Gray Love
The Career of Gov. John Early in the Cordilleras

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Unlike the usual portrayals of racism of American colonial officials in the Philippines, this article explores the career of John Early, a mid-level official who rose to become the governor of the Mountain Province in 1922 until his death in 1932. In 1911 he had served as lieutenant governor of Bontoc but was fired, according to his memoir, for defending the rights of the indigenous highlanders against unfair American colonials. Early’s rather unorthodox rise in the colonial government included actions that at times appear to contradict the prevailing thoughts of the day. The article asserts the complex nature of human motives.

**KEYWORDS:** American Colonialism • Mountain Province • Racism • Dean Worcester • Kalinga
In *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* Paul A. Kramer (2006, 2) posits that racism is not a static category but rather “a dynamic, contextual, contested, and contingent field of power.” His work approximates a “transnational history of race in the Philippine–American colonial encounters of the early twentieth century” (ibid.). Some scholars have criticized Kramer’s well-researched and widely reviewed book because its framework of racism as the sole measure for understanding America’s motives in the Philippines is too narrow. In short, for Kramer there is no room for differing interpretations—even when the historical record contradicts the racist thesis. For example, while Kramer insists that even the pro-Philippine independence American Democrats were inspired by racism, Kenton Clymer (2007) and Michael Hawkins (2008), among others, provide evidence to the contrary. As Hawkins (ibid., 189) notes, “the author’s insistent assertions that negative racial attitudes were the primary underlying premises for all imperial perceptions and actions assumes [sic] an unlikely uniformity in imperial outlook among Americans,” which makes “Kramer’s analyses take on a somewhat cynical tone at times.”

If Kramer has painted himself into an ideological corner with his dynamic racist theory, he is not the first to do so. While his transnational and dynamic racism approach to America’s actions in the Philippines (which is keenly demonstrated in his chapter on the Philippine–American War) may be somewhat unique—John Dower’s (1986) earlier work on America’s dynamic racism against Japanese also has a similar thesis—there are others who view America’s imperial motivation in the Philippines purely through either benevolent and malevolent lenses (Kaminski 2011; May 1980; Hayden 1972; Miller 1982; Woff 1961). Every historian approaches the past with presuppositions; thus one is cautious when an individual or an event is presented solely from one ideological viewpoint. For example, Rodney Sullivan’s (1991) biography of Dean Worcester, *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester*, limits all of Worcester’s life to one large story of his selfish, arrogant, and racist actions. To be sure, that might have characterized most of his life; but whenever someone is all bad or all good, readers should beware. One is reminded of the beginnings of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. His initial attack was on authors who painted literary characters with complex motives and actions. The chairman wanted characters who were all bad or all good and hated characters portrayed with contradicting motives: “What sort of people are these so-called ‘middle characters’? According to their advocates, they are people from among the masses . . . who are midway between good and bad, advanced and backward . . . It is even said that people in this state constitute the great majority of the masses . . . Does this not expose the hostile [class] standpoint of [those] who make such assertions?” (Baum 2010). For Mao everything was black or white—all people and motives were either completely benevolent or malevolent—there was no middle ground. However, in contrast to what Vicente Rafael (2000) calls *White Love*, which is noted below, might there be a gray love that would characterize the “middle characters” that Mao so despised?

In the 1970s Kenton Clymer (1976, 496) observed that historians have not probed very deeply into the American colonial mentality. There are too few studies of individual Americans who went to the islands, particularly of the lesser-known figures (middle-level officials, businessmen, soldiers, adventurers, educators, missionaries, and the like), to speak with much assurance about what motivated them and what their perceptions were of Filipinos, of other American colonials, and of the actions of the government in Washington.

Clymer sought to rectify this gap in scholarship, at least with regard to American missionary attitudes, in his *Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, 1898–1916: An Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality* (1986). Since 1975 other scholars have also added their perspectives in trying to ascertain the American colonizers’ mentality. New methods of looking at this topic include Rafael’s (2000) use of census records and photographs in *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History*. There have also been studies of major American figures in the colonial Philippines, including the above-noted *Exemplar of Americanism* (Sullivan 1991).

Fortunately, a great deal of additional scholarship has emerged regarding motives of imperialist nations and Western colonial officials. Apart from the scholars noted above, other significant works in this genre include Anne Foster’s (2010) *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919–1941*; Warwick Anderson’s (2008)
Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines; and Ann Stoler’s (2002) Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. Collected essays in the following volumes also contain important contributions to the debate of American imperial motives in the colonial Philippines: Cultures of United States Imperialism (Kaplan and Pease 1993); Race, Nation and Empire in American History (Campbell et al. 2007); Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Cooper and Stoler 1997); and Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State (Scarano and McCoy 2009).

The beauty and challenge of this recent scholarship is that there is a lack of consensus by the various authors on the motives of colonial officials and the nations they represent. For example, some postcolonial theorists view the entire imperial enterprise through the lens of economic exploitation, while others view the same subject solely as one group exercising unbridled control over another. The authors and volumes noted above present these recent views. It is within this context that this article contributes to the debate about possible assorted motives of American colonial officials. It does so by examining the life and actions of one American official who served in the Philippines. He was known by his friends as “Jack” but his full name was John Chrysostom Early. His life and the writings he left behind demonstrate the complexity of the human being as well as the dynamic aspect of one’s motives. The case of John Early demonstrates that at least at an individual level, human motives, whether conscious or unconscious, are too nuanced to neatly fit into one theory or category.

Why John Early?
In relation to the study of individual American lives, Clymer (1976, 498) noted that:

The limited studies of the early colonial experience indicate that there were a large number of humanitarian imperialists in the islands, although further research could conceivably alter this conclusion. Ralston Hayden, for example, states that the bureau chiefs in the Philippine government were the opposite of the “typical bureaucrat who doesn’t do a thing and doesn’t give a damn.” Hayden, in fact, begins his study of the Philippines with a brief portrait of one such individual, John Chrysostum [sic] Early.

Hayden himself was not one of the lower-level American officials in the Philippines; rather, he rose to the rank of vice-governor in the colonial government. Yet even Hayden is characterized by many as one who sought to give political power to Filipinos. Patricio Abinales (2009) notes in his critique of The Blood of Government:

But we cannot discount the signs of the times, especially the resurgence of competing ideologies that fought for “egalitarian liberal and republican themes” (e.g., the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois). Certainly there were colonial bureaucrats who saw themselves as purveyors of these ideas. (ibid., 12)

Such was the case of University of Michigan political science professor turned vice-governor of the Philippines Joseph Ralston Hayden whose works and writings on the Philippines showed a consistent commitment to republican egalitarianism. (ibid., n. 11)

Hayden’s most influential writing on the Philippines began with an eight-page tribute to John Early—the individual Clymer (1976, 498) included in the camp of “humanitarian imperialists.” But Hayden was not the only one to ascribe noble service to Early. University of Michigan’s Bentley Historical Library introduces the holdings of John Early with these words, “John Early represents the best of American involvement in the Philippines” (Barritt 1982, 7). Furthermore, according to the notes of the 1921 Wood–Forbes Mission—and subsequent actions of Gov.-Gen. Leonard Wood—the indigenous leaders of the Igorot requested that their Filipino governor be replaced by John Early (Fry 1983, 120).

The following article partially answers the call for more detailed studies on the lesser-known figures; in fact, it is a response to Clymer’s particular call for a study of John Early. Based on primary sources from numerous archives as well as solid secondary material, this article argues that, even as we explore the life of an individual American colonial official, there are contradictions in his words and actions that mirror the distance between our professed ideals and our actions—our stated beliefs and our hidden motives.

This article is structured in three parts. It begins with an overview of Early’s life up to the point of his move to the Philippines. The second portion of the article describes the tumultuous first months of 1911 while serving as
lieutenant governor of Bontoc, a subprovince and capital of the Mountain Province. Three incidents occurred during the first months of 1911 that led to Early’s dismissal. According to his memoirs, he was fired because he defended the rights of the indigenous highlanders against unfair American colonials. While two of the incidents will only be briefly mentioned, the focus of the article will center on just one of these three episodes. The final portion of the article is an attempt to understand how Early viewed himself and how he came to be regarded following his untimely death in 1932.

The Training of an American Colonial
In 1911 John Chrysostom Early (1873–1932) found himself serving as the lieutenant governor of the subprovince of Bontoc, in the Philippine highland’s Mountain Province. It was a place no one would have predicted he might be found considering his obscure origins and multiple professional failures as a young man. His personal and professional route to Bontoc, like most other high-ranking American colonial officials, was marked by detours, chance encounters with influential administrators, and a penchant for taking risks. This certainly characterized the relatively brief life of John Early.

Early was born on 11 November 1873 in Edina, Missouri. He was the eighth of ten children born to John and Anastasia Early. Both John and Anastasia were first-generation Irish immigrants to the United States who had made their way to Edina in Knox County, Missouri, fleeing from the mid-century famine in their homeland. Devoutly Catholic, John and Anastasia were married on 8 April 1860 at the respective ages of twenty-four and nineteen at St. Joseph’s, the local parish. The event brought much joy, although there were storm clouds on the horizon. Days after John and Anastasia’s one-year anniversary, South Carolina’s Fort Sumter was fired upon, sparking the US Civil War.

The Earlys’ precarious financial condition in Edina due to the post–Civil War economic depression led them to move to Moorhead, Minnesota, where the patriarch established a substantial brick-making business. The family’s move to Moorhead appeared to be the right one. In 1882 John Early was listed in the Industries of Moorhead record as a main competitor of bricks with the Lamb Brothers. Noted as an enterprising and energetic gentleman from Missouri, Early owned properly that included a block of valuable lots and a large, productive farm. One year later the Moorhead Weekly News (1883, 1) reported that Early employed sixteen men in his brickyard, and he was on course to producing two million bricks. However, all was not well in the Early home, and the family was in an irreversible downward spiral that would leave scars on all the children, especially for the young boy, John.

The first and most significant blow to the Early family began—as it did for countless other nineteenth-century Americans—with a simple but persistent cough. In 1880 Anastasia, the 40-year-old mother of ten, began showing signs of the most feared disease of the time—consumption or, as we now call it, tuberculosis. In the twenty years since her marriage, she had borne ten children, and now her fragile body gave way to a slow but certain death. On 3 April 1881 she left this world. Within the following year, her eldest and youngest children passed away as well. Several years later, when John was in his twenties, the family’s business went bankrupt.

Throughout these personal trials, John Early’s escape was education. After finishing high school, Early enrolled in local colleges (State Normal School in Moorhead and then Fargo College). Following the bankruptcy of the family business he moved to the state of Washington and entered Whitman College for a semester and then settled in at Washington Agricultural College (WAC) in Pullman, Washington (now known as Washington State University). During his four years at WAC, Early was heavily influenced by Walter G. Beach, one of the most famous American sociologists of his day. His time in Beach’s courses shaped Early’s ideas about race relations.

Born on 20 May 1868 to a conservative religious family in Granville, Ohio, Beach would often comment that he was a descendent of the American theologian Jonathan Edwards and that this was proof that sociology and theology were intricately connected. Beach received a graduate degree from Harvard and continued his graduate studies at Stanford during the 1890s. He was very much attracted to the writings of Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx, and he believed that it was possible to use scientific methods to understand society (Weymouth et al. 1948). Like Marx and Durkheim, Beach asserted that many of the world’s social problems were due to capitalist greed. He believed that all societies, even the remotest peoples—like those Early would one day govern—could be led by rational leaders. Like many other social scientists, Beach trusted measurable outcomes more than metaphysical beliefs. Profoundly affected by Beach, Early spent his senior year writing the thesis, “The Present Status of Child Labor in the United States,” which focused on the need to eliminate exploitation of America’s working youth in the day of robber barons. The thesis was connected to the course he took from
Beach, “The Social and Economic History of the Laboring Classes.” Early received an A in the course whose catalogue description was as follows:

A study will be made of the successive systems of industry known as the family system, the guild system, the domestic system, and the present factory system, with a glance at the social condition of the people during each of these periods. This will be followed by an examination of the condition of the laboring classes during the present century, and the legislation affecting them. (WAC 1902, 69)

While a student at WAC, Early was also influenced by lectures given by Capt. Edward Kimmel, who led the college’s cadets. Kimmel had served in the Philippines between 1898 and 1901—the period of the brutal Philippine–American War. Undoubtedly, these lectures about the war and America’s new colony in Southeast Asia sparked interest among the WAC students.

Following his 1904 graduation from WAC, Early drifted in and out of high school teaching positions. His professional failures piled up, and he subsequently moved to southeast Idaho where he worked as a newspaper editor while taking advantage of a homestead opportunity to try and take 80 acres of wasteland and create a flourishing farm. Based on the 1862 Homestead Act, Early and other entrepreneurs began the herculean task of turning Idaho’s barren high-desert land into commercialized agricultural land (Campbell 2001). They were under a time limit of five years to do this. Early and other pioneers quickly learned that they had been duped by the government. The promised irrigated water from the Snake River was not forthcoming. The government hydraulic projects were behind schedule, leaving the risk-taking farmers with only sage brush and a wind-swept landscape to stare at. Running out of time to successfully farm his land, Early found a way to stop the clock on his land-improvement deadline. The US government ruled that any homesteader who worked as a government employee in the Philippines could keep their land during their time of foreign service. Very few were in a position to take advantage of this offer as most of the pioneers had families and lacked the requisite academic qualifications. Early, however, was in luck. As an unattached bachelor with a college education and teaching experience, he submitted an application for a two-year teaching position in the Philippines; the successful application was Early’s ticket across the Pacific.

**Early’s First Years in the Philippines**

On 29 April 1906 Early boarded the SS *Minnesota* in Seattle, and the massive ship slowly moved out of the port on its way to Yokohama (Betz 1985, 132). After stops in Yokohama, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, Early arrived in Manila during the last days of June 1906, landing in a place where the American colonial government was still in its infancy. Still, it had already been five years since the five-man Philippine Commission appointed by Pres. William McKinley passed Act 74, which provided for a public school system to be initially staffed by American teachers. Early was among the several thousand American educators who arrived as part of America’s social engineering experiment on the archipelago (May 1980, 81).

When Early arrived in Manila, David Prescott Barrows was the superintendent of education in the Philippines. Raised in California’s Ventura County, Barrows typified the restless, ambitious American young men who believed that the sky was the limit for any white American male in 1900. Earning a PhD in anthropology from the University of Chicago in 1897, Barrows was one of hundreds who saw an opportunity for quick advancement by serving in the Philippines. Based on his credentials, he was appointed superintendent of the Manila school in 1900. But just one year later, in October 1901, he received a new appointment as the first head of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT).

In 1900 President McKinley authorized the Philippine Commission to transition authority in the Philippines from American military to American civilian control. One of the members, Bernard Moses, was given the task of creating an education system in the Philippines. In 1903 Moses tapped his former student, Barrows, to lead the embryonic and floundering colonial education program. Barrows accepted the position and its accompanying responsibilities with great seriousness. He quickly gained the confidence of the American teachers throughout the islands who had suffered through countless memos from Fred Atkinson, the former superintendent who micromanaged his team of teachers while somehow forgetting to get their paychecks to them on time (Karnow 1989, 205).

When Early and his colleagues first met with Barrows in Manila for an orientation session in late June 1906, Barrows asked for a volunteer to serve the remote and reportedly dangerous towns in the mountains in northern Luzon. As the former BNCT director, Barrows had firsthand experience in
the highlands and told the newly arrived American teachers “that there was no government established there yet, that the people were quite wild and little known, and in his own instance had driven out his escort when he attempted to penetrate their country” (Early 1931a, 6). Early quickly volunteered for the assignment, and a spontaneous applause broke out among his fellow teachers for his bravery. After the orientation session, Barrows asked Early to remain for a private conversation where he reiterated the challenges of teaching in the highlands; in short, he offered him a face-saving way to quietly back out of his public commitment to teach among the highland headhunters. If Barrows thought that Early’s bravado was for public adulation, he learned in that private conversation that Early was the same man in private as he was in public. Early (ibid.) wrote, “What he told me had, however, excited my interest, and I declined to withdraw.”

A few days after his meeting with Barrows, Early was on his way to the Luzon highlands. The mountains and its peoples would bring Early his greatest pain and joy. As Barrows explained, it was a place and people not understood by outsiders—truly unlike anything else in the world.

**The Making of the Mountain Province**

During Spain’s lengthy rule of the Philippines (1571–1898), the Catholic religious orders were critically important in organizing Spain’s colony in Asia. As one scholar famously wrote, “The history of the Spanish in the Philippines begins and ends with the friar” (Guerrero 2001, xix). For all their hatred toward the “black-robed papists,” American soldiers and colonial officials were deeply indebted to the friars for the logistical unity of nineteenth-century Philippine society. Yet, for all their successes across the archipelago, the Spanish friars, soldiers, and colonial bureaucrats largely failed to establish religious, political, or military dominance among Luzon’s highlanders. For three hundred years the Spanish tried through brutal force, coercion, bribery, threats, and pacifist religious evangelism to convince the highlanders to enjoy the benefits of colonial rule. Nothing worked (Scott 1974).

Geography had a lot to do with Spanish failure among the Philippine highlanders. Starting near the top of Luzon, a spine of mountains collectively known as the Cordilleras stretches 250 kilometers south through the middle of the island. It rises up to 9,600 feet above sea level, offering vistas of pine and oak forests along with cool temperatures that provide a refreshing contrast from the oppressive heat and humidity of the lowlands. Yet, the brilliant scenery and temperate climate of the Cordilleras coincide with its inaccessibility and remoteness.

Despite its refreshing cool air, in 1900 merely 290,000 souls inhabited the Cordilleras’ lush land for various reasons. While the temperature was ideal, there were few mountain trails open year-round. In addition, annual typhoons devastated the Cordilleras’ landscape. Limited economic options in the Cordilleras also discouraged mass migration into the mountains. Yet, while these factors kept the mountain population low, the primary reason lowlanders avoided the mountains was in order to keep their heads.

The semi-autonomous tribes that lived in the Cordilleras were wary of intruders, and they did not welcome visitors. Fiercely independent, the highlanders rejected any outside religious or political hegemony, preferring isolation to even a hint of any imposition. Consequently, thousands of Spaniards lost their lives trying to establish religious and political authority in the Cordilleras (Scott 1974, 6–7; Jenista 1987, 4–5). On numerous occasions, frustrated Spanish soldiers marched into the mountains destroying every farm they found and burning down entire villages. The indigenous peoples simply moved further into the interior.

Deeply respectful of unseen powers that animated the world, the Mountain Province people’s spiritual lives revolved around the rhythms of feasts that placated malevolent spirits and ancestors. Divided geographically, the Cordilleras’ ethnolinguistic groups included the Kalinga, Apayao, Bontoc, Ifugao, Kankanay, and Ibaloi; they were known in aggregate as the Igorot (Finin 2005). Each group had its unique culture, gods, geographical boundaries, social traits, dances, dialect, and history. Pre–twentieth-century Igorot were illiterate, so knowledge of their origins is somewhat vague and based on oral tradition and archaeological studies. But the absence of written records did not stop the Igorot from keeping a mental track of past wrongs committed. Some tribes and clans, particularly among the Kalinga, lived in a state of perpetual war. Peace between different Igorot groups, tenuously kept through peace pacts, easily broke down with a human decapitation based on trespassing, or a generations-old act of revenge. Hundreds of warriors assembled for battle against neighboring clans based on a previous head taking. Consequently, the Americans’ pacification and democratization of the Philippines, like the Spanish before them, ran into a snag in Luzon’s highlands. But the Yankees were persistent.
During the first years of the twentieth century, the Americans in the Cordilleras were mostly mining prospectors and discharged soldiers searching for adventure. They lived among the Igorot and attempted to organize disparate villages. The colonial official who would most profoundly affect the political organization of the highlands was Dean Worcester. As the only member of the noted Philippine Commission with prior experience in the Philippines, Worcester exuded confidence based on his earlier years spent in the Philippines as an academician for the University of Michigan. A social Darwinist to the core, Worcester had little regard for Philippine lowlanders but his sentimentality toward the “noble savage” of the highlands influenced his policy-making decisions. He was also following President McKinley’s orders to “permit these tribes to maintain their tribal organization and government in peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they were unable or unwilling to conform” (Fry 1983, 39).

By 1908 Worcester had manipulated the political process so that the non-Christian tribes of the Cordilleras were under his direct supervision as the Secretary of the Interior. The area was designated Mountain Province and included the subprovinces of Apayao, Kalinga, Bontoc, Ifugao, Lepanto, Amburayan, and Benguet (fig. 1). Worcester selected Bontoc as the new province’s capital and he also chose the provincial governor and the subprovinces’ lieutenant governors (Finin 2005, 42–44). Within this context, Early came to the attention of Worcester as a rather effective teacher among the Igorot. In 1909 Worcester appointed him as lieutenant governor of Amburayan, in 1910 Early was selected for the same position in Bontoc (Fry 1983, 253).

**Early’s Oppositions to Colonial Policy**
During the first months of 1911, Early took a stand against what he perceived were unjust measures placed on the Igorot. Early’s initial repudiation of American policy was his decision to keep agents from taking the Igorot away from the mountains to serve as display objects in world fairs. Much has been written about the popularity of Igorot at world fairs, but little is known about how Early tried to stop what he considered “dehumanizing and racist” actions on the part of those taking Igorot persons around the world (Woods n.d.).²

At the same time, Early also found himself having to defy William F. Pack, the American governor of the Mountain Province, when the latter and other officials unjustly took land away from the Igorot. On this incident Early (1931a, 94) noted:

> The lieutenant-governor was required to take an oath before assuming office, to defend the property and personal rights of the
people under his control against any aggression from any source. The Provincial Board requested me to seize a tract of land which had been in continuous possession of the people of Bontoc for countless generations. There was a direct conflict between the request of the Board and my obligation to defend the people, and I took the matter to the courts which decided in favor of the people. This placed me completely out of harmony with the Provincial Board which carried the matter to the Secretary of the Interior. 

Worcester was also upset that Early supported the Philippine Constabulary (PC). A creative plan, the PC was initially led by 325 American commissioned officers and supported by 4,700 Filipino constables. The PC paradigm was the brainchild of Luke Wright, a member of the Philippine Commission. Wright stipulated that the Filipino PC members serve in their home provinces. This was meant to eliminate the potential for soldiers to exact revenge or act cruelly toward locals who might not share similar linguistic and cultural backgrounds (McCoy 2009).

Philippine Constabulary personnel embraced their responsibilities and created unprecedented order in America's colony. But the Cordilleras presented a unique challenge for the PC. Worcester's fiefdom was ruled by fiat, and his appointed lieutenant governors often acted outside the bounds of the law. A confrontation between the PC and the domineering Worcester was inevitable. It would take place under Early's tenure. In fact, according to Worcester, the last nail in Early's professional coffin was related to the latter's actions during a joint PC–Government military exercise, held in January 1911, meant to teach the Igorot a lesson. It became known as the Battle for Bacari (BFB), and to this incident we now turn.

The Origins of the Bacari Battle

The episode that set the Bacari expedition in motion was a January 1910 attack on and decapitation of a man named Lissuag from the village of Lubo in Kalinga, one of the subprovinces in the Cordilleras (fig. 2). It was common knowledge that three men from the Kalinga village of Bacari were the perpetrators of this crime. To complicate matters, Lubo was under the protection of the American colonial officials while Bacari and its neighboring villages refused to acquiesce to American control. Bacari men regularly attacked PC soldiers and raided pony pack-trains that brought supplies to American officials in Kalinga (Harris 1911, 1).

Bacari tried to make peace with Lubo on 4 February 1910 by killing a woman in their own district and sending her head to Lubo as a payment for taking Lissuag's head. At the same time in Lubuagan, Kalinga's capital, Lt. Gov. Walter Hale had gathered loyal warriors and on 3 February 1910 traveled to Bacari and demanded that the three men guilty of killing Lissuag be handed over for trial. As Hale (1911b, 2) approached Bacari, “people took to the hills, filling trails with Sugas [hidden bamboo spikes], etc.—refused to make Peace [sic] or deliver men wanted—later in the day threw spears at our party and fired a few shots—only two of our party hurt—Sugas.” Hale returned the spears to two Bacari men they had caught and warned them that this was not the way to greet American officials. Then he and his men returned to Lubuagan empty-handed.

Months later, in November 1910, Lubo elders (presidentes) sent a message to Bacari that they would not accept the woman's head as a token of peace for the death of Lissuag. In response, Bacari made an alliance with several neighboring districts, including Guinabal—a group also known for
their refusal to bow to American control of the Cordilleras. Lubo elders appealed to Hale for protection. For Hale, this was the last straw—the time had finally come to crush Bacari’s resistance to American rule. All of the Kalinga knew that the Bacari alliance had chosen the wrong American with whom to tangle.

Born to horse and cattle ranchers on 27 July 1874 near Plattsmouth, Nebraska, Walter Franklin Hale grew up mastering the use of the Colt .45 revolver. He grew in strength but not in height; at 5 feet, 5 inches, Hale was pure muscle. With a full head of black hair, a square jaw, proportional ears and a handsome face, there was a tenacious determination behind his dark eyes. As a young man, Hale longed to see the world beyond Nebraska. His gun would help him. Keen to use his marksman’s skill, he joined Company A in the First Nebraska Regiment, which landed in Manila on 17 July 1898. Hale got his fill of war as the Nebraska men were at the center of numerous bloody battles. On 1 July 1899, the First Nebraska soldiers left the Philippines, returning to San Francisco where the regiment was mustered out of service on 23 August 1899. But Hale decided to stay in the Philippines (Wilson 1956, 3).

Along with many of his fellow volunteers, Hale had heard of mines full of gold in Luzon’s northern mountains. Making his way into the Cordilleras, he began prospecting. He did not find gold and was low on funds so he took a job as a supervisor of a road project. While in the town of Cervantes, Hale struck up a friendship with the visiting Secretary of the Interior, Dean Worcester (fig. 3). The fortuitous relationship would change the rest of Hale’s life.

As sole authority in the Cordilleras, Worcester’s political appointments were based on who he liked and who he thought would carry out his vision for governing the Igorot. Thus, with no government or bureaucratic experience, the 28-year-old Hale was appointed lieutenant governor of the subprovince of Amburayan in the summer of 1903. On the first day of that same year, Hale married Guillerma Linda-Lorenzana, a 17-year-old Filipina from Tagudin. It appeared he planned to make the Philippines his permanent home.

When Kalinga was made a subprovince of Mountain Province in 1908, Hale was appointed its first lieutenant governor (Jenista 1987, 70). Hale moved his family to Lubuagan and was determined to establish peace in the archipelago’s most lawless region. His first action was to spread the word that he was the sole authority in Kalinga. The PC soldiers stationed at Lubuagan were unhappy with this new upstart but found that the Kalinga were drawn to this brash, self-assured, autocratic American. However, Hale’s authoritative dominance in Kalinga made it so that the PC found it impossible to recruit Kalinga men into the PC—a unique problem for the PC recruiters—and they blamed Hale for their lack of local recruits. For the most part, Kalinga men preferred to serve directly under Hale rather than the PC because with Hale there were shortcuts to justice and they only had to answer to one man rather than to an institution.

Hale was anything but lazy. He hiked up and down the Kalinga mountains, crossed rivers, and placed his stamp of authority on the region by appointing presidentes (headmen) for each village. He required these leaders to regularly assemble in Lubuagan, provide timely reports, and carry out his directives. He also made it clear that if an individual committed a
crime, punishment would be enacted against that person’s entire village. A fellow lieutenant governor noted that

Governor Hale had a system that always worked, never to my knowledge [was there] a single failure. Any crime within the Sub-Provence, be it the theft of an egg or a murder, he had the culprit behind bars within forty-eight hours. He did not have to send out police or soldiers to make an arrest. His headman brought the culprit in promptly, frequently before the governor even knew that a crime had been committed. (Wilson 1956, 2)

If a village headman refused to bow to Hale’s authority, he would go directly to that headman and say that he liked to fight as much as anyone and if “they thought that they were fighting people, to tell me so I would see what I could do to accommodate [and fight] them” (ibid., 22).

Hale not only brought unprecedented peace to Kalinga, he also provided medical, economical, infrastructural, educational, and agricultural improvements that transformed the subprovince. Kalingans were so taken with the seemingly fearless Hale that a rumor spread that he possessed an anting-anting (amulet charm) that kept him safe from all harm. Remarkably, given his scores of battles in Kalinga, Hale was never seriously injured. His boss and colleagues were astounded at his successes: “He [Hale] must be credited with being the first man to bring about the complete cleaning and sanitation of the Igorot towns. He has gone practically alone to towns which threatened to take his head if he attempted to visit them, with the result that they promptly changed their minds and decided to be friendly” (ibid., 8).

But while Worcester might have approved of Hale’s style, not everyone likes a dictator. Thirteen villages petitioned Mountain Province Gov. William F. Pack, Hale’s immediate supervisor, to be attached to neighboring provinces rather than Kalinga. Moreover, Hale’s overt disdain for the PC was legendary. He once claimed that he would rather have fifteen Kalinga warriors to police Kalinga rather than all the PC officers in the entire region. PC soldiers loathed their assignment to Kalinga, and it was the Cordilleras’ most unpopular post for both PC soldiers and officers. Governor Pack attributed this directly to the fact that Hale actively encouraged the Kalinga recruits to serve directly under him rather than the PC (Fry 1983, 241).

Fortunately for Hale, he had friends in high places including Worcester and Gov.-Gen. William Cameron Forbes. Furthermore, while Hale privately disparaged Governor Pack, the governor defended the autocratic Hale. So Hale continued to lecture PC soldiers to the great annoyance of their officers. It became so bad that even his most loyal supporter, Worcester, rebuked him in a 1912 private letter, “You either do not know what co-operation means or are unwilling to cooperate . . . you want to run your own show, and are unwilling to make use of agencies provided by the government” (cited in ibid., 46). Still, Hale was Worcester’s kind of man.

The Bacari Plan

During the first months of 1911, Hale’s impetuous trait got the best of him. He lost his patience and was determined to teach the Bacari men a lesson and capture the murderers of the Lubo man. In a letter dated 6 January 1911, Hale in essence told his boss, Governor Pack, that he was setting out to destroy Bacari. He laid out the plan and assumed that Pack would go along. Hale (1911b, 3) ended his letter to Pack with this postscript: “Will keep you informed by wire—as soon after events—happenings—as possible.”

Here was the proposed plan (fig. 4): Hale would approach Bacari from the west, supported by the PC soldiers stationed in Lubuagan under Capt. W. D. Harris’s command. Then in a pincer maneuver, Bontoc’s Lieutenant Governor, John Early, with support from PC soldiers stationed at Natonin (a municipality in Bontoc subprovince) led by Lt. Charles Penningroth would approach Bacari from the east. Both groups were to start out on 11 January and meet on 14 January at Bacari.

Based on Hale’s earlier communication, Governor Pack’s instructions to Hale, Harris, Early, and Penningroth were detailed down to the hour to start marching each day and where to take breaks. More importantly, Pack (1911, 2) made it explicit that Early and Penningroth were to take orders from Hale and Harris:

In case of any such attack, the senior constabulary officer, present, will be in command and responsible and you will then be careful to act in an advisory capacity, of course, before beginning an attack he will counsel with you, and before attacking he will have to have your authority to do so, and if it is a case of self-defense, he will act upon his own judgment.
From 11 January until the morning of 14 January the plan worked to perfection. Both groups followed the routes prescribed by Pack, picking up stray weapons from Kalinga villages along the way. But on the appointed rendezvous day things began to fall apart. Some of the problems were logistical but most of them were due to philosophical differences and a clash of personalities.

The Bacari Debacle

At 8:00 a.m. on 14 January Hale arrived at Bacari; two hours later Harris and his constabulary soldiers joined him and together they began working their way through the Bacari area, looking for a fight. At 3:30 p.m., Early and Penningroth arrived in Bacari—three and a half hours later than they were due. Furthermore, they were on the opposite bank of the river that runs at the edge of Bacari. Hale called for Early and Penningroth to cross the river and join him so that their respective soldiers and headmen could socialize.

According to Hale’s (1911a, 4) report, “Lieutenant-Governor Early refused to allow his Presidentes and head-men to camp on the same side of the river with the Kalingas notwithstanding we offered to build shelter for his men at the same time suggesting it would probably be a good opportunity for the head-men to get acquainted.” Early refused the offer, clearly disobeying the orders from Pack to act as a subordinate to Hale.

The next morning both groups went their separate ways, continuing the mission to disarm the recalcitrant anti-American coalition. For the next five days, the PC along with the lieutenant governors slowly made their way through the enemy area and confiscated numerous guns. It seemed to be a rather successful, relatively uneventful mission. There were a few battles with some fatalities, but nothing that was unexpected. The Bacari coalition was soundly defeated and humbled by the power of the Americans and the PC.

But things took a nasty turn at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, 20 January. On that cool mountain morning, the Early/Penningroth group found themselves once again just minutes away from linking up with the Hale/Harris contingent. Rather than joining their colleagues, however, Early ordered his men to move across a ravine to avoid the Hale/Harris party. But once Hale/Harris heard that Early/Penningroth were just a few minutes away, they sent a message ordering that they immediately join them.

In both the civilian and military worlds disobeying a supervisor’s order carries consequences; so it was surprising that Early and Penningroth ignored direct commands from their superiors. Early refused to join Hale, and Penningroth responded to Harris claiming that he was taking directions from Early who had ordered him to stay away from the Hale/Harris faction. Hale (1911a, 9) complained in his report of the mission: “The actions and conduct of Lieutenant-Governor Early as well as that of Lieutenant Penningroth under the circumstances would seem to resemble that of two very small boys, rather than two full grown men holding responsible positions in the Mountain Province.”

The Lie

On 23 January 1911 the Bacari mission ended. Hale and Harris immediately wrote glowing reports that indicated great success. Hale wrote to Pack a few weeks later, noting that the three men guilty of beheading the Lubo man were either captured or on their way to Lubuagan. Fifteen Bacari men also came to Lubuagan to apologize for their past actions. In addition, Hale had
also confiscated 248 guns. He concluded his letter by saying “Everything is all O.K. Slowly but surely improving.” But there was an ominous ending to Hale’s (1911c) report to Pack: “I want to see you and have a talk.” Captain Harris’s (1911, 5) report to his PC superiors also indicated victory: “It is believed that in a very short time the rest of the Guinabal-Banafa-Pacaoan and all the guns of Bacari district will be surrendered, and the people accept governmental authority.”

These reports of success did not match the reality of the mission. The secret but fatal flaw in the mission was the insubordination of Early and Penningroth. Why did they refuse to join their superiors? Why did they risk their careers over a rather simple mission? The answer—and it was a bombshell—came in Penningroth’s (1911, 1) report of 23 January 1911: “On the other side of the river [that separated Early/Penningroth from Hale/Harris] was Lt.-Gov Hale with his policemen and about six hundred Kalingas [loyal warriors] brought in from outlying rancherias. These had torn down houses to provide material for the erection of their camp.” Penningroth went on to explain that Hale brought hundreds of looting Kalinga warriors with him on this mission and that they used this mission as a cover for exacting revenge on their neighbors by burning entire villages, taking heads, and killing the livestock; in short, they obliterated the entire Bacari area. Even Harris (1911, 1) noted in his report that well into the mission 300 or more Kalinga warriors joined Hale and sent the message to the Bacari district that they “would tear them to pieces.” Furthermore, at least a dozen Kalinga headmen and their warriors arrived in camp and joined Hale and his loyal Kalinga fighters; on the 21st Hale gave them permission to attack Bacari.

John Early would not be part of the hostilities. The ubiquitous evidence of animal entrails scattered throughout freshly burned-out villages pointed to mob action rather than a disciplined police action. Even as Early and Penningroth marched from town to town, village headmen begged them to stay until Hale and his men left the vicinity. Banguiao, Abugao’s village headman, asked if Early would write a letter to prevent Hale’s men from looting and burning his village (Penningroth 1911, 3). Indeed, whenever Early came upon Hale’s men he rebuked them for, among other things, killing the hogs that were part of the Bacari’s food source. At the end of Penningroth’s report, he insinuated that all the fighting in the BFB was due to the excessive force of Hale’s warriors. Early, on the other hand, reportedly accomplished his mission without incident due to his professional behavior: “Remarks: Throughout the trip not one suga was seen by nor was any hostility shown to Lt.-Gov. Early and his escort. The encounter [by the other American-backed forces] was undoubtedly intended for the Kalingas [Hale’s warriors] and not for the soldiers” (Penningroth 1911, 3).

If it had not been for Penningroth’s scathing report of the mission, Hale’s marauding warriors and their outright murder of enemies would have disappeared in the annals of irrelevant historical events. But Penningroth’s report was directed to Col. Wallace C. Taylor, the PC district director stationed in San Fernando, La Union. After reading the report, Taylor sent a 31 January 1911 telegram to H. H. Bandholtz, the top authority in the PC. Taylor’s (1911b) telegram included the following:

[I]t will be seen that the ideas of the two lieutenant governors were evidently at variance as to the extent of the ‘pressure’ to be applied to these distant rancherias. . . . It may be that higher authorities will consider the means were justified by the results but until there is some indication of an expression on the subject I will refuse to furnish escorts to lieutenant governors who take with them hordes of armed warriors for the purpose of devastating the country.

The PC had had enough of Worcester’s lone rangers. From this point on the PC officers would not accompany Mountain Province lieutenant-governors. Within a week of Taylor’s telegram, the issue made its way to Governor-General Forbes, the highest authority in the Philippines. He was also the acting Secretary of the Interior, as Worcester was on a brief visit to the United States.

Wheels were set in motion on 9 February 1911, a month after the mission commenced, to find out exactly what happened. Forbes asked Governor Pack to do a thorough investigation regarding the PC accusations against Hale.

The Real Battle
Word leaked out that Penningroth had written a report on the BFB that contradicted the rosy picture painted by Hale’s description of a smooth operation. In fact, the young Penningroth severely criticized Hale—one of Worcester’s favorites. For the Secretary of Interior—recently returned from an official visit to Washington—this was the last straw. Dean Worcester
intended to use the Bacari mission as the incident that once and for all placed his stamp of authority on the Cordilleras over the upstart PC officials and punish the recalcitrant Early. In a blistering thirteen-page letter Worcester wrote his old friend Governor-General Forbes, defending Hale and the mission. Worcester wanted Penningroth punished for submitting a disparaging report. He also wanted Forbes to order the PC authorities to defer to the Secretary of the Interior when it came to his lieutenant governors and their governing of the Igorot. In his report to Forbes, Worcester noted that he delayed writing the report until he could travel to Kalinga and learn firsthand what had transpired. He went on to write among many other things that: “I consider that the means employed in the Guinabal expedition were more than justified by the results, and indeed I specifically approve of the means employed” (Worcester 1911, 2).

Worcester continued writing that the governor-general had been foolish in asking for an investigation of the mission based on one telegram from the PC official in La Union who presented “a distorted picture of events which occurred,” and that this telegram had led Forbes to mistakenly believe that “Lieutenant-Governor Hale [was] the leader of hordes of savages whom he took along to devastate the country” (ibid., 4–5). Worcester claimed that Hale had in fact been more than patient with the obstinate Bacari people; when they had thrown spears at Hale, “he gathered the spears into a neat bundle and returned them with the suggestion that such conduct was impolite and that he wanted to make friends with them” (ibid., 5–6). Finally, Worcester advised Forbes not to be too concerned that houses were burned in Bacari because they were more like shacks than houses. He insisted that the truth was that Hale brought peace to the most dangerous place in the Philippines; he had confiscated more guns in one year than the PC had done during their entire time in Kalinga.

Then Worcester became personal. He praised Harris for supporting Hale during the mission, but feared for Harris’s future because, “I find to my very keen regret that the view is somewhat general among Constabulary officers that the man who renders effective assistance to the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out his plans relative to work among the non-Christian inhabitants, is due for trouble” (ibid., 12).

Worcester (ibid., 11) also wanted Forbes to know that Early was disciplined for not being part of the team:

In closing I beg to invite your attention to the very temperate character of the report of Lieutenant-Governor Hale relative to this whole matter. In my opinion it is highly creditable to him under the circumstances. I also invite your attention to the report of Governor Wm F. Pack, constituting the enclosure to the fifth indorsement, [sic] and to the very carefully considered instruction given by Governor Pack to the Constabulary and to Lieutenant-Governors Early and Hale, prior to the starting of the expedition. I need hardly invite your attention to the insubordination subsequently shown by Lieutenant Penningroth who flatly disobeyed orders from Captain Harris, nor to that displayed by Lieutenant-Governor Early, who flatly disobeyed the written orders of Governor Pack and whose resignation from the special Government service has since been had at my request.

Forbes was in a difficult position for various reasons, and in the end his report did not make either side happy. He agreed with Worcester that Hale had excelled in bringing peace to Kalinga. He concluded that Worcester’s report contained the true substance of the situation and that “his [Worcester’s] position is sustained by me . . . The results of the expedition are satisfactory, and the fact of the expedition was officially approved by me as Governor-General” (Forbes 1912a, 1–2).

In a separate letter to Worcester, Forbes noted that he had met with Hale and was satisfied with the lieutenant-governor’s explanation for using Kalinga volunteers. But Forbes also told Worcester that he did not believe that the PC was uncooperative with the Secretary or his lieutenant-governors. And in a surprising mild rebuke, Forbes (1912b, 2) wrote, “I see no cause for objecting to the position taken by Colonel Taylor in regard to leading hordes of spearmen into fights . . . The attitude of the Government must certainly be against turning bands of savages loose against each other.” To soften the rebuke, the last sentence of Forbes’s (ibid.) letter to Worcester was: “Penningroth has been let out of the Constabulary.”

Worcester was furious with Forbes’s letter and set out to investigate Penningroth’s dismissal from the Constabulary. He learned that Penningroth had actually turned in his resignation on 1 January 1911—a full week before the expedition even took place. To add insult to injury, Penningroth’s superior accepted the resignation and wrote on 17 January 1911 (while Penningroth
was disobeying direct commands in the BFB) that “[Penningroth] stands superior to all the young officers who have entered the service in this district during the past two years and his departure will be a distinct loss to the service. His services has [sic] been honest and faithful and of a superior class” (Taylor 1911a).

When Worcester received this information, he wrote the following memo which he knew Forbes would read: “I was particularly desirous of having the record in this case [Penningroth’s resignation] because I was verbally informed [by Forbes] that Lieutenant Penningroth had been dismissed from the service because of certain facts as to his record which happened to come within my personal knowledge” (Worcester 1912). By the time Worcester could do anything about Penningroth, the young man was attending Harvard Law School.

In his lengthy report on the BFB, Worcester showed his disgust with John Early’s actions in the mission. In another more revealing moment, Worcester noted his regret at ever appointing Early to an official position; he said that “he had spoilt a good teacher to make a poor governor” (Fry 1983, 120).

The Aftermath—Governor Early?

Following his firing, Early returned to Idaho where after a very short courtship he married Willhelmine Rhodes on 30 April 1912. Within months of their wedding the newlyweds were on their way to the Philippines to serve as teachers. For the next decade they served in the Visayas. Then the most improbable thing happened—Early was appointed governor of Mountain Province. A bit of controversy surrounded this appointment and it took several years for Filipino legislators to confirm Early’s appointment. His confirmation was problematic on account of the supposed reasons for returning an American to govern the Cordilleras.

In the early 1920s, when the Republicans were once again in control of the White House, American officials reporting on the conditions in the Philippines claimed that the Igorot sought an American governor to replace the Filipino lowlander whom the highlanders reportedly did not trust (ibid., 118–20). The Igorot leaders had a specific request—they wanted Early to be their governor. It must have been with sweet vindication that Early (1931a, 95) wrote in his memoir

The people seemed sorry to see me go [following his 1911 dismissal by Worcester] and I believe their regret genuine from the fact that they carried the incident in their memory eleven years later until they had opportunity to report the matter to Governor Forbes, when as a member of the Wood-Forbes Mission he visited Bontoc in 1922, and that they demanded with such persistence that I be sent back to them as Governor for their Province, that General Wood yielded to their demand and sent me back the next year.

All of this does sound like sweet vindication for Early and a fairy-tale ending where the deposed benevolent leader is brought back in triumph. The reality of this tale, however, is a bit more complicated.

Gov.-Gen. Leonard Wood, who appointed Early as governor, was an overt racist who, at one point, told his political enemy Manuel Quezon, “the real problem out here was biological and not political” (Kramer 2006, 390). It is unlikely that Wood would have called on Early to serve as the governor of the Mountain Province if they were completely on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. In fact, Howard Fry (1983, 120) notes, “it is clear that his appointment by Wood to be governor of Mountain Province was based neither upon an outstanding record as a provincial governor nor upon any peculiar qualifications for this post. It seems clear that the attribute which Wood found so attractive, and which differentiated him from Dosser, was his unadulterated ‘Americanism’.”

Still, the Bacari incident, Early’s fight against US officials unjustly taking Igorot land, and his attempts to keep Igorot from serving as objects for Westerners to gawk at did indicate that he was a rather unique mid-level American official in America’s colony. Only space and time limit numerous other examples of his seemingly less patronizing attitudes toward non-Western peoples. In his memoirs he blamed Western arrogance for the problems in the Philippines and China. With respect to his first visit to China he wrote:

In China more of misery was apparent, more professional beggars, more diseased people, more harshness in bargaining between strangers and natives, and every agreeable feature of places within the town of Shanghai forbidden to Chinese—signs up: ‘Dogs and
Chinese Not Allowed.’ This attitude of the Westerner toward the Easterner, although we did not analyze it then, was no doubt the underlying cause of the great upheaval in China during the past several years. (Early 1931a, 4)

With regard to the Ifugao, Early (ibid., 56) noted that the “Ifugao man is as much a gentleman by instinct and tradition” as the best American man. These thoughts and actions might be categorized as those from a humanitarian imperialist. Early’s belief that the Igorot had the same rights as American colonial officials and enjoyed the same titles (gentleman) as the white race should make him stand out from his peers; certainly it was one of the reasons that he was dismissed from his government post. But there were other sides to Early as well.

In a 1928 address on Memorial Day, Early made it clear that he thought that America’s practice of “developing” the Filipino was superior to the British and French colonial policies in other portions of Southeast Asia: “They [other Western colonial powers] thought of colonial domination in terms of commercial advantage for their own nationals. We think of our trust in terms of social development of the people of the Philippines. And ours is the better way.” Toward the end of this talk he explains his life’s work as follows:

We who have cast our lots among the backward people of the Philippines both pagan and Moslem have a still more sacred duty resting upon us. We have in charge a people who have been cut off from that beneficent influence which created the will to progress among the Filipinos, but who must advance or disappear. It is ours to arouse a desire to participate in their own government—in their own affairs—within the minds of Moro and Highlander and then see that opportunity be given them to satisfy that desire. To this requires sympathy and patience and a sense of justice which nothing can daunt and above all the God given ability to pick up the pieces when our plans have been wrecked by incompetence or blindness and build again and again until the structure will withstand all storms. (Early 1928)

Conclusion

Early’s actions, career, and writings demonstrate that a person does not always neatly fit human-created categories that attempt to explain the past. Rather, he is an example for various scholars who have opposite views of American imperialism. For those who write about a selfless, benevolent motive of America in the Philippines, they can point to Early’s decision to end his career based on his belief on the equity of rights among races. If written and oral histories are to be trusted, there is also evidence that the highlanders trusted Early to be fair toward them. One of his eulogists noted:

Among the mountain people the memory of Early is vivid and sacred. More than one among the younger leaders of the Igorots has said to me: “When, on the trail, I come to places that I have visited with Governor Early, I say to myself, ‘He has passed here,—he sat upon that rock. This is holy ground.’ Thus, his monument is not of glass or stone alone, but is reared in the living hearts of his people. (Hayden 1935, 4)

But more research based on Early’s memoirs and the reality in history make one ask whether anyone really knew him. In his memoirs he does not tell the truth about his upbringing. For example, Early was well known for having been the first to manufacture bricks and construct brick buildings in Bontoc. In his memoirs, Early attributes this knowledge of brick making to college courses at Washington Agricultural College, although his college transcripts do not corroborate this. In fact, he was the son of a bankrupt brick maker, and Early grew up doing this work. Was he ashamed of his bankrupt, Irish-Catholic father?

In his tribute to Early, Hayden (1935) and other obituary writers noted “At seventeen, fatherless, he pressed on to the Pacific northwest.” Where might they have received such false information if not from Early himself? While still in his twenties, Early was still working for his father in Minnesota as their brick-making business fell into bankruptcy. In fact, Early began his memoir in 1905—his first 32 years are obviously not part of his
story. The devout Catholicism that his parents followed was also hidden as Early identified himself with the Episcopal Church once he arrived in the Mountain Province, which was the domain of Episcopal missionaries. The region’s bishop, Charles Brent, became one of Early’s closest friends (Slater 1932).

It seems that toward the end of his life Early himself understood the many contradictions and multidimensional aspects to his actions and motives. In his rather self-revealing public speech given on Memorial Day at Baguio’s Camp John Hay just months before his advanced cancer would take his life, he noted:

Of late years a swarm of debunkers has swept from the arid places in our universities and public libraries whose function is to besmirch the fair picture we hold of the fathers of our country. By using the simple formula of disregarding the time environment and refusing to recognize the fact that every time has its own manners, they picture Washington a drunkard, Jefferson a wastrel, Hamilton a stock jobber, Lincoln a foul-mouthed jester, and Grant a political crook. (Early 1931b)

And what was the “time environment” of Early’s time? Perhaps he was looking into the future and what people would write about him and his generation. If so, might it be best to not divide the world strictly into the categories of culprits and victims, angels and devils, heroes and villains but to see humanity as Hamlet noted: a noble piece of work?

Notes

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1 There is no detailed study of John Early. The information about his life in this article is based on archival research (in six archives), census and death records, and private paper collections in various university libraries. All copies of these documents are held by the author.

2 Early’s efforts to keep the Igorot out of world fairs are fully discussed elsewhere (Afable 2004; Vostral 1993; Woods n. d.).

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