Culture Contact and National Identification Among Philippines Muslims

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Whether or not minority religious or ethnic groups in a country identify themselves as part of that country depends upon such factors as their sense of belonging to that nation (Krech and Crutchfield 1958; Feagin 1978). Their sense of belonging stems from their perception of how they resemble or differ from the majority (Hunt and Walker 1979; Feagin 1978), their past and current experience with the majority (Brunner 1973; Krech and Crutchfield 1958), and the presence or absence of some other group with which they can identify (Feagin 1978; Heider 1946; Newcomb 1953; Osgood and Tanembaum 1955; and Festinger 1957).

The national identification of Muslim minorities of the Philippines, for example, may be analyzed using the theoretical perspective outlined above. There is some evidence, for instance, that Philippine Muslims generally do not feel that they are part of the Philippines and consider the Philippine government as a foreign political setup (gobierno a sarwang tao) (Saber and Madale 1975; Isidro 1968; Gowing and McAmis 1974; Glang 1969; Lacar 1972, 1980; Gowing 1971, 1978; and Abbahil 1984).

This phenomenon is, however, not new. Historically, Muslims in the Philippines have had difficulty identifying with the Philippine government. In the 1970s there was an increased trend to look towards the Middle Eastern countries of Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia as their national reference. More recently, as a consequence of the Mindanao conflict which, unfortunately, set Christians and Muslims against one another in a bloody encounter reminiscent of the

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Spanish-induced animosity between Christians and Muslims, there appears to be a greater tendency to identify more with Iran and the Arab countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Conversely, there has been a greater trend of downplaying their Philippine citizenship and national identification. A study, for instance, by Abdulsiddik Abbahil (1984) on the self-images of Muslims all over the Muslim regions in Mindanao shows a tendency among his subjects to identify themselves with the world of Dar al-Islam in the Middle East rather than with the Philippines. Being a Filipino was consistently the fourth preference given by Muslims as their nationality (Abbahil 1984).

Of equal interest is an upsurge of Middle Eastern influence on Philippine Muslims' clothing, especially among women and in their system of education. For instance, since about 1975, more and more Muslim women have been observed to be wearing the hijab and the kabah (long-sleeved, long flowing gowns covering all parts of the body and facial veil hiding the whole face except the area around the eyes).

There is no question that the dawah (mission work) of the tableeqhs (roving missionaries) from Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt in the early part of the 1980s contributed tremendously to this development. It may be recalled that the tableeqh in the early 1980s started enforcing a rather stringent procedure in the Islamic city of Marawi (the only city in the entire Philippines declared as an Islamic city by the City government of Marawi in 1984) of humiliating Maranao Muslim women found walking around the city in jeans or without the required Islamic clothing and head covering and veil. This procedure consisted in shaving the hair of women in public for those without head covering and facial veil and tearing off the trousers or jeans of those caught in these types of clothing. Others were "threatened with death or physical torture if found violating the injunction to wear the necessary "Islamic clothing". one more time.

The number of madaris (Muslim schools) established have also increased by more than 700 percent from those known to have existed in the 1950s and 1960s. As of 1987, for example, more than 2,000 madaris have been identified in the Muslim regions of Mindanao (Hassoubah 1982; Boransing, Magdalena, and Lacar 1987).

Among the ulama and teachers of the madaris, it has been noted that a considerable number are more up to date with news and information about the Middle East than with local events in the Philippines. Moreover, they speak, read, and write better in Arabic than in Filipino or any of the Philippine dialects. These factors indi-
citate an increasing social distance from the government of the Philippines, a development which does not seem to augur well for national unity and political stability. When viewed within the context of the clamor of some segments of the Muslim population of the country for a separate and independent state or region in Mindanao, the need for a dispassionate analysis of factors that are associated with the Philippine Muslims' sense of national identification gains an importance that cannot be overemphasized. If a meaningful, feasible, and informed policy with regard to the problem of Muslim-Christian unity in the Philippines which we all want resolved is to be arrived at, such an analysis is vitally critical.

Focus of the Research

Contacts of people with other cultures are known to have consequences in the way they perceive themselves and their national attachment and identity. Theoretically, contacts with other cultures make people see themselves in proper context since the new culture contact provides a comparative looking glass through which they are able to see themselves relative to their national reference. It is possible that minority people who may have difficulty identifying themselves with the country where they come from may change their perspective after coming in contact with another society. The other possibility, which is equally likely, is that they may identify themselves even more intensely with the contact culture. Conceivably, the greater the perception of similarity with the culture contact, and the sympathy shown by the culture contact, the greater also the intensity of identification with it. The sympathy and identification of black Americans with the African countries in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, seems to be of this nature.

In the case of the Muslims from the Philippines who come in contact with Muslim cultures of the Middle East and other dominantly Muslim societies of Southeast Asia, the two possibilities outlined here could happen. That is their contact with these Muslim cultures can either intensify an existing tendency to identify with these Islamic countries as their national references and decrease further their identification with the Philippines or vice versa.

The theoretical basis of this proposition is the notion that the culture contact experience serves as a looking glass through which Muslims from the Philippines are able to see themselves compara-
tively. Having had contacts with other Muslim countries, they now have a concrete basis for comparing the Philippines and the Muslim countries. Moreover, they would already have experienced the realities of what it means, in practical terms, to be in these countries. Ideal conceptions would have been replaced by pragmatic evaluations. The culture contact will have an impact on their sense of national identity.

Culture contacts of Philippine Muslims with other Muslim societies and cultures of the Middle East and Southeast Asia are not something new. Every year, a considerable number of Muslims from the Philippines go to Saudi Arabia for the annual pilgrimage (hajj). However, it is only in recent years that the contacts with the Arab countries have intensified due to contract and migrant labor arrangements and the Mindanao conflict. Contact with Southeast Asian Muslim countries of Indonesia and Malaysia dates as far back as the eleventh century through trading and barter activities. The conflict in Mindanao which started sometime in the early part of the 1970s increased not only the extent but also the magnitude of the culture contacts of Muslims from the Philippines and the Southeast Asian countries. The aggressive overseas employment program of the Philippine government to export its excess manpower that could not be absorbed by the Philippine labor market has also contributed very much to these increased contacts as a significant number of the labor force placed in the Middle East were Muslims (see, for example, Aban, et. al. 1985).

This study is an attempt to determine the impact of the culture contact of Philippine Muslims with other Muslim cultures on their national attachment and identification. The specific issues pursued in the study were the following:

1. Do the national identification and attachment of Philippine Muslims who have had no culture contacts with Muslim cultures of the Middle East and other Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, differ from those Muslims who have had culture contacts?

2. If there are differences in their national identification and attachment, what aspects of their culture contact experience contribute to the differences?

3. Is the impact of culture contact on national identification and attachment similar for those with the Middle Eastern countries and those in the Southeast Asian countries?
4. Is there any association between absence and/or lack of national identification and attachment with the Philippines and a desire or belief for a separate or autonomous state for Philippine Muslims? Stated differently, do Muslims in the Philippines who do not identify with the Philippines also believe and desire a separate and autonomous state for Muslims in the Philippines?

5. Besides culture contacts, what socio-demographic characteristics of Philippine Muslims help explain differences in their national identification?

6. Does the nature of the specific experience of Muslims in the Philippines have a bearing on their national identification? Theoretically, it may be argued that Philippine Muslims who have had episodes of unpleasant experience of discrimination and prejudice from the majority in the Philippines will tend also to identify more intensely with Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian Muslim cultures than those who have little or no experience of prejudice and discrimination from the majority.

The main independent variable of this study is the culture contact experience of the Muslim respondents. The dependent variable is their national identification and attachment. Other variables such as length of stay in a Muslim culture outside of the Philippines, sex, age, educational attainment, occupation, and income were also used in the analysis to determine their effects on the dependent variable singly and in combination with other variables.

Terms of Reference

For the purpose of this study, the following terms and concepts have been specifically defined as follows:

Philippine Muslims refer to Muslims born in any part of the Philippines and who have been in the Philippines for at least twenty years at the time of the study and whose parents were born and raised in the Philippines. Because of the problem of national identification, the use of the term Filipino Muslims has been avoided. Using the concept Philippine Muslim removes all assumptions regarding their national identification and attachment without necessarily denying such an attachment if and when it is present.

National identification and attachment refers to the specific country that Philippine Muslims identify themselves with as citizen, de-
sire to live in for the rest of their lives and for their children, and render political and national allegiance.

Culture contact refers to having been, physically, to any of the Muslim countries in the Middle East or in Southeast Asia either as a pilgrim, visitor, worker, refugee, or student. The Middle Eastern countries are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Iran, and Iraq. The Southeast Asian countries are Indonesia and Malaysia.

Four groups of Muslims in the Philippines were included in the study. These four groups are the following:

Control group. This consisted of those respondents who have never been to any Middle Eastern countries or any of the dominantly Muslim nations of Southeast Asia. It was expected that a large proportion of this group would disclaim national identification and attachment with the Philippines and would identify themselves with either the Middle Eastern countries or any of the Southeast Asian Muslim countries.

The second group consisted of those who have been to the Middle East only on a religious pilgrimage (hajj) and have not stayed there longer than the period allowed for the hajj and had returned to the Philippines. None have gone back since the first trip. Among this group, an even larger proportion compared to the control group was hypothesized to identify with the Muslim world of the Middle East or Southeast Asia.

The third group was subdivided into two categories. Category A was composed of those who have been to the Middle East for at least one year either as workers, visitors, or students and have returned to the Philippines. Among this group a large proportion was expected to identify more with the Philippines than with either the Middle East or the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. Category B are those who have been to the Middle East and were still there at the time of the study.

The fourth and last group consisted of two categories also. Category A was composed of those who have been to Malaysia or Indonesia for at least one year and have returned to the Philippines. Category B are those who have been in Indonesia or Malaysia for at least one year and were still there for at least one year either as refugees, workers, visitors, or students at the time of the study. It was expected that this group would identify most with the Muslim countries in Southeast Asia and not with the Philippines.

Because of the difficulty of identifying the population for each group included in this study from which a random probability
sample could be obtained, a modified form of interactive or snowball sampling was used (for a detailed description of this sampling method, see Coleman 1970; Denzin 1970; and Oppenheimer 1992).

To draw the sample from the first group using the modified interactive sampling method, we first asked someone (a Muslim) who knew of another Muslim who had never been to any Middle Eastern or Southeast Asian Muslim country. The person pointed to was located, then interviewed about the details of the study. This first person interviewed was in turn asked whether he/she knew of other Muslims who had not been to any of the Muslim countries in the Middle East of Southeast Asia. The person referred to by the first respondent was then contacted and interviewed. The last person interviewed was then asked for other Muslims who have not been to the Middle East and then interviewed. This procedure was repeated until a total of 603 individuals in this category was obtained.1

For the second group, the same sampling and interviewing procedure was used except that the sample size was only 270.2

The same sampling procedure and sample size was resorted to for the third and fourth groups. However, of the 270, 135 were composed of those who have returned to the Philippines either temporarily on vacation or permanently. The other 135 were those who were still in the Middle East or Southeast Asian countries. The total sample size was 1,413. The sample sizes by groups were as follows: Never been to any Muslim country before, 603; Been to Middle East on a pilgrimage, (less than 3 months) 270; Been to ME at least one year and are back to the Philippines, 135; Are still in Middle East, been there for at least one year, 135; Been to Malaysia or Indonesia for at least one year and are back in the Philippines, 135; Are still in Malaysia or Indonesia and have been there at least one year, 135.

The research instrument was an interview schedule consisting of structured questions designed in a manner that all the needed data to answer the research questions were obtained. All interviews were conducted personally in both Maranao and Tagalog in about 80 percent of all the cases. English was used only when it was deemed absolutely necessary. Respondents in the Philippines were interviewed in the Philippines, those in the Middle East were interviewed there, too, by a specially trained research assistant. Likewise, those who were either in Indonesia or Malaysia were interviewed in situ through an Indonesian connection based in a Christian (Protestant) Church in Yogyakarta. Each interview lasted, on the average, two hours and fifteen minutes.
The following hypotheses were used to guide the research and focus attention on the relevant issues raised: A large proportion of those who have not been to either the Middle East or Southeast Asian countries would tend to identify themselves more with these Muslim countries than with the Philippines. Compared with the control group, an even larger proportion of Philippine Muslims who have been to the Middle East on hajj would identify themselves with Muslim countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Compared to those who have been to the Middle East on a hajj, a large proportion of those who have been to the Middle East for at least one year would identify more with the Philippines than with any of the Muslim countries in the Middle East or Southeast Asia. The longer they have stayed in the Middle East, the greater the probability that they will identify themselves more with the Philippines. Culture contact with the Middle Eastern countries will result in a larger proportion who will identify more with the Philippines. On the other hand, culture contact with Southeast Asian Muslim countries will result in a lesser proportion identifying with the Philippines. Those who do not identify with the Philippines will also tend to favor a separate or autonomous region for Muslims only. Conversely, those who identify themselves with the Philippines will tend to be opposed to a separate or autonomous area for Muslims.

Analysis of the data was done by computer using the SPSS/PC + package. Appropriate statistical operations were done to test all the research hypotheses and obtain answers to the questions raised in the research. Percentage distribution and chi-square tests were used to establish differences in proportions identifying and not identifying with the Philippines. A number of correlational analyses were done. Finally, a multivariate analysis was applied on variables considered crucial for unravelling the nature of the data under consideration.

Overall National Identification

For the entire sample of the study, 61.71 percent did not identify themselves with the Philippines; 38.29 percent said they were Filipinos and considered the Philippines as their nation (see Table). Almost all of those who identified themselves with the Philippine government, however, felt that the name of the Philippines should be changed as it has deep colonial roots and does not reflect the
of the historical legacy of the country.

Of those who would not identify with the Philippines (59.75 percent), however, more than 10.78 percent would not identify themselves either with any of the Muslim countries of the Middle East or Southeast Asia (see Table). To them a separate political unit operating either independently of the Philippines or one that is guaranteed more autonomy and flexibility from the control of the Christian dominated government is the only arrangement that is acceptable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups Sampled</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>ME Only</th>
<th>Indo Only</th>
<th>Malay Only</th>
<th>Either Indo/Malay</th>
<th>Any Muslim Nation</th>
<th>None of these</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I N=603</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(30.85)</td>
<td>(64.02)</td>
<td>(4.08)</td>
<td>(8.39)</td>
<td>(7.92)</td>
<td>(4.80)</td>
<td>(10.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II N=270</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28.15)</td>
<td>(74.23)</td>
<td>(3.09)</td>
<td>(7.73)</td>
<td>(2.58)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
<td>(10.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa N=135</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(57.04)</td>
<td>(41.38)</td>
<td>(17.24)</td>
<td>(17.24)</td>
<td>(8.62)</td>
<td>(5.17)</td>
<td>(10.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIb N=135</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(58.52)</td>
<td>(44.64)</td>
<td>(16.07)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(7.14)</td>
<td>(7.14)</td>
<td>(14.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVa N=135</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(47.41)</td>
<td>(40.85)</td>
<td>(14.08)</td>
<td>(19.72)</td>
<td>(5.63)</td>
<td>(8.45)</td>
<td>(11.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVb N=135</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(43.70)</td>
<td>(42.11)</td>
<td>(14.47)</td>
<td>(15.74)</td>
<td>(7.89)</td>
<td>(10.52)</td>
<td>(7.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N=1413</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38.29)</td>
<td>(59.21)</td>
<td>(7.22)</td>
<td>(11.47)</td>
<td>(6.54)</td>
<td>(5.16)</td>
<td>(10.78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among those who would identify themselves with Muslim countries, 59.75 percent would identify only with any Middle Eastern Muslim countries, 7.22 percent only with Indonesia, 11.47 percent only with Malaysia, 6.54 percent with either Malaysia or Indonesia, and 5.16 percent with any Muslim country in the world (see Table).

These data confirm further what has already been found by Abbahil (1984) in his study of the self-images of Muslim youth in the Muslim regions of Mindanao. There are two novel things about the data in the present study not revealed in the Abbahil study: The first is the deep sense of alienation revealed by those who would not identify with the Philippine government but find no reason either to identify themselves with any Muslim country from the Middle East or from Southeast Asia. Among this group, identifying with the Philippines is bad enough. Identifying with other countries even if they are Muslim countries is even worse, they assert, because it deprives them of a place they consider their homeland. What they cannot accept is being under the rule of a government that they do not perceive as being helpful to their aspirations as a people and which cannot accommodate their economic, political, and social goals.

A second aspect of the current data that is somewhat different in revelation is the fact that the greater majority of Philippine Muslims who would like to be identified with a Muslim country would do so mostly with the Middle Eastern countries rather than with the immediate Southeast Asian Muslim neighbor country of Indonesia and Malaysia. The proportion who would identify with any of the immediate Muslim neighbors in Southeast Asia is considerably less than those who would identify with the Middle Eastern countries. The table on p. 439, for example, shows that 59.75 would like to be identified with the Middle Eastern countries, whereas only 7.22 and 11.47 percent would identify with Indonesia or Malaysia respectively. Slightly over 6 percent would identify with either Indonesia or Malaysia and only 5.16 percent would identify with any Muslim country of the world.

As a whole, there is clearly a preponderant tendency toward identifying with the Middle East.

This disposition among Philippine Muslims is somewhat surprising. The research had actually expected a higher tendency toward identifying with the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia than with the Middle East given a considerable amount of similarities in customs, traditions, and cultural practices including language. This information seems to support the contention that people tend to
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perceive more distant gardens as greener than those gardens close by. This attitude does not necessarily mean that Philippine Muslims reject Southeast Asian Muslims. Perceptions of greater economic and social opportunities in the Middle East than in any of the Southeast Asian Muslim countries seems to be a very strong factor in this regard. Data we have gathered also indicate that Philippine Muslims are getting more negative assessments of Indonesian and Malaysian people from fellow Philippine Muslims who have sought refuge in these countries after the eruption of the Mindanao conflict in the 1970s.

National Identification According to Category of Contact

Group 1 = Never Been to Any Muslim Country. As expected, 64.02 percent of those who belong to the group that have never had any form of culture contact with any of the Muslim countries either in Southeast Asia or the Middle East did not identify with the Philippine government. Of those who identified with Muslim countries, more than 64 percent would identify only with any of the Middle Eastern Muslim countries; 7.92 percent with either Indonesia or Malaysia; 4.08 percent only with Indonesia; 8.39 percent only with Malaysia; 4.80 percent with any Muslim country in the world; and 10.79 said they would not like to be identified with any nation of the world even if these are Muslim countries and would rather have an independent or autonomous nation or region for Muslims in the Philippines (see Table).

Three things are clear in these figures. First, the preponderance of the preference to be identified with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries; second, the rather low percentage who of those wish to be identified with any of the two Muslim countries in neighboring Southeast Asia, namely, Indonesia and Malaysia, and third, the sizeable proportion (10.79 percent) who would not want to be identified with any other nation of the world even if these are Muslim countries.

Belief or perception that the Middle East offers more economic prospects is a dominant reason given by Philippine Muslims for identifying with it predominantly. On the other hand, reports that fellow Philippine Muslims have not been treated well in either Malaysia or Indonesia is a recurrent theme in the reasons given for not wanting to be identified with these nations. Among those who would identify only with the Southeast Asian nations, similarity of customs and traditions, racial type, and proximity to the Philippines are prominent reasons cited. The proximity of Indonesia and Malaysia
to the Philippines as a reason for identifying only with these countries is a bit curious, for somehow it indicates that there is a lingering and unspoken desire not to completely sever ties with the Philippines to be able to return when circumstances require. Perhaps, the thought of maintaining links with relatives in the Philippines who can always be sources of help in times of difficulty still looms as an inescapable reality. It could also be that should they find their expectations unmet in these other countries, they can always return to the Philippines. Neglect by the Philippine government in giving Muslims equal opportunities for economic and social advancement is the most common reason for not wanting to be identified with the Philippines. Whether real or imagined, the fact is that they believe they have not been given these opportunities by the government of the Philippines and the consequences in terms of their national identification is real.

Group 2 = Have Been to the Middle East as a Pilgrim (Hajj). Among Philippine Muslim respondents who have been to the Middle East on a hajj, more than 71 percent do not identify themselves with the Philippines. Of those who would not identify themselves with the Philippines, 74.23 percent would identify only with the Middle East; 3.09 percent identify with Indonesia only, 7.73 percent with Malaysia only; 2.58 percent with either Indonesia or Malaysia; 2.06 percent with any Muslim country in the world; and 10.31 with no country even if Muslims. The hypothesis therefore that the greatest percentage of those who would identify themselves with the Middle Eastern countries would be from this group is confirmed.

Earlier in this article, I have argued that the hajj is an event during which Muslims from all over the world converge in the Middle East for this momentous religious experience. While the gathering is palpably for a religious reason, nonreligious factors do shape the impressions that hajj participants will gather. As such, the desire to be as congenial and pleasant to all fellow pilgrims would be expected to be very high. The host country is also under pressure to present its best to other fellow religionists from other parts of the world who may be visiting for the first and last time and whose impressions of the host country will be brought back to their home countries.

It is apparent that the pleasant experience that pilgrims experience during the hajj in the Middle East is reflected in their desire to identify themselves with the country.

Group 3a = Have Been to the Middle East for at least one year but are back in the Philippines. The picture of national identification among
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those who have been in the Middle East for at least one year is alto-gether different and confirms the hypothesis advanced in the study. Among this group, 42.96 percent identify with the Middle East while 57.04 percent identify with the Philippines. Of those who would not identify themselves with the Philippines, 41.38 percent identify only with the Middle East; 17.24 percent with Indonesia and Malaysia only respectively; 8.62 percent with either Indonesia or Malaysia; 5.17 percent would identify themselves with any Muslim country in the world; and 10.34 percent would not want to be associated with any other country in the world even if Muslim.

Although the Philippines improves in its standing as a national identity, the Middle East is still a most attractive country for this group. Those who would like to be identified with Malaysia and Indonesia have also increased in proportion. The implication is that a longer stay in the Middle East improves the attractiveness of both the Philippines and Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the Middle East remains a strong preference by about 42 percent.

Group $3b = $Have been to the Middle East for at least one year and are still in the Middle East.$ The pattern in the percentage distribution in this group is similar to that of the group immediately preceding except that a much larger proportion (14.29 percent) would not want to be identified with any nation in the world regardless of its being Muslim or non-Muslim (see Table).

Group $4a$ and $4b = $For the last group, there is not much variation in the pattern of the distribution of the percentages (see Table). What is obvious is that among groups 3 and 4, the proportion of respondents identifying with the Philippines is much larger compared to those from groups 1 and 2.

**Summary**

The problem of integrating the Filipino Muslims into the body-politic of the Philippines is a long and pestering one. It stretches back to more than 500 years of difficulty induced by a foreign conqueror. The problem has been punctuated by bloody episodes of intermittent armed conflicts with the ruling governmental authority dominantly in the hands of the Christian majority. The armed conflict was at its worst, perhaps, in the 1970s with the emergence of at least four armed groups of liberation fronts. A consequence of the armed conflict in the 1970s was the flight of at least 100,000 Philippine Muslim
refugees who sought safety in nearby Muslim states of Southeast Asia of Malaysia and Indonesia. Today the problem continues to hound the nation for a just, viable, feasible and informed solution. There is no doubt of course that the problem is complex and cannot simply be reduced to the religious factor. It is partly rooted in history which has shaped Philippine Muslims' perceptions of their national identity. Contemporary educational content which fails to make clear to Muslims the value of vocational and professional training and the persistence of prejudicial attitudes by Christians have also contributed to the configuration of the Muslims' sense of national attachment.

It is obvious that there is a great need for data about how Muslims now in the Philippines identify themselves if the appropriate programs and policies for their integration are to be formulated. Thus far, Philippine government policy and program efforts tend to be undergirded more by practical politics than by informed knowledge and a genuine desire for a long term solution. Consequently, the government has been embarking on a series of programs and policies which have been politically convenient and rewarding in the short run, but which tend to be ineffectual and short-lived as they tend not to face existing realities of Muslim Mindanao. Even the passage of the so-called Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao Act (ARMM), reflects a disregard for past and present realities that serve only the goals and interests of politicians in the short run.

Philippine Muslims' perception of otherness and separation from the country and the dominant Christian population is both tragic and ironic because both groups belong to one racial stock. Except for their religious differences, they cannot be distinguished from each other physically. In addition, there is now a growing body of historical evidence indicating that some of the native inhabitants who were converted to Islam prior to the coming of the Spanish conquerors in 1521 and the Christianized population lived together in peace and harmony. When the non-Muslim natives were converted to Christianity, both groups continued to live in peace and were ruled by the same datu system. They also shared many customs and traditions. The historical records, for example,

show a working and palpably peaceful modus vivendi between Muslims and non-Muslims. Trade relations as well as social interactions tended to be harmonious especially since the accounts noted the similarity of customs with the exception of religion. Political status quo likewise proceeded along familiar patterns of rule, the datu system. In
areas occupied by both Muslims and non-Muslims, there was no evidence of sharp power conflicts between the two. This state of affairs changed with the intensification of campaigns against both natives and Muslims (Heide 1982).

As this document clearly indicates, it was the intensification of the campaign of the Spanish conquerors for converts to Christianity that shattered the peace and quiet which had reigned for a long time. Several methods were utilized by the Spaniards in putting a wedge of hatred between native converts to Christianity and Muslims. One method was to hire converts to Christianity in the Spanish militia who were then specifically assigned in the armed campaign against the Moros (the derogatory ethnic slur the Spaniards used to designate Muslims of the Philippines).

A most effective and efficient method of sowing animosity between Muslims and Christians employed by the Spaniards was the literary medium of the stage theater and drama. Two of the most popular and constantly played stage plays to portray the Philippine Muslims as evil incarnate were the Moro-moro and Linambay. Up until the late 1950s, these two theater art media were still very popular forms of entertainment in some rural communities in the province of Cebu and in some areas of Luzon and Mindanao specially during the annual fiesta celebration. Both plays perpetuated an image of the Moro as a murderous, treacherous villain who had to be vanquished by all means fair or foul as he was a menace to humanity. The distorted image of the Moro that these plays effectively depicted continues to linger in the minds of the Christians even now. Mothers use the word Moro to make children toe the line, as it were. “The Moro will come and get you if you do not behave,” “I will give you to the Moro,” are familiar household scare weapons to obtain obedience and conformity from misbehaving children.

Writers of the history of the Philippines, in the past, ignored events in which Muslims played a significant role. Heroes of the resistance movement against Spain and America were invariably Christians. The exploits of Muslims in their tenacious refusal to surrender their way of life and religion hardly gained any notice in the pages of the history books until about the late 1960s. And even this late recognition of their role in the history of the country seems more to be a token rather than genuine recognition of their place in history. Muslims claim that their inclusion in some events in the history of the Philippines has been made simply as the government’s reaction to their
complaints, rather than as a genuine recognition of their role in the Philippine historical record. As such, this inclusion does not really qualify as an authentic recognition of the part they have played in the unfolding of the historical drama of the country. Many Muslims, including those who are inclined to moderation in their attitude towards the Philippine government, feel, and rightly so, that their role in the history of the country is considered purely as an afterthought by historical writers. One can hardly offer any argument against this accusation.

What role have the madrasah and the ulama of the Philippines played in this drama?

There seems to be no doubt that the madrasah and the ulama have a tremendous amount of influence in the formation of the national attachment and identification of Philippine Muslims. It is a matter of public knowledge that the birth of the Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines emerged at the height of the growth in the number of madaris being established in the Muslim regions of Mindanao. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the various Muslim armed separatist liberation fronts surfaced after about 85 percent of the present number of madaris came into being (Boransing, Magdalena and Lacar 1987).

Conclusion

Data in this study indicate that the problem of national identification and attachment of the Philippine Muslims continues to be problematic and one which will probably persist in hounding the nation's conscience for a long time. The evidence from this research and that made by Abbahil in the 1980s does show that the problem of national identification among Philippine Muslims is both real and apparent.

The type of culture contact and the length of time of the contacts with the Muslim countries in the Middle East or Southeast Asia seem to produce different results. Among those who have never had any form of culture contact with any of the Muslim countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the pattern of national attachment and identification with the Philippines is one that can only be described as dismal. More than 69 percent of this group did not want to be identified with the Philippines; slightly over 30 percent identified themselves with the Philippines.
As predicted, the highest proportion of Muslims who did not identify with the Philippines belong to the group of those who have been to the Middle East for a very short duration as in the pilgrimage. Among those who have stayed in the Middle East for at least one year, there are more who identified themselves with the Philippines than with the Middle East. It appears, therefore, that the longer the time spent in the Middle East, the lower the proportion of respondents identifying themselves with the Middle East. Whereas a short duration of culture contact, like the hajj, produces a higher proportion who identified with the Middle East. Culture contacts with Southeast Asian Muslim countries, however, do not seem to produce the same effect in national identification as do contacts with Middle Eastern nations.

Among those whose culture contact is with the Southeast countries of Indonesia and Malaysia, the proportion who identified with the Philippines is very much higher compared to those whose contacts were with the Middle East. It must be noted, however, that we do not have a group in the Southeast Asian category that is comparable to the hajj group, since the hajj takes place only in the Middle East. It would have been interesting to have had a group in the Southeast Asian category who had less than six months of culture contact and compare their identification with those of the hajj group in the Middle East. The research, however, did not foresee this problem. It is clear, though, that the proportion who would want to be identified with the Southeast Asian Muslim countries is much lower than the proportion who would want to be identified with the Middle Eastern countries.

What is surprising is the fact that Muslims in the Philippines are more attracted to Muslim countries of the Middle East than to Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. This pattern of identification with the Middle East appears to have a long history. Islam was brought to the Philippines by Arab traders and missionaries from the Middle East. Indonesia and Malaysia were not prominent in the introduction of Islam to the Philippines. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, the popular heroes of Filipino Muslims were Presidents Anwar Sadat and Abdul Nasser of Egypt. Sukarno of Indonesia or Ali Jinnah of Pakistan were hardly known. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, the leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia do not enjoy the same popularity among Philippine Muslims as Arafat, Hussein, or Mubarak. One can, of course, invoke the old cliche that prophets have less believers in their own backyard. In the case of Muslims in the
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia seem too close neighbors to identify with. The closer ummah in so far as Philippine Muslims are concerned are the more distant ones. One hopes, of course, that this attitude is not a reflection of the "familiarity breeds contempt" syndrome.

As has been noted, the looking glass effect of the culture contact appears most clearly for those who have been to any of the Muslim countries in the Middle East or Southeast for a period of at least one year. Among Philippine Muslims who have experienced at least a year in any of the Muslim countries of the Middle East, the proportion identifying with the Philippines is much higher compared to those who have never been to any of these countries.

Perceptions of the economic benefits that a country is likely to offer seem to be a very strong factor in whether Philippine Muslims would identify themselves with that country. For example, a common theme in the reasons given by Philippine Muslims why they identify with the Middle East is higher pay and more job opportunities in the Middle East. For those who would identify themselves with Malaysia or Indonesia, similarity in customs and traditions, especially food, and ease in adjusting to the language, were common reasons cited.

Negative experiences such as harsh treatment received from local people were common themes cited in not wanting to be identified with other countries. "People are the same anywhere, they are nasty and cruel," was often reported. Absence of relatives and close friends were other common reasons for not wanting to be identified with other countries.

Does the desire to disavow national identification with the Philippines also mean a desire for a separate and autonomous state for Muslims in the Philippines?

Not necessarily so. Data from this study show that about 12 percent of those who do not wish to be identified with the Philippines also wish to have an independent and separate state for Muslims in the country. The rest would very much like to see changes in the way the government deals with Muslim minorities rather than establish a separate and independent state of their own.

The nature of the specific experience of Philippine Muslims from the majority Christian groups also appears to have a definite association with their national identification. For instance, individuals who have had specific episodes of prejudice and discrimination received from Christians in the past were also likely to dissociate identification with the Philippines.
Level of education, status of employment, and age are other factors that seem to be significantly associated with national identification. Individuals with higher education, secure and regular employment, older age, and stable income were more likely to identify with the Philippines. On the other hand, those with low education, unemployed, younger, and with irregular and unstable source of income were twice as likely to disavow national attachment and identification with the Philippines. It is apparent, however, that the government of the Philippines faces a vast and awesome task of nurturing among Philippine Muslims an attitude that will result in a greater number who would make the Philippines its national reference and symbol of national identity. All the available data so far do not augur well for the country.

Notes

1. The figure 603 is derived from a prepared table of sample sizes for random selection of an infinite population at .05 level of confidence with .05 standard deviation or 3.2 in percentile deviation. In choosing the sample size, we make the assumption that the interactive sample size of 603 is a random probability sample from an infinite population rather than from a finite population.

2. The figure 270 is taken from a prepared table of sample sizes for random selection of an infinite population at .05 level of confidence with .12 standard deviation or 4.8 in percentile deviation. The same assumption that 270 is a random probability sample from an infinite population was made.

3. Moro-moro and Limmbay are two of the most common forms of stage entertainment popularized by the Spanish Roman Catholic priests to depict Muslims in the Philippines as a murderous and treacherous lot. These stage plays were part of the annual celebration of the feast of the local Patron Saint of a community. The play revolves around the theme that "the only good moro is a dead moro." In the Moro-moro and Limmbay, the villain is always a moro (derogatory slur for Philippine Muslims coined by the Spaniards) who is the enemy of Christianity and must be vanquished at all costs. The players are of course the Christianized natives. These two theater art media were very effective in inducing hatred between native converts to Christianity and native converts to Islam.

The Spanish word moro was not coined or popularized by "Roman Catholic priests" but came from the Latin mauros, used to designate, first, the inhabitants of Mauretania in northwestern Africa, then the Muslims who based their invasion of Spain on that province, and finally the Muslims in general.

The American General, Pershing, used the slogan, "the only good Indian is a dead Indian" in the campaign against the American Indians in the western United States during the late 1800s. It was applied in the Philippines to the Philippine Muslims by their American opponents in the early 1900s.
The Jesuits used the theater in Europe in the 1600s and 1700s to instruct the people in the Christian Faith. The "Roman Catholic priests" in the Philippines never used the theater to "induce hatred between native converts." But when Christian Filipinos returned from the fields to find their women and children killed or carried off into slavery by Muslim raiders, strong feelings were naturally aroused. [Ecumenism today should promote objective truth.]

References


