Philippine-Japanese Relations: 1930-1940:
Four Aspects of Philippine-Japanese Relations

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to love. Pain then is not to be attributed to a vengeful, "Moloch"-like god but to a Being who loves and is love.

Suffering is likewise necessary to purify love. Renunciation and pain make one realize his poverty, his helplessness, giving him a "soul of a poor man." Suffering helps one realize his state as a sinner; it is, therefore, a call to personal penance. "Those who suffer are the witnesses in the world of the crying need for God." It reminds us that we are not meant for this world, and "that the world must be changed, modified, upset—converted." Deprived and purified through suffering, we grow in our capacity of love and understanding; suffering is thus a power of communion which gives us something in common with all who suffer.

Suffering, moreover, finds its apex in God. He desired the risk of human freedom, thereby permitting evil in the world, because he felt powerful enough to compete with man in intervention by His "initiatives of love"; hence, none of our sins is decisive for there will always be God's forgiveness and our reparation in love.

Christ's suffering and death show us the height of God's powerlessness because of His love. "God is the most suffering of beings, the most abandoned, the most surrendered, the most committed into the hands of another." He is giving, communication of self, love—and this communion is done on the level of suffering and renunciation. Accordingly, to become capable of loving and giving is indeed the happiest thing in the world, for by them one enters into the divine world of generosity.

What we have then is an absorbing spiritual reflection by an author, himself a sufficient guarantee of the quality of his spiritual writings. The presentation is richly scriptural; throughout, moreover, Father Evely maintains a flair for actuality, a relevance to modern problems and ideas. But he is to be especially commended for his own rich and fresh insights with which he makes the reader share in the excitement of spiritual discovery and self-knowledge.

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PHILIPPINE-JAPANESE RELATIONS: 1930-1940


A collection of four papers, this volume covers four aspects of Filipino-Japanese relations during the decade of the thirties. On the one hand, the early part of the period was marked by the Manchurian
incident of 1931 when certain forces of Japan's military arm started their moves towards territorial aggrandizement without the approval of the civil government, and possibly, even without the specific assent of higher military authorities. On the other, party rule was suddenly ended by army and civilian extremists, who forced as much of their program as they could on the government, in which the military element tended to grow and party representatives slowly dwindled in number as the decade wore on. By mid-1930's, Japanese foreign policy was controlled more by field army cliques than by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And the following year (1936) the military naval personnel clearly dominated the Hirotsu government. Thus evolved, in the same year, two schools of thought on the direction of Japan's expansion in Asia: the "continental school," sponsored by the army, which believed that China was to be the target for expansion, and the "blue water school," supported by the navy, which aimed at moving towards the Southern Seas—Nanyó, an area that included the Philippines.

Yet, the author gives a categorical negative answer to the question of whether or not the Japanese had aggressive designs on the Philippines during the ten-year period. "All of the evidence in the four studies in this volume," according to Goodman, "lends full support to the thesis already advanced in numerous scholarly works [Goodman cites no representative examples] that they did not" (p. ix). Is there no possibility that they did? That is, if one turns more closely to a study of Japan's foreign policy, not only in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the author did his research in Japan, but also at depositories containing written records of the various sectors of Japan's armed forces, as well as those of the rightist extremist groups, especially the extremist Pan-Asian organizations which the author dismisses as "not only a minority fringe group in Japan but identification with them was scrupulously avoided by all civil organs of the Japanese government" (p. ix). Would these factors necessarily preclude the possibility of the influence of extremist groups, especially those appearing in the 1930's and actively engaged, overtly or covertly, in disseminating the idea of Japan's "mission in Asia," upon the policy of any civil organ of the Japanese government, say, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Were these extremists not among those responsible for the termination of Japan's party rule during the early 1930's? As indicated earlier, this development eventually lead, during the second half of the decade, to the control of Japan's government by the military whose foreign policy goals were closer to, if not convergent with, those of the extremists. Before the end of the decade, the military extremists, among others, started the 1937 undeclared war in China consequently forcing the Foreign Affairs as well as the military Ministries to support their action.
Underlying the four papers are what the author claims as his two premises of Philippine-Japanese relations in the 1930's: the advent of Philippine independence, and the dominance of Japanese power in East Asia (p. v) which are reiterated here and there in each of the four studies. During this decade, the Philippines' foreign relations were undertaken by the American colonial administrators, who Goodman refers to as remarkably permissive. A specific instance of this “remarkable permissiveness” was the American administrators’ permitting President Quezon to visit Japan in 1938 (p. 251). Was it the permissiveness of American colonialism or Quezon’s constant reference to his trip as “private” that prevented the Americans from interfering in or doing anything about the trip? If one classifies all relations between Filipinos and Japanese described in the four papers as unofficial, because official relations were in American hands, and if one considers the immediate personal, political and economic circumstances of these relationships focused on the specific aspect of interaction covered in each of the four papers, would the author's two premises remain valid?

In the first paper, for instance, could one view in terms of these premises the lobby of the Japanese consular officials in Manila with certain socially and politically well-placed Filipinos, subsidized by the Japanese in order to stem off the passage of the proposed Alien labor entry control bill, introduced at the Philippine National Assembly in 1936 and later, of another bill which became the Immigration Law of 1940? Or could this lobby be better studied in the context of Japanese success in organizing a settlement in Davao, as well as Japan's desire to keep the doors of the Philippines open to unlimited Japanese immigration? On the part of the Filipinos contacted, perhaps in terms of the potential goodwill and aid of the Japanese, as well as the pecuniary returns for their support of the Japanese stand on these bills? Or in the particular case of Quezon, can the lobby be viewed as a test of Quezon's diplomatic skills in dealing with the Japanese as he hoped to pursue a rewarding friendship between the Philippines and Japan side by side with the United States?

Were the Filipino and Japanese students as well as other groups which exchanged visits, described in the second study as taking place during the second half of the 1930's, essentially undertaken within the framework of the author's premises? Or were these exchanges carried on for the purpose of each group's making the trip to, and observing what they could as well as meeting who ever they could in the other's country? These visits were too brief to gain anything more than impressions. The language barrier between the Filipinos and the Japanese seem to have prevented fruitful discussions on topics other than those of the “information please” type, as in the case of the Philippine-Japanese student conferences which took place annually and alternately in Manila and Tokyo from 1937 to 1940. Nor could this
barrier be expected to encourage lasting friendships or exchanges of ideas through subsequent communications between Filipino and Japanese students.

The third and fourth papers deal mainly with Japanese relations with two Filipino leaders—Benigno Ramos and Manuel L. Quezon, respectively. Again, could the author's premises hold true in the case of the relations between the Filipinos and Japanese narrated in these last two studies? Or did personal, political and economic exigencies cause each of these two Filipino leaders to interact with the Japanese? Quezon visited Japan in 1938 ostensively to rest (he could have easily gone to Baguio or taken a cruise aboard his yacht as he was wont to do) but actually, among other reasons, to meet with Benigno Ramos. To retain his undisputed political leadership in the Philippines, it was then logistically important for Quezon that Ramos return to the Philippines before the next national election. And it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that Quezon and/or members of his traveling party solicited financial contribution for the forthcoming election from Japanese businessmen as insinuated in the fourth paper. As for Ramos, he had hoped that, by sojourning in Japan in 1934, he would gain both the financial and moral support of certain Japanese (most of them belonging to the extremist Pan-Asian group) and, by his very presence in Japan, prove to his Sakdalista followers that the Japanese were ready to help them achieve their objectives. The Sakdalistas rose to arms on May 2 and 3, 1935 on the belief that Japanese troops would arrive, once the revolt had started. No Japanese appeared and Philippine government forces easily quelled the uprising. Ramos remained in Japan until 1938.

Whatever be the answer to the questions raised, these four papers contain a wealth of historical data, at times too many and detailed that they divert the readers' attention from the main stream of each account. These data were gathered from the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the United States National Archives, the personal papers of Manuel L. Quezon in the National Library at Manila, and the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, especially from the last depository as one can conclude after examining the list of notes following each of the four studies.

Goodman appears to have relied heavily on the Japanese Foreign Ministry records regarding certain points covered by the four papers, like the presentation and interpretation of the behaviors of Filipinos who interacted with the Japanese in Manila or in Tokyo. Considering that many of the Filipinos in the four studies were leading social and/or political leaders of Philippine society, is there no possibility that pertinent data—direct or circumstantial, converging or diverging—are available in Philippine and American depositories? Such data, in addition to the Japanese, could have given other dimensions on the
background and the character of each of the Filipinos mentioned, as well as other circumstances surrounding their relations with the Japanese.

Filipinos today who have been dealing with the Japanese will find reading these four essays instructive. The past can yield useful lessons to contemporary Filipino elites in their development and in maintaining mutually advantageous relations with the Japanese. One of them is: that economic opportunism which is self-serving has to be avoided if it would cause such unfavorable national consequences as Japanese control of any sector of Philippine society. They can also take note of the close cooperation between Japan's government and private sectors in implementing certain Japanese foreign policy commitments during the 1930's, when the Japanese tried to neutralize their country's image of being an aggressor in Asia. Such cooperation was observable in the subsidizing and planning of the student exchange visits during the second half of the thirties. Similarly and more specifically, Quezon's visit to Japan in 1938 was underwritten by the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (p. 225) while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped in planning the trip in accordance with Quezon's wishes, giving him the best entertainment and services, and placing Quezon and his entourage under close surveillance.

Finally, if the data available in all four studies were woven into one well organized historical account, a less dispersed and more meaningful narrative which will present a clearer picture of Filipino-Japanese relations in the 1930's could perhaps be produced.

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VIEWS ON JEWISH-CHRISTIAN PROBLEMS


The dire and horrendous treatment of Jews during the period of Nazi domination in Europe has had one fortunate outcome, if it can be called that. Responsible Christians were forced, by the sheer weight of events, to reconsider the roots and manifestations of anti-Semitism (i.e. anti-Judaism), which was often presented as part and parcel of Christian tradition. Perhaps the outstanding result of this reconsideration for Catholic Christians has been the statement of the second Vatican Council on the Jews.

However, both before and after that statement, post-war Europe and the United States witnessed a proliferation of books and articles