America’s Colonial Desk and the Philippines

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essays but why these merited exception to the rule is not explained. The list of acknowledgments mentions the sources of the individual selections but curiously omits all dates, except again for two.) The lay reader who is concerned only with the texts themselves and cares nothing for their historical-social context, will have the least complaints to make about the book. Besides, it is a decidedly handsome book, finely designed and professionally printed.

The title page announces that Sinaglahi was issued in celebration of an event hosted by the publishers. Is this perhaps what the anthology really is: a collection of works of, by, and for a select group of writers? Is this why our needs as readers are so little attended to: because we are intruders on a very exclusive party? If so, let us take our leave quietly and let them be. But let them not presume to speak for all of us.

Edna Zapanta-Manlapa:


This book was originally a dissertation presented by the author to the University of California for his doctorate in history. It gives an account of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) created in the Department of War, during President McKinley's administration, to deal with the affairs of government of the territories acquired from Spain in the Spanish-American War.

As its title indicates, the work studies the bureau's activities in relation to the colonial government established by the United States in the Philippines. Its main topics are: the genesis of the Bureau of Insular Affairs; the BIA's general functions and responsibilities; its organizational structure and personnel; and the threats to its existence in the form of proposals to replace it with another department or to transfer it either to the Department of State or to the Department of the Interior. There is an introductory chapter containing an exposition on the subject of imperialism and a statement on the character and tendencies of the American brand of imperialism and its impact on the Philippines.

The Bureau of Insular Affairs began as a division in the office of George Meiklejohn, assistant secretary of war, who created it on 13 December 1898, three days after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Under the name "Division of Customs and Insular Affairs" (DCIA), it was headed by Robert E. Parker, Meiklejohn's chief clerk. John J. Pershing, military aide of the assistant secretary, replaced Parker on 10 March 1899. Pershing, however, remained
only for a brief period with the DCIA. Finding bureaucratic life quite boring, he asked to be transferred to the Philippines. Subsequently, after his tour of duty in the Philippines, he led the American expeditionary force in Europe in the First World War.

In 1902, Congress gave legal status to the BIA and made it the official agency of the Department of War to supervise the workings of the governments of the Insular territories. The Philippine Act of 1 July 1902 otherwise known as the Cooper Act, changed the name of the division into “Bureau of Insular Affairs.” It assigned to it “all matters pertaining to civil government in the Island Possessions of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department.”

A significant event in the history of America's colonial adventure in the Philippines was the appointment of Elihu Root as secretary of war (August 1899). President McKinley chose Root, the author tells us, not only because he wanted a lawyer to direct the governments of the newly acquired possessions from Spain, but also because he was an active and prominent Republican in New York, and, more importantly, because his intimate friend, Horace Porter, the ambassador to Paris, sent word to McKinley through Mark Hanna that he wanted the able New York lawyer to hold the war portfolio.

The appointment of Root proved to be a wise move on the part of McKinley. Root wrote the historic document “McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission” which provided the guidelines for setting up the colonial government of the Philippines. Root introduced important changes in the organization and working procedures of the DCIA which made the office an effective agency of the War Department for the administration of colonial affairs. He placed Colonel Clarence R. Edwards, formerly adjutant general on the staff of Henry W. Lawton in the Philippines, as head of the DCIA. Edwards ably put into effect the secretary’s plans and policies, and became for all practical purposes a sort of undersecretary for colonial affairs.

Throughout the period of its existence (1902–1934), the Bureau of Insular Affairs was, in the words of the author, “a colonial department similar to the kind found in the European imperial structure.” Apart from the ordinary operations common to all government offices, it performed policy-making functions. It prepared the drafts of bills relating to the Philippines for submission to Congress. The drafting of the tariff acts of 1901, 1909, 1913, and the organic laws of 1902, 1916, and 1934 originally was done in the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Its law officers wrote the legal opinions on which the United States based its actions on political and constitutional questions affecting the Philippines. Cases in point were Charles Magoon’s legal opinion on the status of the Philippines under the U.S. Constitution, and Felix Frankfurter’s memorandum occasioned by the political crisis which arose in the Philippines during the governorship of Forbes. In that memorandum, the
suggestion was made that Filipinos be given a majority of the membership of the commission thereby giving them full control of both houses of the Philippine legislature. The author says that Harrison was enjoined to make a dramatic announcement of this policy and that Harrison did this upon arrival in Manila on 6 October 1913.

The author's argument in support of the proposition that the American system of colonial government is identical with the European and that the Bureau of Insular Affairs was "virtually a colonial office" is, as far as it goes, adequate and valid, except for one major flaw. It does not include among the bureau's functions and, for that matter, of the War Department, the selection of the chief executive of the colony, a most important aspect of colonial government.

In the European colonial administrative system, this function was the responsibility of the minister of the colonies. In Spain, during the period of discovery and colonization, it was vested in the Consejo de Indias; under the Constitution of 1876, in the Ministro de Ultramar. The author does not touch on this aspect of colonial government. He has not shown, for example, what role the BIA and, for that matter, the War Department, had in the appointment of Taft, first as chairman of the Second Philippine Commission and later as civil governor of the Philippines.

It is interesting to note in this connection that on more than one occasion, Filipino leaders in the Philippine colonial government had a say as to who should be appointed chief executive of the Philippines. A case in point was the selection of Francis B. Harrison to succeed the incumbent governor, W. Cameron Forbes. As Harrison himself once stated: "Commissioner Quezon was in part responsible for my name being taken to the President for consideration in connection with my appointment." Another instance was the selection of Henry L. Stimson to fill the vacancy created by the death of Leonard Wood. In his autobiography, The Good Fight, Quezon tells how he and Osmeña managed to secure the appointment of Stimson as successor of Wood.

On the subject of imperialism, the author claims that American imperialism was substantially identical with the Spanish. Both shared the same motivation - "Gold, God and Glory in the case of the Spanish, and Dollar, Deity, Destiny, Duty, Defense in the case of the American." It was a mixture of philanthropy and profit. American rule, the author further tells us, had as its unique feature adherence to the concept of stewardship, but the implementation of this concept was "not disinterested and its objective was to keep the Filipinos in bondage out of gratitude and self-interest."

To be sure, there is much to criticize in America's colonial adventure in the Philippines. One can find in the record instances of wrongdoing by selfish, predatory, and exploitive interests. By and large, however, the record is admirable. It shows that in their dealings with the Philippines and the Filipino
people, the American people through their leaders displayed a high sense of honor, fairness, and justice. They viewed with sympathy and understanding the legitimate aims and aspirations of the Filipino people. There was created, as a consequence, a reservoir of friendship and goodwill among Filipinos toward the United States.

On the subject of nationalism, the author shows a tendency to be skeptical, if not cynical. He believes that Philippine nationalism during the American period was a "pseudo-nationalism." "Actually," he says in a footnote, "real nationalism flourished only for a brief period from the 1890's through the early 1900's as epitomized by Marcelo H. del Pilar." The leaders of the independence campaign, he goes on to say, "were never serious about independence for the Philippines. Rhetorically, they used independence to annoy the American proconsuls and to get elected year in and year out."

There is a slight suspicion that these notions of the author are a product of the close association he had with Gerald E. Wheeler, an intimate friend of his who, as he himself states in the preface of his book, gave him "valuable suggestions." Wheeler has written an article entitled, "Quezon and the American Presidents," in which Quezon was represented as a "Janus-faced" politician — in public an advocate of independence but in private an advocate of continued American rule.

When he speaks of nationalism, it is presumed that the author has reference to that phenomenon in the historical process which emerged in the wake of the so-called "Affair of 1872," the martyrdom of Fathers Burgos, Gomes, and Zamora. Specifically, it was the nationalistic movement which was a dominant feature of Philippine history in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. The movement took on successively the forms of the campaign for reforms in Spain under Rizal, del Pilar and their associates in the Propaganda, the Katipunan society, the Philippine Revolution, the Filipino-American War, the campaign for Philippine independence during the American regime.

In the various stages through which it passed, the nationalistic movement remained constant in spirit and in purpose. It had as its ultimate objective the liberation of the Filipino people from injustice and oppression and the elevation of the Philippines to the stature and dignity of a free and independent nation. The aspiration for Philippine independence was the epitome of Philippine nationalism. Consecrated and hallowed by the heavy sacrifices in blood and treasure during the Philippine Revolution and the Filipino-American War, Philippine independence became the "sacred cause" of the Filipino people.

As a historical phenomenon, Philippine nationalism had an element of continuity and progressiveness. There is a historical linkage between the nationalism of which Osmeña and Quezon were the acknowledged spokesmen and leaders and the nationalism of the 1890s and the early 1900s. It is there-
fore incorrect to say that at one stage in the historical process Philippine nationalism was a "pseudo-nationalism," while at another stage, it was real and genuine.

To be sure, the nationalistic movement during the American period was unique in many ways. For one thing, it was carried out in the realm of peace, employing peaceful and lawful methods. The grand strategy of the independence campaign as planned and directed by Speaker Osmeña called for two specific courses of action: (1) the judicious use of the powers granted by the law to the people to prove their capacity to manage their own affairs; and (2) the establishment and maintenance of a policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States.

The nationalistic sentiment for the "sacred cause" was deeply rooted. It pervaded all ranks of Filipino society. Because of its strength and power, Filipino politicians dared not ignore it. Osmeña and Quezon, fully sharing this sentiment with the people, remained steadfast in their loyalty and devotion to the cause of Philippine independence.

Except for those portions of the dissertation which were brought up for critical comment, the work is a notable piece of historical scholarship. It is a study in depth of an institution which has played a major and significant role in the development and implementation of America’s policy in the Philippines. It is a distinct contribution to historical knowledge in the field of Philippine-American relations.

Nicolas Zafra


Apparently based on a doctoral dissertation, this book gives an account of Taft and his activity with regard to United States foreign policy from the time of his appointment to the Second Philippine Commission in 1900 until he was elected President of the United States in 1908. More specifically Professor Minger attempts to show, as it were, Taft’s education in foreign policy through several episodes in which he represented the United States in its foreign relations—colonialist activity in the Philippines, imperialist intervention in Cuba and Panama, and negotiations with major powers, Japan and China. Though in general Minger’s study of Taft pictures him in a favorable light, he does not hesitate to point out how much he mirrored many of the assumptions of his age and political party—seeing American intervention in the affairs of a supposedly independent Cuba, for instance, as fully justified for the good of the Cuban people. Indeed he felt that Cuba was less fit for