

philippine studies

Ateneo de Manila University • Loyola Heights, Quezon City • 1108 Philippines

The Democrata Party

Michael Onorato

Philippine Studies vol. 12, no. 2 (1964): 342–346

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Fri June 30 13:30:20 2008

the whole document there are reflected the chief contributions of modern theology to dogmatic thinking.

The Constitution displays, above all, the sacramental view of a religion that believes in the Incarnation of the Son of God and expresses its faith in His grace and the signs of this grace. It confesses the divine presence in the world and renders glory to the Father for it. Liturgy is regarded as the expression of the faithful's faith in the paschal mystery and their participation therein as a people. Hence the over-emphasis on the all-too-remote function of the ordained ministers in liturgical celebrations, as well as individualism in private devotion plus a certain passivity are rejected, and in their place is emphasized the hierarchy of roles each one should perform in his capacity. For thus is expressed in a vivid way the very hierarchy and the unity that exists in the Mystical Body of Christ, the diversity and unity of the Divine Persons to whose image and likeness man has been created.

The Constitution is a human document, a work of men, but the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is clearly evident in it. In it one finds most important decisions towards the most far-reaching liturgical reform, but these are mainly directives. The long and arduous work of implementation still lies ahead. The main responsibility of putting the reform into effect in dioceses has been laid on the bishops. To them more power has been given so that they may the better serve their flocks and lead them to that interior renovation of the Christian life envisioned by the Council. Theirs is not an easy task; it will call for much courage, humility, patience and understanding. For the people under their care, much patience and cooperation is also required. For many it will mean the uprooting of long planted errors or confusions, an almost complete change of outlook and mentality. They should therefore study the liturgy more earnestly and take comfort in the words of the Constitution where it says: "Zeal for the promotion and restoration of the liturgy is rightly held to be a sign of the providential dispositions of God in our time, as a movement of the Holy Spirit in His Church. It is today a distinguishing mark of the Church's life, indeed of the whole tenor of contemporary religious thought and action" (art. 43)

JOSE MARIA FUENTES, S.J.

The Demócrata Party

There is a very old adage which says, "To the victor belong the spoils." Applied to politics, it is as familiar in the Philippines as it is everywhere else. In the last issue of *Philippine Studies*, Professor

Friend discussed (pp. 72-73) the demise of the *Demócrata* party in relation to the overall Philippine Independence movement of the early 1930s. He pointed to the charge made by Senator Emilio Tría Tirona that the *Demócrata* Party died of malnutrition—that is, lack of patronage—as being hardly the whole answer. According to Senate President Quezon, the *Democratas* acted like “darn fools.” Even this is not enough to explain why the *Democratas* failed as a second party. The history of the *Demócrata* party has yet to be examined in full. The following is merely a sketch—some reflections on the collapse of the *Demócratas*.

The *Demócrata* party was born in the latter part of Harrison's administration. It was from the very first the party in opposition. Any hope of its success rested on how well it could counteract Nacionalista control of both House and Senate, as well as the Governor General in Malacañan. This ambition was broken against the hard reality that the Nacionalista party was the organ which “brought home” the Jones Act. Moreover, the Nacionalistas took every opportunity to proclaim “immediate, absolute, and complete” independence—whether this was the case is not important at this point. In any event, the *Demócratas* managed to secure a few seats in the House of Representatives in the general election of 1919.

The opposition party from its very beginning was led by such men as Juan Sumulong, Ruperto Montinola, Emilio Tría Tirona, and Claro M. Recto. The mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank and the subsequent Wood-Forbes Report, as well as the split in the Nacionalista ranks, gave the *Demócratas* an unbelievable opportunity. The solid phalanx of the grand old party had been split asunder by the ambitions of Quezon who had, by late 1921, determined to assert his leadership. During the 1922 campaign, the *Demócratas* allowed themselves to be courted by Quezon. They had little use for Osmeña or his tactics. The Senate President was more to their liking—flashy, fiery, a spokesman of the people, vocally pro-independence, and more than that, violently anti-Osmeña. Quezon, however, was shrewd enough never to fully identify himself or his party, the *Colectivistas*, with the *Demócratas*. He was friendly to them; and thus, without any formal commitments on his part, he neutralized them. Unwilling to campaign vigorously in those areas where they were weakest, the *Demócratas* allowed Quezon a free hand. And in this way, they felt that they would not divide the opposition to Osmeña.

The outcome of the election of 1922 is well-known to students of Philippine history. Quezon did not emerge with the clear-cut majority he needed to assert his leadership. To control the House he needed to coalesce with either the *Demócratas* or his old friend, Sergio Osmeña. While Quezon preferred for a variety of reasons, which we need not go into here, to effect an *entente* with Osmeña's wing of the Nacionalis-

ta party, younger elements among the Colectivistas were seeking some common ground for a coalition with the Demócratas. By mid-August, 1922, any hope of some Colectivista-Demócrata *entente* vanished. The Demócratas were flush with victory. They had managed to increase their numbers in the House and had picked up a few Senate seats. Realizing that they were now in a position to make their weight felt, the Democratas raised the price. And thus, when they had the chance to join forces with the Colectivistas, they had out-priced themselves. Quezon, however, was not disturbed by the results of the abortive negotiations which had been spearheaded by Camilo Osias, Senate President Pro-Tempore Francisco Enage, and Representative-elect Antero Soriano. The failure of the Demócrata-Colectivista alliance made it easier for the Senate President to pursue, with a great deal of circumspection, it must be added, a union with Osmeña and his followers.

The presence of three parties disturbed Governor General Wood who was a staunch advocate of strong two-party government. Francis Burton Harrison, then in Scotland, had written earlier in the campaign to tell Quezon that strong two-party government was a necessity for the development of democracy in the Philippines. The existence, therefore, of three parties of relatively equal strength prompted Wood to suggest that he would draw his cabinet from the three parties. Quezon immediately launched an attack against the idea. Wood was smart enough to back down. But in the course of his public statements about the relative merits of such a cabinet, Wood had given the Demócratas to believe that at least one portfolio would be theirs and that he would send several Demócrata names to the Senate for approval as judges of first instance. In short, the Demócrata party felt that it had made up for the lost opportunity of that summer. But Wood, who had remained neutral throughout the campaign and had, in fact, counselled Quezon to remain home in order to wage a more vigorous fight instead of going off to Washington with Osmeña and the Second Parliamentary Mission, had not counted on the character of Quezon's reaction.

The reasons for the Senate President's opposition to Wood's proposed coalition cabinet need not be discussed at this time. The importance of Quezon's opposition is the fact that the Demócratas became very angry and terribly petulant. Their anger took the form of calling on Wood and peevishly demanding that he withdraw the names of their candidates for the judgeships. Wood, who understood their hurt, asked them if they really wanted him to fight Quezon and thus possibly destroy the work of the previous year. The Demócratas, however, were hardly mollified by the Governor General's kindly words. Wood, in their view, was in the hands of Quezon.

Annoyed at having been reduced in so short a time to a mere opposition party, the Demócratas watched in dismay and growing

anger the spectacle of Wood stepping aside time and time again while the Senate President walked over the bones of proposals emanating from Malacañan. The capstone of Quezon's power over the Governor General came, the *Demócratas* were convinced, when Wood withdrew a proclamation calling for a special election for the fourth senatorial district. The *Demócratas*, immediately after the proclamation had been issued, had put forward the name of Juan Sumulong. Quezon's candidate, who lacked the stature of Sumulong, was certain of defeat when Wood stopped the campaign. He had been prevailed upon by the Nacionalista-Consolidado leader to withdraw the proclamation. The *Demócratas* hurled invective and abuse on the Governor General. He was the tool of Quezon.

The subsequent Conley issue, the mass resignation of the Filipino members of the Council of State and Cabinet, and the results of the special senatorial election of October, 1923 need not be examined here. The *Demócratas*, that summer of 1923, found themselves supporting Wood. To them the whole issue of the break between Quezon and the Chief Executive was trumped up in order to insure the victory of Quezon's candidate, the rather reluctant Ramon J. Fernandez, who had just resigned as Mayor of Manila over the Conley case. Time and again, Sumulong found himself supporting the contention of Wood that the cabinet crisis had no constitutional basis. Quezon's retort was to label the *Demócrata* party puppets of the Americans and traitors to Filipino nationalism. Recto, the leader of the *Demócrata* campaign, bitterly and caustically flayed the arguments of the Senate President. But it was to no avail. The end result was not so much the defeat of Sumulong as the animosity engendered by that fight.

The subsequent Roxas Mission to the United States in late November 1923, seeking the recall of Leonard Wood, and the sharp rebuff handed Roxas by President Calvin Coolidge, were to have a very definite effect on the future of the *Demócrata* party. Coolidge's sharp letter (March 5, 1924) to Speaker Roxas cut Quezon to the core. The American Chief Executive had not only denied the constitutional basis for the Quezon-Wood fight but he had, in effect, called the Filipino leaders liars for having misrepresented to him and the public the nature of the struggle and the number of those who supported the Filipino side of the controversy. Although Quezon said and did nothing at the time, he was hurt. The subsequent revelation by Representative Recto in November, 1924 that Quezon, while in Washington in May-June 1924, had promised the Coolidge administration that he would support the Fairfield Bill (which called for dominion status), did not alleviate the mental and physical pain the Senate President was suffering.

The general election of 1925 was not an overwhelming success for the Nacionalista-Consolidados. They held their ground and even picked up a few seats in the House and Senate. But the most notable feature

of that election was the successful candidacy of Juan Sumulong. Quezon, as he later informed ex-governor general Harrison, patiently cultivated Sumulong and allowed him to run virtually unopposed. When Sumulong entered the upper house, Quezon took every opportunity to court the Demócrata senator.

The Supreme National Council of 1926-1927 was created by Quezon to weaken, if not destroy, the Demócrata opposition. From late 1923 through the bitter days of March and November 1924, he had laid his plans well. As leader of the Supreme National Council, he could proclaim that the Filipino people were wholly behind him and his fight with the Governor General. He could now thrust in the face of Coolidge's stinging rebuff concerning the number of those supporting Quezon the capitulation of the only opposition party.

The Supreme National Council was not without its problems. First of all, the Demócratas were unhappy with the amount of patronage given it. Secondly, the Demócratas were concerned by the obvious slow pace of the independence movement. Thus, for these and other reasons, the Supreme National Council collapsed. But it died taking with it the Demócratas. The party was never able to survive their capitulation.

The Demócratas, in truth, had acted like "darn fools." They outpriced themselves in 1922; they acted like children in early 1923; they tried to trade invectives with Quezon in late 1923; they provoked him in late 1924; they allowed themselves to be duped in 1925; and they surrendered their freedom in 1926-1927. It is no wonder that they died in 1931.

As for the charge that they died of malnutrition, the above is partly an answer. The truth of the matter is that Harrison, Wood, Stimson, and Davis *did* favor the Nacionalistas. They had little choice in the matter. Wood tried to help the Demócratas and was attacked. And from then until his death, Malacañan was always open to Quezon's appointees so long as they were the best available. The Demócratas time and again accused Wood and Quezon of discussing Nacionalista appointments in the quiet of Malacañan. To this charge there is a large measure of truth. Scarcely one month after the Cabinet Crisis of July, 1923, Wood told Quezon that he could see him anytime; and if he wished to avoid publicity he could use the back entrance to the Palace. While it is true that the Demócratas acted foolishly and that they received no support from the governors general in the way of substantial patronage, it is equally true that strong two-party government can not thrive where patronage is dispensed on a one-for-one basis. It is the expectation of "spoils" that drives the party in opposition to greater efforts. And the use by the governors-general of their patronage powers to achieve certain programs in no way affected the overall history of the Democratas. Senator Tirona's statement is true

to a marked degree. The Demócratas died because there was never enough patronage for its stalwarts. But there is far more accuracy in the contention that the Democratas destroyed themselves.

MICHAEL PAUL ONORATO

The Agusan Image

A few annotations to Dr. Juan R. Francisco's article on the Golden Image of Agusan (*Philippine Studies* 11/3 (July, 1963), 390-400) may be of some use.

The communication of Dr. F. D. K. Bosch concerning this image may be found in *Oudheidkundige Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Oudheidkundig Verslag, 1920), pp. 101-102. He contends that "Hindu-Javanese stylistic influence can be readily recognized. The similarity with the bronzes of Ngandjuk is specially striking. The high, steeple-like *makuta* with rosettes on the forehead fillet, the bracelets ornamented with four-leaved flowers, the female cord... and finally the face with the long Greek nose recall vividly the Ngandjuk images. Only, the Philippine statuette is of a much coarser workmanship and more primitive finish. For that reason it cannot well be ascribed to a Javanese artisan. It is more probably a case of stylistic influence and imitation." He says further that it is impossible to identify this female deity with certainty. She may be Saiva, but is more probably Buddhist, because sivaite bronze or gold images are quite rare, and as a rule are standing, not sitting.

We may add that the statuettes of the Nganjuk collection, which indeed show striking similarities, are undoubtedly Buddhist, but of a very popular and syncretic (*bodhisatva*) character. For this reason they are difficult to identify, even though they are provided with attributes (see N. J. Krom, "De bronsvondst van Ngandjoek" in *Rapporten van den Oudheidkundigen Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indie* (1913), pp. 59-72, and the accompanying photographs). The *mudra* (gesture) shown in the Agusan image is partly (for the left hand only) found in some male representations (nos. 29-33 of the photographs of Krom). Krom relates these, with much hesitation, to figures of Vairasattva and Virupaksa. The females in the collection are of a similar haziness (nos. 21-23, 37, 38). No. 22 may be a *devi dupa* (incense), the next a *devi dipa* (lamp), known also in India, and no. 37 is probably the Buddhist Sarasvati, the female consort of Manjusri.

My own suggestion would be that for an understanding of images of this kind it is not sufficient to study Buddhist iconography; we have to take into account the local indigenous iconographic tradition also.

W. J. VAN DER MEULEN