Housing the Urban Poor in Metro Manila

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While there is a great range of explanations and prescriptions for development, recently development issues have been placed more firmly within a political framework (Leftwich 1994; Kamrava 1993a, 1993b; Carter 1995). The nature of a regime, the context of policy making and the implementation of projects are all significant political issues as much as they deal with development. It is the intention of this article to argue for the merger of state and housing literature in order to provide a greater analytical and critical frame of reference in considering the unabated proliferation of squatter settlements in and around the National Capital Region (NCR). The allocation of funds for housing and the strategies pursued by states toward effectively sheltering the urban poor are issues that need to be analyzed within a more critical frame of reference away from a shortage of skills or capital (Mathey 1992). The politics of housing, according to Baken and van der Linden (1992, 78), is a missing element in World Bank programs and analyses. Potential solutions to urban housing are more likely, moreover, to come from outside current narrow technocentric and facilitation debates. Housing and shelter policy needs to be seen as a political issue which requires a political context (Skinner and Rodell 1983, 230; Rezende 1991; Mathey 1992, 27-31; Gilbert and Gugler 1992). This necessitates utilizing political analysis that locates housing in specific and local socio-political environments (van der Linden 1986, 36; Marcussen 1990, 38-39). In the context of the Philippines, housing conditions are only likely to be effectively addressed once the hegemonic social and political relationships that operate change. A housing solution needs to move beyond the idea that housing is the problem.

Throughout the Third World there is a striking history of failed housing strategies and policies. While it is possible to argue that
housing is but one development problem and that resources cannot hope to keep pace with demand (at least in the short term), there has been a continuity in themes of hostile state-poor relations, poor policy implementation and imbalanced development objectives. To a great extent these issues can be traced to the neopatrimonial character of Third World states and conditions of state-primacy (Carter 1995). In the case of the Philippines, housing plans and implementation have not been immune to wider issues of bureaucratic mismanagement, politicization, corruption and poorly coordinated and administered programs which are and have been inadequately supported and funded (Abueva 1970; Dohner and Haggard 1994, 24). Historically, there have been continual gaps between stated goals and actual implementation in regard to providing housing for the urban poor (Constantino-David 1989, 32). Throughout Marcos’ “New Society,” Aquino’s “People Empowerment” and Ramos’ “Philippines 2000,” the urban poor have witnessed a steady deterioration in their living standards.

This situation is likely to worsen. Significant growth of the urban poor juxtaposed with a lack of policy initiatives points to a very negative future scenario for the National Capital Region in particular. Around the year 2000, half of all Filipinos will be urbanites and urban poverty will become, numerically, the dominant development problem in the country (Murphy 1993a, v; United Nations 1993, 76-77). The modern growth of urban poverty has been closely paralleled by the proliferation of autonomous settlements. In fact, the squatter settlement population has doubled from that of a decade ago (McBeth and Goertzen 1991, 30). This growth is expected to increase at over 60 percent to 5.48 million in 1997. Squatter citizens will then account for nearly 60 percent of the entire urban population (IBON 1993, 8). By no means, however, is Metro Manila a poor city. According to Murphy (1990, 40) the poorest 50 percent of Manila’s population earn just 17 percent of total income. Metro Manila is a city with a highly inequitable distribution of income.

The Neopatrimonial State

In gaining a greater depth of understanding of the rationality of government performance, there is a need to know more about the state in Third World societies, or, in effect, a greater understanding of the “logic of the government response” (Gilbert and Gugler 1992,
This article highlights the concept of neopatrimonialism as providing a useful theoretical tool for illuminating state-society relations in the Philippines. Of late, it has been the concept of neopatrimonialism, or state based political clientelism that has gained the greatest emphasis with regard to Third World political studies (Migdal 1988, 255). So much so, that Bratton and de Walle (1994, 458) have referred to neopatrimonialism as the “master concept” for the analysis of Third World politics and state theory. It has been used as the principal analytical tool in analyzing Third World settings by writers such as Clapham (1990), Kurer (1996), Hutchcroft (1991), and Kamrava (1993a, 1993b).

In neopatrimonial regimes public administration is a personal affair and political power becomes personal property (Hutchcroft 1991, 415). Neopatrimonialism is defined as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and representative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines” (Clapham 1990, 48). This formation is the legacy of the politicization of traditional patrimonial systems. These traditional peasant based systems consisted of informal clusters (clients) linked to a power figure (the patron) who was able to offer security and/or inducements in return for client loyalty and support (Scott 1977, 124; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Cornelius 1977; Guasti 1977). Historically these linkages have derived officials some degree of “traditional” legitimacy (Weber 1968, 12; Gerth and Wright Mills 1991, 78-79), security, and capacity (Crone 1988, Clapham 1990, 43).

Clientelism acts as the basic political structure of society (Guasti 1977, 422), far more pervasive and powerful than parties or the existence of interpersonal government departments. It is the principal political structure in that it (re)distributes all types of material and nonmaterial resources to society and mediates conflict arising from this distribution (Guasti 1977, 424). Elections and electoral systems have not altered these patterns (Ames 1994). In fact, according to Scott (1977, 140), electoral politics in Southeast Asia have had the effect of formalizing, expanding and politicizing patron-client systems. The state’s organizations and activities have furthermore affected political culture which in turn has largely determined the types of political issues that are raised, the types of behavior, and the nature of the demands that are made (or, simply, the nature and form of political participation and activism) (Evans et. al. 1985:21). Subsequently, clientelism has “a resilience, a flexibility, and a degree of rationality for the interests of both patron and client which enable them to sur-
vive even the most drastic attempts at their suppression” (Clapham 1990, 58). Clientelist systems form the political bases of states ranging from the military dictatorship of Indonesia, to the American-styled representative democracy of the Philippines (Bratton and de Walle 1994, 472).

In effect, clientelism has also acted as an internal structure of control (Guasti 1977, 422). Its foundation is both the persistence of inequalities in the control of wealth, status, and power (a situation more or less accepted as legitimate), combined with the relative absence of firm, interpersonal assurances of physical security, status and position or wealth (Scott 1977, 133). Its rationale is founded on ensuring security and advancement (Clapham 1990, 58–59; Scott 1977). Consequently, it is a system primarily characteristic of societies with sharp divisions, in which controlling the state apparatus allows those with power to provide, or withhold, security and to allocate benefits in the form of jobs, investment, development projects and more (Clapham 1990, 56).

As a system of vertical dependency and control, clientelism additionally acts to empower patrons to check horizontal linkages which may allow the population to collectively alter their subordinate position in society. As a client, for example, a squatter can bargain over most things but not his or her basic position in society (Nowak and Snyder 1970, 261). In Caracas, Brumlick (1992, 306–7) has noted that clientelism has been successfully used as a mechanism of the state “to maintain (the) situation and prevent the building up of class consciousness in the exploited sector of the population, social manipulation has been employed, and an increase in clientelism has diminished the level of social and economic struggle within the informal sector.”

Control from the center is ensured through such things as political appointments in key areas and violence (or threat of) (Migdal 1988, 213). By moving bureaucrats constantly, leaders continually strive to prevent alternative power bases from emerging. With the placement of personal appointments, the state additionally creates new forms of patronage and loyalty. This can be quite extraordinary in scope. In Mexico, for example, one particular post-election purge affected tens of thousands of officials (213). This has the effect of creating poorly motivated and overlapping bureaucracies and in doing so creating what Migdal has referred to as the “institutional paradox” (208). That is, by attempting to buttress its own narrow source
of power by weakening bureaucracies, the state is in fact contributing to its own conditions of insecurity, as strong and independent bureaucracies are the basis of any autonomous and effective government.

Among other manifestations, this has led to a near total loss of accountability and the pervasion of corruption (Clapham 1990, 48-49). It has also led to the fragmentation of responsibility and action and has deeply affected policy formation and implementation. For example, in Karachi (often cited as a clientelistic city) the government is seen as chaotic and compartmentalized with poor coordination between “separate kingdoms” and where “particularistic use of public means is at least expected” (van der Linden 1983, 254). Specific, piecemeal programs are the result of transactions based on bargaining, influence and the giving of favors—especially at the local level (Migdal 1988, 239; Grindle 1980, 19). Ad hoc, singular improvements are the rule and in this way “the decision is negotiable and therefore becomes the outcome of an exchange of information, support, influence and money in a transaction between government officials, politicians, local leaders and . . . residents” (Yap 1983, 265).

In particular, political administration is driven by a type of “politics of survival” and a state-society battle for control over policy in which accommodation and control take precedence over change and development (Migdal 1988, 397, 418).

State Neglect: Colonial and Post-Colonial Indolence

Historically, the Filipino state and economy has been governed by a landed and then heterogeneous elite class. Throughout the twentieth century this elite has increasingly used the state apparatus to legislate for its affairs and against its adversaries. Meritorious, constructive policies and addressing the concerns and needs of the population have, historically, not been necessary conditions of office nor criteria of those seeking political service. Customarily then, the state and bureaucracy have not been responsive to the needs of the poor. In only some intervals (such as during the communist New Peoples Army or the Moro National Liberation Front insurgency) has civil society been capable of demanding alternative visions. Continuity has remained a key theme in Filipino politics and in housing poverty. The Philippines has developed into a political economy dominated by and centered around the country’s aristocracy and their interests.
As a result, policy and implementation have been captured by minority elite interests, with grave results for the majority/poor population. Their problems, including housing, remain largely unaddressed. It is within this context that the problems of housing can be placed. In the urban context, housing and housing policy have been victims of Filipino politics, with the urban poor unable to change this situation. As a consequence, housing poverty is directly linked to the Filipino state, politics and state-society relations.

One of the enduring political legacies of colonial and neo-colonial contact with the Philippines was Spanish, then American politicization of traditional patron-client systems (Parrenas 1993, 67; Magno 1989). Official posts were sold and officials were allowed to benefit personally from their privileged positions (Wurfel 1988, 5). Particularly at election time, local elected posts became surrogate battles of personal interests and clan rivalry (May 1989, 15-17). By the end of the nineteenth century this elite had gained control of political life replacing Spanish officialdom (Abueva 1988, 31; Pomery 1992, 25-30) and dominating local society and politics into the American period of colonial administration (1898-1946). Elections acted to further strengthen local elites. While democratic procedures may have widened, the roots of democracy did not deepen. Elections served to elevate and politicize traditional factional rivalries (Paredes 1989, 7). Local elites that entered national politics (or sponsored advocates) did so to promote and/or protect local and personal interests (de Jesus 1982, 448; Magno 1989, 13). While two parties emerged (Liberals and Nationals) they acted more as “alliances of convenience” allowing individuals and families access to party funds and campaign machinery (Timberman 1991, 35). Party switches were common (Parrenas 1993, 68) and loyalty was weak. Manifestos or party lines were almost non-existent.

Elite families took hold of politics and the economy (McCoy 1993). By independence the power of the landed oligarchy had become so entrenched in politics that parliamentary democracy was “principally a system whereby these powerful landed families and their representatives competed for the spoils of political office via shifting alliances of patronage” (Pinches 1992, 391). According to Anderson (1988, 12), elite relatives took over local and provincial positions: brothers, uncles, cousins for senior posts and sons and nephews for junior positions. By 1946 patterns of elite control alongside an emerging urban/rural divide and increased income disparities and standards of living were firmly established.
Following independence there had been a significant shift in the Filipino patronage system whereby traditional patronage systems began eroding and the state now replaced the landlord as patron (Magno 1989, 11). This signified the emergence of what Hutchcroft (1991) has termed “state clientelism.” Yet, while the state was expanding, it remained weak vis-a-vis powerful elites, even in the use of force (McCoy 1993, 10–13). Concurrently, rural and urban labor remained disorganized and unable to coherently alter the status quo to their advantage. “They could neither assert the necessary policy demands on legislators or administrators, nor provide adequately the required public scrutiny and support needed by a well functioning democracy” (Abueva 1988, 53). In any case, patronage retained a coherent logic for most people: “The artesian well, bridge, or road might come only during elections, but better that they did, if only on those occasions, than not at all” (de Quiros 1992, 19).

Despite signs of economic “take off” in the first two decades following independence, the economy continued its dependence on a narrow family-based economic and political group and their interests which had by now diversified into industry, real estate and banking (Pinches 1992, 392). This small, exclusive class controlled the nature of economic growth and its direction over any national or popular consensus. Increasingly, workers and the elite became polarized from each other. Elites moved to Manila and developed luxurious lifestyles in places such as Forbes Park (which Anderson [1988, 17] describes as “sociologically unique in Southeast Asia”) and the army’s even more exclusive Corinthian Gardens. Growth and its benefits were won through keeping labor cheap, working conditions and wages at a minimum and worker’s access to resources constrained (Cariño 1988, 16). Most significantly, political and social development was not occurring at comparable rates. To paraphrase Wurfel (1988), there was simultaneously “development” and decay.

Manila experienced striking growth in the post war years, increasing at an average annual rate of over four percent between 1950 and 1995 (United Nations 1993, 141). Immediate post-war growth was particularly evident in the port of Tondo. Yet it was evident even at this stage that the response of the authorities to the city’s primacy, urban problems and increasing income disparities was inadequate. Effective action was hampered by a combination of problems. In particular, uncoordinated policy implementation and poor planning was compounded by the lack of a national housing policy. Irregular and ad hoc bulldozing often encountered strong resistance and failed
to house the majority of the urban poor. Efforts were failing to effectively address the city's burgeoning problems. Wide and all-encompassing political reforms were clearly necessary, but the pervasiveness and strength of patronage politics effectively prevented any coordinated approach from developing.

While a handful of studies appeared in the pre-World War II years to deal with Manila's emerging problems of urban primacy (including congestion, poverty, slums and inadequate public services), it was not until after independence that an institutional response was first apparent (Caoili 1988, 52–53). Most notable was the creation of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) in 1947 (van Naerssen 1993, 5). The PHHC was one of the dominant agencies involved with housing from the 1950s to the mid-1970s (Tojos et. al. n.d., 198). However, the PHHC and other agencies were to encounter and create the difficulties that were to burden later agencies empowered to build for the poor. Most notable were problems with overlapping functions, excessive administration, a lack of resources and the absence of a housing agenda or "roadmap" (8). While their aims were to provide cheap houses for the poor, it was also necessary to recover full costs and it soon became apparent that they were building ostensibly for the middle classes and production levels were chronically poor (van Naerssen 1993, 5). Between 1948 and 1975 housing agencies produced a disappointing 135,114 housing units (Tojos et. al. n. d., 8).

As informal housing was principally defined within legal parameters (Ramos-Jimenez et. al. 1988, 83), policies of eradication and relocation were favored with the Slum Clearance Committee being established in 1950 (van Naerssen 1993, 5). The authorities, however, still lacked a clear and comprehensive housing policy among the many agencies involved in shelter. These relocation sites were marginal to the metropolis (and therefore to employment, schools and services) and poorly developed. Subsequently such forced removals were resented and sites often abandoned with squatters preferring to move back into the city (Viloria and Williams 1987, 13; Laquian 1969). Under the balik probinsya (return to the provinces) policy, some families were forced to move up to four times (Arn, 1995, 203). Still, mass evictions and relocation were not sustained or comprehensive until 1963–64 with the opening of multiple relocation sites (Tojos et. al. n.d., 7; Laquian 1969). Even in demolition and relocation, government efforts failed principally because of a lack of coordination, particularly with regard to the preparation of sites (Tojos et. al. n.d, 7).
Marcos and the “Hostile State”

The authoritarian nature of Ferdinand Marcos’ rule did much to acerbate these problems. Within only a few years of the Marcos presidency, the state had been developed into a giant patron. In so doing, Marcos became the “supreme godfather” and Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos the self proclaimed ‘father and mother of the nation’ (Hutchcroft 1991, 443). At one time President Marcos was said to be compadre (godfather) to 20,000 people (Timberman 1991, 15). Realizing the centrality of the local level to Philippine politics and the patronage system during the 1969 election campaign, it is estimated that Marcos alone wrote 2,000 personal checks to barrio captains (Doronila 1985, 114). However, far from been considered outrageous, Bulatao (1989, 323) has argued that this placed Marcos at the “quintessence” of Filipino values. He positioned loyal friends and family in key positions, responded to debts he owed, and was a strong president, even if authoritarian. Marcos also exploited cultural values more effectively than his predecessors, bonds such as utang na loob (debt of gratitude), pakikisama (smooth interpersonal relations), and fierce loyalty. At the local level, clientelism depended heavily upon exploiting these virtues (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 129) as it still does (Pinches 1991).

When challenges to state-based patrimonialism did emerge the response was swift. Following the 1969 election radical urban and rural demands for political and socio-economic reform grew (Wurfel 1988, 17). The 1971 local elections confirmed this anger with a massive anti-administration vote illustrating the possible dissolution of clientelism. In the early 1970s, Wurfel (1988, 18) argues, the system appeared to be on the precipice of collapse and renewal. The response was the announcement of Martial Law leading to an even greater concentration of powers and over the next fourteen years the Filipino state all but eradicated civil society. Local politics and elections, long a form of influence over the center, were terminated (Timberman 1991, 84). Traditional checks and balances in the system, parties, institutions, civil disobedience and demonstrations were forbidden (95–96). All power emanated from the center. Between 1972 and 1979 Marcos issued 688 Presidential Decrees (PD) and 283 Letters Of Instruction (LOI) (107). It has been estimated that by the late 1970s the Philippine economy was controlled by as few as sixty families (17).

Throughout the Martial Law period Metro Manila underwent spectacular growth. Partially in response to previous failures but just as
much in response to the shift in international philosophies (in particular those reflected within the World Bank), the authorities expanded shelter policies to include sites and services and upgrading programs, though demolition and relocation was never completely abandoned. Upgrading became a national housing policy through LOI 555 in 1975 (van Naerssen 1989, 206) and LOI 557 in 1977 (Tojos et. al. n.d., 8) and the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) of 1977 grew to be one of the world’s largest housing programs supported by the World Bank to the tune of US$130 million in loans by 1986 (van Naerssen 1989, 207).

Self-help policies though, took place in an extremely repressive environment. Laws were passed that made squatting a crime (PD 772), allowed demolitions on private and public lands for those without permits for riverside and railroad dwellers (LOI 19), or which allowed authorities to impose penalties for living in illegal settlements (PD 296) (van Naerssen 1993, 8). Consequently, participation of the poor in these programs was highly restricted, usually involving residents as a pool of reserve labor to keep costs low enough for projects to be completed. In any case very few of the poor benefited from these programs. With World Bank and government insistence on cost recovery, the majority of those advantaged were middle class, even in the much heralded Tondo ZIP program (van Naerssen 1989, 207).

The history of housing policies particularly during the Marcos period reflects a list of “fragmented, uncoordinated, ineffective and inefficient programs” (Gregorio-Medel 1989, 7). Typically departments entrusted with policy making, financing, and implementation were financially stressed and divided from one another. Routinely, these programs were both vehicles and victims of patronage politics. As such, housing programs were dictated by the political agendas of those in power (8). Often, projects were the ideas of officials who wanted to use them for leverage and political purposes, as with “pork barrel” funds in general. Politicians set up “adhocracies,” or new organizations to bypass the traditional bureaucracy with its inadequacies, as well as to allow them more personal control over distribution and reciprocal obligations (de Guzman et. al. 1988, 195).

In this, Imelda Marcos’ Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) has been described as a “super patronage” machine. Established in 1978 as a rival to the National Housing Authority (NHA) it subsumed all significant housing agencies into its orbit. Originally established for housing construction, the MHS grew to include nineteen corporations and its operations came to be used as a source of pork barrel patron-
age in housing, food distribution, finance and health provision. Pri-
mainly, it was involved in the construction of tourist hotels (Dohner
and Haggard 1994, 35). Resource misallocation was commonplace. A
1994 investigation discovered P97.9 million of MHS funds had been
misappropriated in 1985 alone! (Riedinger 1995, 212). Additionally,
Imelda Marcos' BLISS (Bagong Lipunan [New Society] Sites and Serv-
ices) program built condominiums for friends and allies. Other
projects offered subsidized housing to the "politically favored"
wealthy (Gregorio-Medel 1989, 8).

Mrs. Marcos was reluctant to build houses for the poor believing this would make them "mendicant"
(Bello et. al. 1982, 107).

By the time of the Marcos' demise, the housing sector had liabili-
ties amounting to P1.76 billion and the industry was a labyrinth of
agencies and programs (almost entirely headed by political appoint-
tees) each duplicating, competing and overlapping each other's (al-
beit ill-defined) functions (9). In 1985 the housing industry was on
the verge of collapse. On the eve of the revolution all housing con-
struction was either cancelled or deferred (Abueva 1988, 69).

The Aquino Period

In the euphoria that surrounded the "people's revolution" of 1986
expectations among the urban poor were high that significant social
change would follow the political revolution. Nevertheless such con-
fidence sowed the seeds of its own destruction as the squatter popu-
lation of Metro Manila underwent incredible growth from those
confident of a new pro-poor order. Some urban poor areas doubled
in size in the years that followed EDSA (Murphy 1993a, 15). Through-
out the 1980s squatting grew at a phenomenal 12 percent per annum
(van Naerssen 1989, 201; Arn 1995, 199).

While Corazon Aquino was able to restore some order, her politi-
cal substructure also meant that her regime was unable to deliver
basic services and ensure justice, quality legislation and economic
management (Parrenas 1993, 73). Her support came noticeably from
those sidelined by the Marcos administration and American forces
keen to see an agreeable successor to Marcos (Pomery 1992, 279;
Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991, 4-5). While this allowed the President a
great deal of widely based authority it also meant that her support
was a coalition of fragile, shifting alliances. Consequently it has been
described as a fractious coalition predominantly melded by Aquino's
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charisma, popularity and political skill (Parrenas 1993, 70; Magno 1990, 219; Dohner and Haggard 1994, 14, 219).

While Aquino was elected president on the basis of a radical people’s power, popular consensus soon held that little had changed. Thus the events of the 1986 have often been referred to as a political rather than a social revolution (Magno 1993, 226; Dohner and Haggard 1994, 69; Haggard 1990, 250; Nemenzo 1988; Bulatao 1989, 324). As Timberman (1991, 158) has put it: “The reality is that the February uprising was a revolt against Marcos, not a revolution in Philippine politics and society.” Throughout the Aquino era, the bourgeoisie and cronies once again were able to consolidate their powerful positions. Aquino herself was from the hacienda-owning Cojuangco clan, “one of the wealthiest and most powerful dynasties within the Filipino oligarchy” (Anderson 1988, 3). Thus the Aquino-Cojuangco clan replaced the Marcos-Romualdez alliance at the palace in the process purging both Marcos’ supporters of their state assets and their political positions (Timberman 1991, 386). Bureaucratic reform was, in fact, reappointment on a grand political scale (Dohner and Haggard 1994, 75). Once again personalism emerged over policy. The 1987 constitution plebiscite became “Cory’s Constitution,” and Congressional candidates were “Cory’s Candidates” (Timberman 1991, 386).

The 1988 barangay elections, the first local elections since 1971, were a disappointment for progressives, particularly the Partido ng Bayan (PnB). While the PnB, was popular with the peasantry, working class and middle class it was comprehensively outspent and outmuscled at election time (Hawes 1989, 16–17). Hailed as a test of the strength of the left and of traditional family dominance, personal connections proved more important than ideological coherence. “In only a handful of contests did ideology and party political platforms play a significant role in determining the results” (Timberman 1991, 194). Political violence continued. In fact, more people died in the 1988 local polls than in the 1986 February revolution (195). Eighty-four percent of those who fashioned the new Congress were from traditional political clans and in keeping with pre-Martial Law traditions, the bulk of legislation sought special appropriations for local pork barrel projects (262). In the same campaigns progressive groups were “bruised and humbled” (Arquiza 1992, 246). Concurrently, Philippine income distribution remained one of the most unequal in the Third World (Dohner and Haggard 1994, 16; Jackson 1989). Filipino expectations over a better quality of democracy, one responsive enough
to address issues of land reform, equity and the bringing to justice of those human rights abusers of the past were never met (Hawes 1989, 27).

With a bankrupt public housing sector the Aquino regime was not able to meet ever increasing needs and the urban poor rarely benefited from her policies. Indeed the urban poor may have even become worse off (Constantino-David 1989, 32). In the 1980s, recession struck the Philippines and in particular Metro Manila with great effect. Real wages plummeted, unemployment rose, and child health figures steadily deteriorated (Solon 1988; Ramos-Jimenez et. al. 1988; Constantino-David 1989; Formilleza 1989). From its heady days in the 1950s, the Philippines had now come to be seen as the single greatest economic failure in a region packed with NICs, trailing all in ASEAN and harboring the greatest levels of poverty in the region (Pinches 1992, 390). Yet, in 1991 the Department of Social Welfare was still allocated just 1 percent of the national budget (McBeth 1991, 32).

What the new regime did see to was the creation of new housing agencies and the purging of previously Marcos-supported organizations. The centerpiece of the Aquino government was the National Shelter Program (NSP) which boldly estimated it would benefit 300,000 squatters in Metro Manila in her term alone (Gregorio-Medel 1989, 9). Within the NSP, there was a reorientation of housing away from direct provision toward providing mortgage finance directed at the poorest and the provision of in-city upgrading alternatives rather than resettlement outside the metropolis. What wasn't provided though was the land and money to make the plan work (ICSI, n.d). The conception may have failed miserably but there was no respite in the proliferation of agencies, commissions and reports on the housing crisis. The NSP involved no less than a dozen government organizations (Tojos et. al. n.d, 13). Additionally, in the first year of Aquino's term, two new agencies, namely the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), were established to coordinate, plan, and communicate with the poor. The emphasis was on the increased involvement of the private sector, to help in streamlining the functions of the various agencies and to reorient programs to the poorest (Gregorio-Medel 1989, 9). The result appeared to be even greater overlapping and decreasing coordination within the housing sector. An Ateneo de Manila University study found that the program had "glaring gaps between policy statements and program implementation" (ICSI n.d).
The PCUP is a piquant example of the possibilities and limitations of the immediate post-Marcos period. Established at the end of 1986 as a reaction to urban poor demands to have an organization that would work with them (van Naerssen 1989, 212), the PCUP was mandated to make recommendations to government, to help coordinate government policies, and even to aid in the facilitation of Urban Poor Organizations (UPOs) (Florano 1993, 16). Throughout its short life though, the PCUP was a weak and highly politicized organization. In its first seven years it had five changes of chair and three reorganizations. It has had a vague role in regard to other agencies and is greatly underfunded and poorly staffed. According to Florano (1993, 16), money has simply disappeared into the organization. As a result, the PCUP is greatly mistrusted by the urban poor and NGOs alike who both feel it needs to be purged of its political appointments and must have more policy clout to be meaningful (Mendoza and Rivera 1995, 5; Tojos et. al. n.d, 34; Arn 1995, 216). Following inauguration and in keeping with tradition, Ramos bypassed the agency and created his own Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty, thus adding yet another layer of bureaucracy to the encumbered list. Consequently the PCUP is now just one of three similar agencies with no real power nor influence to enforce its recommendations (Tabora 1993, 4).

Today, it is principally the NHA that is entrusted with housing construction and state programs for the urban poor. Established in 1975, it was formed to replace most previous organizations and to act as a central coordinating body of all housing activities. In its 1983 production, however, only 769 units were provided for the poor, whereas 4,000 were constructed for higher socioeconomic groups (Solon 1988, 181). Little action was undertaken regarding reform and policy initiatives. While it is still at the centerpiece of government plans, throughout its short life it has remained financially bankrupt and dependent on other organizations for external financing (Robles 1994b, 12). Indeed, Karaos (1994, 11) argues that the agency is so much in debt today that in order to survive it needs to directly profit from its housing programs. While in the past it had become involved in slum improvement, relocation, sites and services and the construction of affordable core housing units (Gregorio-Medel 1989, 9; NHA 1993) of late it can no longer even afford to purchase land for redistribution to the poor, subsequently relying on private sector contributions as part of its joint venture social housing program (Tojos n.d, 34; NHA 1994). As a result it has slowly moved away from sites and
services and upgrading toward medium rise constructions affordable only to the middle classes (Karaos 1994, 11; ICSI n.d). This has paralleled the desire of post-Marcos administrations to move toward a “facilitating” role in housing and away from the previous “building” role (Tojos et. al. n.d, 29). Consequently, the main organization entrusted with constructing houses for the urban poor is no longer doing this to any significant extent.

Even organizations with the objective of lending to the poor such as the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) in effect favor the middle classes (Robles 1994b, 12). A Private Sector Low Income Housing Association (PHILSHA) study showed that up to December 1992, 72 percent of money loaned for housing needs was to higher income borrowers. In the late 1980s in order to get a P100,000 loan from the HUDCC a homebuyer had to pay P7,000 in application and processing fees alone, the equivalent to an average earner’s two months salary (Tojos et. al. n.d, 36). The current Community Mortgage Program also appears to be undergoing this same fate (Karaos 1994, 11). Additionally the overlapping lending agencies are prone to compete with each other for housing loans (Tojos et. al. n.d., 37).

As a consequence, in Aquino’s term few significant structural changes benefited the housing sector and there was little improvement in urban poverty. Indeed, the situation appeared to have deteriorated. Housing agencies remained politicized and vulnerable. The housing sector continued to be chaotic, overlapping, uncoordinated and underfunded. The sector and the population were awash with laws, proclamations, bureaucracies and red tape. Between 1975 and the late 1980s no less than seventy five housing laws had been passed (15). The urban poor either ignored them or mistrusted the bureaucracies they had to deal with. Additionally, throughout Aquino’s term demolitions and forced resettlement to distant sites continued. Indeed, the average number of poor affected by demolitions throughout Aquino’s term averaged 100,000, with Quezon City alone issuing 100 court orders for official demolitions each year (Murphy 1993a, 9–15). Throughout Aquino’s term, public satisfaction over her administration’s handling of the housing crisis crashed from an approval rating of +32 in 1988 to -15 in mid-1992 (ACSPPA 1992, 8). Housing implementation continued to favor the more wealthy classes and agencies continued to be used as a source of pork barrel politics (Karaos 1994, 11).
Is Ramos More of the Same?

Throughout the 1992 presidential campaign Fidel Ramos portrayed himself as the non-traditional politician, but patronage politics remains alive and well in the 1990s (de Castro 1992, 42-47). Ramos, elected president as owner of the country’s largest book chain, mining and drilling operations (Sussman 1990, 41), is generally accepted to have won the presidency (with only 24 percent of the vote) because he had the superior patronage system (Parrenas 1993, 70). According to de Castro (1992, 65), the “going price” for a vote in the 1992 presidential campaign was P100. The election continued to demonstrate the importance and vitality of individuals, families and personalities vis-a-vis party politics (Gutierrez 1994). A former film star, Joseph Estrada became Vice President. In the same campaign, a lawyer representing one of the most significant of the Marcos cronies, Eduardo Cojuangco, is reported to have lectured to the press during the Presidential campaign: “let’s not waste time with a lot of propaganda crap about national interest . . . the bottom line is he is running for President to protect his own interests” (Pinches 1992, 397). As Wurfel (1988, 327) has put it, policy implementation has seldom been an important source of regime legitimacy.

Ramos’ principal policy package is “Philippines 2000” and his theme “A better quality of life for every Filipino” (Flores 1993, 1). The plan envisages a GDP growth rate of 6-8 percent from 1992 to 1998, a reduction in the poverty rate below 30 percent of the population, single-digit inflation, an increase in exports and investment, and an increase in annual per capita income to US$1,000 (Doronila 1994, 10). Progressive Senator Tañaña (1994, 91) has decried the plan’s lack of emphasis on land and urban reform, social access to basic needs, and addressing socio-economic inequalities. As such, the plan offers little in clear policy terms for the urban poor on the question of housing (Karaos 1993, 10-11). Indeed, a popular and cynical joke refers to “Philippines 2000” as meaning development of the Philippines in 2000 years!

Ramos inherited a housing sector in crisis. Housing executives warned in 1994 that if urban growth continued the Philippines faced an “urban nightmare” at the turn of the century (Nocum 1994, 8). Typically, early policy statements conveyed the government’s commitment to at least tackling the problem. Under the “Philippines 2000” program the regime over the following six year period aimed to pursue a two pronged policy of relocating 164,000 people to sites
outside Metro Manila and developing medium rise and rental complexes within Metro Manila (Yap and Ungson 1993; Flores 1993). The program, if implemented, is likely to cost hundreds of millions of pesos. Yet, IBON (1993, 8) estimates that even if all these targets are met, these grandiose plans will still only affect 10 percent of the squatter population. According to Mercene (1993, 47), to have a serious impact on the problem, the government would need to spend P180 billion to build 1.2 million low cost housing units by the end of the decade, a task that economically, as well as politically, appears to be an impossible dream. Concurrently, in 1994 Manuel Villar warned that the existing housing industry faced collapse due to a lack of funding (Manila Chronicle June 1994, 4).

Conversely, other aspects of the “Philippines 2000” program, such as the building of circumferential roads, require massive demolition and relocation (Rodriguez 1994, B-24). Poverty issues are clearly taking a back seat in “Philippines 2000” and demolitions continue regularly (Rivera and Mendoza 1996, 7–9). There is a lack of interest in urban poor issues in Congress and a hostile attitude towards their Sectoral Representative. Urban poor issues are often “shelved indefinitely” (interview, 16 June 1994). This has continued well into the Ramos administration’s housing targets and programs. While in 1992 an Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) regulation called for local officials to make lists for people to avail themselves of social housing program, by mid-1994 the Manila Chronicle reported that “records at the interior and local government departments shows that not a single local government unit has complied with the new housing law” (Agoncillo 1994, 3). There remains an embattled attitude of the authorities to the urban poor. For the poor the government has lost credibility, particularly when it comes to promises regarding relocation and compensation. For the authorities a kind of conflict mentality prevails. In one recent example from an infrastructural project of the administration, a civil engineer, when asked why his organization did not give squatters the legally required thirty day notice to move before demolition, responded, “It’s war. In war you don’t warn your enemies” (Murphy 1993b, 5).

But while Ramos pledged in 1992 to purge the country of the real causes of squatting, those professional squatters (including officials, police and army personnel) who exploit and stop the poor from taking advantage of current program, not one person has been arrested on this law (Robles 1994a, 10). Additionally, in late 1995 Ramos vetoed a bill that would have extended the moratorium on demolitions
enshrined within the UDHA. In so doing, this was the first time in the three-and-a-half year presidency in which Ramos had used his veto powers (Karaos 1995, 25).

Meanwhile, self-reported congressional millionaires increased during their terms between 1992 and 1994. On election there were 185 peso millionaires, but by May 1994 this had increased to 196 of the 212 members. The least wealthy was the urban poor representative (de Guzman 1994, 1). In an interview, a sectoral representative in Congress noted that "politics is still the biggest business in the Philippines" (interview, 16 June 1994). "Philippine political life remains defined by special interests vying for government favors in the form of bureaucracy, regulation and protectionism" and "paralyzed by politics" (Tiglao 1994, 5). Throughout 1994 and 1995, Ramos struggled to get initiatives passed by the legislature and implemented, often having to use financial pork barrel inducements, even to those in his own party! (Tiglao 1994, 23). In 1994, the importance of the elite in controlling the barangay was again exposed when Congressional members took leave to "work" in their home provinces during the campaign period, as victory was key to their own reelection in 1995 (Ng 1994, 10). In the 1995 Senate elections most violence, fraud and post-election protests occurred at the local level (Alegre 1995, 5). As recently as 1995 Riedinger (1995, 209) was lamenting the time worn problem that "(the) autonomy and capacity of the Philippine state are constrained by elite penetration of the state and the exclusionary nature of Philippine democracy." Indeed, as the mayor of a Mindanao town has recently been quoted as saying, "(politics) has not changed here and never will" (Tiglao 1994, 22).

**Conclusion**

This article has sought to establish the issue of housing the urban poor as a socio-political issue as much, if not more than, a solely economic or technical problem. In utilizing this level of inquiry it is possible to regard the demise and poor performance of previous housing policies as reflective of the low importance attached to the urban poor, in turn an indication of the lack of (political) pressure that historically the poor have had on policy and the distribution of state resources (Grindle 1980, 9-10). This is not unique to the Philippines and similar conclusions have been drawn from Nairobi and Cali (Temple and Temple 1980; Rothenberg 1980). Consequently, the
issue of housing the urban poor can and should be placed into the orbit of state-society relations. Critical to this is an understanding of the culture and functions of the Third World state. Neopatrimonial state literature provides explanatory tools that shed some light on the reasons for the lack of commitment of governments to the policies which could at least go some way to housing the Third World urban poor. As a mechanism of and for the elite, the state acts both as a means for personal position and gain and ensures, through patronage ties, the subordination and disempowerment of dependent clients. In viewing housing through this framework, it should come as no surprise that bureaucracies are so weak and ineffective, that the state has neglected (and has not been able to solve) urban poor needs and that plans that favor the urban poor are rarely or weakly implemented.

Although altered by time and circumstance and the ways in which successive Presidents have exploited it, the patron-client system has been and remains the fundamental political order in the Philippines. Examining Filipino politics and state-society relations through clientelism is more productive than comparable analysis of conventional political institutions such as parties, laws and constitutions. I would be amiss in not stating that the neopatrimonial model is not without its critics. For a recent critique see Kerkvliet (1995). Such a system is not contingent in its degree of responsiveness to problems such as urban poverty and housing. Subsequently, as Constantino-David (1989, 36–37) has argued, the state has historically doubly failed. It has failed to design programs that are responsive to the needs and priorities of the urban poor, and additionally, the bureaucracy has been unable to properly and efficiently implement programs that benefit the most in need. Any meaningful political analysis of the Philippines and issues of (housing) poverty and marginalization needs to account for this political operation of power.

Yet despite the appearance of continuity and worsening conditions of poverty and housing in the capital, no system is changeless and opportunities do exist for change outside of revolution or subjection (Timberman 1991). Though globalization offers threats of peripheral exploitation and laissez-faire approaches to poverty it also spawns increased forms of localization and resistance. At present, and though problematic, this is measured through the proliferation of NGOs and UPOs. Though uneven, civil society (through these actors) has made some breakthroughs over the years, whether viewed in the overthrow of Martial Law, in the anti-U.S. bases campaign or the legislative
breakthrough of UDHA. Through increased participation in particularly barangay elections and the growing numerical weight of Civil Society, some hope does exist for change. At least the urban poor and their allies (NGOs) have to some extent recognized the political nature of their daily lives. Nevertheless, this is likely to be a long and difficult struggle. Clientelism has created a form of political culture and politics that has penetrated to the grassroots of political participation (Kamrava 1993b, 168). This has manifested itself in a lack of interpersonal trust, mistrust of others' intentions, cynicism and high degrees of currency given to control and conspiracy theories (154). As a result, unity and cohesion have not been hallmarks of the response to state subjugation. With the demise of the left, it is up to these actors to provide an alternative to the status quo and illusions such as the "Philippines 2000" program. In the absence of a powerful and effectual resistance, the Filipino urban poor are liable to face a bleak future into the twenty-first century.

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