absolutely defeated and whipped into such condition. . . . It is to our interest to disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, and any means to that end is advisable” (emphasis mine). The record of American atrocities in the pacification campaign, as compiled by the Anti-Imperialist League, indicates that the Generals' intentions were carried out.

The 1893 overthrow of Hawaii’s Queen Liliu’okalani yielded no deaths, and only one wounded policeman. Yet the U.S. had officially apologized twice—first through President Cleveland, then through President Clinton (during the 1993 Hawaiian centennial)—to the Hawaiian people. It must have occurred to some Filipinos that no such
apologies were forthcoming during the state-sponsored centennial of our Revolution. But, then, what Presidential apology can restitute a nation aborted?

Postscript: Schumacher's Erroneous Assumptions

Schumacher's derisive dismissal of Marx, Gramsci, and Fanon as not "real historians . . . who mean nothing to the ordinary educated Filipino" begs the question of what is a real historian. Even the anti-communist University of Chicago historian Francois Furet had acknowledged Marx's invaluable insights into the French Revolution in his acclaimed opus, *Marx and the French Revolution* (1988). Indeed Marx's penetrating historical analyses—e.g., *The Civil War in France; The Class Struggles in France: 1848–1850; The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*—inspired a whole tradition of historical writing, as exemplified in the works of Raphael Samuel, E. P. Thompson, and the prolific Eric Hobsbawm. Likewise, other distinguished professors of History were influenced by Gramsci, and use his concept of hegemony as a tool of historical analysis—e.g., Florenzia Mellon, T. J. Jackson Lears, and Ranajit Guha, founder of subaltern studies, to whom Ileto's recent book, *Filipinos and Their Revolution* (1998) is dedicated.

It is not true that Fanon means nothing to the ordinary educated Filipino, or that he is passé. His *Wretched of the Earth* was standard reading in the study groups of militant student organizations during the so-called First Quarter Storm (in which I was a participant). He continues to be at the center of debate in postcolonial theory and cultural studies. For example, in 1996, a conference on Fanon ("Finding Fanon: Critical Genealogies") was held at New York University, and three academic books on Fanon were published. In *The Fact of Blackness: Frantz Fanon and Visual Representation* (1996), the question of "Why Fanon, Why Now?" is raised by Stuart Hall, and discussed at length by, among others, Homi Bhabha, an oft-cited author in the First Philippine Literature Conference, sponsored last year (2000) by the Ateneo English Department (which I attended).

I would not be so dismissive as Schumacher is of Constantino's notion of partisan scholarship, which I take to be the pursuit of knowledge in the service of social justice, and aimed at exposing the lies and mystifications of power—a stance that characterizes all the radical intellectuals that I cite. I don't believe that there is such a thing as neutral scholarship—Schumacher himself is biased against Marxists and anti-
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Catholics. The late Constantino's heart was in the right place, but his vulgar Marxism stood in the way of a truly emancipatory scholarship.

The great Claro M. Recto, much hated by the clergy and American Filipinists (including the Briton Benedict Anderson), was not a disciple of Constantino, if anything the reverse was the case. Unlike Constantino, Recto (whose academic record in Ateneo is as impressive as Rizal's) revered Rizal, and never questioned his status as our national hero. My good friend Vivencio Jose, who told me recently that his view of Rizal has changed, was never a follower of Agoncillo's, and in fact had engaged the latter in a long-drawn, acrimonious debate in the pages of a journal over Jose's seminal work, The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna (1972). The matter that particularly riled Agoncillo was Jose's claim that Aguinaldo was behind Luna's assassination.

Lastly, the term "vulgar Marxism" did not originate from Gramsci, who instead used the term "vulgar materialism." Hegemony, historic bloc, and nation are not loosely similar or interchangeable concepts, as Schumacher tends to assume (unfortunately, my publisher opposed the inclusion of an appendix clarifying these concepts). Hegemony, for Gramsci, refers to "the entire complex of political and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Gramsci 1971, 244). Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is not a Gramscian term. It was first used by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), and became a key concept in the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz and the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas. Lifeworld refers to the structure of beliefs, assumptions, feelings, values, and cultural practices that constitute meaning in everyday life—something akin to Raymond Williams's notion of culture-as-hegemony.¹⁴ Historic [or historical] bloc (see fn. 8) is not in the lexicon of classical Marxism; vulgar Marxists, for that matter, never use it, as it subverts their mechanical notion of class struggle.

These key concepts were my tools for making sense of the sad trajectory of Filipino nationalism: to understand, and if possible, explain why Rizal's project failed, or why the nation was aborted. I don't think this problem has been adequately addressed in the scholarly literature. I used these tools—and I would be happy to discard them if I could find better ones—to overcome the obfuscating and misleading dichotomies of Rizal and Bonifacio, ilustrado and masses, Enlightenment and the Pasyon, and Reform and Revolution. Schumacher sees pessimism in my conclusion; on the contrary, I see hope.
Notes

1. The Jesuits had acquired ten haciendas in the provinces around Manila by the seventeenth century, and added three more in 1759. However, they sold their estates in the 1790s (Roth 1977, 41, 183 [fn. 20]).

2. Personal communication with Dr. Jaime B. Veneracion, U.P. professor of history, whose forthcoming book, *Philippine Agriculture During the Spanish Regime*, includes a chapter on pre-colonial agriculture.


6. Jansenism, a movement based on the religious teachings of Catholic archbishop Cornelius Jansenius of Ypres (1585-1638), began as a dispute among clerics over the means of grace and salvation, but later became politicized and came into conflict with the Jesuits, as well as the French Monarchy. According to Gwynne Lewis, “A minority movement, Jansenism became extremely important in the battles between the Paris parlement and the Court during the reign of Louis XV (1715-1774). It contained in its doctrine and practice three elements that alienated it from the Court and the Papacy: it sought to attract the support of ordinary people; it leaned towards the nationalist ‘Gallican’ tradition of the French Church; and it was a profoundly moral movement. Peter Campbell [1996] has insisted upon the enduring influence of Jansenism, while Dale Van Kley [1996] has argued for a direct link between Jansenist thought and the constitutional democracy of the early Revolution” (Lewis 2000, 89-90). See also John Paxton, *Companion to the French Revolution* (1988).

7. For example, in the poetry and plays of Patrick Pearse, one of the executed leaders of the Easter Rising of 1916. See Patrick Pearse, *The Literary Writings of Patrick Pearse* (1979).

8. The Gramscian concept of historic (or historical) bloc is broader and more dynamic than the more familiar notions of power bloc or class alliances: “Structures and superstructures form an ‘historic bloc.’ That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the social relations of production” (Gramsci, 1971:127). This ensemble—or, as Andrew Austin puts it, “complex of leading and dominant networks of class fractions, political cadres, and interclass alliances”—emerges at a particular historical conjecture to organize and mobilize for political and cultural-ideological hegemony, and stamps the historical period with its political-cultural character (Austin, 1999).

Gramsci’s example of a successful historic bloc is the ensemble of ascendant socioeconomic forces led by the Jacobins during the French Revolution. In the U.S.A., Austin cites two examples: first, “the constellation of class fractions the Roosevelt Administration pulled together under the New Deal”; and second, The New Right, a coalition of capitalist, racist, patriarchal, and fundamentalist religious and reactionary interests, which emerged out of the socioeconomic and political-cultural crisis of the late
60s and 70s, and came to formal power with the Reagan regime in 1981. The New Right's economic reform agenda (privatization, deregulation, tax cuts, balancing the budget, etc.) now constitutes the core of the so-called Washington consensus.

9. The American command was perceptive in seeing Antonio Luna and Apolinario Mabini as the brains behind the revolutionary forces and therefore the real threat to the American military campaign. Admiral Dewey speaks disparagingly of Aguinaldo as merely a "figure head" who "played a very small part in the insurrection [sic]." Aguinaldo, says Dewey, "was surrounded by men of brains and ability who did the work. One of his ablest men, Luna, he had assassinated . . . I think Mabini and a number of those men superior to Aguinaldo."[Testimony of Admiral George Dewey given at the Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines—1902; cited in American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection, (Congressional Hearings), edited by Henry Graff, 1969.

General Otis, in an interview with an American daily, declared that Luna, not Aguinaldo, had been the real "evil influence" behind the "insurrection" and the one who had prevented the Filipino "pseudo rebels" from surrendering. Otis also confidently predicted that with Luna's assassination, the war was as good as over. From San Francisco Call, 14, 21, 25 June 1899; Public Opinion 26 (1899): 74 (cited in Miller 1982).

10. The head of the Spanish forensic team attached to the International Criminal Tribunal, Emilio Perez Pujol, estimates that as few as 2,500 were killed. Cited by John Pilger, "Kosovo Killing Fields?" New Statesman, 15 November 1999.

11. UN investigator James Dunn estimates the death toll to be around 2,000. Associated Press, 20 December 2000.


13. The quotes from Generals Shafter, MacArthur, and Chafee are cited in Francisco 1973, pages 4, 6, 8, 9


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