Leonard Wood as Governor General: A Calendar of Selected Correspondence, A Postscript

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Fri June 27 13:30:20 2008
Texts & Documents

Leonard Wood as Governor General: 
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MICHAEL ONORATO

In this postscript to the four-part series of selected correspondence, the relevant files in the papers of President Warren G. Harding are presented. For some four decades after his death, the Harding Memorial Association of Marion, Ohio, was the custodian of the presidential papers. Then in 1963-64, these manuscripts were offered to the Ohio Historical Society. Once completely sealed, they are now available to qualified scholars.

The Harding Papers are extensive. However, they are arranged by subject matter which has facilitated their use. The librarians of the Ohio Historical Society have prepared a preliminary checklist which was made available to this writer. It is believed that a detailed list of the holdings is in preparation.

As the files described below will indicate, Harding was concerned about the Philippine Islands; was a little cynical of the Filipino leadership and their demands for independence; was somewhat sympathetic, however, to the political exigencies they faced in Manila; and rather satisfied in his choice

* The research was made possible with the support of a grant from the American Philosophical Society.
of Wood as governor general. Much of Harding’s awareness of the Philippines stemmed from his chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions.

From the paucity of Philippine material in the collection relating to the Wood period, it is difficult to say with certainty how Harding would have handled the events resulting from the cabinet crisis. It is probable that he would have made the proper gestures in the direction of the politicos whose needs he understood so well—a word of conciliation, a slight tap on the wrist, perhaps, for the governor general, a plea for renewed cooperation. It is doubtful that he would have gone any further considering the fact that his Secretary of War, the chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, as well as men like Forbes and Taft, supported Wood. The Memorandum of July 20, 1923 and the letter of Secretary of War Weeks to Harding, July 23, 1923, which are found in part one of this calendar, tend to disprove the argument that Harding would have relieved Wood.

It is hoped that the presentation in this calendar of the papers of the two presidents associated with Wood’s years in the Philippines will permit a better view of their relationships than had been hitherto possible. The most comprehensive picture of the Wood era will be obtained only when the Quezon Papers are available in the United States to scholars and the Wood manuscripts to Filipino historians. When that day arrives a better understanding of the Twenties should be possible.


Governor General Harrison intends to leave the Philippine Islands in March. In view of the fact that the Vice-Governor is out of the Islands and might not return, it seems that a Filipino cabinet officer will be selected as our acting governor general. We feel that this should not happen. If you cannot appoint a governor general who would arrive before Harrison’s departure, then we would suggest that you designate a member of the American

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A Republican national committeeman in Manila.

This letter and the next can be found in the Taft Papers.
community as vice-governor. There would be no need then to select a Filipino as acting governor general.\textsuperscript{294}

McCoy to Harding, December 28, 1920.

On December 21, we cabled you asking that you appoint Newton Gilbert, General Wood, Cameron Forbes, Frank Lowden or someone of equal stature as governor general. The Republican organization here also asked that you delay any appointment to the post of governor general until our letter arrived. The American community believes that American sovereignty ought to be maintained here with full opportunity given the Filipinos for local self-rule. We also believe that American needs in the Far East will depend upon retention of the Philippines. Unless we control these Islands, our merchant marine will have no friendly ports in this part of the world. Moreover, our political influence will disappear. Therefore, we must have a highly qualified governor general. He must be familiar with the Filipino, with Philippine politics, and political conditions throughout the Far East. Moreover, he should meet frequently with our minister to China and our ambassador to Japan. We suggest the following men: Forbes who has long experience in the Philippine government; Wood who spent many years in the Philippines and knows the country well; and Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois who is a fine administrator. While the Governor has no Far East experience, we believe he can learn quickly.\textsuperscript{295} We have reason to believe that Forbes and Wood would accept the appointment.\textsuperscript{296} Please choose someone capable of the position.

Harding to General Leonard Wood, February 14, 1921.\textsuperscript{297}

I am aware that you know what I have in mind to ask of you. A mutual friend has already communicated with you about the Philippines. I would like you to know directly that it would please me to have you become the next governor general. I would

\textsuperscript{294} Vice-Governor Charles E. Yeater did return to the Philippines before the departure of Governor Harrison.

\textsuperscript{295} All governors general prior to Harrison had served the Philippine Government in various capacities. Many Americans and Filipinos feared that Harding would select some political crony who would be incapable of the high responsibilities demanded of the office. Cf. note 131.

\textsuperscript{296} Letters in the Taft and Stimson Papers indicate that Forbes did not want the post, while Wood was lobbying for the position of Secretary of War in the Harding cabinet.

\textsuperscript{297} This letter and the next can be found in the Wood Papers.
like to announce the appointment as I start my administration in order to show the importance we attach to the Philippines and our position in the Far East. I am anxious about this post. We must have an outstanding American in the government there. I have talked to many friends about this and my wish that you accept this position. The nation will rejoice at the appointment. Our posture in the Orient will be strengthened. But "I think the situation will interest you because it affords you an opportunity to render a very great and lasting service to your country." I am not asking you to go to the Philippines in order to avoid selecting you for another position. I believe that you can do what must be done. It will please me if you would accept.298

Wood to Harding, February 25, 1921.

In the last few weeks I have had a series of interesting conversations with Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra relative to the Philippines. They were quite informative. However, I would like to have your views on the Philippines. Yet, I must inform you of my decision to leave the service for a high civil post. But your letter does demand my attention. I would like to meet with you as soon as possible.299

George H. Fairchild300 to Harding, June 29, 1921.

I have talked to the General. He will stay on if he is urged.

Horace M. Towner301 to Harding, Personal, August 10, 1921.

It has been suggested that the Philippines will be discussed at the forthcoming disarmament conference.302 It might be interesting to explore the possibility of the neutralization, as well as the guaranty of Philippine independence. Japan is seeking the spread of her influence. Britain is looking to advance her trade in the Far East. France wants to strengthen her hold on Indo-

298 See note 199. See also the Wood correspondence in the Stimson Papers.

299 Wood met with Harding in Marion, Ohio, a few days prior to the inauguration. Despite their exchange of views, Wood was still opposed to the appointment.

300 A prominent member of the American business community in Manila. He was close to Quezon and Harrison, as well as Wood.

301 He was chairman, House Committee on Insular Affairs. He was later governor of Porto Rico. During the 1920s, he was mentioned several times as being acceptable to the Filipinos as their governor general.

China. However, we must not give up our sphere of influence without compensation. As you know "our friend Quezon" will be arriving soon. Why nobody knows. He will probably call upon you to discuss Philippine matters. He might even discuss the above with you. He is a strong advocate of neutralization.

John W. Weeks to Harding, October 17, 1921.

In a few days Forbes will be here with the report of the Commission. I know that you will want to know his views of conditions in the Islands.

Harding to Weeks, October 24, 1921.

We shall wait until Forbes returns before doing anything further. I am open and without bias concerning the situation there. Wood has been given "a difficult task" to perform. We should try to "meet his wishes so far as possible."

Harding to Jaime C. de Veyra, November 26, 1921.

I shall be very glad to meet with a Philippine Legislative committee before submitting recommendations to Congress concerning the Philippine Islands. As it is, "I am in no particular hurry" about making any suggestions to Congress.

De Veyra to Harding, Confidential, December 15, 1921.

At the moment I do not know who will make up the legislative mission. Probably Quezon will come. I think Osmeña should be a member also. It is important that he be here also. But he has always declined in the past when the Legislature was in session. Perhaps if you suggested that you would like to see him, he would join the mission.

Harding to de Veyra, December 16, 1921.

I would like to help you out, but it would be embarrassing for me to suggest who should be a member of the mission. I shall meet the mission when it comes. However, any suggestion by me

303 In July, 1921, Quezon left Manila for a quick trip to the United States. It is probable that he wanted to take advantage of the lull in Philippine politics caused by the presence of the Wood-Forbes Mission to get away from Manila. He did get to see President Harding.

304 While resident commissioner, Quezon tried several times to secure acceptance of a neutralization plan for the Philippine Islands.

305 See note 19.

306 Harding never submitted any recommendations to Congress.
of its membership would be construed as an effort to frustrate its work. I know Quezon and Osmeña. But I still cannot "suggest their coming."

Jacob Gould Schurman\textsuperscript{307} to Harding, March 11, 1922.

When I last wrote you I was in Peking. Since then I have been inspecting our consulates in China. Recently I visited Manila where I had the opportunity to meet with Filipino leaders, with students, as well as the old leaders of the revolution. I also had a fine opportunity to talk with Governor General Wood. I made speech after speech. These were reported fully in the Manila press. My theme was three-fold: vindication of American aims in the Philippines; the need for full discussion before taking the final step leading to independence; and aptly, to give aid to Governor Wood. With respect to my first point, there seemed to be no reaction. Everyone seems to be satisfied with what we have done there. The greatest reaction centered on my second point. The people want independence. If we challenge its veracity, I am certain that "the silent masses" will follow their "vocal leaders." The older leaders are afraid of independence which they know is bound to come. I have noticed also that those who want independence are no longer willing to listen to reason as they were years ago.\textsuperscript{308} The first general reaction to my comments was one of disappointment. I have always been known as a friend of Filipino aspirations and early Philippine independence.\textsuperscript{309} Now I am calling their attention to their defenseless position and the unsettled conditions in the world. This is regarded as "downright infidelity" to their aims. From my short stay in Manila I am convinced that we must honor our commitment to the Filipinos. Moreover, any congressional tampering with the Jones Act will lead to "uprisings in the Philippines" and certainly a boycott of America.\textsuperscript{310} Yet, independence is beset with difficulties. A Philippine Republic would probably be taken over by some imperialist power.\textsuperscript{311} There is a general lack of military preparedness.\textsuperscript{312} There has been fiscal

\textsuperscript{307} He was the United States minister to China at the time.

\textsuperscript{308} Schurman was probably referring to those same forces Pardo de Tavera lamented over in his letter to Harrison, February 27, 1925. See also note 136. It is doubtful that Schurman meant Quezon or Osmeña.

\textsuperscript{309} During the debate over the Jones Act, Schurman, who was then president of Cornell University, came out strongly in favor of Filipino aspirations.

\textsuperscript{310} This was the viewpoint of Forbes, Barrows, Taft, Wood, as well as Quezon.

\textsuperscript{311} An obvious reference to Japan.

\textsuperscript{312} See Wood to Schurman, September 10, 1922.
mishandling of the worst type. Lastly, the Filipinos and the Moros still seem to be at odds. I think, however, with time we can come to some arrangement with the Filipinos. Our government should decide what naval and military bases we will need. Maybe the retention of a depot for our commerce with China should be decided upon. And the acceptance of these demands should be "a sine qua non of Philippine independence." It seems to me that before the Republican convention of 1924 meets you may want to state "your Philippine policy." Right now our people have little interest in the Philippines. But with the forthcoming independence mission, I think the issue will become part of American politics. I trust that you will accept these suggestions from one anxious to be of service.

Weeks to Harding, May 23, 1922.

I think that the enclosed resolution of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippine Islands is interesting. I am not in sympathy with its aims and neither is Wood. Moreover, I fail to see how General McIntyre could affect the relations between Americans and Filipinos.

Harding to Weeks, May 25, 1922.

Thank you for the resolution of the Chamber of Commerce. I think that we should find out the reasoning behind it. Please ask Wood for further information.

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313 See Schurman to Wood, October 7, 1922.
314 Schurman was unduly concerned. The Filipino leaders did not take the independence issue before the American people in any vigorous manner until the 1930s. During the 1920s, the leaders were willing to make bold statements but refrained from any attempt to inject the independence issue into the mainstream of American politics. Cf. Rafael Palma to Harrison, April 24, 1924. See also Eulogio B. Rodriguez to Harrison, March 6, 1924, September 9, 1924.
315 For President Harding's reply see Harding to Schurman, April 19, 1922, Schurman Papers.
316 Presidents Coolidge and Hoover were to receive long memorandums in which Schurman outlined his arguments against Philippine independence. They can be found in the Schurman Papers, Cornell University.
317 Colin MacRae Hoskins to Harrison, February 17, 1922.
318 McIntyre was chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, during the administrations of Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. He was, in effect, the closest Washington came to having a permanent undersecretary for Colonial Affairs. In such a capacity, it was natural that he had his detractors.
Towner to Harding, June 14, 1922.

According to telegrams received by the Resident Commissioner, it seems that the Philippine Legislative Mission is not anxious to appear before committees of the Congress. It looks as if they want you to make some statement before they do anything. When I tried to set up some hearings I was told that any preparations would have to wait until the mission arrived. I do not know what you will say to them. But if you pardon this intrusion, might I suggest that you let them speak first? Let them make their demand for independence. Then we can make our answer. Of course, we can say we know the Filipino people want independence. It was for this reason the Wood-Forbes Mission was sent. And from the Report, it seems that independence is inopportune at this time. But whatever you say, I feel that we must wait until they speak. Moreover it is not absolutely necessary that you answer immediately.319

Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Confidential, June 14, 1922.

On June 13, Quezon and Osmena called on the Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs,320 to discuss their views. Accordingly, they expressed their desire to cooperate with the government and the governor general. They believed that such cooperation is necessary. Moreover, they wanted nothing to happen while here which would make such association difficult. They wanted to prevent any misunderstanding which might embarrass them before their people at home. They were aware that the administration is against independence at this time. For this reason, they see no need of hearings before congressional committees. There is some fear that they might be put in a position which will cause them to be argumentative. They do not expect anything further in the nature of a statement about independence. However, they want a positive statement that nothing granted will be withdrawn.321 Moreover, they want to make certain that Governor General Wood will allow them to administer local matters. However, they fear friction might develop between them and Wood if he is not cautioned to

319 The Mission did present the President with a request for a solution to the Philippine question. Harding’s reply was delivered on June 22nd.

320 In view of the status of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, it was not unusual that Quezon and Osmena should have called on General McIntyre first.

321 Taft, Forbes, Wood, and Harding, on several occasions, indicated that the autonomy granted could not be withdrawn and that it should not even be considered.
let them run their own affairs. They implied that Wood was seeking credit for everything accomplished in the Philippine Islands. They think he should allow the Filipino leaders to get the credit for the accomplishments of the past few months. Furthermore, they believe in the retention of the present organic act. They are certain that the educated and propertied class in the Islands would be happy if they were granted local autonomy. In fact, they would probably stop their agitation for independence for some years to come. As for the masses, a government with the "word, 'independence' " attached to it would satisfy them. How long this would satisfy everyone they could not say. They feel that the American community in Manila would not be unwilling to accept a "purely Filipino government" just so long as that government was not independent of the United States. Finally, they are not interested in fixing a date for independence. They believe that if a date was fixed for the distant future it would cause unrest at home. Right now, they say, independence is not "seriously thought of."

Harding to Towner, June 15, 1922.

Thank you for your kind letter. I believe that the Mission should be told that this administration "very cordially sustains" the Wood-Forbes Report. Moreover, I am inclined to let the Mission state its case before we answer them.

Towner to Harding, June 23, 1922.

Your reply to the Mission was superb. I have seen Quezon and Osmeña and they have praise for it. Both men are anxious to return home with something. I feel that they came because of political pressures at home. Therefore, when I asked them to make some suggestions, they spoke of changes in the existing situa-

\footnote{Cf. E. W. Wilson to Harrison, July 14, 1922. See also note 92.}

\footnote{In 1916, the Jones Act granted local autonomy to the Filipinos in a form which the other colonial peoples of Asia would have thought impossible. What Quezon and Osmeña were speaking about was dominion status similar to that enjoyed by Australia, New Zealand or Canada in 1922. It is doubtful that the Filipino leaders contemplated any form of dominion status which would have meant absence of United States control of Philippine foreign relations. In 1931, Britain relaxed its control over the foreign relations of its dominions.}

\footnote{There was talk in Manila in 1922 of seeking the appointment of a Filipino governor general—presumably Quezon.}

\footnote{See George F. Parker to Wood, March 31, 1924. See also note 192.}

\footnote{Cf. Gabaldon to Harrison, April 27, 1922.}
tion. But I warned them that any legislation right now might lead to total independence or else abrogation of present privileges. They then intimated that a Filipino as vice governor or else a Filipino majority on the Supreme Court might satisfy the people. I told them that this should be brought to your attention so that when a vacancy occurs you would be able to take their views into consideration. I thought you would like to know their thinking about your reply and the above matters.

Harding to Towner, June 23, 1922.

Thank you for your interesting letter. I was able to have a short confidential talk with Quezon and Osmeña. I think that I now know some things that they would like to have done which would help them “maintain their political prestige” in the Islands. I told them that I will give them every consideration. However, we cannot change the vice-governor at this time. I think, however, we might be able to help them place their appointees in the cabinet of the governor general.

Harding to Weeks, July 24, 1922.

Thank you for letting me see the cables received from Wood. It appears that he wants to come home. But I trust he will be satisfied with his work before leaving his post.

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327 Whether any plans were sent to President Harding cannot be ascertained by this writer.

328 Eugene A. Gilmore, who had been professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, had just been appointed to the post. He served in that capacity for nearly a decade, which was the longest for any vice-governor.

329 In view of the fact that any governor general after 1916 had to seek Philippine Senate approval for any appointee to his cabinet, it seems difficult to believe that Quezon and Osmeña had to secure presidential aid in getting Wood to heed their wishes. It is possible that they feared Wood might retain his cabinet intact despite the results of the election just concluded. As it turned out, Wood chose those men who had the confidence of Quezon and Osmeña.

330 There seems to have been confusion during the spring of 1922 as to what Wood had in mind: returning home or staying on as governor general, if only for a short time. It is very probable that Wood was not quite certain what he really wanted to do. It seems that he did want to get a five year program approved by the Philippine Legislature. Had Quezon or Osmeña won overwhelmingly, the legislature would have been controlled by one individual. Thus Wood could have sent in his program with some assurance that it would be studied. Instead the legislature was hopelessly torn between Quezon’s Colectivistas, Osmeña’s
Eugene A. Gilmore to Towner, September 26, 1922.

I am taking advantage of your remarks to me before leaving Washington that I keep you informed of the situation out here. The Independence Mission returned to be enthusiastically welcomed. The outcome of the last elections showed the popularity of Quezon. Of course, Osmeña is still popular and influential. Unfortunately, the election has produced three parties. And while all the leaders are for more power they do not anticipate immediate freedom at this time. The Mission was pleased with their trip and feel that the expense of the trip was worthwhile. Some here feel that the President's message merely perpetuates the uncertain status, especially since the President did not address himself to the Filipino request that their status be discussed. But then, most Filipinos did not expect the President to come up with any suggestions. What seems to have been their intention was the establishment of a commission to look into independence. The leaders now feel that their privileges, especially the powers acquired during the Harrison administration, are secure. It would be wrong to think that the leadership here will accept any status quo. These privileges, plus the President's pledge of "no backward step" is a part of the Filipino "charter of liberties." The Philippine independence drive shall go forward. It cannot stand still. There must be some progress made. The next drive shall be against the executive power. [Vice-Governor Gilmore then takes seven single-spaced pages to develop the Filipino view of the role of the governor general, to point out the weaknesses in their argument, to show how trouble may develop, to indicate that Congress abdicated its responsibilities for the Philippines thus leaving the governor general in a most delicate position, and finally to suggest that the uncertainty of Washington's attitude toward the Philippines favors further encroachment on the powers of the chief executive.]

Nacionalistas, and the Democrata Party. It took almost a month to elect Manuel Roxas as Speaker of the House. In such circumstances no program could have been sent up to the Legislature. Thus Wood decided to remain just a little longer. And having remained longer than he intended, he got caught up in a Filipino political feud of which the outcome was the cabinet crisis of July, 1923.

331 See note 192.

332 During and after the cabinet crisis of 1923, it was claimed that Wood's interpretation of the Jones Act thwarted the realization of Filipino aspirations. Moreover, it was argued that his exercise of executive authority was in violation of the Jones Act and its spirit. For an analysis of the cabinet crisis see this writer's forthcoming article on that subject in the Philippine Historical Bulletin.
ONORATO: LEONARD WOOD

Weeks to Harding, November 6, 1922.

You can see from reading between the lines of the article by the Manila correspondent of The Times (London) that our efforts are being watched by the other Powers in the Orient. Whatever we do in the Philippines will have a “material influence on their conduct of affairs in the possessions under their control.”

Harding to Weeks, November 9, 1922.

Thank you for bringing The Times to my attention. It is gratifying to know that others are watching us.

Harding to Weeks, January 1, 1923.

From what I can see after reading Quezon’s speech, we are not going to get away from the demand “for the fulfillment of the so-called promise in the Preamble of the Jones Act.”

Towner to Harding, January 2, 1923.

I would like to bring to your attention some extracts from letters by Americans in the Philippines. The general impression gained is that Wood is antagonizing the American community. [Rep. Towner then devotes the next four pages (single-spaced) to the extracts. He does not name his correspondents.] I am also enclosing letters from Vice-Governor Gilmore. From what I can see, my opinion that the Filipino leadership wants orderly progress rather than immediate independence has been sustained. They are too shrewd to want “full responsibility” at this time. We are now seeing Quezon and Osmeña coalescing because neither could go it...

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333 In the opinion of this writer there should be a study of the British, French, and Dutch attitude toward the growth of Filipino self-government. The Filipinos had achieved the highest development of self-government imaginable for non-Europeans in 1935. It would be too easy to dismiss the possibility of British, French, or Dutch interest in Filipino growth toward full independence as being without merit.

334 Francis Burton Harrison from his self-imposed exile in Scotland fumed over the letters in The Times from its Manila correspondent. He believed that they boosted the imperial ego of Britain, as well as prejudiced the case for Filipino freedom by references to the imperial responsibilities of the Western Powers in Asia. See Harrison to Quezon, December 13, 1922, Quezon Papers, Quezoniana Collection, National Library, Manila.

335 It is impossible to determine which speech Harding had read.

336 Cf. Hoskins to Harrison, February 17, 1922, Ernest Westerhouse to Harrison, November 8, 1922.
alone. Gilmore's letter of September 26th last is very comprehensive. However, I feel that he overdoes the difficulties inherent in the Jones Act. While Wood has been successful in some ways, it is true that he has not established closer, cordial relations between us and the Filipinos. However, I detect a change in his attitude as seen from his message to the Legislature on the occasion of its opening. As for the question of allowing the leaders to draw up a constitution, there is no need to worry about it until they formally request our permission. Then we can say that no authority is needed: write one and submit it when you see fit.

We have just received word of the resignations of the Filipino members of the Philippine cabinet.

337 See James Ross to Harrison, March 3, 1923. Cf. this writer's essay on "The Democrat.a Party" in the April, 1964 issue of Philippine Studies.

338 In the autumn of 1922 there was a definite effort made by Americans and Filipinos to find a solution to the independence issue. Several proposals were submitted to Washington. For the next two years, they would be the topic of conversation for Wood, the Filipino leaders, and the Bureau of Insular Affairs. These proposals, however, were never submitted officially. The reluctance of the leaders to formally state their terms annoyed Forbes, Wood, as well as the Coolidge administration. While the Filipinos understandably refused to bind themselves, they nevertheless gave currency to the belief that the leaders were not interested in solving the Philippine question. It was felt that the Filipinos did not want a solution because they would then lack an issue with which they could win elections. Cf. note 141.

339 Harding was then on a tour of Alaska and the West Coast. He would be dead in three weeks.