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Promotion of Faith and Justice and the Philippine Jesuit University

EDMUNDO M. MARTINEZ, S.J.

The present work seeks to address a very fundamental question: what is the nature and function of a Jesuit university in the promotion of faith and justice in a developing country like the Philippines? The question is fundamental in a theoretical sense, for it implicates in its answer such foundational notions as "Jesuit" and "education," "faith" and "justice," and so forth. It is also fundamental in a most experiential sense, for it arouses feelings and bestirs thoughts, evokes opinion and fuels discussion, demands decision, moves to action, and thus touches the everyday lives not only of the teacher in the classroom ("What does poetry or accounting have to do with faith?"), or the student at his desk ("How does good grammar promote justice?"), but also of administrators ("What are we up to?"), religious superiors ("Is education as urgent as social work?"), and whole religious congregations ("Is it not time to phase out schools and take the bull of poverty and injustice by the horns?").

As the question is both theoretical and experiential, so also the scope of the present work embraces both the realm of ideas and the realm of action. It seeks to meet two seemingly disparate needs — of clear thinking and decisive action — and thus may offend some sensibilities. It may not sound stringent enough for ideologues, and it may not appear complicated enough for academicians. To both complaints, the paper pleads guilty, and it does so with a sense of relief.

This paper is addressed to a very specific audience, for the most part silent, but it seems comprising a majority in our Univer-

sity community. These are the men and women, lay or religious, old or young, who may not be able to quote Freire but can think straight; who may not be all that well-read in theology or philosophy or history or anthropology, but can say "yes" when they mean yes, and "no" when they mean no, rather than say "yes" or "no" when they mean "maybe" or "I don't know"; who, as Christians and Filipinos, deeply feel for the poor and the oppressed, yet are so grounded in the actuality of the human life situation that in their sanity they cannot rant and rage against "all injustice," nor in their human Christian hearts rest insulated and uninvolved with the plight of the suffering.

Insofar as the paper attempts to understand a specific problem in the light of the Christian philosophical and theological tradition, it can be considered a *reflection paper*. Insofar as it tries to understand all the relevant issues connected with the problem, it can be considered a *monograph*. Insofar as purposeful understanding necessarily leads to some kind of judgment, it can be considered a *position paper*. And insofar as the position it seeks to arrive at suggests policy decisions and executive action with regard to Jesuit and Catholic education in general, it can be considered a "white paper."

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It was not until the proclamation of the 32nd General Congregation of the Society of Jesus that a simmering discontent with the Jesuit educational apostolate found what was felt to be an authoritative focus. For the General Congregation categorically stated:

There is a new challenge to our apostolic mission in a world increasingly interdependent but, for all that, divided by injustice: injustice not only personal but institutionalized: built into economic, social, and political structures that dominate the life of nations and the international community.

Our response to these new challenges will be unavailing unless it is total, corporate, rooted in faith and experience, and multiform.¹

The reactions were varied.

On the one side were those who felt strong misgivings with educational work, for they could not see how Jesuit schools

1. Thirty-Second General Congregation, "Our Mission Today: Service of the Faith and Promotion of Justice," nos. 6-7.

were socially involved. The extreme form of this criticism even accused the Ateneos of perpetuating an unjust situation by educating the establishment, who thereby retain their position of dominance in society. To such minds, the Congregation's proclamation seemed to offer sufficient justification to turn their backs on educational work as embodied in such traditional institutions as the Ateneos and forge a frontier's path in more direct social apostolates.

The Jesuits, having always been a group of stout hearts and stronger heads, have always had a happy mix of varying apostolates. While Ignatius was hobnobbing with the Roman establishment, Francis Xavier was braving the seas of the Far East; and while there was a Peter Canisius who founded universities, there was also a Peter Claver who ministered to slaves; and while the Ateneo was educating its Rizals and Rectos, other Jesuits were consoling the lepers in Culion and preaching the gospel in the dialects of Mindanao.

Availability for the work of the Church and adaptability to the needs of Christ's flock have always marked the long history of the Jesuits, and so multiformity of Jesuit work is nothing new.

What was new, and dangerous, in the Philippine Jesuit experience of responding to the call to promote faith and justice was the feeling, often unexpressed, that the educational apostolate was a thing of the past: if not a mistake, at least without much relevance to the present actual and pressing needs of God's impoverished people, who constitute the majority of Filipinos.

The feeling was dangerous, for it tended to be divisive. But it was often unexpressed, for the selfsame Congregation (as well as the 31st General Congregation: "The Jesuit Priestly Ministry," no. 8) reiterated in the very same set of proclamations, the inherent value of the Jesuit's educational apostolate:

In presenting this review of our apostolate in its various dimensions, the General Congregation wishes to continue along the lines given by Father General to the Congregation of Procurators of 1970 and to emphasize once more the importance of theological reflection, social action, education and the mass media as means of making our preaching of the Gospel more effective. The importance of these means rests in the fact that, in touching its most profound needs, they permit a more universal service to humankind.²

2. Ibid., no. 59.

While, then, there was a minority, sometimes vocal position that questioned the value of schoolwork, it is a measure of the Jesuits' sensitivity to the actual Philippine situation that a counter-position never developed that would defend the status quo of the schools at all cost. No doubt, as in all institutions, there was a natural temptation to rest content with the familiar and the "good thing" (Why rock the boat?). But if there was, no one succumbed to it or gave any overt expression of his opinion, for it was not that clear that the urgent needs of the majority of our people — poverty, ignorance, lack of freedom of various forms — were being met that convincingly by the schools.

There then developed an uncertain and majority middle ground. It was uncertain of its ground for it was caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the call for social involvement was ringing, and the urgency of the social reality that occasioned the call irrefutable. On the other hand, educational work possessed its own intrinsic value, and with their seven to thirteen years of studies after a basic degree, Jesuits, more than anybody else, felt the value of education in their bones.

It is this middle ground, then, that still obtains in the present time, and it conceives of the social apostolate as important, and the educational apostolate as equally important. And depending on one's predilection, a priority is placed on one rather than the other.

Now unless the relationship between the educational apostolate and the promotion of faith and justice is clearly spelled out, the operational assumption that begins to guide the educational effort is this: Education and the promotion of faith and justice belong to two parallel, equally valid, but distinct levels; and while one should be supportive of the other, as best it can, still the two have different finalities.

But this, clearly, does not square with the conception of the 32nd General Congregation that calls for a "total" and "corporate" response in the promotion of faith and justice and repeatedly states that the very Jesuit institutions themselves, like the schools, should have as their primary goal the promotion of faith and justice.³

3. Ibid., nos. 9, 60 and so forth.

In the course of this paper, we will try to show that the goal of education as authentically conceived in the tradition of Christian and Jesuit philosophy of education, finds its precise historical formulation today in the goal to promote faith and justice.

HUMAN AND DIVINE FAITH AND JUSTICE

While in the context of the decree, the promotion of faith and justice clearly refers primarily to the faith and the justice that comes from Christ, still it is helpful to distinguish between the faith and justice that is possible to man as man, and the faith and justice that is possible only through the grace of Christ.

The element of *human faith* need not detain us unnecessarily. Human faith is intrinsic to the nature of human knowing and is operative in the very process of man depending on his fellowmen for the fund that he calls knowledge, and of one generation building on the achievements of past generations.

If one has never been to Bangladesh, it is by faith and not by sight that he knows such a country exists. If one uses a calculator it is by faith rather than knowledge of microchip technology or cybernetics that he knows its computations are correct.

Human faith, as operative in the educational process, is a fact. And we prescind from further discussion of it and simply point out that in the contemporary state of the science and organizations for information-gathering, storage, retrieval, dissemination, that is world-wide and instantaneous, there is need for critical awareness of the processes of mass media communication, and of the possibility for systematic control and falsehood to which such highly technical and integrated processes are subject. And of this, of course, our students must be made aware.

It is human justice, and the faith and justice that comes from Christ, that must be more closely investigated. Further, the relationship of these realities to the objectives of the Ateneos as institutionalized apostolates of the Jesuits must be established.

HUMAN JUSTICE

KEY NOTIONS

In the great synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas which still forms

the underlying foundation of current Catholic thinking on justice, the following salient points deserve underscoring.⁴

1. Justice is a moral virtue, and as a moral virtue, *it is the perfection of man as man*. In contrast to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which are strictly supernatural gifts, the moral virtue of justice is not the prerogative of the baptized alone, but is attainable by man as man.

An immediate implication of this teaching is the following: the justification for a university to have as its primary goal the promotion of faith and justice does not rest, formally speaking, on its being Catholic or Jesuit, but simply and quite adequately, on the fact that it is a university — an institution devoted to the full development of the human person.

2. As a virtue, justice *requires a "lasting and constant will"* (q. 58, a. 1 and a.2, ad 3). It is not enough therefore to be just in this instance but not in the next; or with this person but not with another. In short, to form students with the virtue of justice somehow involves the development of habits of acting justly.
3. Because justice is a virtue, *it requires knowledge*. What is done in ignorance is not virtue; it is, properly speaking, not even a human act (q. 58, a.1). Even getting angry against injustice, with a seething anger, is not a virtue of justice. In fact, for St. Thomas, the movement of the virtue of justice begins not from the sensible appetite (the "passions") to end in reason, but the reverse: "It begins in the reason and ends in the appetite inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason" (q. 59, a.1, Resp.).
4. The specific object of this knowledge that issues into just acts is the "*proper balance of equality*" (q. 57, a.1) — the mean between what is too much and too little — that brings about the due ordination of one person with another (q. 58, a. 8, Resp.). And, we may note in passing, to determine what is just between you and me in any particular instance should be a relatively easy thing to ascertain. But to determine what is just where structures are concerned is an altogether different kettle of knowledge.

4. See *Summa Theologiae*, IIa-IIae, qq. 57-122.

5. Unlike the other virtues in which the "mean is taken according to right reason with respect to the doer himself and not to outside things, justice (i.e. that which is just, *justum*) strikes the notion of objective medium" (q. 61, a.2 and 3). Hence, *justice regards external actions and things* rather than the intention of the doer (q. 58, a.11, Resp.) or the uprightness of the person in himself (q. 58, a.8 and 11).

Hence one must not confuse talking about justice and doing justice. Talk is the expression of thought, and thought ranges the wide open fields of everything that can be conceived – actual or potential, real or unreal, possible, futurible, impossible. In contrast, doing is action, and action is always in concrete existing human situations. And human situations are never what they ought to be, or what we wish them to be, or what one wants them to be. They are, simply, what they are. And so when faced with problematic human situations, as in the shortcomings of structures or institutions, critics on the sidelines always seem to have the ready answer, until they are placed in positions of authority and must not only talk, but do.

6. *Justice is essentially other-directed* (q. 57, a.1, Resp.). The other moral virtues concern what befits the person in himself, justice is constituted by a relation to another (q. 58, a.8, Resp.) for the proper activity of justice is none other than to render to each his own (q. 58, a. 11, Resp.). As Aristotle puts it, "justice is another's good."⁵

We may make two points in passing: 1) with the strongly individualistic training of Jesuit formation in the past, this is one area that can bear close scrutiny in the reassessment of the Jesuit school's curriculum; 2) The call to promote faith and justice is, in substance therefore, identical to the call for our schools to form "men-for-others."⁶

7. Finally, because justice intrinsically concerns what is another's and not just one's uprightness or intentions; because what is another's ("justum") concerns objective reality and not abstract ideas, therefore justice finds *diver-*

5. Aristotle, *Ethics*, V, 1, 1130a 3.

6. "Our Mission Today," nos. 60, 76.

se manifestations according to the diversity that obtains in the social reality (q. 61, a.2).

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of these principles to contemporary questions are far too extensive to be examined here. The preaching of the gospels, for example, emphatically upholds the absolute value of the human person, and with the emergence of a historical and world consciousness in modern times, this absolute value of the person has been spelled out in the UN's Declaration of Human Rights.

Still, because the measure of balance or "equality" is in reference to a concrete other, regarding external things, what is just is not an invariant quantum, but, according to varying situations, is more a constant proportion of proportionality (q. 57, a.4, ad 1; ad 3).

Thus, in an economic slow-down, what is more just for an employer who is seeking to do what is just: to lay off half of his work force and pay the stipulated just minimum wage, or to retain all of them at "unjust wages?" Again, in Sweden I believe it is considered an appropriate expression of human rights to have a paternity leave for fathers with pregnant wives. Would it be "just" to do the same here in the Philippines?

The implications of the Thomistic principles on justice are multitude. These instances are mentioned only to emphasize the fact that because what is just is always concrete, i.e., a historical reality, its determination in any particular time and place and circumstance regards not good intentions, but knowledge of the concrete situation with the firm will to do what is just.

CONCLUSION

What should become immediately apparent in this hurried singling out of some salient points of St. Thomas' teaching on justice is that, far from being a simple task for which education is irrelevant, both the education to justice and the doing of justice demand the highest degree of competence and the deepest involvement with the actual situation.

Compared to the complexity of the causes of injustice in the real Philippine situation, one cannot but be saddened by the sweeping simplistic pronouncements of ideologues (and even of Churchmen, whose long theological training should have equipped them better) that are passed on as the "moral teaching of the Church." And because simplistic teaching never squares with the realities of actual situations, confusion reigns and the situation remains.

The complexity of the question of justice in the Philippine situation, and the need for the highest quality of education, becomes even more apparent when one considers the topic of "structural injustice."

STRUCTURAL INJUSTICE

While it can be shown that the gospels themselves sought to promote justice in man's dealings with man, still there is a distinctively new note in the Society's mandate to promote faith and justice.

This new note is the promotion of faith and justice in the structures of society and not merely in individual hearts. It does not quite meet the Society's demand, therefore, to produce graduates who, in their personal lives, will be just — as great an achievement as that may be. What is required is the undoing of unjust structures, and the setting up of more just patterns of relationships among the sectors of society.

This mandate, moreover, is directed not only to individual Jesuits, but also, more pointedly, to the works and institutions that the Jesuits run.⁷

In short, the Jesuit educational institution should so function and be structured that it will produce graduates who will purposefully direct their skills and efforts to undoing and replacing unjust structures.

The discussion on unjust structures is a very heated one, and I can only present, in schematic fashion, a point of view that argues how the educational apostolate is indispensable in the refashioning of human structures.

7. Ibid., nos. 5, 7, 9, 60 *et passim*.

THE NOTION OF DEVELOPMENT

It is helpful to begin with the notion of development, for Philippine society is a structure that is not static but, such as it is, functioning and undergoing change (i.e. development or decay). From the complex topic of the notion of development, we single out two basic elements.

In any process of development, whether of a man or of a nation, there are the stages of differentiation of operations ("activities"), and the ever higher integration of differentiated operations.

Thus, from a fertilized egg, the human body differentiates into arms and legs, brains and buttocks; and the differentiated parts of the body are integrated by the systems of muscles and bones, nerves and blood vessels. As the child develops into an adult, operations continue to differentiate, and are integrated; so that, for example, the whole process of education from gradeschool to college can be viewed as an institutionalized assistance in this continuing process of differentiation and integration of the constitutive elements of the human person.

By the time the graduate is to be a manager or a teacher, one presumes that such operations as reading, writing, calculating, and speaking are present, together with any specialized knowledge and skill in one's chosen field or work. Other skills (operations) that one may look for in a manager, and demand that they too be integrated with his book knowledge, are such operations as responsibility, good judgment, imagination, enterprise, capacity to deal with people of all shapes and sizes.

So also in the development of a nation. There is a vast difference between the undifferentiated life of the barrio where the parish priest is at once counsellor, financier, teacher, and storyteller, and the highly differentiated life of the city, with its psychiatrists and bankers and professors and entertainers, in addition to its priests.

Again, there is a difference between a sari-sari store where under a little roof, with a single attendant, one can buy (with luck) the oddest assortment of merchandise from fish to hairpin, and the supermarket with its specialized sections and personnel, from butcher to cashier, and its whole supporting differentiated yet integrated network of advertising, procurement, distribution, finance agencies.

The process of any development, therefore, involves among other things, the elements of differentiation of operations and the ever higher integration of differentiated operations.⁸

A crucial insight that must be gained in the undoing of unjust structures and the fashioning of just structures is that, unlike the organic development of a tree or a dog that unfolds according to the genetic programming of nature, human structures are the devisings of man. The structures of banking and finance, of law and politics, of commerce and industry and trade, the very achievement of statehood — all these are the products of man's thinking and doing.

True, one generation builds upon the work of preceding generations, and therefore human structures are the cumulative and co-operative result of many human minds and hands through time. But given one sufficiently intelligent and capable human being, important changes can be wrought within one generation in these complex processes of differentiating operations and ever higher integrations of human society.

For the operator in all these operations, sitting at the controls, so to speak, of all processes of differentiation and integration in human society, is the human individual.

In a properly developing society, there is a healthy differentiation of appropriate operations (e.g. in a nation's economic life, a balanced rate of growth between the agricultural and the industrial sector; or, in its political life, between a properly functioning legal and police system and a conscientized citizenry). And there is also the proper integration of these differentiated operations into a developing nation.

THE GOOD OF ORDER AND UNJUST STRUCTURES

What is a "healthy differentiation" and a "proper integration"? It is the differentiation and integration that results in the good of order.

The good of order, in B. Lonergan's succinct definition, "consists in an intelligible pattern of relationships that condition the fulfilment of each man's desires by his contributions to the fulfilment

8. A full treatment of this can be found in Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), chap. 15.

of the desires of others and, similarly, protect each from the objects of his fears in the measure he contributes to the warding off the objects feared by others."⁹

And so, a person willingly pays his bills or taxes but justly demands that the phone works and the potholes are filled. And he can readily expose corruption provided that the enforcement agencies and the courts function properly, and so on.

In this framework, an unjust structure is that pattern of relationships among sectors of human society whereby through lack of differentiation or lopsided differentiation, and through absence of integration or inequitable integration, a good of order does not obtain so that some sectors of the society do not receive what is owing to them, while others take more than they deserve.

Combatting unjust structures, therefore, is worlds apart from combatting particular acts of injustice.

Conspicuous extravagance is a highly visible injustice; so is the securing of loans through nothing but political patronage; so is the allocation of borrowed money (to be paid by the whole citizenry) to some favored sectors of the economy to the detriment of others. Now to expose and protest and stop these acts of injustices, does manifest a social conscience. But to undo an unjust act is not necessarily to undo the structure of relationships which foster and support such unjust acts. To attack the problem at its roots in the unjust interrelationships of the structure demands that one has the wisdom and the convincing power to modify the structure or create substitute-structures whereby a true good of order begins to function, and all receive the good to which they have a claim.

And this means competent leaders who possess, in the traditional Jesuit phrases, the *sapientia* to discover and devise such mechanisms of integration that will take into account all the just demands of the groups concerned, and have the *eloquentia* to convince the differing groups that their plan benefits all and does injustice to no one.

To produce such men, for an increasingly complex developing society, is impossible without a high degree of education. And this is perhaps what Fr. General means when he says: "education is the key to leadership."¹⁰

9. Ibid., p. 213.

10. Pedro Arrupe, S.J., "Letter to Educators of the Western Catholic Educational Association," 1967.

THE FAITH AND JUSTICE OF CHRIST

In the classic exegetical study of Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., on the *Justice of God* (1960), he convincingly proves that God's justice, as understood in the Scriptures, is essentially salvific. It is God's activity whereby He restores the people of Israel to the favored state which God had promised them.

Thus, God's justice is far removed from the justice of man, just as His thoughts are above man's thoughts. For human justice demands that one renders to another what is his due, and by this standard, man, having sinned, deserves no salvation but punishment. But God's justice regards not man, but Himself. He promised to save man, and He owes it to Himself to be true to his promise despite man's sin.

The justice of God, then, is at the same time His mercy and forgiveness and His love. And this divine justice was incarnated in the teaching, life, and death of His only Son.

Again, the full implication to our contemporary Philippine situation of what is meant by this justice is something beyond the scope of our present discussion. Suffice it to say that if the whole Christian message — both of the Scriptures and of Tradition — could be distilled and the meaning of Christ's whole life and teaching captured in a moment, that moment would be the cross, and the distillation would be what theologians and saints call, "The Law of the Cross."

For what essentially happened on the cross, and what is its meaning? Essentially what happened is that a man, in all things like us but sin (Heb. 4:15) had such total faith in the word of God whom he called "Father," that rather than take the law into his own hands and disobey the commandment of God to love one's neighbor by rendering evil for evil, he offered instead forgiveness and love to those who did him wrong: Judas, the cowardly apostles and the unquestioning soldiers, Pilate and his travesty of justice, Caiaphas and his mockery of religion, the crowd whose votes were so easily bought; not because they did not deserve rejection and condemnation, but because God's commandment is love, and love does not do evil: love of our neighbor worketh no evil (Rom. 13:10).

It would take a whole lengthy development to show the convergence and unanimity of Christ's teaching and actions, and of the

early Church's fidelity to this central meaning of the cross; but it is the distinguishing mark of the Christian, as all the saints and martyrs of the Church have shown. And so:

I say this to you: love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be sons of your father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on bad men as well as good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest men alike. For if you love those who love you, what right have you to claim any credit? Even the tax collectors do as much, do they not? And if you save your greetings for your brothers, are you doing anything exceptional? Even pagans do as much, do they not? You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect.¹¹

To promote the justice of God in the hearts of men and in society, therefore, is to render to others not only the good that is owing to them (even pagans can do as much), but also the forgiveness and compassion, the mercy and love that is owing to them not according to their merits, but according to the promise of God, and to render such justice (given the concrete sinful situation of the world) at the cost of giving up what is one's own, out of a motivation of faith in God's word and the love of Christ.

The relationship of all this to the objectives of a Jesuit school will be seen through the topic of religious conversion which we shall now take up.

CONVERSION AND EDUCATION

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The long history of philosophy confirms the basic truth that the essential difference between man and the rest of creation is his quality of rationality. In the Scriptures and in St. Augustine, this quality is described as "the image of God in man," or "the inner man," or "the spiritual man"; in St. Thomas Aquinas, it is called rationality; in the neo-scholastics these terms "image of God," "inner" or "spiritual man," "rationality," carried not only an exclusively intellectual connotation, but also an over-weening emphasis on the individual.

In the contemporary era, with the advances in the social and anthropological sciences, this emphasis on the intellectual and the

11. Mt. 5:44-48.

individual has been complemented in various important ways. Man is not only a thinking animal, he is also a symbolic animal (Cassirer, Jung). He is not only an intellectual symbolic animal, he is also an affective animal (Freud and the psychologists). He is not only a thinking, symbolic, and affective animal, he is also a religious animal (Eliade and the anthropologists of religion). And so on. Moreover, besides being an intellectual symbolic, affective, religious animal, he is also a social and historical animal whose very thoughts, symbols, affectivity, and religiosity are born and nourished in the womb of his social, cultural, and historical heritage.

A term that has become current to designate this more nuanced and richer meaning of "rational animal" is that of "human spirit" or "human consciousness."

The fuller and more accurate presentation of this historical evolution of man's understanding of himself is the task of the historians of ideas. But it seems necessary to allude to this wider perspective because it has a direct relevance to the present discussion.

For it appears that when the Ateneo de Manila was established — or re-established — by the Jesuits in 1859, the prevailing philosophy that guided its establishment was that of the neo-scholastics, with its generous sprinkling of rationalist mentality. Rizal is a good example: emphasis on the intellect and the individual. And it is only in the rather recent past that other currents of thought, some as already embodied in movements or practices in society at large (e.g. sensitivity techniques), began to influence Jesuit education.

Indeed one can view the unresolved state of the question regarding the specific purpose of Jesuit education as the result of the unsettled and unsettling streams of thought in the philosophy of man and therefore of education.

A common understanding of the precise and coherent meaning of the phrases, "educating the total man," or "forming the whole man," must be established if the theoretical issue is to be resolved with some degree of satisfaction.

HORIZONS AND LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Taking as our starting point the notion of "human conscious-

ness," education in general can be defined as the expansion of human consciousness, and formal education as the institutionalized and systematic differentiation, expansion, and integration of the horizons of the various levels of human consciousness.

1. Firstly, a brief explanation of the key concepts.

Consciousness. Neither a tree nor a dog is conscious in the way man is conscious. And when one is in deep sleep, human consciousness seems to take some kind of a break. A mosquito or a bedbug can bite a sleeper, but unless he is awakened, it is not until the morning, when he wakes up, that the bite itches. Asleep he was not aware of the bite, awake he was aware. Consciousness is awareness.

Horizon. Physical horizon is the limit of one's physical sight, beyond which one cannot see. The horizon of consciousness is the habitual limit of one's awareness: of what is beyond that horizon, one is not aware. Thus, a thoroughly sensual man is unaware of the world of religious experience: it is beyond his horizon. A rich young man, effectively insulated from the ordinary aches and pains of daily living is unaware of the lot of the working man and of the poor: they are beyond the habitual limit of his awareness, the horizon of his consciousness.

2. Secondly, human consciousness is neither an univocal state nor a confused blob of awareness. It consists of levels, and in B. Lonergan's critical study (building upon St. Thomas), four distinct but interrelated levels of human consciousness can be ascertained.

Experiential Consciousness. There is human consciousness on the experiential level, as when one is lying under a coconut tree on the seashore, simply enjoying the sighing of the sea and the whining of the wind, "without a thought or care in the world." Experiential consciousness is the subject's awareness of objects simply as presented by the five senses of sight and sound, taste, smell, and touch. It is expanded in range tremendously by language, memory and imagination.

Intellectual Consciousness. There is also human consciousness on the intellectual level. It is the awareness of the subject when he asks questions or works out explanations: why, how, when, where, by whom, how many times. A child who

is poor is only experientially aware of his poverty. It takes some development of intelligence to be able to ask the question: Why are we poor?

Rational Consciousness. Further, there is human consciousness on the level of rationality as when, having asked questions, the subject now weighs alternatives, scrutinizes evidence, seeks verification and, having satisfactorily answered all the relevant questions pertaining to a prospective judgment, he affirms or denies: this is true; that is false. It is a judgment that is made not on the basis of feeling or fear or guesswork or luck, but on the basis of verified understanding. Good managers are endowed with good judgment (they are often right), poor managers with none.

Responsible Consciousness. Finally, there is human consciousness on the level of responsibility and choice. Having weighed the consequences, having rejected various alternative actions, a man makes his choice of action not on impulse or pique, but on the basis of a rational responsible judgment of the value of his choice.

3. Thirdly, these four levels of human consciousness are distinct from one another. A man can correctly understand yet be incapable of choice; or a man can have all sorts of explanations and yet cannot judge which explanation is true and which is false; or a man can collect all sorts of data and amass all possible experiences, and yet not understand anything.

It is because human consciousness consists of distinct levels that the social conscientization of our students, for example, is not so simply accomplished by mere immersion. "Living with the poor" gives one an experiential awareness of poverty, but not necessarily an understanding of its causes nor (more importantly, in line with the mandate to change unjust structures) a real understanding of viable solutions to poverty. Neither does the mere experience of poverty, particularly if the root cause of the poverty is an unjust structure (like a short-sighted educational policy of a government), automatically put one in a position to effectively implement the corrective to the unjust situation. And so, having real experience of poverty, but without understanding, one can end up confused; and having experience with half-baked ineffectual understanding,

one can end up angry, and take refuge in ideology where no confusion is possible, because all answers are pre-given, and no tiresome verification is needed, because one is talking of a dream.

4. Fourthly, while these levels of human consciousness are distinct, still they are mutually interdependent. The true value of one's choice rests on one's judgment (and so, one can miss the forest for the trees), and the correctness of one's judgment rests on one's understanding (and so one can have the most logical theories, but find they do not work). In turn, the scope and depth of one's understanding rest on the range of one's experience and available data (and so there are armchair philosophers).

It is in the context of the interdependence of these distinct levels of human consciousness that the necessary and solid value of the Jesuit school program of social immersion is to be seen. Because human choice follows from one's judgment, which follows from one's understanding, then, if that understanding is not to be nominal ("empty concepts"), an experiential basis that gives substance to the concepts of understanding must be provided. To see, touch, feel, taste, smell poverty and injustice introduce into the student's consciousness a set of data that, it is hoped, will be taken into account in all his thinking and judging and choosing.¹²

Indeed, if social concern is a primary objective of the school, then the immersion program should not only be for a few or be peripheral to the curriculum. The mode and manner of social immersion can be discussed further, but just as the government can rightly demand rural work of its professional citizens, so also the question can very validly be posed: cannot the Jesuit school make a similar demand of all its students in the cause of the promotion of faith and justice?

The present shortcomings of the program, however, must be overcome. Experience is not understanding. True, there is an attempt in the program at some kind of reflection. But unless such reflection, that seeks understanding, is made from the background of validated information and theories of some such key disciplines

12. It should be clear that there is no intent in this essay to disparage the true value of these social immersion programs, but only to point out the shortcomings in conception and execution of some programs as they presently exist.

as economics, developmental theory, psychology, and anthropology, it will tend to be shallow. For one can only reflect on one's experience, and the root causes of poverty and injustice — precisely as structural — go beyond one's immersion experience. In short, to be effective, the social immersion program of the Jesuit school must be closely complemented by a properly conscientized curriculum.

Finally, it is from the background of the mutually interdependent character of the distinct levels of consciousness that we can talk with some precision about the purpose of Jesuit education.

For there are not four consciousnesses in a student, there is only one, constituted by four distinct levels. And when we talk of the "total formation" of the human person, what is meant is the appropriate expansion of the various levels of his consciousness with such an integration among them that a desired orientation is given to his life as a person.

In other words, the objective of the Jesuit school in its educational effort is the continual conversion of its students. Strictly from the formality of its being an educational institution, its purpose is intellectual and moral conversion. As an educational institution that is at once an apostolate of the Society of Jesus, its further purpose, that perfects both conversions, is, with the help of God's grace, religious conversion.

INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS

Conversion is a change in the orientation of a person's life for the better.

Intellectual conversion is such an orientation in a person's life that, as a habitual quality of the person's horizon of consciousness, he affirms what is true and denies what is false not on the basis of rote repetition or hearsay or fad, but on the basis of verified understanding.

The importance of achieving a measure of intellectual conversion cannot be exaggerated. Particularly with regard to the issue of justice or injustice, such a conversion is indispensable for, as we have seen, justice demands the correct understanding of actual situations.

More generally, beyond skills, a university education seeks to communicate to the student theories that embody the accumula-

ted insights of mankind in the various fields. But no theory is ever the total and final explanation, and theories abound, and will abound even more in the future. No sooner is one out of school than the textbook theories are tested by experience, and substitute theories proposed. And this is true not only in the scientific disciplines, but also in morality and religion, in theories of politics and society. To sift the chaff from the grain, to seek out and guard, and accumulate the precious bits of truth that one may find, is the achievement of intellectual conversion.

Hence, for example, if all that is offered to students, as the response to the problem of poverty and injustice, is to protest or dig ditches, one should not be surprised if after graduation such responses no longer seem to be forthcoming. When the school should have been preparing him to be just in the real world he would enter, he was shown how to be just in a world that was properly another's.

And so also, in the current social and political situation in the Philippines, one hopes that there are sufficient Jesuit school graduates who are taking their stand, not on the basis of what happens to be fashionable — whether with the establishment or with the anti-establishment — but on the basis of the truth they, in their varying conditions of life, know to be true. In any individual case, this truth may not seem to be much, but at least one stands on truth, and standing thus, he stands solid.

Moral conversion, in turn, is such a habitual orientation in a person's life that his choices are made not on the basis of his likes or dislikes, or what is pleasant or unpleasant, but on the basis of what in fact is objectively good. And since what is good admits of a hierarchy, it is the habitual orientation to ever choose the higher good. Hence, the good of the spirit is higher than the good of the body, and the good of the family is higher than one's personal good, and the common good is higher than the good of one's person or one's family.

Finally, *religious conversion* is such a habitual orientation in a person's life that, with the help of God's grace, he lives as Christ lived — in self-giving service to his fellowmen, purely out of a desire to be more fully conformed to Christ. And the quality of this service we have already seen in discussing the faith and justice that comes from Christ.

But the statement that intellectual, moral and religious conversions are the objectives of the Jesuit educational process, must be correctly understood.

First of all, any conversion is a life-long process that does not begin only in the school nor end with graduation. And so, there is a lack of intellectual conversion if one can be objective in dealing with a textbook problem but is pig-headed when dealing with a personal or family problem. And there is a lack of moral conversion if one can work zealously for personal gain, but lose interest in a cooperative task for a common worthy cause. And there is a lack of religious conversion if one can be strictly honest and just, but show no mercy or compassion.

Secondly, no conversion is an automatic process, for its achievement is the cumulative result of the personal openness, choice, and fidelity of the individual. In short, any measure of conversion is an achievement of personal human freedom.

The question then arises: if any conversion is at once so total and personal, in what sense can conversion of its students be considered an objective of the Jesuit school? A response would be: in the sense that the school as an institution provides the consistent and continuing structure of encouragement, guidance, support, and example whereby personal acts of freedom by the students towards conversion are more readily and more frequently possible.

A school, a common saying goes, acts "in loco parentis." And the truth of the saying applies perfectly in this instance. Just as the father and mother, brothers and sisters, and the pattern of relationships within the family, provide the structure that results in the early (and continuing) formation of the person, so also the school, by the composition of its students, the calibre and quality of its faculty and administrators, its program of studies and activities, and the pattern of relationships among them all, provides the structure that forms the students "in loco parentis."

In short, conversion is the objective of the Jesuit school in that it provides, as an institution, the good of order whereby intellectual, moral, and religious conversion is possible. And to this notion of the good of order, we must now return.

INSTITUTIONAL SERVICE AND PERSONAL SERVICE

Institutional service is directed to providing the good of order,

while personal service provides an individual good.

The good of order, no less than the individual good, is something concrete. And while the individual good is that which is made possible by the good of order, still the good of order (or in St. Thomas, "the common good") is not simply identical with the individual good, nor is it constituted merely by the sum total of the individual goods (q. 58, a.8, ad 2). And so, St. Thomas himself distinguishes between the justice that seeks the common good, and the justice that is directed to the private good of the individual (q. 60, a.3).

If the student has a personal problem, and needs counseling, it is an individual particular good for him to be able to have a counselor available; and the counselor in helping him performs a personal apostolic service. But human needs are recurrent. A student needs a counselor not only today, but also at other times. Moreover, his human needs are as varied and multiple as the requirements of man for his total formation are varied and multiple. He needs not only counseling but also sports and companionship; he asks questions not only about statistics, but also about love. And again, these varied and multiple needs are recurrent. Finally, these recurrent, varied, and multiple needs are the needs not only of this or that individual, but of a multitude of individuals, indeed, of generations of individuals.

The good of order, then, is that which results from the proper functioning of an institution, whereby recurrent particular needs are met not once, but repeatedly; and the particular needs that are met are not of one type alone, but a variety and a multiplicity; and not for this or that individual alone, but for an indefinite multitude.

Thus, it is a commendable act of personal service to finance a convento boy in school for four years; but it requires the proper functioning of an institution to finance 500 students through a high quality college every single year, year after year, indefinitely.

Just as therefore there is a personal service by which an individual answers the particular need of another, so also there is institutional service by which, cooperating with others, an individual assists in the creation of a good of order that answers the recurrent needs of all.

The difference between individual service and institutional service must be clearly appreciated, and the profound value of institutional service fully embraced, if a school is to survive as a Jesuit institution.

CONCLUSION

It would be tragic if the Jesuit university simply strove to maintain the status quo, whether by design or by neglect, half-hoping for the best, only to find out after two or three generations that the school is no longer viable as an instrument for communicating the gospel.

It is of course conceivable that the Philippine Jesuit university will develop along the model that is operative in some other "Jesuit" universities abroad: namely, that the school, as an educational institution, will develop a secular life of its own, and the Jesuits will look upon it merely as a special apostolic field where individual Jesuits, according to their personal talents of counseling or teaching or even administration, will render personal service. But the work would no longer be corporate, and the institution would no longer be Jesuit. In the extreme case, such a model recalls the work of Fr. Delaney and of the other Jesuits after him in the University of the Philippines, or of other priests today in the University of the East or Far Eastern University, etc. — the so called "campus ministry."

And it seems that unless critical understanding is applied to recognize that such a model is not the only possible direction of development, and unless conscious effort is exerted to direct the Jesuit school along a consciously chosen path so that it remains a corporate institutional work of Jesuits, that is precisely the way the Jesuit school, by force of circumstance, is liable to go.

But this, as already mentioned, does not seem to be what is intended by the General Congregation and the General's prodding. In these official documents, the call is for the Jesuit institutions as such to be instruments for the promotion of faith and justice.

It is a natural human temptation, particularly for those driven by a zeal to be agents of change, to be drawn to undertakings that are dramatic, mass-based, promising quick palpable returns. And of course in the Philippine situation, with the underdevelopment

of other equally vital structures such that politics occupies a preponderant role in society, the field of politics fills the bill perfectly (and with a vengeance!).

But from what has been said about structures and the good of order, about the long-drawn process of development, particularly about the complexity, intimacy, and delicacy of the development of the human person, the thought must at least suggest itself that the task of nation-building cannot be accomplished simply by changing political rulers or even constitutions. Politics has its place, and deserves the service of those gifted for it. But it is by no means the only structure that shapes society.

Finally, it will help not a little if this truth of faith became a feature in the horizon of consciousness of all those who would struggle for faith and justice: namely, that the ultimate agent of change, both in the particular instance and in the broad sweep of human history, is God. All that is demanded, and all that is possible to do, is for the individual to push his talents and his gifts to their full limits in the service of his neighbor, and for an institution to exploit all its resources in discerning, total service to provide for the common good. Having done that, the rest is in the hands of God who not only makes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust alike, but whose Providence makes use of both good and evil to accomplish His holy will.