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Post-Summit Reflections

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munist terms. *Second*, such terms would spell Communist enslavement from which there would be no escape except genocide and death.

The stationing of U. S. missiles in the Philippines will come about when such a step is warranted by the strategic interests of both the Philippines and the United States. Already, Foreign Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, together with responsible Philippine defense officials, have placed the matter before official Washington. When and if U. S. missiles are stationed here, they will form part of the muscle and sinew of the defensive alliances and security arrangements that defend democracy and freedom in this corner of the globe. These defenses, it must be clearly understood, are part of the collective security system that alone can ensure the survival of small nations like the Philippines.

A Philippine-American decision to station U. S. missiles in this country would be an act of faith similar to that expressed by Gordon Dean, former Chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission: "For most of us the mere survival of ourselves and our children is not sufficient. We think more in terms of surviving in freedom, and we believe that on this fast-shrinking globe our freedom is somehow bound up with the freedom of all people and particularly those who have it today or are determined to have it some day."

MELCHOR P. AQUINO

Post-Summit Reflections

The failure of the Summit Meeting to come off in Paris in mid-May raises the question of where the Philippines, as one of the world's nations, goes from here. Relaxed tensions and substantial agreement on disarmament between East and West would have permitted all countries to re-examine the goals of their foreign policy. Especially, a happy outcome would have allowed less concentration on preparedness against attack and more on the matters of peace, of increased national and personal freedom.

Unfortunately, defense must remain a large concern—collective readiness to repel attack. The first answer to the question raised is that we must continue to stick close to our friends. This means that we must be highly sensitive to detect what Nehru once called "fissiparous tendencies".

The Philippines can indulge a feeling of relief to this extent, that its biggest dangers do not seem to stem from within, but from

without—not that the country is entirely free from danger from within. Looking at the Red peril alone, trained observers detect more than a trace of successful Communist activity in the press, in higher schools, in government agencies, in political organizations and in the labor movement. Added to this is the danger lurking in highly placed and frequently honored fellow travelers who give aid and comfort to Communists by preaching a message indistinguishable from the party's preachments. Then there are the involuntary, unconscious minions of the enemy—the unholy innocents—who pursue their own short-run, mostly nationalistic goals along paths parallel to the Communist line. Yet our state of affairs is nothing like that of Cuba or Indonesia. We do not appear to be in imminent danger of stepping deliberately into the Communist trap. Nonetheless, the experts concede that the conspirators have made a lot of headway since Magsaysay's time.

The large danger is from without—the danger of being overwhelmed and crushed in a gigantic war. Ours is not the curious peril of the neutral: that of finding oneself all alone; the enemy of none, and therefore, in the concrete, the friend of none. This country is a committed ally of the nations of the Free World. The countrys' foreign policy is based upon this commitment. Actually, the Philippines was left little choice in shaping the principle and foundation of its foreign policy; its survival as a free nation required its alignment with the West against the Communist system.

The end and aim of foreign policy is clear: survival as a democratic people. The generic means to this end is no less clear: alignment with the Free World against the unrelenting threat of totalitarian domination. So far the picture is not only clear but quite simple. But once one leaves the comprehensive aim and descends to the details of foreign policy, the picture grows both complex and turbid. For it is neither clear nor simple how a relatively small country like the Philippines can go about being an ally substantially faithful to its commitment and at the same time remain utterly independent. How do I play on the Big Team and still stay free to develop my own style? This is a poser, the dilemma between the end—survival as a free nation—and the means—alliance with the West, specifically with the United States. If the means involves surrender of national independence, survival as a free people has not been gained, only the choice of which master to serve.

Independence looms large as a national objective: survival as an independent nation. The country which most recently held sovereignty in the Philippines is the United States. The Philippines is now independent of the United States and intends to stay that way. Its independence, specifically of the United States, is a great and worthy national treasure. The nation sets value on proving its independence

of the United States both to itself and to others. It is a specially cutting insult against the sovereign majesty of the Philippine Republic to brand it a puppet of the United States, an American satellite, a colony in all but name. The problem therefore comes to this: how can an ally be independent, and how far? Wherein consists the essence of being independent, specifically of the U.S.? Is it in championing all the U.S. opposes, in opposing all the U.S. champions, in going an opposite way?

Perhaps it would be illuminating to examine the matter concretely. There are on the face of the earth certain acknowledged independent nations—the U.S. for one, the United Kingdom for another. The Philippines wills to be an independent nation like them, not analogously but univocally. The U.S. is quite aware that it is not the Free World. It chooses to cooperate with its allies of the Free World because it is convinced, rightly, that it cannot survive alone. It can be buried. Its decision to cooperate with its allies is a free choice—every bit as free as would be the decision not to cooperate. One conclusion is obvious. A nation can cooperate with others in a common cause without losing its independence. Free cooperation is not synonymous with being a puppet, a satellite.

Yet the U.S. is also aware that it has yielded up part of its national independence and has sacrificed some of the freedom of its people as a result of its entangling foreign alliances. The sacrifice is not negligible. More than 25% of the incomes of private U.S. citizens is siphoned off by government and a good part of this is spent on global defense. This greatly limits the people's freedom to do what they want with the incomes they earn. Also, its young men are required to spend a couple of years in military service, at home or abroad, whether they like it or not.

The cost of international cooperation is the bite it takes out of a country's independence. For example, the U.S. maintains military bases in the Philippines. As a result, Filipinos do not rule all their own land; pieces of the country are under foreign sway. The complaint is inevitably raised that the U.S. is using this country—using it as a military base. The fact is that a disagreeable contest of strength is going on in the world. Its most active locale right now happens to be Asia. The Philippines finds itself in a condition of stark and utter vulnerability without U.S. protection. This country must be linked with the U.S. in a security pact or be helpless. That is, it must play on a team and undertake its share of the teamwork. Yet not a few among leading Filipinos have voiced their doubts whether the desired degree of independence from the U.S. can be realized within the frame of the present alliance.

For the U.S.'s part it, too, would prefer to be out of the Philippines altogether. It is not imposing military dependence upon the

Philippines for imperialistic ends. It freely gave up its rule over the country. Its continued military presence here is by mutual agreement and stems out of a contemporary fact — the cold war, the express and untiring threat of Red aggression, the very need of the Philippines for some arm to defend it. The Americans would go cheerfully home and leave the Filipinos unimpeded run of their country, if only the cold war were ended. Unhappily, the unborn Summit did not bring the end nearer.

It is of comfort to know that the dilemma is not an exclusively Filipino one. All nations now depend upon alliances with one another for their solidary survival. That is the kind of world we live in. If independence is to mean "one just for oneself", it appears that no land on earth is big and strong enough to afford independence. "One for all and all for one" is the practical rule. It is our problem and also everybody's problem to reconcile unavoidable interdependence with independence, getting as much independence as possible.

But one might put the blunt, unpleasant question: Really, in this kind of world, how much independence is practical and possible for small nations? The very idea of United Nations is that each must yield up a measure of sovereign freedom of movement in the interest of the common good. No one nation may be entirely free to do as it pleases — not the U.S.S.R. in Korea nor the U.K. in Suez. Big nations sponsored the U.N. aware that they cannot go it alone. Nations need each other. The Philippines and the U.S. need each other. But they do not need each other equally.

There's the rub. In an alliance of unequals, it is not very exalting to be the weaker member and to play the minor role of the partner who does not have much capital to put up. In a stockholders' meeting my voice cannot be bigger than my share in the equity. In reality the U.S. is not just a Free World partner. It finds itself by its size and strength cast in the role of a leader. And no one relishes being led. It is not so much partnership with the U.S. which makes Filipinos uncomfortable as the unevenness of the partnership. The U.S. is too big for a partner. In a word, Filipinos chafe against U.S. leadership.

During the past few years there has piled up a mountain of evidence of irritants in P.I.-U.S. relations. At the moment we are experiencing a welcome pause; it is surely only an intermission. It is instructive to examine the quality and type of these irritations. One preliminary observation is in order. Anyone who plays a second fiddle can even things off a bit by heightening the faults and caricaturing the features of the one who calls the tune. Now it is a cinch to caricature the ungainly creatures who come out of the land of unlimited opportunity. They are ignorant, clumsy, simple-minded,

tactless and inept. The best of them are ugly. Watch out for the quiet ones. They are preachers, — preaching the gospel of salvation through more production and less propagation to the earth's poor and backward peoples with the missionary zeal of the new messiah. They are determined to drag us out of our traditional slough. Only they send us second-raters.

They promise more than they deliver. They have let us down. They do not appreciate their best friends, loyal through thick and thin. They treat yesterday's enemies more bounteously than old, reliable comrades in arms. We are taken for granted. We would make out better by being less reliable, by wooing the U.S.'s enemy, by behaving like the smart opportunists who play off one side against the other. We have gotten too little for war damages, too little on our claims, too little aid with too many strings. We are forced to listen to unending American advice — just glance at the recent report of the Trade Mission and the lengthy lamentation left behind a decade ago by Daniel Bell. It seems impossible for Americans to cooperate without wanting to reform the world.

I personally believe that no useful purpose is to be served by resolving to stop the gripes. They are a sign of health, an escape valve for gases which, if kept under pressure, might otherwise explode. Besides, griping among friends serves the purpose of pointing out defects that they may be corrected. Just let it be remembered that the offenses are not all in one direction. The Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. is esteemed by Americans as a warm friend but he, too, is an unwearied preacher. From coast to coast his sermons have resounded with the theme of the mounting disaffection toward Americans among their allies. He has admonished the U.S. again and again to cherish its friends lest it find itself all alone fighting its cold war.

This begins to verge on the dangerously fissiparous. When one offers as proof of friendship to the U.S. loyalty to it during *its* war against the Axis, and continuing loyalty to it during *its* cold war, the underlying misunderstanding is grievous. We were all in that one together and we are all in this one together. The Philippines' stake in both was and is nothing less than national survival. The U.S. needs friends, to be sure. Yet, if it comes to a showdown, it is still better able to take care of itself, alone, than any other single nation. Every nation needs friends, and must cherish and cultivate its friends, not take them for granted nor irritate them irresponsibly. Nor talk as if it were a matter of national indifference how the present struggle of giants comes out in the end.

The heart of the matter is this. How are the leading nations of the Free World to lead — including the United States — while

seeming just to stride along in step with their small and sensitive companions? And how are the weaker countries — including the Philippines — to find their place in the world, while remaining parties to an unequal alliance? The main line of solution appears to be this. It is unrealistic for this country to demand to be treated as an equal. It is just not equal. But it is a free and independent partner in the alliance. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that leading nations make it as easy and reasonable as possible for others to follow their lead by insuring to every nation as much independence of action as possible and as much active voice as the realities warrant. The cause is not the cause simply of the great nations. There is a common good. In their striving toward it, they are not always, and not only, serving narrow, imperialistic designs.

In practice, it is clear how the thing can work. The Philippines has been anything but voiceless in shaping P.I.-U.S. arrangements. This is as it should be.

MICHAEL MCPHELIN

Setting The Record Straight

When last March 4th all the metropolitan dailies carried in banner headlines the welcome news that Archbishop Santos of Manila had been created Cardinal by Pope John XXIII, they all reported in the prelate's biographical sketch that he was promoted Archbishop of Manila on "February 18, 1953". The uniformity with which this date appeared in the papers seems to indicate that the error, very likely typographical, was committed in the press release. The exact date of that event, according to Vatican records, is February 10, 1953.

Another mistake worth correcting in the published reports is the date when His Eminence was first promoted to the episcopacy and his exact title as auxiliary bishop. According to newspaper reports the date was August 25, 1947, whereas the correct date is August 19, 1947. Moreover, he is said to have been promoted on that date as "titular bishop of Barca and auxiliary bishop of Manila". This is erroneous. He was designated "auxiliary to the *person* of Archbishop O'Doherty of Manila", not "auxiliary of the *See* of Manila", which terms are not canonically the same.

Still another error, the biggest of them all, needs to be corrected lest it be perpetuated. One reporter (THE PHILIPPINES HERALD, March 4, 1960) said that in 1950 His Eminence "was reappointed