Familism Among Muslims and Christians in the Philippines

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Luis Q. Lacar

The importance and centrality of the family among Muslim and Christian Filipinos is one of the most distinctive aspects of Philippine social life that observers of the local scene cannot help but immediately note (Rivera and McMillan 1952; Hunt et. al. 1986; Hunt 1966; Eshleman 1974). The focal role of the Filipino family is clearly manifested in its willingness and ability to continue to care for its aged, the sick, and in assisting family members, immediate and not-so-immediate, in times of financial difficulty and need. In most developed societies of the world like America, Japan, Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain, much of the function traditionally performed by the family has been effectively taken over by or handed over to organized institutional arrangements such as housing for the elderly, day care centers for children, and welfare assistance programs for the sick, socially displaced, and unemployed.

So important is the family in the psychic and sociopolitical dynamics of Philippine society that in 1987, the family was enshrined in the fundamental law of the land. Articles 2 and 15, sections 12 and 4, respectively of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, for instance, provide that:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall

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equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the government. (Art. 2, sec. 12)

The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security. (Art. 15, sec. 4)

What is Filipino Familism?

Familism is a sociological phenomenon in which the extended family is the most central and dominant institution in the life of all individuals. Familism demands that the loyalty, commitment, and devotion of each member be organized and focused around the family as a closely knit social, economic, and political unit. It is characterized by obligatory mutual assistance, filial piety, hierarchy of power and authority based on age and birth order, and total and unquestioning support and allegiance from and to all members of the extended family. It is said that all societies in the world go through a stage in their growth and development during which familism becomes a central and dominant social force. Its salience and centrality, however, is said to diminish as societies become more complex, urbanized and industrialized (Bottomore and Nisbet 1978; Hodges 1971). It appears, however, that in some societies, familism has become so entrenched in the value system of its people that it constitutes a formidable force to contend with. In some instances it seems to be the most central and primary institution that controls all other facets of society (Hunt 1966). The Philippines seems to be one such society.

Traditionally, Filipino familism meant, in addition to filial piety and loyalty, strong bonds with one's family of orientation and procreation, interdependence, mutual assistance, and the assumption of obligations to every known kith and kin who come for help in times of need. Pal and Arquiza (1957) denominate Filipino familism as

a privilege-obligation system with each member enjoying privileges from the other members at one stage and discharging obligations to other members at another stage in his life, and enjoying privileges from the other members and at the same time fulfilling obligations to other members.

Because of familism, it is not uncommon for older brothers and sisters in a family to postpone plans for their own lives, such as
settling down in marriage or advancing their own career interest and welfare in favor of the needs and interests of younger siblings or nieces and nephews. The more economically fortunate the individual is, the greater the social expectation for him/her to render assistance to the less fortunate. In addition, traditional norms expect children to help provide for the financial and welfare needs of their parents especially during the latter's old age.

Unfortunately, the pervasiveness of Philippine familism has also been pinpointed as one of the primary culprits in the persistence of extensive nepotism and the attendant graft and corruption that tend to accompany nepotism in the government and in the consequent inability of the nation to develop economically (Hunt 1966; Rivera and McMillan 1952). It has been variously argued, for instance, that the demands of economically nonproductive relatives on an economically active and productive member of the family severely limit the ability of the latter to invest in activities with economic and growth and development potential for society (Hunt 1966).

Graft and corruption is the most prominent and recurrent issue in all elections in the Philippines. There is no election in the country, be it local or national, in which graft and corruption is not the central and dominant issue in the campaign. Every candidate who desires to be elected will promise to remove the grantees and corruptions in office if elected. Once elected, however, they become again the target of another round of accusation about graft and corruption. This cycle has gone on for generations and will probably go on for generations more unless something really drastic in terms of changes in values that spawn this phenomenon will take place.

Quite a number of laws have been passed to curb and eliminate graft and corruption in the government of the Philippines, but the level of corruption goes on unabated despite the laws and public denunciation by the public and by political aspirants against corruption. Among Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines has the most number of laws against corruption and the most number of agencies created by the government to implement ant graft and anticorruption laws. However, the Philippines remains as the most graft-ridden government among all Asian nations judging from the discussions and scandals that continue to center around graft and corruption. In not a few instances, the agencies created to fight corruption are themselves the object of criticism for being corrupt. Familism is one of the strongest factors that seem to be at the core
of the persistence of a very high level of corruption. Politicians and others justify corruption by saying that "there is nothing wrong with providing for one's family."

Among minority groups such as the Maranao and Maguindanao Muslims of Southern Philippines, familism is also observed to be as vibrant, if not even more so, as among other Philippine ethnic groups. Being Muslim makes the family among the Maranao and Maguindanao even more paramount since in Islam one's duty and obligation to the members of the extended family is intimately linked to one's faith (iman), which must be translated into action (amal) (Eliade 1987; Glass 1989). In addition, for the Maranao and Maguindanao Muslims, customary norms of maratabat (word of honor and personal pride) make any violation of the value of familism an extremely painful and uncomfortable psychological event for the transgressor. Among lowland Christian ethnic groups, hiya and utang na loob operate with the same psychological impact as maratabat.

Regardless of ethnic groups, it can be asserted with some degree of confidence and certainty that the notion of damayan, tinabangay, awidan (sharing, helping, and supporting kin) are social forces that help galvanize the centrality of familism and the concomitant privilege-obligation syndrome attached to this value among all Philippine ethnic groups.

Change in Philippine Values

The persistence of some deeply rooted Filipino values notwithstanding, changes are nevertheless occurring. Like any other values, many time-honored values are yielding to change. The family itself has not been spared the onslaught of change, and some of the most cherished values that make the Filipino family distinctive and strong are also changing, some very slowly but others more rapidly and radically. Various factors are at work in these changes.

Indigenized Western-type politics learned from our former colonizers, has probably made the most devastating alterations in our values of familism. It is a matter of public knowledge, for example, that intense involvement in the political processes among our people, has torn families apart. Some of the family cleavages due to politics seem to be beyond repair. While it is probably true that politics has also welded some families together even more tightly, the
instances of families that have irreparably drifted apart beyond reconciliation because of politics appear to be much more widespread than those which have been bonded together.

Quite a number of Filipino families ripped apart by politics can be cited, but among the classic and popular cases of recent memory are the Cojuangcos of Tarlac and the Duranos and Osmeñas of the province of Cebu. It may be recalled that Danding Cojuangco, first cousin of Mrs. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, was a very close political ally and personal friend of Ferdinand Marcos, arch enemy and political rival of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, husband of Corazon Cojuangco Aquino. When Ninoy was persecuted and later imprisoned by Marcos during the Martial Law period, Danding Cojuangco did not lift a finger at all to help Benigno as expected. When Marcos was toppled from power, Danding was one of the Marcos cronies banished in the United States and was not allowed to return by Mrs. Aquino who had become President of the Philippines. Eventually, however, he was able to return and run for the 1992 presidential elections against Fidel Ramos, who was hand-picked by Mrs. Aquino as her successor. Fidel Ramos was one of those who engineered the downfall of Marcos. He is a very close blood relative of Marcos.

The Osmeñas of the province of Cebu, known to be a very close-knit family, were seriously divided in the 1992 elections. The Duranos, also of Cebu province, provide yet another case study. A Durano killed a brother Durano because of politics. The Duranos boast of and have been known to be very close to each other.

Some argue that the divisive impact of Philippine politics on the family is confined largely among the more ambitious elite. There is probably some truth to this observation. Given, however, the intensity with which the followers from the masses throw their support behind the politically ambitious elite, it is not entirely presumptuous to state that the family divisions due to politics among the masses are just as extensive as they are among the elites.

Exposure to alternative forms of thinking, lifestyles, and values through mass, electronic and print media, travel, and contact with other people who have different outlooks and values, are the other sources of the changes sweeping the value firmament of the Philippines.

Schools appear to be the most obvious institutions that exert pressures for change, both at the individual and structural levels, for schools place individuals and their values under stress and strain in the process of performing their functions in society, such as when imparting knowledge to their clients. For instance, in teaching
universalistic values of meritocracy, schools may be indirectly teaching other values which are incongruent or diametrically opposed to those that students have been socialized into in the family. The disjunctive and incongruent values taught by schools and those imparted by the families exert tremendous pressure upon the students and put them in the crucible of change.

Schooling is also an intersystemic experience that has dissociative consequences for individuals. Dissociation is the process whereby an individual’s attachment and commitment to his/her traditional social norms are radically diminished and altered while his/her attachment and commitment to alternative norms he/she comes in contact with are disproportionately increased. Dissociation occurs most strongly in an intersystemic situation. Schooling is an intersystem experience that changes the values and outlooks of individuals. The physical and psychological mobility occasioned by schooling is dissociative because it brings new awareness of alternative behavior modes, facilitate attribution of meaning to these alternative behavior modes in terms of their centrality, attractiveness and potency, and provides opportunities for trying the new behavior modes within a new normative framework. Formal education is a dissociative intersystemic experience because it provides both physical and psychological mobility to individuals. It further gives an individual long enough time in intersystemic contact during which attitudes and perspectives are bound to change.

Among Filipino Muslims, in the early years of the 1960s and until the later part of the 1960s, going to schools established by the Christian-dominated government of the country was something they vigorously resisted and avoided. They suspected these schools to be subtle agents for their conversion away from Islam and their customs and traditions (Isidro 1968; Isidro and Saber 1968; Saber and Madale 1975; Lacar 1980 and 1991). The resistance of the Muslims to participate in the educational system of the government was such that at one point, the government felt compelled to employ drastic measures to force compliance among them to let their children go to school. Some pretended compliance by sending their slaves and the children of their slaves. Muslim women in particular were especially kept away from the kafir (infidel) influence of the schools as Filipino Muslims consider their women precious and to be protected at all costs. Muslims feared that not only would their women be converted to Christianity, but that they would also be lured away from Muslim men.
In the 1960s, however, Muslims begun to realize that keeping their children from obtaining education in the government-recognized schools was self-defeating, as this was a strategy that actually deprived many of them of the economic benefits that studying in these schools gave. Those who insisted in patronizing only the madrasah suffered most in terms of the economic rewards that schooling gave. The reason for this is that the madrasah curriculum was only up to the primary level and the subject matter focused mainly on reading, reciting and memorizing the Qur’an. There were no subjects in the vocational and technical skills. In effect, madrasah schooling was an educational dead end which prepared Filipino Muslims for neither employment nor the possibility of secondary education. By the time many Muslims realized this catastrophe, there was already a tremendous time lag in their economic standing in comparison to many Christians. The Philippine government responded by creating the Commission for National Integration, which immediately launched a massive scholarship aid program for the Muslim minorities. Despite its obvious failures, the CNI made significant gains in terms of educating a good number of Filipino Muslims through the government-recognized educational institutions. Beginning in the later part of the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s, the population of Filipino Muslims seeking entrance into government schools and even into private sectarian and religiously run Christian schools begun to swell in an unprecedented fashion unknown and inexperienced in the past (Hunt 1954; Lacar 1988, 1991). Muslim women who used to be shielded from the influence of the government schools started to enroll in large numbers and enter into disciplines previously considered taboo and unthinkable for Muslim women in the Philippines. Today, Muslim males and females continue to increase in number in schools all over the country in all academic disciplines (Lacar 1988).

Previous Studies on Filipino Familism

Because of the dissociative effects of schooling on peoples’ values, students are very appropriate subjects for the study of deviations from and adherence to certain values considered central in a society. Studies on deviations from and adherence to familism among students are, therefore, appropriate and important as familism is a central value of Filipino society.
MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS

Given the acknowledged centrality of familism in Philippine social life, the scant empirical research on the subject, particularly as it affects individual members of the family who are exposed to intersystemic experiences in academic institutions, seems less pertinent. The most seminal study on Philippine familism was done by Pal and Arquiza in the 1950s using as their subjects lowland Christian college students, a majority of whom were from the Visayas. Obviously, their data are now quite dated and since then, there has been no known empirical work on the subject matter.

Among Filipino Muslims, there seems absolutely no study at all done on familism. While there is related research on Filipino Muslim families, studies specifically dealing with familism among them are virtually unknown.

The focus of the Pal and Arquiza study was on the socioeconomic characteristics of college students who deviate from or adhere to the value of familism. Within the limitations of their study, Pal and Arquiza arrived at the following conclusions: men are more likely than women to deviate from familism. Among women, however, they could not find any relationship in the patterns of their deviations from or adherence to the tradition of familism. Economic status was associated with familism. For example, high socioeconomic background was positively correlated with deviations from familism while lower socioeconomic status was associated with greater tendency to adhere to familism. There were no differences in the attitudes towards familism among Catholic and Protestant respondents. The number of siblings the respondents have and the size of their family were not related to familism. Respondents from urban areas showed a greater tendency to deviate from familism. However, no definite relationship was found between rural residence and familism. Likewise, it was found that those who desired rural areas as their permanent residence in the future showed also a greater tendency to adhere to familism whereas no definite relationship was observed among those who indicated a desire to make urban areas as their places of destination in the future.

Since the pioneering study of Pal and Arquiza, no one, as far as can be determined, has done any further study on the subject of familism in the Philippines. Among the Muslim groups in the Philippines, no single study on the subject can be found.

Two studies on Maranao Muslim family values in Marawi City seem to indicate that familism is indeed very strong among the
Maranaos (Sarip 1985; Abdullah 1984). These studies, however, focused entirely on the Maranao Muslim women and give practically no information on the familistic orientation of Maranao Muslim men and the younger generation of students. Among Maguindanao Muslims of Cotabato and the Muslims of Jolo and Sulu islands, no study on the subject has been found.

Dizon, in a study of a representative sample of Manila-based Filipino Christian managers, discovered that while there seems to be a trend toward the weakening of familistic orientation, familism shows signs of strong persistence even among groups who may be expected to follow it least. He found out, for instance that familism was still very pervasive among the Filipino managers that he studied (Dizon 1973).

Lacar (1974), in a national sample to test the Catholic-Protestant fertility differential hypothesis found no differences in the familistic orientation of Catholic and Protestant subjects and found that vestiges of familism were still strong among the college student sample in his study.

**The Present Study**

The study summarized here was conducted to assess the status of the value of familism among two segments of the Philippine population exposed to the intersystemic experience in social institutions that are known to have significant dissociative consequences on the values and attitudes of people who come in contact with them. More specially, the study sought to establish a benchmark for the status of familism as a value among Muslims and Christians in Southern Philippines; determine and compare the strength or weakness of the value of familism among Muslims and Christians; evaluate the impact of schooling on the value of familism among Muslims and Christians; and determine the extent to which Muslim and Christian students deviate from or adhere to familism.

Improving on the work of Pal and Arquiza, this study devised a Familism Scale (henceforth referred to as FMS) containing 21 questions to which the respondents were asked to either agree or disagree with. Five responses to each question were possible. These responses ranged from AGREE VERY STRONGLY to DISAGREE VERY STRONGLY. Each response was designated a score. An AGREE VERY STRONGLY response scored 5, which indicates high adherence to the
value of familism. Conversely, a DISAGREE VERY STRONGLY response was scored 1, which signifies very low adherence to or very high deviation from the value of familism.

The FMS has not been tested for reliability, validity, and repeatability. It was constructed for the purpose of this study only. It seems, however, to indicate unidimensionality as shown by the value of the item intercorrelations.

The 21 questions of the FMS may be grouped into 9 clusters. Each cluster or group pertains to an aspect or dimension of family life considered central by Filipinos. Among these aspects are the (1) obligation/responsibility of older siblings to help their parents educate younger siblings; (2) priority of the needs of younger siblings over the needs of older ones; (3) obligation/responsibility of older siblings to help solve problems of younger siblings; (4) obligation/responsibility of younger siblings to respect and obey older ones at all times; (5) priority of the needs of the family vis-à-vis the needs of the individual member; (6) individual family member’s obligation/responsibility to parents during the latter’s old age; (7) respondent’s attitude toward the traditional expectation that it is their responsibility and obligation to house and shelter their parents during the latter’s old age within their homes; (8) respondent’s attitude toward the traditional expectation about the role of parents in the choice of a marriage partner; (9) attitude toward housing and sheltering old parents in government-provided institutions away from their children. The area on children’s attitude toward the traditional expectation on where parents should be housed and sheltered during their old age had more questions than others.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that the work of Pal and Arquiza reports the agreement or disagreement of their Christian subjects to only one question, which was considered as an index of familism. The question of Pal and Arquiza was as follows:

You should not marry immediately after your graduation so that you can help your parents educate your younger brothers and sisters.

Response: _ Agree
     _ Disagree

The corresponding question in the FMS is question Number 1 found in part 2 of the research instrument, which reads:
Older sons and daughters should not marry immediately after graduation so that they can help their parents send their younger brothers and sisters to school.

Responses:  
- 5 = Agree very strongly  
- 4 = Agree  
- 3 = Undecided  
- 2 = Disagree  
- 1 = Disagree very strongly

This study has introduced several substantial improvements on the work of Pal and Arquiza by including several questions which reflect some of the many dimensions of the value of familism among Filipinos. The FMS seems to indicate unidimensionality as shown by the value of the item intercorrelations. It is recognized, however, that there is a need to subject the FMS to a separate study of validity and reliability.

The localities covered by the research are: the cities of Iligan, Marawi, Cotabato, General Santos, and Pagadian. Other places covered were: Midsayap in North Cotabato; Pikit in Maguindanao; and Tacurong in South Cotabato.

A total of 1,552 random probability sample of students were asked to fill out the research instrument containing the FMS. These students can be considered as typical or representative of students in the region of the research. Of the 1,552 filled questionnaires, only 1,500 were used in the final analysis. The other 52 questionnaires were discarded because they either had too many unanswered or improperly answered questions. The 1,500 usable questionnaires were distributed as follows: 4th year high school, 30 percent; 1st year college, 23 percent; 2nd and 3rd year college, 17 percent each; and 4th year college, 13 percent (Table 1).

The 1,500 samples consisted of 62 percent Christians and 38 percent Muslims. Muslims, therefore, are overrepresented in the sample while Christians are underrepresented relative to their respective total population in the country. Nationally, Muslims constitute only about 5 percent of the Philippine population while Christians constitute about 95 percent.

Females in the sample outnumber the males: 63.44 percent of the total sample size were females (Table 1).

The type of community of origin of the total sample is as follows: 46 percent are from the rural areas while 54 percent are from the urban areas. The proportion of respondents intending to make rural
### Table 1. Summary of Selected Characteristic of Sample

_N = 1,500_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Year/Level of School/College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th year high school</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st year college</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd year college</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd year college</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th year college</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religion/Sex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Type of Community Presently Residing In</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Type of Community Desired as Future Residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
areas their permanent residence in the future indicate a migration trend to the urban centers. Only 34 percent said that they intend to live in a rural community in the future while 66 percent said that they intend to live in an urban community in the future (Table 1).

Attitudinal studies focusing on student population have had their share of criticisms on the ground that the students do not necessarily represent the frame of mind and attitude of the larger population. However, for the nature of the problem under consideration, students are a most appropriate subject. Given that students today will constitute a crucial segment of the Philippine population tomorrow, knowledge of their attitudes toward aspects of Philippine social life critically important to our national direction will allow us to predict with a greater degree of accuracy the shape of things in the future. If only for these reasons, studies which focus on the changing values of students are very justified.

Furthermore, pinpointing areas of convergence and commonality among Filipino Muslims and Christians is important in our efforts at national unity. It seems that for too long now, there has been a trend toward emphasizing and enlarging the differences that separate Muslims and Christians in the country. The elements that bind them more meaningfully seem to be ignored or underplayed. Studies that attempt to identify some of the critical points of convergence of vital values among Christians and Muslims in the Philippines may be an area which needs more highlighting. Perhaps, there are more convergences than divergences among Filipino Muslims and Christians than we have been willing to admit and acknowledge up to this time and that the common values that we share are far greater in importance that the outward differences that we have thus far allowed to divide us for many centuries now.

The main hypothesis advanced by this study is that Muslims and Christians show similarly strong values of familism. Data gathered and analyzed, however, show very succinctly that as a whole Muslims are more familistic in their values than Christians. As a group, the average familism scores of Muslims on all the 9 clusters or groups of questions in the FMS is 4.36, which indicates a strong adherence to the traditional expectations of the family.

On the other hand, Christians as a group obtained an average familism score of 3.82. This score is close to the margin of uncertainty and possibly a transition stage towards deviance. It may be recalled that a score of 3 means that the respondent is undecided on whether to adhere or deviate from the value under consideration.
Being undecided denotes marginality and a potential transition stage toward eventual deviation (Table 2).

A t-test of the average familism scores of Muslims and Christians indicates that the two groups differ significantly from each other, with the Muslims closest to adherence and Christians closest to deviation. Muslim subjects as a whole tend consistently to be more familistic in their responses to all clusters of questions, while Christians tend to bunch closer to the deviant side of the scale.

An area in which there appears to be a very radical divergence between Muslims and Christians pertains to the role of parents in choosing marital partners for the children. Muslim respondents scored almost twice higher than Christians (4.28 and 2.97, respectively) in this particular question. Muslims appear to accept the tradition of allowing parents to choose their marriage partners while Christians reject the idea strongly. In most Islamic traditions, the role of parents in the choice of marriage partners is accepted almost without any question.

It might be mentioned that the practice of parentally arranged marriages known as penggaraya among Filipino Maranao Muslims is still widespread today even among highly educated families (Saripada 1992). The practice, however, is slowly being questioned by a tiny but significant segment of the Maranao Muslim population (Lacar and Lacar 1989). The data in this study seems to indicate however that penggaraya will be with Filipino Muslim society for a much longer time to come.

Christians, on the other hand, tend to score lower than Muslims on all questions and the differences in their responses point toward a trend of greater deviation from the familistic orientation.

There are, however, two questions in the FMS in which Muslim and Christian respondents were very alike in their attitudes. These questions relate to the housing of parents during old age in government-provided institutions away from their children and the traditional expectation to house old parents within the children's residence.

The average score of the Muslim subjects on the question of housing old parents in government-provided shelter institution is 2.55 while the average scores of the Christians is 2.58. On the tradition of housing parents within the household of the children, the Christians' average score is 3.91 while the average scores of Muslim respondents is 3.93. These mean scores are not statistically different. They indicate that Muslims are just as likely as Christians to want to fulfill the traditional expectation of housing parents within the
Table 2. Mean Scores of Muslim and Christian Respondents on Nine Dimensions/Clusters of the Familism Scale
N = 1,500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension/Cluster in the scale</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Obligation/Responsibility of older siblings to help parents educate younger siblings</td>
<td>4.92*</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Priority of the needs of younger siblings over the needs of older ones</td>
<td>4.76*</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Obligation/Responsibility of older siblings to help solve problems of younger ones</td>
<td>4.94*</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Obligation/Responsibility of younger siblings to obey/respect older siblings at all times</td>
<td>4.96*</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Priority of the needs of the family vis-à-vis needs of the individual member</td>
<td>4.39*</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Individual family member’s financial obligation/responsibility to parents during the latter’s old age</td>
<td>4.48*</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Attitude towards traditional expectation to house and shelter parents in children’s households during their parents’ old age</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.91 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Attitude toward the practice of parents choosing children’s marital partners</td>
<td>4.28*</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Attitude toward housing and sheltering old parents in institutions provided by the government away from the children</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.58 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average Scores</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Differences in Mean Score is statistically significant at p<=.05
ns = Differences in Mean Score not statistically significant at p<=.05
children's household and to reject strongly the idea of housing elderly parents in government-provided shelter institutions.

It appears, therefore, that providing shelter for the elderly away from the children will most likely fail in the country. Perhaps, this is the reason why homes for the elderly, known as senior citizens' homes in the United States, have not caught the enthusiasm of people in the Philippines as much as they have in America. There is only one known shelter for the elderly in the Philippines located in Quezon City called the Golden Acre, established and managed by a private institution. The occupancy rate by elderly clients of this place is not as it should have been expected.

The scores on the issue of housing parents within the children's household seem to indicate an uncertainty or undecidedness. However, they are still much closer to the side of the familistic spectrum. Both religious groups, however, tend to disagree very strongly with the idea of housing old parents in government-provided shelters away from their children.

It may be concluded, therefore, that while both Muslims and Christians in this study still show familistic orientation, Muslims tend to be much more strongly familistic in their attitude compared to Christians. Elements of ambivalence in the attitude of both Muslim and Christian respondents in regard to housing and sheltering elderly parents within their own households are indicated but both groups would reject an institutional arrangement which provides housing and shelter for their old parents away from them.

One of the primary differences between the present study and the Pal and Arquiza research is that the latter only assumed that the familism they found among their subjects was the consequence of schooling. For instance, the authors assumed that the proportion of respondents who agreed or disagreed with the statement of familism did so as a result of having been in school. However, there was really no attempt to test directly the impact of schooling as such on the values of familism either through some form of correlational analysis or other methods appropriate for the purpose. In the present study, we have included the variable of years in school and correlated this variable with the familism scores. By adding this variable and correlating it with the respondents' familism scores, we were able to measure the effect of schooling on the value of familism.

Table 3 shows the impact of schooling on familism scores. Among Muslims, lower educational attainment is associated with higher
familism scores while higher educational attainment is associated with lower familism scores. For instance, among the 4th year high school students, the average familism score is 4.50 while those who were in 4th year college had an average familism score of 4.20. The differences in the average familism scores of all the year levels among Muslims are all statistically significant.

Table 3. Mean Familism Scores of Respondents By Religious Groups and Level of Education N = 1,500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Year High School</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Year College</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Year College</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Year College</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Year College</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average Score</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$t$ test values of all cells compared are significant at $p<.05$

Among the Christians, a similar pattern is discernible. For example, among the 4th year high school respondents, the average familism score is 4.20 while among those who were in 4th year college, the average familism score is 3.20. Like the Muslim group, the average familism scores of the Christians decrease as years in school increase.

The data indicate clearly that years in school and familism are inversely related, i.e., the higher the educational attainment of the students, the greater their tendency to deviate from the traditional expectations of the family and conversely; the lower their educational level, the greater the tendency to adhere to traditional patterns of expectation. The intersystemic experience of schooling does seem to have a tremendous impact on the familistic orientations of the individuals in this study.
It seems, however, that Muslims as a group show a greater tendency toward stronger adherence to the traditional family expectations than do Christians at all levels of educational attainment. The data about the impact of schooling on the familistic values of the respondents seem to confirm previous research on the dissociative consequences of the intersystemic experience of schooling on the changes in values. In this study, those who are in the lower years of schooling show closer attachment to the traditional familistic orientation than those who are in the higher years of schooling.

Daniel Lerner (1958) and Alex Inkeles (1961) have already provided sufficient research evidence from studies in other cultures in underdeveloped countries showing the impact of schooling on the values of traditionalism. These scholars found that traditionalistic values of people slowly become replaced by a modernistic orientation as they move up the educational ladder. The data these scholars obtained suggest very strongly that the sharpest turning point—the point at which change appears to occur most dramatically—appears to be after six years of schooling. The implication with regards to this study seems to be that a sample of students from grade 1 to 3rd year high school should be studied. In this study, we have deliberately limited our sample to students in 4th year high school to 4th year college. It now appears that there is a need to study students from grade one to third year high school.

Schools, therefore, appear to be critical points of change in values regardless of the complaints that they are not performing according to expectations. Whether this area of change in which the influence of education appears to have a clear impact is to be encouraged, is extremely difficult to say. It would seem, however, that if education is making significant inroads in the particular value of familism, then it is very likely that it is also changing the other values of our people.

Perhaps, the changes in the other values of the students that are occurring because of schooling have not emerged in the form of tangible actions but it does appear that their seeds are already sown in the right places. How soon the nation will see the fruition of these seeds, we cannot now say for certain.

Pal and Arquiza found out that their respondents from urban areas had a greater tendency to deviate from familism but could not detect a definite relationship between rural residence and familism.

Our data (Table 4) depict that rural residence among male Muslims is significantly related with familism scores. The mean scores
of rural Muslim respondents is 4.4 compared to 4.2 among urban male Muslim residents. The difference in the mean scores is significant at the five percent level of probability. Likewise, among female rural Muslims, residence is significantly associated with familistic orientation, i.e., female Muslims from rural areas are more familistic in their orientation than their urban counterparts.

Table 4. Mean Familism Scores of Respondents by Religious Groups, Sex, and Type of Community Presently Residing in N = 1,500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Total</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among Christians, males and females from the rural areas do not differ in their familism but differ from their urban counterparts. Both male and female rural residents among Christians are more familistic than their urban brothers and sisters. However, among the urban group, the males tend to deviate more from familism while females tend to adhere to the value of familism (Table 4).

Rural Muslims as a whole are more familistic than rural Christians. Urban Muslims as a group also are more familistic than urban Christians (Table 4).

The pattern of the familism scores of the respondents according to the type of community in which they intend to reside in the future is very similar to the patterns of responses according to the type of their present community of residence.

Again, Muslims, both males and females, who intend to make rural communities as their permanent residence in the future tend to score higher in indices of familism than those who intend to reside in an urban community in the future.

Likewise, among Christians, the pattern is similar. Whether male or female, Christians and Muslims alike who desire as their future permanent residence a rural community are likely to adhere to
familistic expectations than those who have inclinations to reside in urban communities.

In the study of Pal and Arquiza, a higher socioeconomic background was positively associated with deviations from familism, i.e., the higher the socioeconomic background of the respondents, the greater the tendency to deviate from traditional family expectations and conversely, the lower the socioeconomic background, the lesser the tendency to deviate from familism.

Table 5. Mean Familism Scores of Respondents By SES and Religious Group

\[ N = 1.500 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio Economic Status</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Total</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ t\text{-test among all cells compared are significant at } p<=.05 \]

Our data confirm the hypothesis of Pal and Arquiza for both Muslim and Christian groups. As may be seen from Table 5, lower class respondents tend to be also more familistic than upper class individuals while upper class respondents tend to be less familistic in their orientation.

The pattern of the differences in the familism scores of the different socioeconomic classes for both Muslims and Christians shows very clearly that the lower the socioeconomic status of the individuals, the higher also their familism scores. However, among Christians, the drop in the familism scores is much sharper as one moves from the lower class to the upper class compared with the drop in the familism scores among Muslims. Note, for instance, that among Christians who belong to the low socioeconomic status group, the average familism score is 4.54. Among middle SES group, however, the average familism score drops to 3.98 and drops sharply to 2.94 among the upper SES group.
Among Muslims, the lowest average familism score is 4.10 among upper SES group. This score is still towards moderate adherence to familism. Among Christians, however, the lowest average familism score is 2.94 among the upper SES category. This score is very close to the moderate deviation level.

The gamma correlation among Muslims is -0.673 while among the Christians it is -0.831. The correlation in both groups is negative with the value of the correlation being higher among the Christian group suggesting a greater difference in the nature of the deviation from and adherence to the value of familism among the different socio-economic groups of the two religious sectors.

Summary and Conclusions

This study was partly motivated by the dearth of scholarly research into the subject of Filipino familism, a very central value of Philippine society. It was felt rather strongly that the attention given to the subject by Filipino scholars seems inversely proportional to the salience of this value among our people. Since the 1950s only one seminal work on the subject has been produced. As far as can be determined, there are no recent studies on the subject. Given the prominence of this value, one wonders why there is scant attention paid to it by Filipino social scientists.

Even more appalling perhaps is the lack of any study on the same subject among Filipino Muslims whose familistic orientation seems to be even stronger on observation than among Christians.

Moreover, the original work of Pal and Arquiza seems quite crude in many respects. For one, it had only one question which was used as an indicator of familism. Familism as practiced among Filipinos, however, has several aspects or dimensions, which could range from the expectation that older siblings must help parents educate younger siblings to the obligation and responsibility of children to tide over parents financially during their old age and to house and care for them during the twilight years of their lives. The expectation that older siblings help younger ones appears to be only one aspect or dimension of familism among Filipinos.

In the area of measurement, the work of Pal and Arquiza can stand substantial improvement to give it more precision. It may be recalled that deviation or adherence to familism in the work of Pal and Arquiza was only measured by the dichotomy of agreeing or
disagreeing with one question presumed to be the indicator of familism.

In an attempt to introduce substantial improvement in the precision of the measurement of the variable familism, this study employed a scale which contains more questions considered reflective of a number of dimensions or aspects of the value of familism. All in all, there were 21 questions in the scale used in the present study. These questions represent nine dimensions of familism as practiced in the Philippines. In addition, this research attempted to use a more systematic and rational scoring system so that the data will become more amenable to more powerful and sophisticated statistical analysis. In doing so, we make no claims whatsoever that statistical sophistication in research can replace cogent, careful, and logical conceptualization of the research issues and rigorous methodology. For as Dr. Lewis Coser (1973) has pointedly said:

If concepts and theoretical notions are weak, no measurement, however precise, will advance an explanatory science.

The major findings of this study may be summed up as follows:

1. In general, Muslims as a group registered higher familism scores than Christians as a group. The average scores of the Muslims in the familism scale were very much higher than the average familism scores of the Christians. Muslims appear to be more likely than Christians to fulfill the traditional expectations of the family. Christians on the other hand are more likely to deviate from the familistic demands.

There is one dimension or aspect of familism, however, in which Muslims and Christians are very similar. This dimension pertains to their attitude toward housing and sheltering elderly parents in government-provided institutions away from the children. Both groups reject very strongly the idea of housing elderly parents in institutions away from the children. This finding reflects the very traditional perspective of the respondents on this particular matter.

Alternatively, it seems that both groups are not quite certain whether parents should be housed during their old age within the household of the children. It is definite, however, that both groups reject the idea of housing elderly parents in institutions away from them.

2. The intersystemic consequence of schooling on the value of familism appears to be similar for both religious groups with the
exception that the impact of schooling on the value of familism among Christians is much more pronounced than among Muslims.

Schools, of course, do not deliberately teach students to deviate from traditional values. Changes in the values of students as a result of schooling are what Robert K. Merton (1968) calls latent and unintended consequences of the process of being educated. The erosion of the value of familism as a consequence of the intersystemic experience of schooling is inevitable.

Perhaps, schools can deliberately counter its latent subversive effects by consciously teaching those values considered central and important by society. However, whether or not deliberate efforts to teach values considered important will succeed is entirely a different story altogether.

Some aspects of familism will probably take longer to subvert while others will easily be eroded even without schooling. Culture lag operates more strongly among an older generation. Thus parents seem to find themselves behind in accepting values that younger generations easily embrace. And some of the inertia of this lag tends to be felt by the younger generation. That phenomenon is at the core of the difference in the values of the two groups.

References


