A Supplement to the Chinese Expulsion from the Philippines, 1764-1779

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As the title indicates, this is an addendum to the article, "Expulsion of Chinese and Readmission to the Philippines, 1764–1779," which was published in the Philippine Studies (47 [1999]:48–76). Some of those who read the earlier article will probably raise two important questions that are left unanswered, namely: 1) Why did the innocent Chinese who were living peacefully in some distant parts of the Philippines share the same fate as those who assisted the British invaders in their military campaigns in neighboring provinces of Manila? 2) Why and how was the expulsion decree rescinded? This article aims to address these questions and in addition provide other unreported information relevant to the topic.

At the end of the war in 1764, the feeling among the Spaniards in Manila to expel the Christian Chinese was unanimous and unprecedented. For the first time, the secular and religious authorities in the Islands, including the merchants, the Dominican friars and the cabildo (the city government of Manila) that were traditionally sympathetic to the Chinese, launched emotional denunciations to the king, clamoring for their expulsion.

Supreme Council of Indies

From 12 March to 25 August 1765, the Supreme Council of the Indies in Madrid, which governed all the Spanish colonies in the New World, studied and deliberated the Philippine question. The ministers knew that their recommendations to the king concerning such a sensitive issue would have serious repercussions throughout the islands. They pondered long and hard, exploring vast ranges of legal, religious
and historical principles, and seeking guidelines in their effort to find a solution to the problem. They cited the holy scriptures, civil and canon laws, the Recopilation of the Laws of the Indies and the opinions of university jurists and theologians. Most interesting was the importance they attached to the so called “antecedentes,” the records of past Chinese revolts and misdeeds.

The Council first focused its attention on the two principal crimes committed by the Chinese: infidencia (treason or disloyalty)—the renunciation of their allegiance to the king by siding with the enemy; and apostasia (apostasy)—the abjuration of their Catholic faith by perpetrating sacrilegious acts and violence against priests and sacred places.

In their medieval style of argumentation, the ministers defined disloyalty or treason as a crime of lèse majesté—an injury inflicted upon the dignity of a ruler that represents a sovereign power—for which death is the normal penalty. They agreed that the least punishment that could be given to the perfidious Chinese in this regard was perpetual exile. They reasoned that by allowing Chinese to remain, the islands would be in constant peril, given the Chinese bad record of repeated uprisings in the past. The king then ran the risk of losing his dominions there and the loss of many souls that were converted with great sacrifice and at great cost. The Chinese presented a problem similar to that of the Moors in Spain. As they increased in number, so did the fear of further disobedience and revolts in many parts of the kingdom. According to the opinions of theologians, jurists and canon lawyers, allowing the Moors to remain was like nourishing a serpent within the heart of the country, spewing its venom to circulate throughout the land. The dire warning that economic disaster would befall Spain if deprived of the Moors’ economic skill and money proved, however, to be unfounded. The case with the Chinese could likewise be a false alarm.

The Council continued their discussions:

Apostasy is even worse. No person can be expected to be loyal to his Prince if he is not faithful to his religion. Infidencia is a lesser crime because a just punishment can be meted out to the guilty, but to apostasia no adequate measure of penalty can be thought of. To propose death to all of them and confiscation of all their properties are not unusual, severe measures. It is sanctioned by divine and civil laws. "An apostate is a useless person of perverse tongue and wicked heart, offensive even by his looks, the ground sinks wherever he tread, and causes
troubles and scandals with his evil deeds." Other offenses are minor evils compared to the abominable sin of apostasia.

The Council was fully aware that many of the reports from the Philippines could well be exaggerated, reflecting the anger and vindictiveness engendered by the war. However, waiting for passions to cool and obtaining more accurate information would take a long time. The circumstances demanded that this delicate question be addressed as soon as possible. To help make up its mind, the Council gave great importance to the "antecedentes," the pattern of behavior that the Chinese had in the past, because it would certainly give a true reflection of the recent occurrence. Unfortunately, the examination of the past revealed a recurrence of Chinese uprisings, a consistent superficial practise of their Christian faith and the tendency to return to their idolatrous customs despite the lapse of two hundred years after their conversion. Unless drastic measures were meted out, this pattern would likely be repeated.

Punishing the culprits with expulsion, however, was the easy part, the Council argued, but the grave consequences were the most troubling: First, the likelihood that many innocent might suffer accidentally the fate of the guilty (The Council, however, did not discuss the means to solve this problem). The second consequence was the hardship that expulsion would bring to their wives and families; and the last one which bothered most the collective conscience of the Council was that the Christian Chinese might lose their faith after returning to China.

Experience, however, showed that many Chinese accepted the faith, not because of strong conviction, but as a pretext to remain in the islands. Since 1620, many royal decrees were issued for their expulsion, but were never carried out for economic reasons and the unwillingness on the part of secular and religious officials. When [Governor] Arandia finally expelled all infidel Chinese [in 1755], more than 1,100 asked for baptism. Although the ecclesiastical authorities doubted their sincerity, suspicion alone was not enough to deny them this sacrament. The British invasion, however, proved that their conversion was insincere and a ruse to remain in the islands.

The ministers decided that expelling the Chinese was the best course of action, and assuaged their consciences with the following rationale: Expulsion was indeed a severe penalty because of the untold misery it would bring to the families involved, but compassion should be tempered with justice. With regard to the infidentes who joined the
British, separating them from their wives and children was not an uncommon practise. People condemned to prisons or to hard work in the galleys or in military forts were usually separated from their families. To those who have abjured their Catholic faith, canon law and the holy scriptures clearly stated that apostasy was tantamount to a divorce. It was because it exposes their wives and children to the contagion of idolatry of the husbands. St. Paul allowed this kind of separation.” It was not an infringement of paternal rights to oblige children under twelve years to remain with their mothers. When their fathers accepted baptism voluntarily and later apostatized, the church had the right to protect the children and to give them the necessary Christian education. The Council believed that many children aged between 12 to 25 incurred the guilt of their fathers, some perhaps against their will; but “if they are truly repentant, they may remain with their mothers; if not, they go with their fathers, but never to return.”

Having decided the fate of the “infidentes” and the “apostatas,” the Council grappled with the problem of what to do with the innocent Chinese who would remain behind. The Council wanted to isolate the remaining Chinese in selected sites with strict safeguards to effectively prevent future uprisings and to thwart the possibility of their assisting foreign invaders. The ministers found a perfect solution already mandated in law 8, title 18, book 6 in the Laws of the Indies, which encouraged Christian Chinese married to natives to engage in agriculture “in order to be very useful to the Republic.” This law enacted in 1620 allowed the Christian Chinese to settle outside Parían (a kind of Chinese ghetto located outside the city walls), thus reducing the dangerous concentration of Chinese living in the capital and at the same time shielding them from the harmful political and religious influence of their non-Christian countrymen. The overwhelming Spanish sentiment then in Manila was for their total expulsion from the land. For this reason, several restrictive laws were passed, one of which prohibited Chinese from marrying native women, including potential widowers who might use their marriages to escape deportation in the event their wives died before them. By banning also the entry of new Chinese immigrants and forcibly confining the remaining Christian Chinese in the rural areas, the Council calculated that it will not only deter future revolts, but will lead to their “eventual extinction.” This was a happy compromise between those (the overwhelming majority, which included all government officials in Manila) who strongly advocated
outright expulsion of all Chinese, and some ecclesiastics, who favored internment for innocent married Christians. Having concluded its work, the Council submitted its recommendation to the king.

On 17 April 1766, Charles II issued the expulsion decree which is [abridged] as follows:

Because of the petitions made by the interim governor [De la Torre], royal audiencia, the municipal government of Manila and other ecclesiastical dignitaries, I was fully informed of the numerous crimes perpetrated by the Christian sangleyes [a term referring to the Chinese], either by armed collaboration with the British, or by their public disdain of the Spanish crown, or of the Catholic religion, as manifested in the pillages of towns and churches as well as in the torture or killing of captured Spaniards and ecclesiastics. They showed in many instances their insincerity of faith, such as praising the enemy because they had no friars, no masses, no confessions, nor sermons, and the failure of the 200 catechumens to return to Parian for their scheduled baptism, declaring that they were just pretending conversion.

Consequently, on the recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Indies, I order the expulsion of all married or unmarried Chinese, who during the war had either apostatized or had committed seditious acts, either by helping the enemy or by fomenting the rebellion of the natives in the neighboring provinces of Manila. Children under twelve years old may remain in the islands with their mothers, and those older who repent could also stay. Those who left voluntarily with the British and those about to be banished should not be allowed to return under penalty of death. Any public officials or ecclesiastics who violate this order under any pretext will be deprived of their respective offices. Chinese who sail regularly to Manila for trade could continue as usual as provided by the laws. They have to stay at the Alcaycería de San Fernando and return to China after the fair. No one will be allowed to remain, and trading in other ports is absolutely prohibited.

Those Chinese allowed to remain as disposed by law 8, title 18, and book 6 of the Code of the Indies, are to be registered and assigned to towns or places suitable for agriculture or the mechanical arts, and should be accessible to local churches for their religious obligations. They may not carry arms nor leave the locale without the expressed permission of the magistrates or alcaldes mayores (provincial governors) under penalty of expulsion. At the appropriate time, you have to send me through my secretary an account of what you have done and the outcome of your compliance in carrying out my royal decree. I, the King, Aranjuez, April 17, 1766.
The Expulsion of Chinese

The Chinese population in the Philippines at this time was just a fraction of its original size. Perhaps as many as 3,000 to 4,000 non-Christian Chinese in the once teeming community of Parian had already left the country. They were the traders as well as immigrants recruited by the British in 1762-1763 to settle in the Islands. Also gone were “more than 3,000” supposedly Christian Chinese who fled before Manila was returned to the Spaniards after the war in 1764. Still, more than two thousand remained and they would soon be rounded up and expelled.6

Although Governor General José Raón ordered the alcaldes mayores to send to Manila all the Chinese found in their respective territories, he knew that some of them, especially those who lived in distant provinces, were not British collaborators, and could well be exempted from deportation. So, he also sought information from several provincial governors as well as from religious superiors concerning suitable places where the innocent Chinese could be interned. He emphasized the importance of the size (at least one league long) of uncultivated lands, their proximity to abundant water (for irrigation, fishing and transportation), to mountains or forests (for hunting and other livelihood resources), and to churches (for complying with their religious obligations) and their remoteness from the sea (to prevent contact with foreign invaders).

Among the several replies Raón received, the one submitted by the Dominican superior was quite interesting, because it gave a picturesque description of an immense fertile land near the town of Sta. Catalina Virgin y Mártil de Baruc, between the provinces of Pampanga and Pangasinan. It also portrayed an abundant supply of fresh water from two adjacent rivers and a lake, all of them teeming with fishes. From the nearby mountain [illegible - Arayat?] covered with thick foliage of many kinds of trees “descend numerous deers and wild carabaos.” Beside its proximity to towns by land and by water whereby the Chinese could transport their crops and go to church for Sunday masses and holy days, “it is shut off from the sea from all sides, making it extremely difficult for them to join any invading forces.”

Antonio Uruñuelo, an oidor or magistrate of the Audiencia (the highest tribunal in the Philippines), was appointed “commissioner,” an official invested with broad powers to carry out the expulsion decree. His intense dislike of the Chinese caused him to interpret literally the
words “all” in the royal decree, and apply the term “provinces” to all parts of the Philippines. He was able to win over the governor-general as well as the Audiencia to his view. In deference to the demand of Fiscal Antonio Andrade, the royal attorney, Uruñuela conducted an inquest (pesquisa) to identify “the guilty from the innocent,” but he totally excluded the fiscal from participating in the judicial process.

An investigation was held night and day from 21 June to 7 July 1769, in order to start the expulsion with the coming monsoon. Identifying individual Chinese was hard for the Spanish witnesses, who hardly associated with them, and to whom they all probably looked alike. So, the result of the pesquisa was predictable. The testimonies of the seventy two witnesses generally described the events in collective terms—frenzied, faceless, murderous mobs or rampaging rabble of iconoclasts caught up in a heady uprising where even the leaders were hardly identifiable. Only three Chinese individuals were mentioned by names as non-participants. Thus, Uruñuela concluded that practically all Chinese were guilty and had to be deported.

The fiscal complained in vain to the king that he was not allowed even to examine the documents of the investigation, and that the Commissioner’s wholesale round-up of the Chinese was harsh, arbitrary and indiscriminate. “The office of your fiscal is not respected,” Andrade protested, “and [the commissioner acts] as if I don’t exist.” Uruñuela defended himself stating that the fiscal’s views were impractical and contrary to the authority vested in the audiencia and the governor, who backed his decision. To identify the innocent from the guilty on an individual basis is extremely time-consuming and unrealistic, Uruñuela countered. Furthermore, the royal decree had to be enforced promptly, and to miss the monsoon means another year for the Chinese to overstay in the islands. After examining “a large number of witnesses of all kinds and status” (actually only fourteen of them were not Spaniards), Uruñuela told the king, he was convinced that “if all were not accomplices in the crimes, the rest were at least suspects of lacking loyalty to Your Majesty and, as shown in many occasions, readily inclined to abandon the Catholic religion.”

Consequently, 2,460 Christian Chinese were expelled from the Philippines. Uruñuela informed the king that only ninety-two incapacitated, sickly, old people and five able-bodied men remained, and “after their services [of these five] are no longer needed, they would also be deported like the rest.”
It would seem then that only ninety-two Chinese remained permanently in the Islands and, because of their health and age, most of them would be gone within a few years. Actually, many more remained, including those who appealed to the king and could not be deported until the royal decisions were received. For instance, several court documents dated between 1764 and 1769, showed Miguel Ignacio Mayoralgo Coquia demonstrating his innocence and loyalty to the king by enumerating the numerous services he rendered to the government, namely:

a) Twice, a collector of donations for the bulas de la Santa Cruzada;
b) A collector of Chinese tributes in Parían for three years. He turned over 46,000 pesos a year to the royal treasury;
c) A fiscal celador who inspected all kinds of commercial fraud and abuses committed by Chinese traders in Binondo;
d) A cabecilla of Chinatown during Archbishop Rojo’s administration in 1759–1762;
e) An interventor between Chinese merchants and the government;
f) Arandia’s assistant in the expulsion of non-Christian Chinese in 1755;
g) One of the four trustees empowered by Uruñuela to inventory and dispose of the assets of the Chinese expelled in 1769;
h) Appointed sole custodian of all properties confiscated from the Chinese.

Then, he disclosed that during the British occupation of Manila, he corresponded secretly with Simón de Anda and contributed a huge amount of donations (he gave a detailed list of firearms, ammunitions, supplies of abaca, nails, wheat, papers, etc.) to help win the war. Both Anda, who was at that time a newly appointed member of the Supreme Council of the Indies, and Pedro, former oidor in Manila and a powerful minister in the same Council, knew the appellant personally and confirmed his claims. So, on 31 October 1772, the Council of the Indies praised Mayoralgo Coquia as an honest man, a good Catholic and a loyal vassal of the crown. Consequently, Coquia not only escaped deportation, but was also allowed to practise his profession as a merchant which was prohibited by the decree.

Another appeal was made on 25 April 1768 by a group of seven wealthy Chinese from Cebu, who hired a prominent lawyer to represent them in Madrid. Their leader was Capitán Domingo Cangleón,
presumably an influential man because eight high-ranking local Spanish officials certified the group’s loyalty to the crown and fidelity to the teachings of the Church. These Cebuano Chinese enumerated their contributions to their local government as follows: a vessel (bajel) donated for the defense against the Moros; another vessel (galley) and 800 pesos plus 200 cavans (a cavan is about 44 kilograms) of palay (unhusked rice) supplied to the fort of Misamis to help quell some rebellious towns there; a gift of 227 pesos and 4 reales, some food supplies, and a number of their countrymen volunteered their services to put down the rebellion in Bohol; a generous contribution of money, a Chinese brigade and arms for the defense of Cebu against possible British attacks in 1763. In a later undated petition, the names of forty-five more Chinese were added to the list, but it is unknown whether all of them were spared from expulsion.

Like other Chinese, this group was sent to Manila and sequestered in Parian. Somehow, Fiscal Andrade was able to persuade Anda, the new governor-general, to allow Cangleon and company to return to Cebu while awaiting the decision from Spain. However, a new cédula of 21 June 1770 arrived reenforcing the expulsion of all Chinese; so Anda recalled them back to Manila. Once more Cangleon and company renewed their appeal. Again, the fiscal came to their defense stating that they could not be tried twice on a single case. He argued that the Cebu Chinese no longer belonged to the jurisdiction of Uruñuela, but should be judged by law 8, tit. 18, book 6 of the Laws of the Indies, which allowed them to remain in the Islands. Despite the Council’s decision of 1772, which finally arrived and exempted them from deportation, Anda would not permit them to return to Cebu. They could stay, Anda agreed, but he wanted them interned in a rural community as ordered by the cédula (decree) of 1766. So, the Cebuano Chinese wrote again to the king in 1773, complaining that they and their families lacked food in Manila, and would undergo more sufferings because they were not accustomed to till the soil. They could not understand why they had to pay for the misdeeds and crimes of their countrymen in Manila, while they were helping the Spanish authorities in Cebu. Afterward, Anda gave them the option of working in the copper mines of Masbate, and apparently, some of them accepted because it was recorded that seventeen of them sailed from Manila in 1776. Finally, the decision of the Council dated 1777 told Anda to stop detaining the Chinese and let them return to Cebu.
The Change of Attitude

The change of attitude toward the Chinese began as early as 1767. It gradually gathered momentum and culminated with the representation made by Pedro Calderón in November 1772. With the help of Julián Arriaga, the colonial secretary, Calderón petitioned the Council of the Indies to recommend to the king the repeal of the expulsion decree and to invite back the Chinese, including non-Christians. It is ironic that while this same Council used the “antecedents” six years earlier to justify the expulsion of the Chinese, Calderón used the same documents in urging for their recall. He underscored the fact that in his thorough review of old records, past royal decrees, canon law and other ecclesiastical pronouncements, he did not find a precedent or a single law that advocated banishing Christian Chinese. Even after the worst revolt of 1603, when some 500 Christian Chinese were sentenced to work as slaves in the galleys and arsenal in Cavite, expulsion was never contemplated. On the contrary, past laws were formulated to favor the Christian Chinese. Law 3, tit. 8, lib. 6, of the Laws of the Indies ordered them to live in Binondo in order to separate them from their heathen countrymen in Parian. Law 7, tit. 18, lib. 6, gave them the same status as the natives to choose any place they preferred to live, and the right to engage in domestic trade. New Christians paid no tribute for ten years just like the natives, and the royal decree of 1696 placed them under the jurisdiction of the archbishop and not the Inquisition. When the expulsion decree was carried out in 1755, it was directed toward the heathens and not the Christians.

Expulsion was unjust, Calderón continued, because it punished both the guilty and the innocent, and those who remained were not allowed to engage in commerce, the only means of livelihood they knew and on which their survival depended. In the process, their wives, children as well as their religion were abandoned. It had no justification, because it deprived the country of good, productive denizens and vassals. Even the Holy Tribunal of the Inquisition in Spain imposed penance to Jews who acknowledged their errors, but it never exiled them to Geneva or to Liorna[sic]. The fiscal in Manila (Andrade), the protector of the Chinese by virtue of his office, complained that he was not even given a copy of the inquest. Instead, all the Chinese were indiscriminately arrested and robbed of their properties; not even the Moors were treated with such severity. “If they are guilty of treason, there are the gallows, the galleys and the presidio. If they have sinned
against religion, punish them as dictated by the laws, but don’t expel them, because it causes great harm to their family, to religion and to the republic.” Calderón continued:

The royal tribunal does not have jurisdiction over apostasy and divorce. The local Ordinary (the diocesan bishop) is the competent judge of these matters and should administer the appropriate punishment. Many of the Chinese are married, because our laws prohibit those under 18 to settle in the Philippines. St. Paul in [I Corinthians] Chapters 7 and 8 stated that the new Christian could not live with his heathen wife without offending God, if that heathen resisted conversion. However, ecclesiastical law states that it is necessary to inform the non-Christian consort if she does not live far away. Because of the rigorous prohibition imposed by the Chinese emperor against bringing their wives overseas, the Church of Manila has dispensed with that regulation. Therefore, permitting a Chinese to return to his former gentile wife [in China] will lead to the loss of his faith. Moreover, his heathen neighbors will ridicule the stability of marriage in our religion for permitting the abandonment of his Christian wife. To expel a Christian is to deny him a chance of reconciliation with the Church through the sacrament of confession. A good number of natives had revolted or apostatized many times in the past. They were not transplanted elsewhere, instead they returned to the right path through the patient exhortations of the missionaries. The argument that our missionaries in Tonking will take care of the expelled Christian Chinese is flawed. There are few missionaries in that province and is very far from Emuy where most of the Christian Chinese in the Philippines went.

During its consultation [in 1766], the Council was concerned about the injustice suffered by the Christian wives who married in good faith. The Council, however, soothed its conscience with the thought that “without doubt a true divorce [occurred] because according to canon law, cohabitation is not permitted when an apostate will not allow the Catholic spouse to practise her religion.” Calderón then used the same epistle of St. Paul to refute the arguments cited by the Council six years earlier to justify the Chinese expulsion. That was true only when the gentle induced the Catholic to commit a mortal sin, but when the infidel wanted to cohabit with his Christian consort, he should not be impeded, because the infidel was sanctified by his wife. Then, Calderón quoted St. Thomas and other authoritative writers, who in essence stated that “even if the Christian wife doesn’t like to cohabit with the apostate husband, but if he repents and is reconciled
to the church, she is obliged to cohabit with him. In chapter 6, St. Paul considers it a temporary divorce, because marriage among Christians is indissoluble.”

Calderón attributed the denunciations against the Chinese to post-war passions and vindictiveness. He considered most reports as generalities and exaggerations, even downright false, “una novela” a figment of a vivid imagination. He stated that he was still in Manila when approximately 1,000 armed Chinese joined the British military campaign in the province of Bulacan. However, “they were new Christians, rowers, stevedores and poor people, and they did it not out of love for the British, but for the 15 pesos bribe which each one of them received.” Moreover, the burning of temples and houses was done by the English soldiers. It was the indios who sacked the houses outside the city walls, and robbed 40,000 pesos from Don Manuel Peredo, while he was fighting the British in the plaza. Several native servants revealed where their masters had hidden their money and jewels because the British soldiers went directly to specified locations without bothering to check other places. Some of the natives revolted in the provinces and pounded the rosaries in mortars [with the pistles] as if they were rice, but [we] did not expel them. Calderón also did not believe that the Chinese participated in the sack of Manila, nor that the sampan crews mistreated the Spaniards fleeing across Pasig river. The British entered the bay 27 September 1762, and assaulted Manila October 5. By that time there were no more sampans in the bay because they usually left for China from May through the end of August.

Calderón continued his argument: To assert that all Christian Chinese were bad or that their idolatry would contaminate the natives like a pestilence were impious and reckless statements. In the same consultation, the Council noted that their mestizo children were very good Christians and loyal vassals to the king. How was it possible, quipped Calderón, that the parents were considered bad, but their children received good upbringing, and were not taught idolatry nor disloyalty. As the bible says, “by their fruits, you’ll know the tree.” In fact, the archbishop ordained many of them and gave to some the best parishes. Calderón sarcastically remarked that if all Chinese were assumed to be bad Christians and traitors, why was it that even Anda and the archbishop admitted that “Miguel Ignacio Mayoralgo Coquia is a faithful vassal of the king and a good Christian.”

Calderón pointed out that another compelling reason for rescinding the expulsion decree was the great benefit the general public received
from the Chinese. They were the suppliers of all the necessary foodstuff, not only in Manila, but also in all the towns of the islands. Because of their industry, they kept prices low, since they had the patience to go from farm to farm, from hut to hut, to buy chicken, cacao, and fruits from the natives in the absence of harvesters of these products. While in Manila, he found out that towns without Chinese remained poor and miserable, and those that had them were happy and prosperous. The Chinese stimulated the cultivation of sugar cane and other crops in the area; and the owners of sugar cane fields, some of whom were mestizo-Chinese who greatly benefitted from these crops, aroused the natives from their apathy to engage in productive activity. When questioned by Calderón, the natives invariably answered that through barter they were able to obtain all kinds of commodities from the Chinese, who then made a profit by sending the foodstuff to their agents in Manila.

According to Calderón, the Spaniards did not understand retail business. They just wanted to enrich themselves in a short period of time while doing a minimal amount of work. Thus, it was wrong to believe that once the Chinese were expelled, the Spaniards would take over. The mestizo Chinese and even the natives were better at running retail businesses because they were thrifty and hardworking. On the other hand, the moment the Spaniards arrived in Manila, because of the distance from Spain and the paucity of their number in the islands, they considered themselves gentlemen and hired servants although they had nothing to eat. With regard to the creoles who went there as military recruits, they came from the most dysfunctional and useless social class in Mexico.

Calderón urged the Council to ask the king to repeal the expulsion decree and to inform the expelled Christian Chinese that they would be welcomed back with the same privileges they once had. To underscore his point, Calderón reminisced that while he was in Manila, a similar case happened in Batavia (now Djakarta) with the revolt of more than 30,000 infidel Chinese. After expelling them, commerce plummeted and economic conditions in that island became so bad that the Dutch decided to welcome them back.13

After Calderón's impassioned plea, the Council endorsed his proposal, although its implementation had to wait for an opportuned time. As long as Anda was the governor-general, the status quo remained in the Philippines. Voices that advocated change were muted; so far no record exists of anyone publicly demanding the return of the
Chinese during his administration. Finally, Anda, worn down by illness and the heavy burden of his office, informed the king in December 1775 that he wanted to resign, and in fact died the following year. With his death, the last obstruction was removed and pro-Chinese sentiments finally came out in the open. A long classic work, probably one of the best apologia ever written in their defense, soon appeared—authored ironically not by the Dominicans, who traditionally defended the Chinese, but by Fray Manuel de la Concepcción, an influential Franciscan friar. On 21 April 1777, he wrote to the king, heaping praise on the Chinese and pleading for their return. The essence of his message was “only the return of the Chinese can save the Philippines from total ruin.”

According to Fray Conception, the Spaniards were not endowed with the necessary talent to become merchants, and they would perish without the Chinese. The soul that maintained the islands was the imported textiles, not the exorbitant kind like silk, but the inexpensive ones like the linen, the blankets, the average cloth, which kept this country going. The inhabitants needed money to buy these essentials, but it was the Chinese that supplied both. The natives needed shirts and underwear for normal wear, and a second garment for holidays. The women needed sayas (skirts, petticoat), and tapis, another piece of cloth to cover the sayas. Without them, they gave thousand of excuses for not hearing mass. In a family with many men and only one good shirt was available, they would take turns going to the church while the rest stayed at home because they were ashamed to display their poverty and misery. The poor increased everyday because the Chinese, who used to give them many job opportunities and the means to buy clothes, were gone.

The indios needed money to obtain plows, fishing equipment, cutting tools, and transportation for their crop. The Chinese provided for all these needs. They walked unshod and acted just like the indios; there was no area where the indios went that the Chinese couldn’t. “That is why, where there are Chinese in any place, there is an abundance of cheap wheat, cacao and sugar. Unfortunately, there is scarcity now, because the indio’s habit is such that he only walks if someone prods him, and if left alone, he sits. It’s the Chinese that energizes all; he gives movement to everyone.”

If a Chinese had no other means of livelihood, he became a farmer; and not a single square foot of land was wasted for he made it productive all year. His house was always well provided and he gave
plenty of work to the indios, bred many animals, and raised well his children. In short, he taught everybody who was willing to learn. He never stopped in his daily chores; it seemed that he could not live without working. To him, there was no such things as dry land or lack of rain. If there was a river nearby, he had “this fantastic machine” that filled his land with abundant water. If there was no river or it was a highland, he remedied it with his shoulder muscles, his son’s as well as his servants’ without permitting a single plant to be lost. Their absence was the cause of misery and utter poverty to all, and many means and ways to make a livelihood had closed to so many people.

“When there are Chinese, every thing is fine, peaceful, abundant, and cheap. Now that they are gone, everything is scarce, even bread, has disappeared. Only the return of the Chinese will bring back prosperity and joy.”

Fray Concepción ended his panegyric, imploring the king with the following plea:

May God and Your Majesty save us. I beg Your Majesty to order the return of the Chinese to Manila and to all the provinces. Permit all the married Chinese to return to the Islands, because many of them will still find their wives and families. Divert your most merciful eyes from the sins of these unhappy and disgraced people. Take into account that without the Chinese, these dominions of yours will be lost. Consider the many wives, their sons and daughters, let alone their widows and orphans, who are clamoring for their husbands and fathers. Most of them except for a few living in the suburbs of Manila, are found in poverty. When the Chinese return, they’ll still find their homes where their families live. For newcomers, grant them empty lands to farm; they’ll increase the tributes and will be useful tenants. Permit them to bring their ten to twelve-years old children from China provided they’re Christians, to be raised in the schools and colleges in Manila. They deserve a parish of their own in Parian that should be served by full-blooded Chinese parish priests like them, and who will administer to them in their own tongue and learn their love for the Church. When they become numerous, they may go back [to China] some day to serve their countrymen. By establishing Christianity there, it will reduce Your Majesty’s expenses. Cast your eyes at your beloved indios, a source of all that is good, and especially, the mestizos, whether of Chinese or Spanish blend. The longer the Chinese’s return is delayed, the longer the common people here could not pay the tributes to Your Majesty. Order your ministers to take a good, scrupulous look at what is said in your decrees, because through their misunderstanding, they do not know that
it was never your intention, nor will it ever be, to expel these good and serving people. (San Gregorio Province of the Discalced Religious of St. Francis, Pandacan, suburb of Manila, 21 April 1777).

As eloquent and persuasive as his entreaty was, Fray Concepción's contribution to the return of the Chinese was just a grand finale to the movement that had been gathering momentum before 1772. In fact, by the time Anda's resignation of 31 December 1775 reached the king, the expulsion decree had been revoked. The king's instruction to Jose Basco, Anda's successor, prior to his departure for Manila in December 1776, echoes some of Fr. Concepción's words. For instance, the first sentence of article 15 says: "Since the Chinese expulsion did not produce the favorable results expected, but has caused instead a decrease of tributes and food shortages in the islands, I hereby resolve to permit the return of the Chinese at a number to be determined at the new governor-general's discretion. Every Chinese has to pay 5 pesos tribute, and the governor should take all the precautions to prevent any possible revolt." Thus, Basco arrived in the Philippines with a new government policy, and Chinese immigrants were once more welcomed to the Islands.

Beside the Council of the Indies' deliberations that led to the expulsion of the Chinese in 1766 and Calderón's representation which resulted in its reversal, there are related events that deserve mentioning. For instance, the internment of innocent Chinese in rural areas as ordered by the royal decree was apparently not implemented, although those who originally came from the haciendas and villages were of course allowed to return. While the overwhelming majority of the expelled Chinese returned to China, small groups went to Sulu and Sumatra. A newly found document indicates that at least fifty-nine and possibly as many as 219 went to Borneo. The Hospital San Gabriel founded specifically for Chinese patients became a casualty of the expulsion decree. The king ordered it closed, but the civil authorities delayed the enforcement of the royal decree until the construction of a new facade sparked a heated controversy between the fiscal and the Dominican provincial superior. Although the hospital was finally terminated in 1776, the friar's brilliant legal defence kept its adjoining chapel open as an ancillary church ministering to a racially mixed congregation.

How many Chinese remained in the Philippines after 1772 is a question that seems to defy a definite answer. Obviously, it is impos-
sible to obtain an exact figure, but a reliable approximation is now attainable. As reported by Uruñuela in 1772, there were only ninety-seven left in the Islands, ninety-two of whom were sickly and very old, and he hinted that the five remaining healthy, younger men would be expelled eventually. However, a recently found document has shed considerable light in solving this question. In 1778, before the arrival of new immigrants, Governor Basco reported that there were 318 Chinese residents in the Philippines (Basco to Arriaga, AGI, leg. 495). The increase from ninety-seven to 318 can be attributed to several factors: some Chinese like those from Cebu successfully appealed to the king; several were sick, eight of whom were confined in the Hospital San Gabriel; eleven servants who accompanied the exiled Jesuits to Acapulco returned to the Philippines in 1772; and forty-two Chinese sailors aboard three ships bound for Cadiz in Spain also came back two years later. Probably, the most numerous were the late-comers from distant islands. The arrival of twelve more Chinese from Iloilo in 1779 demonstrates that small groups were still winding their way to Manila. The fact that no more expulsions took place after 1772, implies that all Chinese still in the islands after that year were allowed to remain.

In summary, there were reportedly around 6,200 supposedly Christian-Chinese residents in the northern half of Luzon before the British invasion in 1762. Since the overwhelming majority of them, around 90 percent lived in that area, it is reasonable to assume that there were approximately 7,000 Chinese in the entire country. Of these, the first wave of more than 3,000 fled the Islands before 1766. This desperate exodus as early as 1763 seems to indicate that they were the guilty ones, the men who joined the British and murdered some Spaniards or pillaged several churches. The second wave consisting of some 2,460 men were forcibly expelled from 1767 to 1772. With the possible exception of those deported in 1767, the rest were just mere "suspects," many coming from remote parts of the country. Probably, about 1,000 died between 1762-78 (hundreds of them were killed during the war), and—to round up the number "318" mentioned by Gov. Basco—only about 350 Chinese were allowed to remain. Since the provincial governors outside Manila and the neighboring provinces reported to Uruñuela that there were no more Chinese left within their jurisdictions, the number of fugitives and illegal residents (some of them were left undisturbed in the hinterlands of Samar) was extremely small. Therefore, the approximately 7,000 Chinese who lived in the Philippines before the British invasion in 1762 are virtually accounted for.
Conclusion

There were two protagonists that dominated the Chinese expulsion controversy: Simón de Anda, who inspired this policy, and Pedro Calderón, who had it rescinded. The former was sinophobic; the latter a converted sinophile. In his capacity as leader of the resistance movement against the British invaders, Anda could not forgive the Chinese, who sided with the enemy and almost killed him. Admittedly, the clamor at that time to expel the Chinese was overwhelmingly popular among the Spanish residents in greater Manila, but Anda initiated it (the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies confirmed this fact in 1779) and in the post-war years, his voice was most influential in the royal court. Calderón on the other hand, a hero in his own right while serving as oidor in Manila in the mid-eighteenth century, fully realized the indispensable economic contribution of the Chinese to the islands. These two were old adversaries. A story of a rancorous confrontation between them had long entertained gossipy social circles in Manila. It was said that while briefly serving as minister of the Council of the Indies in 1767–1769, Anda had a heated argument with Calderón, and became so incensed that he got sick. Anda admitted afterward that the altercation did indeed take place, but denied becoming sick as a consequence.17

Unfortunately for Anda, he was no match for Calderón, who was a powerful figure in the Council, and whose views were reflected in virtually every important piece of legislation or policy affecting the Philippines. Time and again he foiled controversial decisions that Anda made as governor-general of the Islands.

As public opinion gradually changed among the Spanish residents in greater Manila and they began to miss the economic services of the Chinese, Calderón made a timely move in 1772—and won the day. Anda, having relinquished his post in the Council, was thousands of miles away, and could not personally counter Calderón’s influence. Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful if Anda could have altered the outcome even if he were in Spain. Calderón’s forceful arguments before the Council of the Indies, however, seemed to stretch the facts a little bit and should be understood as merely a display of rhetorical exuberance. For instance, he attributed the piety and loyalty of the Chinese mestizos solely to their Chinese fathers. The major credit more likely should be given to their native Christian mothers and the socio-religio-
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gious environment of the community where they lived. Calderón also argued that while he was still in the Philippines, about 1,000 Chinese joined the British, not out of love for them, but because they were poor, new converts, rowers and stevedores, and were bribed fifteen pesos each.

Calderón was probably right concerning the character of the Chinese rebels. As Schurz pointed out, most of the Chinese in the Philippines came from the Canton waterfront and did not represent the “best traditions of Chinese culture or the Confucian higher standards of conduct.” In fact, after the Chinese revolt of 1686, a group of merchants exculpated themselves before the Spanish authorities, stating that the rebels were composed of men “from the lower class . . . idlers and vagabonds” (Schurz 1939, 82, 95). Calderón was also right when he partly attributed the Chinese revolt to their belief that the British capture of Manila terminated permanently the Spanish sovereignty in the Islands. Again, it is probably true that the rebels were young and new converts, and Calderón was indeed in Manila on 18 January 1763, when the Bulacan incident he referred to took place. However, it is interesting to note that Calderón is the only source of this exculpatory information, and presently no documentary evidence has corroborated his claim, especially his assertion that the Chinese were bribed. A huge number of letters, reports, memorials and even volumes of works have been published on the British occupation of Manila, but Calderón’s allegation cannot be found in either Spanish or British sources. Even Fray Concepción, the ardent Chinese admirer, was silent about this matter. Furthermore, Calderón did not disclose this important information in 1766, when the Council of the Indies was deliberating on the fate of the Chinese in the Islands.

Spain’s problem with the Chinese was as frustrating as it was unique. The Philippines was the only colony in the empire that had a numerically significant and culturally sophisticated ethnic group that was not Catholic. On the one hand, the Chinese’s economic expertise and taxes were indispensable for the survival of the colony. On the other hand, from the late sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth century, their number generally far exceeded the Spaniards’. To have around 20,000 Chinese in the suburbs and neighboring provinces of Manila in contrast to less than 1,000 Spanish soldiers was not unusual, and sometimes the ratio was even more disproportionate. There were also more revolts at that time, about eleven of them, and some almost ended Spanish sovereignty (Bernal 1966–1969, 58–63; Schurz 1939, 81–83).
Understandably, the Spanish authorities feared the Chinese as a menace to the security of the islands since they could take up arms anytime and overwhelm the undermanned garrison in Manila.

To counter this threat, the government adopted various preventive measures: segregation, reduction in the number of Chinese and conversion. However, restricting their living quarters to Parían outside the city walls under the threatening gaze of mounted cannons did not always discourage uprisings. Limiting their number to 6,000 as ordered by many royal decrees since 1620 was difficult to enforce due to conniving corrupt officials, which included some oidores and probably even governor-generals. Ironically, the biggest drop in Chinese population occurred everytime the Chinese rose up in revolt. The battle casualties and the punitive pursuit of fleeing rebels, somewhat inaccurately labeled as "massacres," usually inflicted a heavy toll on the ranks of the insurgents. For instance, 23,000 Chinese were reported killed during the revolt of 1603 and at least 20,000 in 1639. These pogroms, however, only temporarily stemmed the flow of settlers into the Philippines.

Expulsion, the harshest method employed to decrease the Chinese population, should not be confused with mere deportation or voluntary departure, which occurred more often. Thus, Antonio Morga reportedly deported around 12,000 Chinese in 1596, because most of them were considered illegal or undesirable new settlers in the Islands. Likewise, Gov. Basco shipped 157 men back to China in 1786, and "many of the resident Chinese left the country [after] the revolt of 1819." About 1,300 Chinese departed voluntarily for China in 1662, and more than 3,000 in 1764. Actually, expulsion, decreed many times since 1574, was rarely enforced. In fact, there were only two general expulsions during the entire Spanish colonial period. The first was the expulsion of 1755, the importance of which has more to do with the precedent it set and the category of the Chinese involved, than with the number of people expelled. It targeted exclusively the non-Christians and was implemented only after more than 100 years of vacillation and inaction on the part of the Spanish authorities in Manila. Quantitatively, it was highly ineffective, because only around 600 were banished, most of whom were silk merchants, while 1,824 "infidels" decided to become catechumens. Consequently, 3,443 Chinese were allowed to remain. On the other hand, the expulsion of 1767-1772 was ruthless and sweeping, because it virtually wiped out the entire Chinese population from the Islands.
Unlike the British and the Dutch, the Spaniards adhered to the policy that religious conversion should go hand in hand with colonization. The medieval dictum that no vassal could be truly loyal unless he professed the same faith held by the crown was consistently observed as a doctrine of governance. Thus, beside its religious significance, baptism was also regarded as a safeguard of political loyalty, a sort of pledge of allegiance to the Spanish crown. No sooner had the Spaniards established themselves in Manila than the early missionaries began to evangelize the Chinese. Once Christianized, they were expected not only to continue performing their valuable economic role in the Islands, but also to serve as an effective counterforce to potential revolts posed by their heathen countrymen. For this reason, the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in Manila assiduously labored to promote the formation of a large number of staunch, loyal Catholic Chinese. Consistent with this policy, converts were not allowed to go back to China for fear that they would lose their faith while in their homeland. They were encouraged to marry Christian natives to deepen their religious inculturation. They were granted separate residences so as not to be contaminated by the idolatrous practices of their non-Christians counterparts. In fact, one reason for the expulsion of 1755 was to permanently stop such contact between Christian and non-Christian Chinese, which the Spaniards believed was largely responsible for the former’s superficial adherence to their Catholic faith and relapse to apostasy. To further bind their material interest and well-being with the Spanish regime, the Christian Chinese were given many privileges including exemptions from paying taxes for ten years. Because of the higher tributes they paid, they were excused from polo, the hated manual work in public projects which the natives had to perform. While non-Christian Chinese were confined to the Alcaycería de San Fernando, the converts could live anywhere and monopolize the interior trade in the provinces. With all this preferential treatment, the Chinese were expected to become faithful Catholics and loyal vassals of the king.

The British assault of Manila in 1762 is an historic event of far-reaching significance. It shattered many time-honored Spanish policies and practices, one of which was the termination of church prelates from acting in the capacity of interim governor-generals. Another casualty was the trust of loyalty put in the Christian Chinese. Since practically all the Chinese in the Philippines were supposed to be Catholics after 1755, it was an unnerving disillusionment to the Spaniards to see
them side with the enemy and disown their adopted religion. The two hundred years of assiduous spiritual nurturing and political indoctrination—a period considered sufficient to stabilize their Catholic faith and loyalty to the Spanish crown—came to a shocking end. Before this incident, it was unthinkable to expel the Christian Chinese, because so much time and effort were spent in their religious and political formation. They were the untouchables, the favored ones, but in the end they sadly flunked the test. Therefore, they too had to go and the last expulsion of the Chinese materialized. Understandably, a change of policy was implemented in 1790. Segregation was no longer based on religious affiliation, but on residency. Permanent residents, whether Christians or not, could now live together in Binondo or Santa Cruz, and only transient traders were confined to the Alcaycería of San Fernando.22

In conclusion, the expulsion of 1767-1772 was unprecedented in several ways. It was the last of its kind. For the first time it was intended exclusively for those who were Catholics; and it banished the highest percentage of Chinese. Anda who initiated it in 1762, also laid the basis on which they were to be expelled: "treason, apostasy and idolatry" (Anda 1964, leg. 713). Were it based solely on treason, it would have affected only the Chinese in Manila and the neighboring provinces, but the addition of apostasy cast a huge net that enveloped the entire colony. During its deliberation, the Council of the Indies agonized before recommending expulsion, not only because of the painful uprooting of the Chinese from their habitations and the untold suffering that would befall their families, but also because of the probability of losing their Catholic faith. Ironically, the decision to expel them was based not so much on their collaboration with the British, but on the so called "abominable crime" of abjuring their Christian faith. In the view of the Council of the Indies, apostasy was even worse than treason. Uruñuela, in turn, gave a subjective interpretation, not an uncommon practise at that time, to the royal decree. He justified his action to the king, explaining that "his examination of many witnesses had convinced him that even if not all of the Chinese had become allies of the British, at least they are suspects . . . in lacking loyalty to Your Majesty and, as shown in many occasions, are readily inclined to abandon the Catholic religion. [So], I went ahead with the general expulsion of all in order to safeguard these dominions from internal enemies." He ended his letter asking the king's pardon for
whatever excesses he might have committed in the performance of his commission (Anda 1773, leg. 716).

To Uruñuela, suspicion equated with guilt. In other words, it did not really matter where all the Chinese lived or whether they actually joined the British. Ultimately, it was assumed that had they the opportunity, they would have sided with the enemy and abjured the faith. It was therefore imperative, Uruñuela believed, to expel all Chinese, regardless of their situations, in order to safeguard the internal security of the Philippines.

Notes

I wish to thank Prof. Edgar Wickberg for his comments, suggestions and bibliographical assistance on the Chinese in Dutch Batavia.

1. I recently obtained additional archival material, which enabled him to write this essay and to fill in the gaps in his earlier article. However, it is limited in scope and a reading of his previous article is essential to comprehend the entire episode and ramifications of the Chinese expulsion.

Unless indicated otherwise, the source material of this article was taken from AGI (Archivo General de Indias, Seville), Secci6n Filipinas, legajo 714.


3. This is called Pauline privilege, the only kind of divorce permitted by the Catholic Church and based on the writings of St. Paul on marriage, which are found in chapters 7 and 8 of his “First Epistles to the Corinthians.” His teaching on this subject was later incorporated in Laws 1120, 1121, 1127 of the Canon Law.

For a good reading on this Catholic doctrine, see Gregory (1931).

4. A combined customs house, wholesale mart, and living compound, erected in Binondo in the late 1750s. See Wickberg (1965, 23).

5. This is a revised translation taken from Escoto’s “Expulsion of the Chinese and Readmission to the Philippines: 1764–1779” Philippine Studies 47 (1999): 53.

6. Quiason (1966); Anda to king, Manila, 30 June 1764. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 713. For more information on the Christian Chinese population before the British invasion, see page 15.

7. Fray Andres Meléndez, Provincial de Santo Domingo, to Gov. Raón, Manila, 8 July (1769), AGI, Filipinas, leg. 715.

8. Uruñuela to king, Manila, 22 Jan. 1772, AGI, leg. 716. For a detailed account of the roundup and deportation of these 2,460 Chinese, see Escoto (1999):54–65.

9. This contribution was originally levied to defray the heavy expenses incurred during the reconquest of Spain from the Moors during the early part of the Middle Ages. It consisted of spiritual benefits (indulgences) conferred upon the faithful in return for money offerings. Partly because of the subsequent Turkish threat in the
Mediterranean (later applied to the war against the Moros in the Philippines) and the Spanish Crown's commitment to propagate Catholicism, the popes reluctantly agreed several times to extend its collection. At first free and voluntary, it eventually became the most important permanent revenue from ecclesiastical sources rising to as much as 800,000 ducats a year. However, the yield was minuscule in the Philippines. From 1750 to 1774, only 17,594 pesos were collected representing 3.19 per cent of the amount the king spent (551.670 pesos) for the maintenance of the religious orders in the Islands, and 0.19 per cent of the total royal expenditure during the same period. See Lynch (1969, I, 11, 129–30, 227; II, 35, 104, 139); Moyano (1986, 125–26).

10. Calderón was oidor of the Audiencia in Manila in 1736–1761 and played a major role in the history of mid-eighteenth century Philippines. Among his achievements were the tactful pacification of the agrarian revolt in the provinces of Pampanga, Laguna de Bay, Ilocos, and Tondo in 1745, as well as his reform of the tribute system (known as cuenta abierta), which added a huge amount of money—45,000 pesos in 1749 with steady increases in the following years—collected by the royal treasury. Because of his vast experience and knowledge of the Philippines, he wielded great influence in the formulation of policies and legislation affecting the Islands.

For detail, see Roth (1977); and Garcia-Abasolo (1991).


12. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) is considered the greatest theologian of the Catholic Church. His preeminence is reflected in an old ecclesiastical dictum "with the exception of the bible, no single work has so influenced the doctrines of the Catholic Church than St. Thomas's monumental work, Summa Theologica." Hence, the aphorism: "No Catholic will go astray by following the teachings of St. Thomas."


15. Royal Instructions to Jose Basco, New Governor-General of the Philippines, December 1776, article 15, AGI, leg. 881.


17. Fray Pedro de San Miguel a los PP. Agustinos en la Isla de Panay, 8 octubre 1772; AGI, Ultramar, leg. 687. Anda a rey, 20 diciembre 1772, ibid.

18. After completing his long service as oidor (1738–1761), Calderón sailed for Spain on 3 September 1762 aboard the galleon Santísima Trinidad, but the British captured it on 30 October and brought him and other passengers back to Manila as prisoners. Finally, on 2 March 1763, he embarked aboard an English frigate and reached Paris sometime in October. He must have arrived in Spain a few days later. See Rodriguez, (1966–1997, III, 177–78, 188).
19. Antonio Morga to King Philip II, Manila, 6 July 1596, BR, IX, 266; Diaz-Trechuelo, 1996, 208–10; Bernal 1966–69, 58; Schurz, 1939, 81, 90; Alberto Santamaria, "The Chinese Parian," also in Felix The Chinese in the Philippines, I, 115. Caution in estimating Chinese population and the number of casualties inflicted during revolts is stressed by Santamaria, who cited examples of numerous conflicting figures during this period (76–79).

20. Santamaria (ibid., 111); Diaz-Trechuelo (1966, 208–9); and Garcia-Abasolo (1986, 170).

Actually, it is quite hard to obtain from published works the number of non-Christians expelled by Gov. Arandia. The approximate “600” banished is just an estimate, because reportedly there were about 4,000 Chinese in the Philippines before 1755, and 3,443 immediately after. For details, including an interesting comparison between the number of catechumens baptized from 1740–1755 to the succeeding years prior to the British invasion in 1762, see Sugaya (1992, 305–6).


References


