The Enlightenment, Deism, and Rizal

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http://www.philippinestudies.net
Fri June 27 13:30:20 2008
Upon his arrival in Spain in 1882, Jose Rizal, newly emerged from the sheltered environment of the Ateneo Municipal de Manila and the Universidad de Santo Tomas, came upon a new intellectual climate. Spain, long isolated from the rest of Europe, was being challenged and transformed by the ideas of the Enlightenment, a movement which had its roots in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The focus of the ferment was the Universidad Central de Madrid where Rizal studied for three years.

The Enlightenment and Deism

In Immanuel Kant’s succinct description, the Enlightenment was man’s emergence from the age of immaturity, marked by indecision and lack of courage, to reliance on his own reason. Its motto was *Sapere aude*, “Use your reason, think on your own” (Kant 1973, 384). It presaged the twilight of the Ancient Regime and the birth of a new world. In fact its influence pervaded all aspects of life, but its greatest impact was on the religious consciousness of Europe.

Denying the existence of the supernatural, the Enlightenment thinkers, known as *philosophes*, reduced religious belief to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, religious practice to ethical behavior, and the role of the Church and her ministers to that of moral guides in what concerns private life. Supernatural revelation was impossible, scripture was mere classical writing, miracles were figments of the imagination. This new theology, known as deism, constructed the theory of “natural revelation” as a substitute for Christian revelation. “Natural revelation” contained the religious truths and ethical principles the human person ought to live by and everything else needed for salvation, within the processes of nature. The deists sought to propagate the “religion of nature” or “natural religion,” which in their estimation was free of all religious strife and on which all clear thinking persons would agree.
Deism was British in origin, proclaimed with a flourish in the lengthy titles of classical deist works such as John Toland's *Christianity not Mysterious, or, a treatise showing, that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason, nor above it: and that no Christian Doctrine can be properly called a Mystery* (1696) and the book which came to be known as the deists' bible, Matthew Tindal's *Christianity as old as Creation: or, the Gospel as republication of the Religion of Nature* (1730). But it was the French philosophes who popularized it. And it was through the channel of the French, principally through Voltaire and Rousseau, that deism reached Rizal.

Among the philosophes, who formed some sort of a loose international fraternity though often at loggerheads with one another, by far the best known was Voltaire (François Marie Arouet, 1694–1778) by reason of his rare personal qualities and exceptionally gifted pen. His life-long obsession was the eradication of all organized religion, with its superstition, fanaticism, intolerance, and obscurantism. But in fact, he had only the Catholic Church in mind, which he called "the infamous one." Voltaire's battlecry was *Ecrasez l'infame*. The replacement was the natural religion of deism, which he learned from the British deists in England where he stayed for three years, and which he now sought to propagate in French, the language of Europe, in his captivating agile style (Lauer 1961, 15). Shying away from anthropomorphic images of God, he preferred to call God the Supreme Being, but nevertheless resorted to images perceived as low in religious and emotional content, like the Grand Architect of the Universe, the Great Geometrician, the Perfect Watchmaker. Once the machine of the world is set in motion there is no need of divine interference, as a general rule because Voltaire held Newton's view that God himself must adjust the movement of the planets on rare occasions. Divine providence was thus replaced by the secular notion of human progress.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), the odd man out among the philosophes, whom Voltaire considered an adversary rather than a colleague, gave deism his own peculiar stamp (Laboa 1980, 438–42). Inveighing against the intellectualism of the philosophes, and their excessive confidence in mind and reason, Rousseau focused on the interior life of man and on the role of the heart, conscience, sentiments, feelings, and moral intuition in the conduct of moral life. Reason was not enough. Rather, conscience as the function of man's interiority and sentiments tells us what our moral obligations are.
God reveals himself not only through nature, but speaks to us through conscience and our sentiments.

Another point of contention was Rousseau's idea of the "noble savage," clearly an attempt to throw cold water on the Voltairean enthusiasm for present civilization and human progress. For Rousseau, who rejected the Catholic doctrine of original sin, man was born in the "state of nature," which was lost in the course of history beneath the layer of the present "state of civilization." The corrupting influence was human society, contact with which breeds pride, avarice, the thirst for power and all other evils. The task of education was to recapture the pristine and noble ways of man living in simplicity and peace with nature and himself, and reawaken in the student the inborn sense of goodness. The romance of the "noble savage" was to command considerable influence in social and educational theory.

**Universidad Central de Madrid**

When Rizal began his studies in 1882 at the Universidad Central de Madrid, the faculty was sharply divided. On the one hand, liberal professors like Morayta and Giner de los Ríos were challenging Catholic unity of doctrine with unorthodox ideas. On the other, staunchly Catholic scholars like Menéndez Pelayo and Ortí y Lara were defending Catholic tradition with remarkable zeal and breathtaking erudition. Academic circles in the Universidad Central and elsewhere were rife with the controversies incited by Krausism, which was a philosophical movement founded by Sanz del Río in the mid-nineteenth century based on the thought of an obscure and minor Kantian disciple, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–32). The year Rizal first enrolled in Madrid, Giner de los Ríos, Sanz del Río's spiritual heir, and his Krausist followers, earlier expelled from the University for unorthodoxy, were reinstated and were received enthusiastically by the students.

Spain was making progress in science and technology, but often enough the scientific method was accompanied by a positivist mentality, particularly in medicine, Rizal's chosen profession. Rejecting the theory of "vitalism" (which held that the body was governed by certain vital forces), Pedro Mata (1811–77), dean of the Faculty of Medicine and later Rector, had earlier changed the orientation of
medical studies at the Faculty of Medicine toward the intensive study of chemistry and heavy emphasis on laboratory work and clinical practice (Pesset and Pesset 1974, 643–51). In the estimation of Menéndez Pelayo, Mata was a materialist philosopher who had paved the way for positivism in nineteenth century Spain (Menéndez Pelayo 1932, 7: 353–56). Although he was already several years dead when Rizal was studying in Madrid, his influence in the Faculty of Medicine persisted through his innovative curricular changes and his books, one of which Rizal had occasion to refer to in his notes to Morga’s Sucesos.1 There were other liberals in the faculty, like Santiago-Encinas (Nuñez 1986, 120; Schumacher 1973, 51n; Rizal 1961, 1: 120) who was a darwinian and showed sympathy for the political views of the Filipino students and Javier Santero who was a mason (Alvarez Lázarro 1985, 97). Still, Rizal deplored the presence on his examination board of the senior professor Tomás Santero Merino (Javier’s father), who still taught hippocratic medicine and traditional medical theories (Rizal 1884a; Rizal 1959, 184).

To compound the Church’s problems, Spanish masonry, divided into competing federations, exerted common effort in eradicating Roman Catholicism from public existence, and influence in the academy, politics and all other sectors of public life.

For the young Rizal in his early twenties, this new air was fresh and exhilarating. He began to admire new authors like Voltaire and Rousseau, whom he called “the fathers of modern thought” in a letter to his parents on 2 August 1883 (Rizal 1959, 146), and whose tombs he visited in Paris. In Madrid he purchased the complete works of Voltaire, nine volumes in all (Retana 1907, 69). Fascinated by an article written by Marcelo del Pilar, a new addition to the Filipino community in Barcelona, he enthusiastically recommended that its author learn French so as to be able to read the works of Voltaire, “whose beautiful, simple, and precise style you must admire, aside from the fact that they are in harmony with your manner of thinking” (Rizal 1889; Rizal 1930–38, 2: 97). There were of course numerous other writers and thinkers. Two of these deserve mention because of their special relationship to Rizal—Morayta and Pi y Margall. Miguel Morayta Sagrario (1833–1917), holder of the Chair of Spanish History at the University and masonic Grandmaster of the Gran Oriente Español, had Rizal in class and cultivated the friendship of the Filipino propagandists. Francisco Pi y Margall (1824–1901), president of the short-lived First Republic, became a
friend. Rizal wrote a favorable review of his *Las luchas de nuestros días* in *La Solidaridad* (Rizal 1890c, 2: 264–66).

No sooner had he started with his courses in the University than Rizal embraced the Kantian principle: *sapere aude*, have the courage to use your own reason. By early 1885, if not earlier, he was already judging traditional Catholic beliefs by the yardstick of human reason.

What I believe now, I believe through reason because my conscience can accept only what is compatible with the principles of thought. I can bow my head before a fact even though it is mysterious to me, provided it is a fact, but never before something absurd or merely probable. For me, religion is the most sacred, most pure, most sublime of all things, which shirks away from all human adulterations; and I believe that I would be failing in my duty as a rational being if I were to prostitute my reason and admit an absurdity (Rizal 1885; Rizal 1959, 224).

Academic freedom was one of the first lessons Rizal learned at the Universidad Central. At the inaugural ceremonies of the academic year 1884–85, Morayta gave a lecture in which he questioned the computation of the age of the universe on the basis of biblical sources and impugned the historical accuracy of Genesis by referring to the flood in Noah’s time as “el pretendido Diluvio Universal” (Morayta 1884, 7), ending with rousing defense of the academic freedom to be limited only by the professor’s competence and prudence. Spanish ecclesiastical authorities excommunicated Morayta and attacked the government’s tolerance of Morayta’s unorthodoxy. The students staged a large demonstration in support of Morayta, and violence ensued when the police came to disperse the mob. Rizal, who joined the protest and had to disguise himself to escape arrest, wrote home an angry letter, echoing the words of his history professor.

*Rizal*

Knowledge must be free and the professor as well (Rizal 1884b; Rizal 1959, 200).

*Morayta*

The professor in his position and as professor is free, absolutely free, with no limitation except his prudence (Morayta 1884, 90).

In fact, it was this faith in human reason which triggered the long and protracted correspondence with Fr. Pablo Pastells, Rizal’s coun-
sellor as a student in the Ateneo Municipal and then Superior of the Philippine Jesuits. Rizal, exiled by the Governor-General’s decree and newly arrived in Dapitan, received a message from Fr. Pastells through Fr. Obach that he “stop this nonsense [majaderías] of trying to look at his affairs through the prism of his own judgement . . . .” (Rizal 1892a; Rizal 1930–38, 4:36) He then wrote his first letter to Pastells, politely but sharply expressing perplexity over the unsolicited counsel, and affirming that it was ultimately on his own judgement that he must rely in the conduct of his personal affairs. The self-sufficiency of reason is a major theme running through all of Rizal’s five letters to Pastells, which in many instances echo passages from Pi y Margall.

Rizal

I likewise agree that our judgement is often deceived, our reason errs, but . . . reason alone knows how to correct its own mistakes . . . . Humanity, for all its folly, has not been able to extinguish this lamp which God gave it; its light has dimmed at times, man has committed errors on his way, but this state of affairs passes, the light shines even more brilliant, more powerful, its beams showing the errors of the past and pointing to the vast expanse of the future (Rizal 1892b; Rizal 1930–38, 4: 66).

Pi y Margall

Reason is subject to error. How can this be denied? But take note that it alone can correct its own errors. Fortunately it can recognize its errors and mend them . . . It recognizes them thanks to its progressive character . . . it mends them thanks to its tireless search for truth. These are precisely the factors that have impelled historical development. Reason is sovereign and therefore autonomous (Jutglar 1975–76, 1: 185).

Rizal’s Deism

Symbolic of the enthusiasm with which Rizal had taken to the spirit of the Enlightenment is Tasio el filosófo of the Noli me tangere. Tasio was not a philosopher in the scholastic or traditional sense, but in the Enlightenment usage of the word—a secular prophet of the age, a social critic who poked at the consciences of men, a preacher of the gospel of progress and reason’s sovereignty, in a word, a philosophe as Voltaire was. Already there were suggestions in Rizal's novels of the deist notion of “natural religion” or “religion of na-
ture." But it was in his letters to Pastells that, prodded by the priest's importunings, he gave a somewhat lengthy exposition of his religious beliefs, which coincided with the basic tenets of deism.

"Through reasoning and by necessity rather than through faith do I firmly believe in the existence of a creative Being" (Rizal 1893b; Rizal 1930–38, 4: 85). Divine revelation is impossible. The dogmas of the Church contain obscurities, which "are glorified by calling them mysteries" (Rizal 1893c; Rizal 1930–38, 4: 120). Sacred Scripture is purely of human authorship, flawed with errors, contradictions, and inconsistencies (Rizal 1893b). Miracles are fictitious since they are "deeds contrary to the laws of nature" (Rizal 1893b). The "living revelation of nature" is the only true revelation, which all human beings can understand.

I believe in revelation, but in the living revelation of nature which surrounds us everywhere, in the voice speaking through nature—powerful, eternal, unceasing, incorruptible, clear, distinct, and universal as the Being from which it comes. It is this revelation that I believe in, which speaks to us and penetrates our being from the day we are born to the day we die. (Rizal 1893c; Rizal 1930–38, 4:119)

Natural revelation reveals God's goodness, love, providence, glory and wisdom, as well as certain ethical principles, which Rizal derives from the processes of nature. For instance, even the precepts of charity and respect for the rights of others are deduced from the behavior of animals.

Seeing how freedom when overrated destroys and ruins the principle of life in a living thing which can subsist by itself, seeing the daily lesson in all creation of how weak creatures—from nestling birds to young lions in the den—are given support and protection, but as soon as they can get on by themselves, freedom and room for action; I find justification for the precepts of charity and respect for the rights of others (Rizal 1893b).

The only true source of revelation, inerrant and universally valid, is the book of nature.

... for me nature is the only divine book of unquestionable legitimacy, the sole manifestation of the Creator that we have here in this life—clear, perennial, living, powerful, capable of overcoming our blunders and errors, incorruptible, one that cannot play us false in
spite of human caprice, with its laws constant and unchangeable in all places and all times (Rizal 1893b).

On the other hand, the books of Sacred Scripture are merely the work of human beings, "the insights of men and whole generations" (Rizal 1893b). The religious precepts found in them, such as the Ten Commandments, are "condensations or formulations of the precepts of the natural law; as such, they are for me God's word" (Rizal 1893b). Or they are, in Tindal's language, "the gospel" inasmuch as they are the "republication of the religion of nature."

Christianity is still superior to all other religions not because God discloses himself in an unexpected and gratuitous manner in the Old and New Testaments, but because it best conforms to nature and fulfills the needs of men.

The best religions are those that are simplest, most in conformity with nature, most in harmony with the needs and aspirations of men. Here lies the principal excellence of Christ doctrine (Rizal 1893c; Rizal 1930-38, 4:120).

The insistence on the "clear" and "distinct" quality of natural revelation is Cartesian, and the exposition represents unmistakably the classic statements of British deism. However, Rizal's natural revelation includes Rousseau's peculiar argument against the intellectualism of the philosophes: revelation resides also in conscience and the human heart, "in the mysterious sentiment speaking within me" (Rizal 1893b, Rizal 1930-38, 4: 86). Nature is God's open book. What is not found in nature has been implanted in the human heart, God's temple. The priestly voice we hear from its sanctuary is the mysterious voice of conscience. Rizal's encomium on the role of conscience as ultimate norm for one's actions is indeed reconcilable with traditional Catholic doctrine as explained in scholastic manuals he had previously studied. But the spirit behind them is now the self-confidence of the Enlightenment philosophes.

**Rizal**

I strive to read and find God in his creatures like myself and in the voice of conscience, which only can have come from him . . . I have no better guide to lead me than my conscience, my conscience alone, which decides and qualifies my actions (Rizal 1893c; Rizal 1930–38, 4: 120).

**Rousseau**

Conscience is the voice the soul, the passion the voice of the body . . . . Reason deceives us often, and we have all too good a right to disregard it, but conscience never deceives us. It is man's true guide (Rousseau 1974, 256–59).
Further traces of Rousseau are to be found in Rizal’s other writings. In his notes to Morga, there was a marked tendency to idealize the condition of the native Filipinos before their Christianization and to play down their faults. The primitive religion of the Filipinos, he states, was more in conformity with Christ’s religion than the religion brought by the friars (Morga 1961, 315n). This idea is echoed in the Fili by the liberal student Sandóval who says that the Filipinos owed their present sorry state to the struggle of the friars over the past three centuries “to change the way Nature made us” (para modificar la forma que nos dio Naturaleza) (Rizal 1911, 2: 76). Likewise, the sexual promiscuity among pre-Hispanic Filipinos was merely a way of following “the laws of nature,” the middle road between prostitution and cenobetic celibacy (Morga 1961, 308n). Such ideas have their roots in Rousseau’s noble savage living in innocence and the blissful state of nature.

Again Rizal echoes Pi y Margall’s Luchas.

Rizal

Someone has said that everyone makes his own God in his own image and likeness. And if memory serves me right, it was Anacreon who said that if a bull could form an image of God, it would imagine him with horns and mooing in a superlative degree. (Rizal 1893b; Rizal 1930–38, 4: 86)

For me nature is the only divine book of unquestionable legitimacy, the sole manifestation of the Creator that we have in this life (Rizal 1893b).

Pi y Margall

(Leoncio:) Amalia believes that it is madness for one to call God’s existence into question, and not to see that God is the likeness of man. In every land man adores God according as he has forged him in the furnace of his own conscience (Pi y Margall 1890, 421).

(Leoncio:) You should have looked for God in nature [rather than the gospels]. You would have seen him in the orderly succession of nights and days, in the periodic change of seasons, in the uninterrupted flow of the rivers . . . (Pi y Margall 1890, 367).

(Leoncio:) Examine attentively the sacred texts, and you will find in them the error and concerns of the age in which they were written (Pi y Margall 1890, 69).
The Enlightenment was heady wine for Rizal. By the time he wrote the *Noli*, if we may believe his travelling companion Maximo Viola, Rizal had ceased to believe in the divinity of Christ (Viola 1961, 1: 316–17). He was a religious genius, the best of religious leaders, but nevertheless merely a human being. Similarly, the Church was a merely human institution, the product of historical development.

Heretofore, Rizal’s historical fare had been the likes of Cesar Cantú, whose ten-volume work, *Historia Universal*, his father bought at his insistence. Cantú, whose conscious, explicit assumption was the providential structure of history, began this work with the Genesis account of creation and made ancient history revolve around the history of Israel. For him, history is considered as the constant and perennial work of Providence, which watches over, guides, and judges human beings and institutions and together with Christianity leads to the work of pacification, brotherhood, cultural and social civilization through the instrumentality of the Church and the papacy (Della Torre 1949, 3: 646–50).

Morayta, deridingly calling Cantú “the father of the Catholic philosophy of history,” taught Rizal a different kind of history. According to Morayta, there is indeed a law of history, by which each nation or race plays a distinct and partial role in the total effort of humanity to attain its end in the course of time (Morayta 1884, 83ff.). Israel occupies no privileged place in human history, and in fact Egyptian civilization was even more ancient and exercised wider and stronger influence than God’s people of the bible. Ancient history went through three stages. Egypt played an important part in the first, Greece in the second, and finally Rome so instrumental in the spread of Christianity. But Egypt, not Israel, was the “great educator which occupied the premier place in the ever upward march of humanity” (Morayta 1884, 86). And no country, people or race has escaped its beneficent influence.

Undergirding Morayta’s whole discourse were even more fundamental rationalist assumptions: not only that the bible contained historical errors, but that God never interfered in the course of history, that biblical revelation was impossible, that religion and dogma were purely a matter of historical development. Thus he found the ancient Egyptians believing in the one uncreated God, the spirituality and immortality of the soul—the core doctrines of a reduced or
"natural" religion. There were also, in his view, in Egyptian religion traces and adumbrations of some form of doctrines on the trinity, heaven, hell, purgatory, and the resurrection of the body.

From Morayta's historical perspective, Rizal in his fourth letter to Pastells passes judgement on the historical phenomenon of the Church.

The Church too bears the human imprint. She is an institution more perfect than others, but human just the same with all the defects, errors, and problems peculiar to any institution of human making. She possesses more wisdom and enjoys more efficient government than most other religions, inasmuch as she is the direct heir to the religions, arts, and politics of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. She has her foundations in the heart of the people, in the imagination of the crowd, and in the tender sentiments of women. But like all the rest, she has obscure points which are glorified by calling them mysteries, naivetes which pass for miracles, divisions and dissensions otherwise known as sects and heresies (Rizal 1893c; Rizal 1930-38, 4: 120-21).

Rizal's formal initiation into Masonry, which appeared to have occurred in London sometime in 1888-89, was merely confirmatory of his estrangement with the Church. His stinging attacks against the Catholic Church were Voltairean in humor and unabashed irreverence. But with a marked difference. For Rizal l'infame, the infamous one, was not Catholicism as such, as it was for Voltaire, nor even the Catholic clergy, but the friars. In a subtle distinction, Rizal said he was attacking the Catholic religion, not as such but only insofar as the friars were hiding behind it as a shield (Rizal 1890; Rizal 1930-38, 5: 523).

Critique

Briefly, three points may be made in criticism of Rizal's deism. Firstly, Rizal's view of nature is one-sided, ignoring the all too tragic facts of floods, plagues, earthquakes and other natural disasters. This deist ethical naturalism has long been opposed by John Stuart Mill, who wryly observed: "In sober truth nearly all the things which men are hanged for or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's everyday performance (Mill 1923, 28).

Secondly, Rizal's preference for the "open book of nature" in lieu of Scripture presupposes that the study of nature is an easy one, in
which all are equally capable and on which everyone would agree. In actual fact however, the study of nature requires mental effort, its success depends on intellectual ability, which is not equally accorded to all; there are conflicting scientific theories, and much scientific knowledge is provisional.

Finally, the "revelation of nature" is not a true revelation. For if the world is in principle completely intelligible, so must God likewise be, a conclusion which would empty the reality of God of the mystery of his incomprehensibility. Hence nothing is really revealed. Ours is a closed, self-contained world, which follows nature's set patterns and inflexible laws, to which God is himself bound. God can not and must not act in a manner other than that which he had determined when he first created nature. Absolute freedom is not the attribute of this Absolute Person.

But it must be said that Rizal's rupture with the Catholic Church was not so easy nor so complete. In Europe, as he indicated in his diaries, he still went to Mass, at least on occasion (Rizal 1893a; Rizal 1959, 393). The Catholic faith always held a strong attraction for him, and he found Protestantism colorless and insipid (Rizal 1886; Rizal 1930–38, 3: 11–12). The figure of Padre Florentine, together with the biblical imagery of his discourses, emerged from the religious background of his youth (Bonoan 1987, 1–27). But more important perhaps, God was a loving father for Rizal who exercised provident care of his children, an idea incompatible with the tenets of deism, which viewed God as a perfect workman or watchmaker on the margin of the universe, who governed by the inner laws of nature and needed not to interfere in history and human affairs. Rizal's diaries are punctuated by prayerful invocations to God (Rizal 1961, 1: 4, 7–9, 11, 17, 33, 34, 39, 44, 56, 59). Quite moving is the prayer he wrote in German in his diary when in 1896 he was being shipped back from Barcelona to face trial in Manila: "O my God! You are my hope and consolation! May our will be done; I am ready to submit myself to it. Whether I convicted or acquitted, I am happy and prepared" (Rizal 1961, 1: 287).

In point of fact, the convergence point of Rizal's religious thought and political philosophy was his trust in divine providence, so forcefully expressed in "Una esperanza." In 1890, the Filipino community in Spain pinned great hopes on the Overseas Minister Becerra of the liberal Sagasta government for the passage of certain reform measures which the Minister had promised them. But Becerra temporized
till the Sagasta government suddenly fell, before approving any of the Filipino demands. Rizal then wrote “Una esperanza” which was at once a solemn prayer to God and prophetic exhortation to his people. His words have no parallel in Voltaire, Rousseau, Morayta or Pi y Margall.

Now, let the Filipino people, without losing trust in men, place their confidence on Someone higher, on Someone with better memory, on Him who knows better the value of justice and a sacred promise.

God has made man free and has promised victory to whoever perseveres, whoever fights, whoever does his work well.

God has promised man his redemption when he shall have offered his sacrifice.

Let man fulfill his duty and God will fulfill (Rizal 1890, 153-54).

Thus beneath the thick layer of Enlightenment and deist ideas lay the deeper stratum of Catholic religiosity which persisted in Rizal’s psyche all his life. Rizal was not a thorough-going deist nor a rigorous rationalist. But the Enlightenment provided him with an armory of ideas for articulating his own aspirations and his people’s rising national consciousness, which unhappily in the late nineteenth century were looked upon with suspicion by the Church, her leaders and an impoverished, defensive Catholic theology.

Notes

This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Eleventh National Conference on Local History, 25-26 October 1990, Ateneo de Naga, Naga City.

1. Rizal makes reference to Pedro Mata’s Medicina legal, where the author cites the sexual mores of the Filipinos. See Morga (1961, 310).

2. For a lengthier treatment of this subject, see Bonoan 1987.

3. Rizal’s memory played him false. It was in fact Xenophanes, the pre-socratic philosopher from Colophon on the coast of Asia Minor, who wrote: “But if oxen and horses had hands or could draw with hands and create works of art like those made by men, horses would draw pictures of gods like horses, and oxen of gods like oxen, and they would make the bodies of their gods in accordance with the form that each species itself possesses.” (Freeman 1966, 12)

4. ([Pastells] 1987, 10). On the uncertainty of the date of Rizal’s initiation into Masonry, see John N. Schumacher, The Propaganda Movement, p. 157. Rizal played a rather insignificant role in Philippine Masonry and, unlike Del Pilar, was sceptical of the masonic contacts in Europe as effective means in the pursuit of the goals of the propaganda. See John N. Schumacher (1966a; 1966b).
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