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Leonard Wood as Governor General: A Calendar or Selected Correspondence, Part 2

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2. "Memoria sobre la Casa-Misión de los PP. de la Compañía de Jesús establecida en Tamontaca." Campamento de Cotta-bato. 20 de marzo de 1879. 10 ff. (no catalogue number)

3. "Misión de Tamontaca. Copia en borrador de las comunicaciones oficiales salientes. 22 julio a 27 abril 1879." (In bound notebook) E-II-b-69.

4. "Historia de la Misión del Río Grande de Mindanao." (up to 1879, in bound notebook). E-II-b-70.

5. "Diario de la Casa-Misión de Tamontaca. Año 1894. ["a 1899," added by a later hand]. E-II-b-71.

6. "Origen y progresos del orfanotrofio de Tamontaca y registro de libertos de uno y otro sexo que en él ingresaron desde el 9 de setiembre de 1872 hasta el 10 de octubre de 1893." 108 ff. E-II-b-72.

7. "Registro de los moros que han venido a la misión de Tamontaca desde fines del año 1891." (from November 1891 to June, 1898) E-II-b-73.

Leonard Wood As Governor General: A Calendar of Selected Correspondence, Part 2

MICHAEL ONORATO

In this second installment of my Calendar I list pertinent material in the personal correspondence of J. Ralston Hayden and the papers of Katherine Mayo. The numbering of the footnotes is consecutive to that of Part 1, to facilitate cross-reference.

It is unfortunate that this portion of the Harrison papers must suffer from the lack of the former governor-general's replies. The letters in his files are evidence of Harrison's deep interest in Filipino matters. In fact, many of the letters are directed toward answering the questions he raised concerning Quezon, Wood, or Filipino matters in general. The correspondence from Filipinos concerning Wood and Quezon is very interesting.

The J. Ralston Hayden papers are at the University of Michigan. They are valuable for the Philippine scholar whose

interests lie in the Commonwealth period. In fact, the more important segment of the Hayden papers is his Philippine Collection which deals primarily with his duties as Vice Governor-General. The papers examined below are in his personal files. It is obvious from them that Hayden enjoyed the confidence of Filipino and American officials in the Philippines. Wood was extremely fond of him.

The papers of Miss Katherine Mayo are at the Yale University Library. As in the case of Professor Barrows, we have the stimuli but not the responses. Actually, there is little that is significant in the Mayo papers relative to the Philippines for the period of 1921 to 1927.

Francis Burton Harrison Papers

Clyde H. Tavenner to Francis Burton Harrison, January 27, 1923.

Now that Wood has decided to remain in the Islands there seems to be more understanding on all sides.¹⁰¹

Adolph Spitzel¹⁰² to Harrison, February 19, 1923.

I saw Manuel and Osmeña recently. Quezon is still your "true friend." From what I can see, it seems that Wood is staying here to enhance his chances for the nomination in 1924.¹⁰³ At any rate, Wood makes a good governor-general.¹⁰⁴

James Ross to Harrison, March 3, 1923.

Don Manuel's victory is remarkable considering the fact that he had little organization. Moreover, the Democratas were an obstacle to an easy sweep at the polls. Opposition to the Democratas has been the basis for the fusion of the Colectivista and Nacionalista parties. This coalition has brought Manuel and Osmeña under heavy attack from the Democratas. Don Manuel has had to bear the brunt of Tirona's "venomous attacks" concerning his and Osmeña's attitude on independence. The coalition will probably run Generoso for the vacancy created by Senator Pedro

¹⁰¹ See note 21; cf. W. Morgan Shuster to Harrison, December 8, 1922, Harrison Papers.

¹⁰² An American businessman in Manila.

¹⁰³ Cf. Quezon to Harrison, (September, 1921), Tavenner to Harrison, December 16, 1921, Harrison Papers.

¹⁰⁴ This seemed to be the consensus of Filipino and American scholarly opinion before and after the Cabinet Crisis.

Guevara's election as resident commissioner. As you probably recall, Guevara's district includes Bataan, Laguna, Rizal, and Manila. And Manila is a Democrata fief. Juan Sumulong will be the Democrata candidate. Casey¹⁰⁵ told me that he has to win this election. And so we see Quezon and Osmeña in harness again. I can tell you that many of Manuel's friends, who hate Osmeña, are disturbed by their coalition. Many of Casey's supporters had hoped that his victory would spell the end of Osmeña. There are a few who believe that the split was a political trick. Who knows?¹⁰⁶ Some of the younger representatives resent the coalition. A revolt seemed a distinct possibility until Don Manuel managed to smooth things over. As for the Senate everything is going nicely. As regards Osmeña's candidacy for the Senate, he showed good judgment. I have been told that he would not have been re-elected to the House from Cebu. Concerning the coalition, many of Casey's friends hope that it is a temporary measure. From what I can see, the fusion seems permanent especially in view of the pending election for Guevara's seat. The big fear on the part of Quezon's best friends is that the younger members of his party will desert him for the Democratas if the alliance ever becomes permanent. What Casey will do for the future remains to be seen. I do not think he knows himself what he will do. However, he has always been a good interpreter of public opinion. And so far, he has used his abilities with caution and wisdom. Concerning his relations with Wood, he seemed ready to fight for his principles when the Governor-General backed down at the last minute. In fact, Wood has surrendered on every issue. Look at his recent proposal to establish a coalition cabinet composed of Colectivistas, Nacionalistas, and Democratas.¹⁰⁷ Juan Sumulong, whom Wood likes, would have been in the cabinet. Quezon protested¹⁰⁸ and Wood finally appointed the men proposed by Don Manuel.¹⁰⁹ Wood came close to making the error of ignor-

¹⁰⁵ A nickname for Quezon.

¹⁰⁶ See Westerhouse to Harrison, May 20, 1922, Westerhouse to Harrison, November 8, 1922, Harrison Papers.

¹⁰⁷ Wood thought that since no party had won a clear majority, it would be conducive to Filipino political experience to give the Democratas some share of responsibility at the cabinet level.

¹⁰⁸ Rafael Palma, who, at times, was at odds with Quezon, wrote Harrison in April, 1924 that Quezon did everything possible to oppose Wood's plan for a coalition cabinet. See Palma to Harrison, April 22, 1924, Harrison Papers.

¹⁰⁹ See entry for February 18, 20, 1923, Wood Diary, Wood Papers.

ing Casey.¹¹⁰ The Governor-General saw the light and their relations are now amicable. I can appreciate your concern about the possible effect that Manuel's close cooperation with Wood might have on his future career. I am sure there will be no problem. He has yielded nothing and has gotten his way more often than Wood has. Speaking of Wood, many Americans here are pushing for the appointment of a Filipino governor-general to succeed Wood. The General is constantly antagonizing the American community.¹¹¹ His advisors are McCoy and Colonel Gordon Johnston, who has made a nuisance of himself. Moreover, Wood is unable to make up his mind on anything it seems.¹¹² Returning to Manuel's present situation, I am not worried so much by his relationship with Wood as I am by the possibility of his losing a great many of his supporters through a permanent coalition with Osmeña. Casey has had to fight alone. He lacks good lieutenants. And Guevara's Fourth Senatorial District is a key one and representative of public opinion. The results of this election, which will be held on June 5th, will show the strength of the coalitionists and the Democratas. Getting back to Wood, George Fairchild is disillusioned by the Governor-General's performance. You may not like to hear this, but your bitterest enemy never said half the unkind words concerning you that one hears about the General. And if you were to run against the "Doctor," as his detractors at the American Chamber of Commerce here call him, you would win. I think our Democratic Territorial Convention should be crowded next year. I really do not like repeating these things about the Governor-General; and I do not say them in public.

Pardo de Tavera to Harrison, March 5, 1923.

The Democratas in the last election won a number of seats as a result of the split in the Nacionalista party. It was generally

¹¹⁰ In a letter to Secretary Weeks soon after Wood's first clash with the Philippine Legislature, Forbes warned that Wood should be very careful to work with Quezon. See Forbes to Weeks, November 12, 1921, *Forbes Journal, Second Series*, II, 346, Library of Congress.

¹¹¹ The consistent refusal of Wood to promote the plans of American business interests for the Philippines drew the fire of the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila. The fact that Wood yielded continually to Filipino pressure annoyed the die-hard imperialists among the Americans in Manila.

¹¹² The seeming lack of purpose on the part of Wood not only aggravated some Americans but also the Democratas who regarded his constant yielding to Quezon as a sign of weakness. Wood was aware that he was regarded as being weak. See Wood to McIntyre, May 22, 1924. Wood Papers.

hoped then that the Democratas and Colectivistas would form a coalition. This, however, did not happen. The Quezonistas and the Osmeñistas settled things between themselves, having now united in a coalition. Some feel, however, that this temporary fusion will end in a complete union.

Westerhouse to Harrison, April 12, 1923.

It seems that Wood is trying to put the Philippine National Bank out of business. He is working hard at proving that the Wood-Forbes Report was correct about the Bank. On the other hand, Wilson is hanging on in spite of the forces working against him. And despite my feelings, I shall never publicly criticize Wood.

Camilo Osias to Harrison, April 12, 1923.

I admire your refusal to re-enter public life and your self-restraint with regard to criticizing your successor. Thank you for your favorable comment on my article concerning Wood's first year in office. I presented the facts as I saw them. Since then I have been subjected to considerable criticism.¹¹³ As for President Quezon, he has had to shoulder more and more responsibilities. It is sad that he is not in good health. And as for our difficulties in the lower House, some people here think that this is a sign of retrogression. Nothing can be further from the truth. The organization of the lower House did produce a deadlock,¹¹⁴ but a solution was found.

Hoskins to Westerhouse, [April, 1923].

I imagine you know by now of E. W. Wilson's separation from the Bank. Wood, the military dictator, was more than he could stand. The outburst against the Governor-General for his handling of Wilson¹¹⁵ was spontaneous. Everyone seems to be angry with Wood. The Democrata organ, *La Nacion*, is now against him.

¹¹³ The article was very friendly to Wood. See Camilo Osias, "A Year of Governor Wood's Administration," in Quezon and Osias, *Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause* (Manila: Manila Book Co., 1924).

¹¹⁴ The selection of the speaker of the House of Representatives resulted in two weeks of heated debate in October, 1922. Manuel Roxas, a protégé of Quezon, was finally elected.

¹¹⁵ Wood, it seems, was very disturbed by the fact that he had to take steps for Wilson's removal. Wilson, it appears, was trying to carry out policies which were at variance with the wishes of the Board of Control. See entry for April 6, 9, 1923, Wood Diary, Wood Papers.

And the Democratas are now convinced that Wood is listening to Quezon too much. Take for example, the special election for Guevara's Senate seat. As soon as Wood issued the proclamation, the Democratas put up Juan Sumulong while the Coalitionists could find only Diokno. Sumulong would have beaten him in Manila, Rizal, and possibly Laguna. Then two weeks after the Democrata campaign got under way, Wood postponed the election and then finally withdrew the proclamation. As you can imagine, the Democratas were furious. And then came the Wood-Wilson furor. *La Nacion* in a front-page editorial said, "This Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippines, a disgrace; as President of the United States, a shame."

Gabaldon to Harrison, April 28, 1923.

It seems that Wood's policies have undergone a radical change since he arrived in Manila. This is due in large measure to the "energy, tact, and discretion" of Quezon. The Governor-General wanted to form a coalition cabinet, but Quezon forced him to draw his secretaries from the Nacionalista and Colectivista parties. The Democratas wanted the office of Mayor of Manila, but Ramon Fernandez is still there. Quezon did not want to associate himself with Osmeña, but he recognizes his patriotism. Moreover, Osmeña represents a force which must be recognized. Quezon had to form a coalition. For my part, I have faith in the President of the Senate.

Westerhouse to Harrison, July 4, 1923.

Cotterman¹¹⁶ is now sorry that he endorsed Wood. He also said that Washington is annoyed¹¹⁷ with the Governor-General. Quezon seeing the reaction is standing aloof. Moreover, it seems that he and Wood are about to do battle.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ One-time Director of Posts in the Philippine government.

¹¹⁷ In an answer to an Administration query concerning his actions relative to the Philippine National Bank, Wood said that he would continue the Bank as a commercial institution since it was impossible to close it. See Wood to McIntyre, cable, May 19, 1923, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Wood Papers.

¹¹⁸ In late June and early July, 1923, several issues were emerging on the Manila political scene, any of which could have brought on a crisis between Quezon and Wood. There was the Conley Affair, which seemingly dealt with the autonomy of the Mayor of Manila and the Secretary of the Interior. There was also the fact of the challenge of the younger generation of Filipino politicians to the leadership of Quezon and Osmeña. And finally there was Wood's unwillingness to allow Quezon to use public funds for pork-barrel tactics.

Stephen Bonsal¹¹⁹ to Harrison, August 2, 1923.

When the Filipinos arrive I think that I will go to Washington to help them. However, there seems to be a feeling here that they are only making noises for the effect. If so, I am not sure what good I would be to them.

Tavenner to Harrison, August 2, 1923.

Wood was unwise to stay in the Islands. As for your statement that his first year was a success, I think that this can be attributed to his fooling everyone. The Filipinos were smart in giving him enough rope to hang himself. As you can see, everyone is supporting Quezon and Osmeña.

Spitzel to Harrison, August 20, 1923.

I agree with you that if the Governor-General would have gone to the University of Pennsylvania after his first year here, he would have been numbered among the great governor-generals. As it is right now, he has made enemies on both sides of the political fence—Democrats and Republicans. Most Republicans in Manila have accused him of running the Islands into the ground. Personally, I respect him, but it seems that he always likes to be on the stage taking the applause of the public. Major Anderson and Carson Taylor¹²⁰ are confident that Harding would have recalled Wood had he lived. They feel that Coolidge will do the same shortly.

Westerhouse to Harrison, October 11, 1923.

Wood had lost the confidence of most Americans in Manila, but he has regained their favor. Business, however, is still at a standstill.

Westerhouse to Harrison, October 16, 1923.

It is a shame that Forbes and Wood cannot drop dead. Politically speaking, they are both as dead as they come.

Westerhouse to Harrison, October 28, 1923.

I am confident that Wood will be replaced if the Republicans win in the November elections. As things stand now, Coolidge has supported Wood. However, he told Wood to keep the government in business. I am sure that the Governor-General is not too happy about this.¹²¹ The Legislature has informed Wood that

¹¹⁹ One-time executive secretary to Governor-General Harrison.

¹²⁰ Two prominent Americans in Manila.

¹²¹ See note 46.

it will refuse his legislative program. Of course, Wood is not altogether to blame for everything that has gone wrong. As for the Philippine National Bank which seems to be a bone of contention, you knew that Concepcion was incompetent and said it often. But Osmeña supported General Concepcion; and Quezon, on the other hand, was not ready to support you at the expense of a break with Osmeña. Maybe you should have forced the issue in the light of what happened to the Bank. At any rate, the Bank will survive and go on to greater things.

Tavenner to Harrison, November 19, 1923.

Quezon has been asking for a Filipino governor-general to replace Wood. I cannot help but think that this would be a mistake at this time. Independence is now within the grasp of the Filipinos. To compromise now by asking for a Filipino governor-general would be a mistake.

Eulogio B. Rodriguez to Harrison, March 6, 1924.

When I was associated with the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington, giving out with strong statements against the Wood-Forbes Report, etc., I was taken aback by the silence of our leaders. I have since learned that they had hoped to lure Wood to their side. The General, however, went his way and depended on his own military men for advice. His military cabinet¹²² led Wood to the blunder which touched off the constitutional crisis of last summer. At the present moment, it seems that either Wood has yielded to our leaders or else they have accepted the Governor-General's militaristic ways. A compromise seems to have been reached.¹²³ Wood has just announced that he will make as

¹²² The fact that military men were attached to Wood's office was nothing new. Each governor-general had need of assistants, but neither the Philippine Legislature nor the American Congress would provide the funds for civilian assistants. Therefore each governor-general had attached to his office a number of qualified military men thus obviating the need for any special financial arrangements. As for Wood's so-called military kitchen cabinet, Gabaldon's comment to Secretary of War Davis best refutes the allegations concerning this Khaki Cabinet. See Davis to Coolidge, August 30, 1927, Coolidge Papers.

¹²³ The Wood Diary indicates that Quezon became very worried in early 1924 with the recurring rumors that independence was his for the asking. It seems that Quezon and later Osmeña approached Wood with an offer of reconciliation in exchange for his efforts to kill any independence legislation. Wood thanked them but told them that they would have to terminate such legislation themselves. See entry for March 13, 1924, Wood Diary, Wood Papers.

few ad-interim appointments as possible. So it seems that he has given way to our leaders. As for me, I am back home because my opinions on independence were too radical for our leaders. I believe in our people and their ability to rule themselves. Therefore anyone who hesitates or compromises our cause without our consent betrays us. Someday I hope you will be returned as governor-general.

Teodoro M. Kalaw¹²⁴ to Harrison, March 9, 1924.

The Democrats and progressive Republicans in Congress favor independence for the Philippines. On the other hand, the conservative Republicans, led by Coolidge and Secretary Weeks, have supported General Wood. The enclosed copy of Coolidge's answer to Speaker Roxas shows the present attitude of the Administration. Coolidge's reply does not appear to have been received favorably by our friends in Congress. They say that Coolidge has placed the responsibility for cooperation with Wood solely on Filipino shoulders.

Hoskins to Harrison, March 15, 1924.

As you know, feelings were very taut here for about three months after the July crisis of last year. And while the politicians confined themselves to outbursts of political dissatisfaction, others tried to stir up racial animosity. Since November, however, things have quieted down. General McCoy is back again and Colonel Gordon Johnston, the pest, has gone to Europe. The Filipinos are glad to see McCoy back at Malacañan.¹²⁵

Rafael Palma to Harrison, April 24, 1924.

Political conditions here seem no different than when Forbes was governor-general. The Governor-General goes about, despite the existence of the Jones Act, playing the part of a Roman consul. Wood at the beginning followed your policies; he would have continued were it not for certain harmful influences. I got to know him while I was President pro-tempore of the Senate in 1921. And I was convinced then that we could win him to our side thus gaining another friend for independence. He was courteous and anxious to consult with us. He followed the practice of calling the Council of State into weekly session and abiding by its decisions. And this *entente cordiale* continued even after my withdrawal from the Senate. Once the Nacionalista split became inevitable, I wanted to get away from politics. I believe

¹²⁴ At this time, he was Director of the Independence Commission.

¹²⁵ Cf. Rodriguez to Harrison, March 6, 1924, Harrison Papers.

Quezon was wrong to force a split, but maybe it was for the best. As a result of the 1922 elections, however, none of the three parties had a majority in either house.¹²⁶ Osmeña was quick to associate himself with Quezon. "President Quezon's henchmen" were to have first place, while "Osmeña's colleagues" were to take second place. As you know, Wood attempted a coalition cabinet based on the fact that no party had a majority. Quezon, to the chagrin of the Democratas, vehemently opposed this scheme of Wood to control the cabinet. It appears that the Governor-General promised the Democratas some cabinet positions. As a consequence of Wood's surrender, the Democratas threatened to thwart the Chief Executive.¹²⁷ And for a time it seemed that Wood and Quezon had come to an understanding. But Quezon, who was concerned about his political future, "became impatient and provoked" the Cabinet Crisis. The immediate cause of the crisis was insignificant. Wood's insistence that Conley be reinstated to the Manila Police force which many felt to be within his rights, was nevertheless regarded as the culmination of a series of abuses by the Governor-General of his powers. The stand taken by the cabinet was acclaimed everywhere as was evident by the victory of the Coalitionists in the special election in the Fourth Senatorial District. Ex-Mayor Fernandez was put up against Juan Sumulong, the Democrata candidate. As for Wood, he has become arrogant since the break. Things have gone from bad to worse. As for me, I have retired completely from politics. And while I remain in the Nacionalista party, I am nevertheless disgusted by the coalition and the inconsistency of Osmeña and Quezon for resorting to such a scheme. I only wish both men could avoid the impression of dirty politics. The fusion of both parties has become a reality. Just over two weeks ago, the partido Nacionalista Consolidado was formed with Quezon as President and Osmeña as Vice-President. Independence, it seems, is imminent despite the "scurrilous report" by Wood in which he objected to

¹²⁶ Wood regarded the presence of three Filipino parties as detrimental to the best interests of the Filipino people. See Wood to Weeks, August 31, 1922, Wood Papers. Harrison, as well as Wood, wanted to see two strong parties emerge. See Harrison to Quezon, Personal, April 23, 1922, Harrison Papers.

¹²⁷ When the Democratas complained about their loss of a cabinet portfolio, Wood asked them if they really wanted him to throw everything in order to give them a position. See entry for February 13, 1923, Wood Diary.

independence.¹²⁸ It appears that some independence legislation is a distinct possibility. And while I am not too hopeful about Coolidge, I think that he might be prevailed upon to modify his present stand.¹²⁹

E. W. Wilson to Harrison, May 20, 1924.

My differences with Wood were business and not personal. As you know, the Governor-General has failed in three great endeavors to get the government out of business. He was unable to sell the Manila Railroad, close the Bank, or sell the sugar centrals. My fight became acute in June, 1922, but we finally compromised and things went along fairly smoothly. Since my return to the States, Speaker Roxas has told me that the politicians went along with Wood in the hope that he would recommend their independence. Whether this is so I am not certain. However, it became rather apparent in early 1923 that the Filipinos were a bit too quiet for me. I decided then that it would be better if I resigned.

Pardo de Tavera to Harrison, July 10, 1924.

I am sure that you know that our friend Quezon broke with Osmeña so that he could be the dominant force in Wood's government. The Governor-General, at first, seemed to prefer Osmeña, but Quezon soon captured him by his good will. Both men were soon in agreement. And this formation of the Colectivista party increased the intrigue against Osmeña as well as the hope that the Colectivistas and Democratas together would put an end to Osmeña. But the Colectivistas soon after the 1922 election dropped any connection with the Democratas. Later Quezon started the fight with Wood which has had the effect of drawing Colectivistas and Nacionalistas together.

¹²⁸ On March 11, 1924, Wood received an urgent cablegram from Washington insisting that he write something which might be used by Secretary of War Weeks to stem the tide of independence legislation. Wood, in his reply, affirmed his sympathy for the Filipino desire for independence. He stated, however, that it would be detrimental to Filipino interests at that time. See McIntyre to Wood, Strictly Confidential, cable, March 11, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, Strictly Confidential, cable, March 14, 1924, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Wood Papers.

¹²⁹ On April 3, 1924, in a surprise move aimed possibly at stemming the tide for immediate independence, the Coolidge Administration offered support for the Fairfield Bill which would have given the Filipinos freedom after twenty-five years. The only Administration stipulation was that the Filipino leaders give their endorsement to the Fairfield Bill. See McIntyre to Wood, Strictly Confidential, cable, April 3, 1924, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Wood Papers.

Bonsal to Harrison, July 21, 1924.

It seems that the Philippine delegation to the Democratic convention managed to avoid an investigation by the Platform Committee. They did this by subtly splitting their votes from the beginning to the end between the leading candidates.

Rodriguez to Harrison, September 9, 1924.

We have made some advance toward independence by our vigorous campaign. But what I cannot understand is how Secretary of War Weeks can tell the Press that our leaders are in favor of the Fairchild Bill. And yet, none of our leaders have denied the Secretary's statement. If we are to succeed, we must be courageous and fight in a straight-forward manner. We must work on our own and not leave it to others. If our leaders have hesitated, then our goal is very far away. No Filipino must vacillate or compromise our cause without the consent of the people. And when someday the Democrats return to power, we will want a seasoned governor-general back here again.¹³⁰ To take anyone, even if he claims to be democratic, is to play into the hands of our enemies. If Don Manuel ever again recommends a friend of his who has no experience in Philippine affairs for governor-general, our independence will be placed in jeopardy.¹³¹

General Frank R. McCoy to Harrison, January 21, 1925.

Thank you for your letter of congratulations on my promotion to Brigadier-General.¹³² It was nice to hear from you again. General Wood has asked that I send you his best wishes.

¹³⁰ An obvious reference to Harrison.

¹³¹ This is another reference to Harrison. Quezon, while resident commissioner to the United States, was in part responsible for Harrison's appointment. The fact that the New York Congressman had no experience with the insular government did not seem important. Rodriguez, in 1924, was merely voicing the sentiments of many concerning Harrison's appointment as governor-general. His inexperience, according to many, led to conditions in the Philippines which did not present a favorable impression of Filipino readiness for independence.

¹³² McCoy knew Harrison when both were in Washington: the former as aide-de-camp to General Wood, then Army Chief of Staff, and the latter as a rising young Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee. In fact, Harrison tried to take McCoy to the Philippines as his aide-de-camp. See Harrison to McIntyre, telegram, September 12, 1913, McIntyre to Harrison, telegram, September 2, 1913, McCoy Papers.

Gabaldon to Harrison, January 22, 1925.

I do not like for a moment the articles written by Miss Katherine Mayo concerning the Philippine Islands.

Pardo de Tavera to Harrison, February 27, 1925.

Our politics, we can say, have not changed. Since Coolidge's election, Wood has been supported all the more. It seemed a while back that Quezon went to the United States in order to establish better relations with Wood.¹³³ This, however, did not come about. Yet, it is true that his attacks are no longer as violent as before.¹³⁴ For my part, the difference between Wood and the leaders is not very important. Filipinos will admit this here.¹³⁵ On the other hand, it has some importance since it brings forth from Filipinos that which is contemptible and that which our politicians, with the exception of Quezon and some others, do not even take into consideration.¹³⁶

Franks to Harrison, March 24, 1925.

The political situation has changed very little. Quezon and Osmeña are still on top, but they are getting some competition from the Democrats.

Francisco Oñate to Harrison, July 12, 1926.

I wonder if the Carmi A. Thompson Mission is coming out to the Philippines to investigate the Filipino people or the Governor-General.

Quezon to Harrison, August 21, 1926.¹³⁷

Very frankly, no one knows the purpose of the Carmi A. Thompson Mission. I am sure, however, that he was not sent here to boost the Wood regime. In fact, Thompson refused Wood's offer to accompany him on his tour of the provinces.

¹³³ When Quezon went to Washington in 1924, he went ostensibly to see the President in order to effect some reconciliation.

¹³⁴ A reference to the intemperate speechmaking which characterized the special election of 1923.

¹³⁵ See Davis to Coolidge, August 30, 1927.

¹³⁶ Pardo de Tavera was most likely referring to the latent political energies of the people which were unleashed when Quezon made an issue of the Cabinet Crisis. According to Pardo de Tavera, Quezon was aware of the forces that were released during the special election, while others were ignorant of the changes coming over the political scene in the Islands.

¹³⁷ This letter was enclosed in Quezon's note of December 11, 1926 to Harrison.

Wood has set out ahead of Thompson in order to smooth the path. Stimson, who seems to have come here to help Wood in the event that things got hot during the Thompson trip, is with Wood.¹³⁸ "My fight with Wood is on." He has gotten Aguinaldo to publicly come out in his support. Do you remember when the Cabinet Crisis occurred how the Democratas stood by Wood? Their attitude gave Wood, and later Coolidge, the excuse to declare that some elements of the population were with the Governor-General. I then made up my mind to unite the Democrata party with the Nacionalistas so as to deprive Wood of all Filipino support. And the introduction of certain measures in Congress during the last session gave me the opening I needed to appeal to the Democrata leadership for unity in the face of these reactionary measures.¹³⁹ Moreover, Juan Sumulong, the Democrata leader, has been friendly toward me since I did not oppose his election to the Senate. In fact, I have treated him very courteously in the Senate. So it was very easy to arrange the coalition. It was simple to point out that we, as Filipinos, should present a united front to the enemy. I was just about to taste the victory which the union of all Filipino forces would have brought when treachery struck—Aguinaldo betrayed his people. And now, Osmeña, who has been in Washington for some time, is trying to woo the Administration. In fact, he is listening to McIntyre and Forbes and you can imagine what that means. No, Osmeña is not in the same category as Aguinaldo, but he is far too conservative. He thinks that the way to succeed is to bow to "our masters." We should have kept him home. We should have sent someone there who will call a spade a spade.¹⁴⁰ To be honest, I am sick and tired of everything. "I am losing faith in my own people." I want to get out of public life. What is there in this for me? If it were not for my people's freedom, I would have quit politics long ago. And if I see that no one is

¹³⁸ In the early part of 1926, Wood practically begged Stimson to make the trip to Manila. Wood said he was in need of legal advice. See Wood to Stimson, March 2, 1926, Stimson Papers. In all probability, Wood wanted someone he felt he could count upon to report as objectively as possible what he saw.

¹³⁹ The famous measure was the proposed creation of a Moro province under sole American jurisdiction. Another would have enlarged the governor-general's appointive powers. Still another would have provided for periodical congressional visits to the Philippines.

¹⁴⁰ In the summer of 1926, Osmeña startled everyone by calling for moderation and reconciliation.

ready for the great sacrifice, and if I see that everyone is out for himself, then I am not running for the Senate next year.¹⁴¹

Quezon to Harrison, December 11, 1926.

I am enclosing a letter that was written in August. It was misplaced at the time and just discovered. I am certain that Stimson came out to help Wood. As for Thompson, while he did not tell me what he was going to say in his report, he did hint that he did not consider Wood qualified for the position of governor-general.

Rodriguez to Harrison, December 19, 1927.

The Supreme National Council was a failure. Quezon admitted as much.

J. Ralston Hayden Papers¹⁴²

J. Ralston Hayden¹⁴³ to his parents, September 12, 1922.

I think that Sergio Osmeña is better than Quezon. However, I still have "an open mind as to their relative merits." Quezon seems stronger now. The real test, however, will come in October when the Legislature convenes.

Wood to Hayden, Personal, April 9, 1924.

I cannot understand how Raymond Buell¹⁴⁴ could write that article in *Atlantic Monthly*.¹⁴⁵ I do not remember him being in the Islands. As for the politicians, they want to modify the Jones Act. They claim that the secretaries of departments have the

¹⁴¹ Ironically, Quezon, in less than two years, would be bitterly accused by Isauro Gabaldon of hypocrisy for failing to fight for immediate independence. See Gabaldon to Harrison, July 2, 1928, Harrison Papers. Tavenner, in a letter to Harrison, would accuse the Filipino leaders of scuttling a magazine known as *The Philippine Republic* because it promoted independence. See Tavenner to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, October 5, 1928, Harrison Papers.

¹⁴² The papers of J. Ralston Hayden are divided into two parts: his personal correspondence, which are abstracted here; and his Philippine Collection, which contains most of his official correspondence while Vice Governor-General.

¹⁴³ At the time of this letter, he was a visiting professor at the University of the Philippines.

¹⁴⁴ At the time, he was an instructor of Government at Harvard University.

¹⁴⁵ "What about the Philippines?," *Atlantic Monthly*, 133 (March, 1924).

final word. However, I have maintained that the Jones Act is the constitution of these Islands and cannot be modified except by Congress.¹⁴⁶ I have been supported in this by Secretary of War Weeks. Why not write an article about the Philippines? In closing, I want to say that I think that the Jones Act is good. It can be made to work until Congress decides on what to do with the Islands.

Wood to Hayden, April 13, 1924.

Why not prepare an article for *Atlantic Monthly*?

Hayden to Ellery Sedgwick,¹⁴⁷ May 23, 1924.

I really do not want to answer Buell. However, his article does Wood an injustice. It passed over the difficulties which the Harding Administration inherited from Harrison. Do you want an article on the Philippines from one who knows something about conditions there?

Hayden to Wood, May 26, 1924.

I am not confident that I have the ability to answer Buell's article. However, I have written fourteen articles for the *Christian Science Monitor* which should be of some help in setting the record straight. One of these has even appeared in the *Congressional Digest* along side of one by Quezon.¹⁴⁸

Sedgwick to Hayden, May 28, 1924.

I am sorry if you cannot agree with Buell's article. I believed that he was qualified to write it. However, I did find it necessary to edit certain remarks which seemed unfair to the Administration.

Raymond L. Buell to Hayden, June 9, 1924.

Thank you for your comments. Maybe I should not have written the article. As for what the Filipino politicians made out of their fight with Wood, all I can say is that any politician would have done the same. Yet, I feel that the explanation of political

¹⁴⁶ See note 56.

¹⁴⁷ Editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*.

¹⁴⁸ "Are Complaints against the Wood Administration justified? pro [Quezon] and con [Hayden]," *Congressional Digest*, 3 (April, 1924).

capital is "too simple" when offered as the reason for the Cabinet Crisis.¹⁴⁹

Wood to Hayden, Personal and Confidential, July 21, 1924.

You are more than qualified to write the article. As for the Jones Act, I am convinced that with "loyal cooperation it is quite adequate for a successful and progressive conduct of" government until such time as Congress reaches a decision as to future policy.¹⁵⁰ The greatest defect in the Jones Act, however, is that which demands confirmation by the Philippine Senate of the secretaries of the departments, who are really the governor-general's helpers, advisors, and staff. And since the governor-general has no political party, and thus is without representation in the Legislature, the problem of confirmation is very often difficult. As for a Platt Amendment¹⁵¹ for the Philippines, I cannot see it. Once we leave Manila, we leave for good. We are too far away for a Platt Amendment to be operative.

A. V. H. Hartendorp to Hayden, October 2, 1924.

Aides of Wood have said that they believe Quezon will behave himself when he comes home because he knows that Coolidge is certain to win the election. During his absence the "non-cooperation movement" has petered out. And the Legislature has done nothing in anticipation of the "return of the master mind and master hand." I cannot forecast what is going to happen, but I am sure that Wood is not worrying over it. If Wood thinks that the Jones Act is fine until the status of the Philippines is settled, then he has changed his mind since the Wood-Forbes Report. In fact, I know that he has even though I have not spoken to him about it. I am sure he has appreciated the difficulties in amending the Jones Act,¹⁵² and that probably explains his attitude. I have seen somewhere that a government, no matter how it is organized, usually will do what is necessary, and

¹⁴⁹ Today, all available evidence points to the fact that Quezon used the Conley Affair for political reasons. In 1923, however, few persons outside of the Philippines would have been able to see the Cabinet Crisis as anything more than a fight over the most lofty principles of self-government and self-determination for colonies.

¹⁵⁰ When Wood wrote the letter to Hayden, self-government for the Philippines seemed more than imminent. See note 129.

¹⁵¹ The Platt Amendment forced the inclusion in the first Cuban constitution of an article permitting American intervention in the external affairs of Cuba. President Roosevelt as part of the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s abrogated the Platt Amendment.

¹⁵² See note 19.

that is what we are doing here. The tension has been relieved here because the end seems in sight with regard to the Philippine question.

Hayden to Wood, Personal and Confidential, December 19, 1925.

I would like the post of Vice Governor-General if Governor Gilmore decides to quit. I do not need the job, I only want to serve my country.

Hayden to Willis J. Abbot,¹⁵³ 1926.

I believe that Daniel R. Williams is opinionated and fits in with the Hearst newspapers. But he is much better than Miss Katherine Mayo—if anyone can be better.

Wood to Hayden, Personal, June 3, 1925.

Thank you for your article.¹⁵⁴ Quezon is not trying to kill Osmeña politically through the Supreme National Council. Osmeña, who is in Washington, has been gaining too much prestige by opposing the measures advanced by the Secretary of War and the President.¹⁵⁵ No one can be a candidate unless he is approved by the Supreme National Council. This is Quezon's way of becoming supreme leader. Aguinaldo, however, refuses to go along and this has been a blow to Quezon. The Council seems to be disintegrating due to the civic courage of the people.

Osmeña to Hayden, June 9, 1926.

I think that you are qualified to judge the reasons for the split in 1922. And I am not in favor of autocratic government.

Hayden¹⁵⁶ to Abbot, August 21, 1926.

I have heard that Quezon is willing to give Thompson something and that he has made him an offer. The big hope of the politicians is that Thompson will sabotage Wood's position. If this

¹⁵³ Editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* (1921-1927).

¹⁵⁴ "Philippines: an experiment in Democracy," *Atlantic Monthly*, 137 (March, 1926).

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Quezon to Harrison, August 26, 1926, Harrison Papers. It is very possible that Osmeña did a *volte-face* during the summer of 1926 in order to undermine Quezon's position as a reasonable leader of the Filipino people. See note 140.

¹⁵⁶ At the time, Hayden was in the Philippines with the Carmi A. Thompson Mission.

happens, this will be bad for our position in the Philippines and the Far East.

Katherine Mayo Papers

Wood to Katherine Mayo,¹⁵⁷ January 29, 1923.

I would like to see you come out to the Philippines to do a story. I wanted to return home at the beginning of this year, but the situation here is such that I cannot leave as yet. The people in the States are as unfamiliar with conditions here as they were in 1898. It was difficult to take over after writing the Report, but the people have been friendly and the Legislature cooperative. As you know, it is not easy to work through a Legislature "but in the long run it is better for the people." I could have done things faster if I were a military governor as I was in Cuba, "but it would not have resulted in the training of the people to handle their own legislation and affairs." What we need here is real publicity. I do not want condemnation or ill-deserved praise, but an honest and proper assessment of the situation here.

Wood to Mayo, February 12, 1923.

I want a good story of conditions here and not propaganda.

Wood to Mayo, Personal, April 4, 1925.

Thank you for your book¹⁵⁸. It has been a help at home and here.

Wood to Mayo, July 9, 1926.

Carmi A. Thompson is arriving today. I wonder "what he really wants to see."

¹⁵⁷ A noted American publicist of the twenties and thirties whose books on India and the Philippines produced a great deal of controversy. Although her books were factual, they exceeded the bounds of good taste in many instances.

¹⁵⁸ *The Isles of Fear; the truth about the Philippines*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925).