In the mid-nineteenth century, as the ideas of the Enlightenment were making inroads in Spain long isolated from intellectual currents of Europe, there appeared a peculiarly Spanish philosophical movement known as Krausism. Though freakish in character in the context of the history of European thought, with no significance outside Spain, Krausism did in fact provide many a Spanish thinker with the philosophical base which justified the Glorious Revolution of 1868 and the radical changes which liberals unsuccessfully tried to bring about in the six years following. During the period of the Restoration, which began in 1875 with the ascension to the throne of Alfonso XII, the seat of Krausism was the Institución Libre de Enseñanza in Madrid, which produced three generations of what the historian María Dolores Gómez Molleda (1981) has called "the reformers of contemporary Spain." The influence of Krausism was pervasive. But it was felt most strongly in the academe, especially in the premier state university, Universidad Central de Madrid, where Rizal was enrolled in 1882–85.

Krausism

In 1843 Julián Sanz del Río, the movement's founder, was sent to Germany by the Minister of Fomento to study German literature and philosophy. He chose to go to Heidelberg and focus his studies on Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832), an obscure philosopher and minor Kantian disciple (Estéban 1985, 4: 97–117). Circumstances did not allow him more than one-and-a-half years to study Krause, whose Urbild der Menschen he was to translate into Spanish under the title, Ideal de la Humanidad para la vida. After much delay and hesitation on his part, Sanz del Río finally accepted in 1854 the professorial chair of history and philosophy at the Universidad Central de Madrid, and at the inauguration of the academic year 1857–58, delivered his famous lecture, full of religious fervor, calling for
educational reform, but more, for a new understanding of man and the renewal of Spanish society, on the basis of the redemptive truth expressed in Krause's philosophy. Expelled from his teaching position in 1867, he was brought back shortly after the Glorious Revolution of 1868, as dean, while his friend and fellow Krausist, Fernando de Castro, priest and former Franciscan, was named rector.

By the time Sanz del Río died in 1869, his philosophy had a firm footing in the university with a number of Krausists holding teaching positions. Many of these, however, were expelled with the Restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy in 1875. Whereupon the band of Krausists, under the leadership of Sanz del Río's spiritual heir, Fernando Giner de los Ríos, founded the Institución Libre de Enseñanza where they could try out their new ideas with the freedom that they desired. The roster of its graduates includes distinguished intellectuals and leaders, "reformers of contemporary Spain." Among them, to mention only a few, were the poet Antonio Machado, Manuel Azaña, president of the Second Republic, and perhaps the best known outside Spain, the writers and philosophers José Ortega y Gasset and Salvador de Madriaga.

But aside from the school, as the Krausist Azorín pointed out, there was another Institución Libre, an institución difusa, a sort of "Church in dispersion" (Gómez Molleda 1981, 237), whose pervasive influence was felt in almost all facets of Spanish life: literature, journalism, the courts, parliament, politics, social behavior and public mores, but most of all, in the academe and university studies. In a word, Krausism in a variety of forms and complexions became part and parcel of the intellectual atmosphere in Spain in the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth.

God, Man, History

Departing from Kant's view which relegates the knowledge of God to the sphere of practical reason, Krause affirms that the root of all knowledge is the knowledge of God himself. Man first becomes aware of his body, which forms part of Nature, and his intellect, which belongs to the sphere of the Spirit. But Nature and Spirit, both finite essences, call for an infinite essence, the Absolute Being or God. The world is not something distinct from and existing outside God, but rather God contains all things which are "a determination of the divine creation" (Estéban 1985, 4: 106–10; López Morillas 1980, 36–37).
Answering the charge of pantheism, Krause coins a new word to describe his idea of God, *panentheism*, since "all things are in God." However, there is difficulty in interpreting Krause and the Spanish Krausists. Estéban (1985, 4: 107) believes that for Krause, God is a personal being distinct from the world, but Gómez Molleda (1981,41) sees in the God-language of Castro, Azcárate, and Giner de los Ríos only a vague impersonal deity.

Inextricably bound up with the knowledge of God is Krause's philosophy of history. History is the infinite work of God, depends on God and has its law in the divine life. Man, being finite, can only know part of the infinite life of God. The philosophy of history may be defined as the knowledge of the Absolute and its evolution in the world. The work of the historian is at the same time a philosophical task. It is not enough to do external history, that is, describe the external event, but historiography must also study internal history, which is the history of ideas, the only true history. The idea is always the idea of God, unfolding itself in different states of human history, which always aspires for the fullness of life here on earth or the ideal of humanity.

Man is the microcosmos mirroring the whole of humanity, which in turn is the reflection of the individual man. Like man, humanity goes through three stages. Infancy is the stage of simple unity of indifferatiation. In early times human society was weak, displayed no historical consciousness, and its religion was some vague monothesim. Youth is the stage of differentiation and numerous conflicts. Humanity became divided into tribes, nations, classes and castes. Early in this stage polytheism was the dominant religion but in time gave way to a monotheism which was attended by a clerically-dominated theology enslaving the arts and sciences. This was the period of the Middle Ages. But then, much later, there occurred tremendous conflicts on the question of freedom, tolerance, law and science in the nineteenth century, which however is beginning to see the dawn of the final stage. Maturity is the stage of harmony. Here the Ideal of Humanity is achieved when opposites are reconciled on a higher plane of unity, when all individuals live in one harmonious collectivity, professing the religion of panentheism and forming a universal brotherhood.

Harmony is a key word in Krausism, which is often referred to as a "harmonic rationalism" or a philosophy of "rational harmony." The individual and society form an organic whole, and the life of man and history a continuity; thus the concept of social evolution
and progress is an organic one. Man must attempt to achieve harmony between body and mind, Nature and Spirit, within himself. And humanity strives for its ideal guided by the law of universal harmony, resolving all conflicts and at the same time achieving a more perfect knowledge of the Absolute God. In the words of Sanz del Río, "humanity is the harmonious synthesis of Nature and Spirit under the absolute unity of God"; and "man must realize in his limited place and sphere the harmony of all life and give beautiful expression of that harmony in the world outside" (quoted in Gómez Molleda 1981, 51).

Ethics and Religion

Moral behavior was always so much of a concern among Krausists that the Krausist writer Azorín has stated quite strongly that Krausism was not a philosophy but an ethic (una moral) or a moral doctrine and way of life (Gómez Molleda 1981, 31). The strange anomaly, López Morillas (1980, 51) points out, was that only few really grasped Sanz del Río's ideas and fewer still Krause's thought which was couched in the unfamiliar language and abstruse categories of German philosophy. In point of fact, the Ideal de la Humanidad was the object more of respect than serious study, with however the important exception of the Mandamientos de la Humanidad, which was Sanz del Río's own composition appended to the book (López Morillas 1980, 83). This was the most popular section of the Ideal. Skimming over metaphysical arguments, many a reader found greater ease and much spiritual comfort in the pithy formulations of the precepts. Some are summary statements of Krause's philosophy, others are more directly ethical precepts.

Know, love and sanctify nature, the spirit, humanity above every natural, spiritual and human individual.

Fulfill your duty to every one not for any utilitarian motive but for justice's sake.

Do not be proud, egoistic, lazy, false, hypocritical, servile, envious, vengeful, irascible, forward; but modest, circumspect, moderate, dedicated, true, loyal and of simple heart, benevolent, loving and ready to forgive. (Jiménez 1985, 90-92)
These precepts, twenty-three altogether, fulfilled the desire of well-disposed readers for a morality which spoke in categorical and absolute terms, but was devoid of threats and punishments. They contained a clearly religious ring, but were presented as dictates of the law of reason, putting order into chaos and driving away the darkness of error.

Ethics and metaphysics were inextricably tied up with the religious question, which was always a central issue. Notwithstanding the constant appeal to reason, Krausists displayed, in discourse as well as in conduct, an unmistakably religious tone and fervor. Their purpose was the religious transformation of man and Spanish society. They wanted to divest Spanish religiosity of its heavy historical accoutrements and push forward their own ideal of "rational" Christianity. Although all of them, including the priest Fernando de Castro, broke with the Church, they never abdicated the title "Christian." For Krause, as well as for his followers, there was no supernatural, historical revelation but only the philosophic revelation of God through human reason. All religions were historical manifestations of man's religiosity. But above Mohamed, Buddha, Zoroaster and the other religious founders, Jesus towered as having best understood God. Similarly, Mosaic religion and Christianity were the two religions most admired because they best responded to the religious needs of man.

All religions are in fact moving toward "natural religion" which recognizes only the existence of one God, the universal religion, the religion of the future (Gómez Molleda 1981, 43-44). In the New Testament imagery of Krause, man, the prodigal son, is about to go back to his father's house. Having left the vague monotheism of his early years (first stage) when he fell in love with nature, man succumbed to the blandishments of polytheism and then embraced Christianity, which despised nature and displayed a theocratic and static view of society and the world. Now stimulated by the scientific spirit, man is entering upon an age (the third stage) of harmony of Nature and Spirit in a happy return to its former but renewed and purified understanding of the one God (López Morillas 1980, 46-47).

Art, Literature, and the Novel

The climate created by Krausism stimulated a perceptible change in literary writing and criticism (López Morillas 1980, 121-35). The
two decades preceding the Restoration of the monarchy in 1875 were marked by social unrest and political upheaval, culminating in the Revolution of 1868, which dethroned and exiled Isabel II, followed by the brief reign (1871–73) of the imported king, Amadeo of Savoy, and the even briefer interim (1873–74) of the First Republic. Paradoxically enough, the literary output of this period, far from reflecting the turbulent social ambience and the onset of new ideas, was generally mediocre, frivolous, anecdotal, sentimentalist, and escapist, perhaps in reaction to an "exacerbated lyricism" and effete romanticism.

In this artistic wilderness rang the message of harmonic rationalism: art is not to be confined to the fine arts, but all of life is a work of art (López Morillas 1980, 123). The beautiful is to be found in "unity in variety." It belongs to the artist to organize the multiple and diverse facets of human experience into an orderly harmonious whole, through the use of the creative power of the imagination. The work of art derives from an interior human experience, of which it is the expression within the limits of time and space, as for example, a piece of sculpture. A great work transcends these limits and has timeless meaning. But to do justice to a truly artistic production, inasmuch as it reflects the authentic sentiments of people in a given stage of history, one must study its historical, social context.

Among the arts, literature occupies a primary place since, according to Giner de los Ríos (1983, 113), it is capable of expressing "with the greatest clarity and precision the happy harmony between the universal and the individual, the summun of all sensible representation." But there is another reason. In contrast with historiography, which merely describes the events, thus providing the bare "structure" and "skeleton," literature gives "life." Do we want to know the Athenian in Pericles's time or the Spaniard in the reign of Philip III? (Giner 1983, 144; López Morillas 1980, 12). Then we must go to the tragedy of Sophocles and the comedy of Lope de Vega because literature is "the first and surest road toward the understanding of history, the universal mentor, which reproduces for us the past, explains the present, and teaches us about the uncertain developments of the future" (Giner 1983, 114). As we search for the meaning of life and history, literature serves to complement our observations.

Writing in the sixties, Giner de los Ríos was expecting a new development in literary production to come in the form of a revitalized drama (harmonious poetry) or the epic (objective poetry). But in actual fact, it came in the novels of Galdós, Pereda and Alarcón
in the late seventies. In these was to be found what the Krausist author and literary critic Clarín (Leopoldo Alas) missed in the novels of the sixties, namely, "artistic altruism," meaning the capacity of the creative imagination, which starts with the writer's personal experience, to rise above it and depict transcendental types (Alas 1983, 219). This altruism is only possible when there is a synthesis between the imagination and reality outside, so essential for any work of art. Because of its ability to blend objective, transcendental ideals with the individualist concerns of lyricism and romanticism, the novel was considered the "harmonic genre" par excellence.

Furthermore, often referred to as "the epic of the century," the novel was, in the opinion of the Krausist González Serrano, "the literary genre best suited to the spirit and tendencies of the present times" (quoted by López Morillas 1980, 134). It became the most popular and was considered superior to all others because of "its syncretic character of poetry in the form of prose, its dual role of revealing the impressions and personal judgments of the artist as well as describing the real and objective circumstances attending the development of the plot, the wide sphere allowed the novelist to speak on any topic . . . and lastly, the constant pasture the novel offers the critical spirit" (López Morillas 1980, 134).

Moreover, the hardened, hostile conservative ideology of the early years of the Restoration lent a strongly polemic character to the genre of the novel, which became, as in Galdós, a most convenient and powerful instrument for social criticism, circumventing the prevailing censorship policies.

The Institucion Libre de Enseñanza

The ideas of Krausism were in fact translated into an educational project with the founding of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza by Fernando Giner de los Ríos in 1876, shortly after the conservative Cánovas government expelled him and other Krausists from the Universidad Central.

The objective was to form new men for a new Spain on the basis of the Krausist ideal of a person who had achieved harmony between body and reason, Nature and Spirit, individual conscience and the conscience of humanity (Gómez Molleda 1981, 59–60; Estéban 1985, 4: 112–17; see also Menéndez Ureña 1985, no. 4, 91–95). This naturally entailed the rejection of what was considered the formal-
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ism, ignorance, coarse and uncultured manners, and fatuous religiosity which had characterized the Spaniard and much of Spain's historical past.

Educating students at the level of the segunda enseñanza leading to the bachelor's degree, Giner and his band of dedicated teachers made it a principle "not to disturb" the mind and consciousness of the young, and in view of the conflictive nature of dogmas and doctrines, professed to maintain a policy of religious "neutrality" (Gómez Molleda 1981, 61-65). Religion was to be taught, not with a view to propagating dogma and commanding faith, but as a historical and cultural subject. What was judged immoral was anything that would produce disharmony within and detract from harmony with the rest of humanity. Tolerance, therefore, was the supreme virtue to be cultivated, since it was best suited to bring all contending parties and sectors to unity and result in the country's progress.

The educational program also strove to promote the love of nature against what Giner viewed as the somber and cheerless other-worldly Christian view of life, little "in conformity with nature" (Gómez Molleda 1981, 72). Thus there were frequent outings, field trips, and bicycle tours. But even more fundamental, the school taught proper body care and hygiene, even as it chastised the prevalent culture for its "horror of nature" and ridiculed Spaniards as people "who seldom eat, wash even less frequently and are accustomed to bathing every other summer" (Gómez Molleda 1981, 74).

At a time when Cánovas del Castillo was building a parliamentary system based on the British model, Giner held as the educational ideal no longer the traditional Spanish caballero, but the English "perfect gentleman," distinguished for his proper behavior, esthetic sense, social graces, spirit of tolerance, suavity and affability (Gómez Molleda 1981, 83-85). He was in fact crusading against endemic social habits, such as spitting, which in his description was performed with dexterity even by ministers of state and ladies of high station, almost everywhere—at home, in the streets, from balconies, carriages and professorial chairs, even in parliament and in church (Gómez Molleda 1981, 78). What was distinctive about Krausism was that it raised social graces to the level of moral conduct and behavior.

New ways were also introduced, such as the socratic dialogue and methods designed to stimulate self-activity, the abolition or at least reduction of exams, the offering of electives, and coeducation.
The Spanish Kulturkampf

The sincerity of Giner in his claim of religious neutrality of the Krausist movement and the Institución Libre may indeed be beyond question. But it is extremely doubtful whether, in the late nineteenth century Spain, such neutrality was really possible, even for a man of such personal integrity and good intentions as Giner. Tolerance and freedom of religion were being urged on the basis of rationalist principles and a political program designed to banish the Catholic faith from public existence and replace it with a philosophic religion. It was a clash between two diametrically opposed ideas of religion: Christianity understood by the Catholic Church as supernatural revelation and God's intervention in human history, versus the Krausist notion of "panentheism" or "harmonic rationalism" as the natural and universal religion, to which all humanity was moving in its own historical evolution. In their statements, neutrality for the Krausists meant more often distrust of the Catholic religion than respect for all religions, notwithstanding the frequent references to Buddha and Mohammed. Although Giner never openly and rabidly attacked the Church, it cannot be said that he always observed strict and highminded neutrality in religious matters (Gómez Molleda 1981, 257-58). The frequent Krausists' attacks on the Church and attempts to secularize Spanish society provoked Menéndez Pelayo to charge them with the "intolerance of impiety" (Gómez Molleda 1981, 71). In fact, the novelist Galdós himself in his novel La familia de León Roch depicted a young Krausist moving from tolerance to intolerance in the enthusiastic defense of his ideas.

After the War of Independence in 1808, the cry for liberal reforms was increasingly heard in Spain. Among the central issues was the thorny question of religious freedom and the disestablishment of the Church. The pressure often took the form of an anti-Catholic aggressiveness, which negated the very freedom which the reformers were fighting for, resulting in the expulsion of religious orders, especially the Jesuits, the confiscation of Church property, and even convent and church burning. In the mid-nineteenth century it was in large measure Krausism which intellectualized these demands, elevated the crass liberalism of the past by lending it philosophic substance, and forced many a liberal toward a break with the Church and the past. The ideological content of the Revolution of 1868 and of the liberal progressivist delegates which successfully pushed for affirmation of religious freedom in the Constitution of 1869 owed much to the
thought of Sanz del Río and Krause (Gómez Molleda 1981, 139-43; Petschen 1974, 110).

Krausism, however, in the view of Palacio Atard and Gómez Molleda, must be understood against the wider panorama of conflicting historical forces in nineteenth century Europe. Two well-defined coordinates help us pinpoint the place of Krausism in this larger picture (Gómez Molleda 1981, xix-xxiv, 137-41). The first is the anti-Catholic movement, known as the Kulturkampf, founded by Rudolf Virchow. German in origin but European and in fact worldwide in scope and intent, it launched a total war against the ancient institution of the Roman Catholic Church which in its view had outlived its usefulness and represented the antipodes of all progress and culture, promising Catholics liberation from the slavery of Rome. It pressed for religious freedom, separation of Church and State, laicism or the control of the Church by secular powers, the secularization of culture and society, and in fact, the removal of the Church from public existence. The philosophical underpinnings of the movement were the principles of liberal subjectivism. And as the contemporary distinguished Protestant thinker Ludwig von Gerlach stated, it was in fact “not a struggle for civilization, in favor of progress, but a fight to the death of those who affirm the absolute autonomy of the individual against those with faith in the transcendence of human destiny” (Palacio Atard 1981, xxii). The second coordinate was the insertion of this movement into the warp and woof of nineteenth century Spain. Krausism was a strong philosophical anchor of the Spanish Kulturkampf.

Rizal and Krausism

During the period of the Restoration, the Universidad Central de Madrid was sharply divided. On one side were unorthodox, liberal professors, prominent among whom were Giner de los Ríos and his Krausist followers, challenging Catholic unity of doctrine with new ideas. On the other side were the likes of Menéndez Pelayo and Ortí y Lara, eminent and staunchly Catholic scholars, defending the Catholic tradition with remarkable zeal and, many a time, breathtaking erudition. The two conflicting climates of thought represented what was often referred to as “the two Spains”—a new Spain emerging out of and challenging the old.

In 1882 a newly appointed minister in charge of education reinstated Giner de los Ríos and fellow Krausists Salmerón and Ascárate
and encouraged the collaboration of the faculty of the Institución Libre in the university (López del Valle 1987, 388–95). The return of Giner and his friends was received with great enthusiasm. Giner became the object of idol worship for his magnetic personality, new ideas and innovative pedagogy. Scoring bookishness and memorization and getting students enthused about learning, he did not call the roll, used no textbook and did not hold exams. Students followed him where he went—in libraries, museums, the Institución Libre, and faraway places as Toledo, Segovia, and Avila (Gómez Molleda 1981, 278–79). The impact was felt most especially in the Faculty of Law, where Giner lectured on the Philosophy of Law, but the new spirit of freedom pervaded the entire university.

While the intellectual atmosphere in the Universidad Central and the rest of Spain was bristling with the Krausist controversy, there were other currents of thought being propagated not only by academicians but also by groups like the Masons. It is not easy to separate the various philosophical strands from each other and determine their influences on contemporaries such as Rizal. Although there was by no means unanimity among the new thinkers, there was much exchange and interplay among them. Some Krausists became Masons (Krause himself was a Mason), and some Masons sympathized with or embraced Krausism. Freethinkers likewise attempted to define their own principles, but many did have alliances with Masonry. Two thinkers who influenced Rizal and whose ideas he echoed in his writings were Miguel Morayta, professor of history at the Universidad Central, and Francisco Pi y Margall, extreme republican and former president of the First Republic. Morayta was essentially eclectic, Krausist after a fashion or at least a Krausist sympathizer. On the other hand, Pi y Margall, while borrowing from Hegel's idea of man and history and Proudhon's social philosophy, displayed in his writings some familiarity with the variety of philosophical currents, including deism and Krausism. Moreover, there was a common vocabulary of intellectual discourse, such as freedom of religion, academic freedom (libertad de la cátedra), tolerance, natural religion, harmony, and progress of humanity.

It was in 1882, when Giner and the Krausists were reinstated in the university, that Rizal began his studies, taking courses in the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. Rizal was no Krausist nor did he ever mention Krausism or any well-known Krausist by name (except Morayta, who however was not a Krausist in the same sense as Giner and Salmerón); but there is no
gainsaying the fact that this movement, which was so much part of the intellectual air he breathed, had a profound impact on the neophyte Rizal. And it is possible to find traces of this impact in Rizal’s writings.

In his letters to Fr. Pastells written from exile in Dapitan, Rizal professed his adherence to the basic tenets of deism: divine revelation is impossible, the mysteries of the faith are mere absurdities, miracles do not take place, the bible is merely the work of man. Revelation is the “living revelation of nature which surrounds us everywhere.” Its voice is “powerful, eternal, unceasing, incorruptible, clear, distinct, and universal as the Being from which it comes” (Letter to Pastells, 5 April 1893; Rizal 1936, 4: 119). The sacred books contain errors and inconsistencies. They are merely the work of human beings, “the insights of men and whole generations.” The religious precepts in the bible are “condensations or formulations of the precepts of the natural law; as such, they are for me God’s word” (Letter to Pastells, 9 January 1893; Rizal 1893). Or in language of the English deist Tindal, for Rizal these precepts represent the true “gospel” inasmuch as they are considered to be “the republication of the religion of nature” (McDonald 1950, 47-50).

The irony of Rizal’s deism was that in actual fact he held on to the idea of a personal God and, as he indicated so often in his writings, prayed daily to God as a loving Father for his protection and guidance—a far cry of Voltaire’s watchmaker God unconcerned about the daily conduct of life.

Krausism shared some common views with deism. Like Krause and the deists, Rizal denied the supernatural, referred to “natural religion” as the universal religion that would unite all humankind, and believed in the superiority of Christianity above all other faiths. It must be said, however, that the principal source of Rizal’s deism was not Krausism, but Voltaire and the writings of Pi y Margall.

Among the nineteenth century liberal thinkers progress was a key concept, which took on various forms. Some, like Kant and his disciple Krause, spoke of progress in idealist terms, that is to say, on the basis of certain philosophical assumptions about man and history. The human being is perfectible and the development of the individual and humanity is inevitable (Menéndez Ureña 1985, 648). Kant also saw a scientific and technological dimension as a necessary condition for the perfection of man and viewed progress as the gradual conquest of the slaveries of nature through scientific advancement. What Krausism added was the notion of history divided
into stages corresponding to the growth of the individual. In time however, the metaphysical and idealist principles of Kantian inspiration would give way to the positivist and scientific mentality encouraged by Comte. With Darwin theorizing on observable data, progress became an evolutionary process which was unstoppable. Then the rapid development of science and technology would give it more concrete empirical content. Progress meant machines, ships, railroads, and other modern inventions. Within the context of these current notions Rizal penned exhortatory, rhapsodic paeans to progress.

The best known is Tasio's discourse on progress in the Noli. Man has finally become aware of himself and the world in which he lives. University studies are changing, scholasticism is dead. New lawyers are being trained in a new Philosophy of Law (not by accident, the course taught by Giner de los Rios in the Universidad Central). The key to progress is the advancement of the experimental sciences. And freedom is the indispensible ingredient and the proper ambience of all progress. That is why the Jesuits, who are more advanced than the Dominicans and had brought the natural sciences, "the soul of the 19th century," to the country, appear progressive in the Philippines, but in fact in Europe are considered reactionaries because they have not embraced the liberal principles of the Enlightenment (Rizal 1909, 2: 161-63).

In the Fili however, the vision of the Philippines becomes more concrete, complete with the description of a rising industrial complex and a prophetic reference to Mandaluyong.

I see towns rising where railroads cut through the land and factories and building everywhere, as in Mandaluyong. I hear the whistles from the steam ships, the clattering of trains, the thunderous roar of machinery. I see monstrous engines breathing out powerful puffs of smoke, I smell oil dripping like sweat from constantly moving muscles. We shall see this port, the result of long labor, and this river where commerce seems pathetically dwindling, we shall see them full of masts, like the bare trees of a European forest in the winter time. This pure air and clear stones will be dirty with soot even as industrial products in crates and barrels arrive. But no matter, we shall be able to travel fast inland in comfortable coaches to find clearer air, newer sceneries by newer beaches, and cooler weather in mountain resorts. Our navy ships will patrol our coasts; the Spaniard and the Filipino will vye with each other in repelling foreign invasion, in defense of your homes so that your wives may laugh and live in peace, loved and respected. Freed from an exploitative system, without shame and
discouragement, the people will work, because work will cease to be degrading and servile like labor forced on a slave. No longer will the Spaniard sour his character with ridiculous pretensions of being a despot, but rather we shall look at each other straight in the eye and with stout hearts walk hand in hand. And commerce, industry, agriculture, and the sciences will develop in the spirit of freedom under the protection of wise and equitable laws, like in prosperous England. (Rizal 1911, 2: 62-63)

In his letter to Fr. Pastells, progress assumes an evolutionary though not strictly Darwinian slant and ends in a rousing Krausist finale.

Taking a closer look at things, when we contemplate skeletons of gigantic monsters now gone from the face of the earth, when we read in history epitaphs of great and mighty empires which lived off the life and freedom of humanity, when we see how the cat lives on as the tiger disappears, how shopkeepers increase in number as conquistadors vanish; we become better aware of the principles of peace, the triumph of the mind and the law of universal harmony which follows the world in its rapid course, demanding life for all and freedom for all. (Italics the author’s; Rizal 1893)

The reference to "the law of universal harmony" is indicative of how Krausist vocabulary and thought had become part of Rizal’s discourse.

Scholars have shown the likely influence of Benito Pérez Galdós’s Doña Perfecta on Rizal’s Noli (Schumacher 1973, 81; Hornedo 1980, 11: 385–86, 390). However, the parallelisms between the key figures in the two novels should be viewed as pointing to a deeper commonality—the shared understanding of the nature and uses of the novel as a literary genre. With its idealist philosophy, emphasis on the Urbild of humanity and view of history as a series of progressive stages, Krausism created an intellectual atmosphere, in which literary writers began to view their task as that of discovering the meaning of history. If for Giner de los Ríos literature was the great teacher which recalled the past, Rizal similarly believed that his own Noli was more than just a fictional narrative, but in fact the interpretation of his people’s history. In the dedication of the novel, he defined his intent: he was seeking his country’s welfare, therefore he would describe the cancer presently afflicting her (Rizal 1909, 1: 24). “The events in my narrative have truly taken place,” he explained in a letter to Resurrección Hidalgo, “I can give proofs. My book has defects from an artistic and esthetic point of view, I ad-
mit; but what is beyond question is the impartiality of my account” (quoted by Retana 1907, 126). In brief, Rizal’s view of his novel as history coincides with Giner’s own understanding of literature as “the first and surest road toward the understanding of history” (Giner 1983, 114). And his choice of the novel as the vehicle for his political ideas is in agreement with Krausist González Serrano’s view of this literary genre as “best suited to the spirit and tendencies of the present time” (quoted by López Morillas 1980, 134).

Rizal’s novels were written at a time when the novel had achieved tremendous popularity, having developed into a powerful instrument of social critique. The “artistic altruism” which Clarín, found in Balzac, Zola, Daudet, Tolstoi, Gogol, Dickens, and Galdós is equally present in Rizal. His novels are in a sense realist. They abound with reflections of life in Calamba, his student days in Manila, the Spanish experiment and European sojourn, and indicate a clear attempt to narrate recognizable historical realities. But at the same time, Rizal created transcendental or universal types: the cautious reformist Ibarra, the evil-scheming Simoun, the coy and religious Maria Clara, the hypocritical Fray Dámaso. While unveiling before the reader the social cancer afflicting the country, they provide a deeper insight into the human condition. Thus, the novels fulfill Giner de los Ríos’s canon for great literature, the “happy harmony” between the universal and particular.

No sooner had Rizal enrolled in the Universidad Central than he began to show keen interest in the problem of the education of his people. The interest grew and amounted to an obsession which persisted up to the days of his trial: education was of the highest priority in the task of national redemption, the necessary and indispensable precondition to all social change. It was an idea first broached in his early study, “La Instrucción,” repeated in a lengthier article “Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos,” and novelized in the episode of the schoolmaster and Ibarra’s project of a new schoolhouse in the Noli. In fact, he began dreaming of founding a colegio moderno in the Philippines and actually drew up the draft of its statutes and plan of studies, which included the study of religions as a historical and cultural subject, and hygiene (Rizal 1961b, 8 [part 1]: 293–96). Education, which Rizal always paired with the exercise of freedom, must fill the vacuum, “the lack of the sense of nationhood” (la falta de sentimiento nacional) (Rizal 1961c, 7: 257).

Rizal made no explicit mention of Giner de los Ríos’s educational ideas, nor was the teaching of religion as a cultural and historical
subject and of personal hygiene exclusive of the Institución Libre. Further, it may be that Rizal had also in mind other European models, above all the German educational system. Nevertheless, Rizal began to think out solutions to the educational problems of his country while studying at the Universidad Central, just a stone's throw from the Institución Libre, many of whose graduates were Rizal's fellow students in the university, and whose founder, Giner de los Rios, newly reinstated in the Universidad Central, stimulated the minds and hearts of the young with new ideas and innovative pedagogy. Just as the objective of Giner and the Institución Libre was to train a new breed of Spaniards for a new Spain, so for Rizal and his colegio moderno the task of education was to form the new Filipino for the emerging Filipino nation.

In Spain, Rizal found great excitement in the new intellectual milieu and readily imbibed a great deal of liberal unorthodox ideas. He made common cause with the "reformers" building a new Spain, but with a difference. His focus was his patria, the Philippines, and his people, el pueblo filipino. In matters of religion, he was clearly on the side of the Spanish Kulturkampf, but again from his own optic. As he himself put it, the target of his attacks was not the Catholic religion itself, but the Spanish friars, who were taking cover behind it (letter to Blumentritt, 20 January 1890; Rizal 1938, 5: 523).

Nonetheless, his break with the Church was never complete. In Europe, as he indicated in his diaries, he still went to Mass, at least on occasion (letter to his mother, 3 January 1893; Rizal 1959, 393). The Catholic faith always held a strong attraction for him, and he found Protestantism colorless and insipid (letter to Blumentritt, 22 August 1886; Rizal 1938, 5: 11-12). The figure of Padre Florentino, together with the biblical imagery of his discourses, emerged from the religious background of his youth. (For a lengthier discussion on the topic, see Bonoan 1987, 1-16.) But more important, for him, God was a loving father who exercised provident care of his children, an idea incompatible with the tenets of deism, which viewed God as a perfect workman or watchmaker on the margin of the universe, who governed by the inner laws of nature and needed not to interfere in history and human affairs. His diaries are punctuated by prayerful invocations to God (Rizal 1961a, 1: 4, 7-9, 11, 17, 33, 34, 39, 44, 56, 59, 287).

But the fact remains that Rizal lost his faith. And it must be said that Krausism contributed in some way to this loss.
Conclusion

Krausism, a freak and exclusively Spanish philosophical movement, was a significant feature of the intellectual milieu of late nineteenth century Spain. Its impact on Rizal is evident in his concept of God and history, educational ideas, use of the novel, and attacks against the institution of the Church.

With the Krausists, he believed in the idea of "natural religion" as the universal religion toward which humankind was moving and clung to the supremacy of the Mosaic and Christian faith as superior to all others. He saw the world and his country on the onward march to progress, led by the ineluctable "law of harmony." The task of education in his country was similar to Giner's Institución Libre in Spain: to form the Filipino for a new nation. Rizal's attacks against the Church, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he was aiming not at the Catholic religion itself but merely at the friars, were in line with the anti-Catholicism prevalent among secular liberal circles, many of whom sought the weakening and even the eventual downfall of the Church.

While the Krausist influences are evident in Rizal, it must be said that the above ideas were not the exclusive creation and possession of Krausism, but were commonly held by many liberal groups. However, Krausism did have a distinctively peculiar impact on the development of literary writing, linking history with the novel as the literary genre par excellence. Rizal shared the view of Giner and the other Krausists of the novel as the conveyor of historical meaning and an instrument of social critique. He strongly claimed that his novels actually took place; that in fact, like a drama, in which he played an actor, the Noli and Fili, even after they were written, were unfolding before his very eyes in the events happening in his country.

References


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