The Japanese Occupation: "The Cultural Campaign"

Victor Gosiengfiao

*Philippine Studies* vol. 14, no. 2 (1966): 228–242

Copyright © Ateneo de Manila University

Philippine Studies is published by the Ateneo de Manila University. Contents may not be copied or sent via email or other means to multiple sites and posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's written permission. Users may download and print articles for individual, noncommercial use only. However, unless prior permission has been obtained, you may not download an entire issue of a journal, or download multiple copies of articles.

Please contact the publisher for any further use of this work at philstudies@admu.edu.ph.
UNTIL recently, Chinese political tradition identified the ruler as a mere superintendent over a society already arranged in accord with the Will of Heaven. Only when the time was out of joint did the ruler become the sanctioned agent of intervention to restore the natural order. The Japanese tradition, revealed in practice if not always formulated into theory, has been the opposite: it has been strongly colored by what Ronald Dore has called, "a sense of the contingency of social institutions on the human will."

Two periods of Japanese history are often cited as notable illustrations of the tradition where political authority is purposefully and energetically engaged in reconstituting society, morality and culture in general for political ends. They are the Tokugawa (1603-1867) and the Meiji (1868-1912) periods. The inauguration of the Tokugawa regime in the early seventeenth century was in large part an exercise in the official sponsorship of those institutions very likely to contribute to the perpetuation of the regime — an official philosophy, morality, and social hierarchy complementing the military and political efforts at establishing a system remarkable for its powers of survival. When this system finally expired in the middle of the nineteenth century, the new Meiji government showed less diffidence and more energy in an even more deliberate work of cultural engineering. Seeking its political survival and that
of the nation in a program of rapid modernization, it boldly abolished the feudal structure of traditional Japanese society, pragmatically encouraged the pursuit of "knowledge . . . throughout the world," and cunningly cultivated an indigenously grown imperial cult. Ogyu Sorai, a prominent Tokugawa scholar, was in the mainstream of Japanese political tradition when he maintained, in effect, that the sanction for the existing institutions was to be found not in the Will of Heaven but in the political will of the ruler.

The Japanese military which over-ran Asia during the Pacific War did not abandon this tradition. In Tokyo, The Total War Research Institute chose to state the goal of the Japanese occupation of the conquered areas in terms of promoting the "moral culture of the Orient." In the Philippines, the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration spoke energetically of a "renovation of government, economics, industry and civilization in general." Upon his arrival in Manila to launch a "cultural campaign," the Marquis Tokugawa let it be known that "the Co-Prosperity Sphere would not endure unless founded on cultural ties and affinities."

It is difficult to determine exactly how much the Japanese knew of the Philippines which they proposed to "renovate." We may however identify some of the sources of information which were available to them. The Philippine Society In Japan, a study group founded in 1935, had an enrollment of three hundred members. Its founder, the Marquis Yorisada Tokugawa, paid an extended visit to the Philippines in 1942 to serve as an adviser to the Japanese Military Administration. Perhaps the more common sources of general information were the twenty-five thousand Japanese nationals residing in the Philippines. Before the war, eighteen thousand of them lived in the province of Davao, four thousand in Manila and the rest in over fourteen provinces. Prominent among these Japanese nationals was Hisashi Enosowa who, in the first year of the Occupation alone, wrote thirty-five articles in the local English and Japanese periodicals. Finally, whatever information the Japanese themselves lacked they could always secure from the more informed among the captive population.
The late Claro M. Recto has given a remarkable instance of the promptitude with which the Japanese acted to collect data from Filipino scholars.

Corps of university and college professors came from Japan, almost at the same time as the spearhead of the invading army, with a ready list of well-known Filipino scholars and scientists who were hastily summoned to the army headquarters and ordered to submit monographs and treatises on practically every phase of Philippine thought and culture. A research commission was organized under the military administration in which all of these Filipinos were called to membership, together with the group who were to be their mentors.¹

The construction of the "New Philippines" had to meet three specifications. First, Western, especially Anglo-American, cultural influence was to be reduced. Second, in place of the United States, Japan was to serve as the cultural focus of the Philippines. Third, the revival of elements of the pre-Spanish culture of the Philippines was to be encouraged, in so far as this was compatible with the goals and nature of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.² As Professor Oshima more succinctly put it, "With respect to Western civilization, (the policy) is one of discriminate rejection; with respect to Eastern civilization, it is one of discriminate acquisition."³

The Japanese military were not disposed either by policy or war-sentiment to contemplate with equanimity the evidence of many things Western thriving on Philippine soil. They were appalled at seeing the Philippines steeped in the "degenerating influence of American culture" and the habit of "reliance upon Western nations." The life the Filipinos had been living was "unnatural," "abnormal," devoid of "introspection," and an exhibition of "inferiority complex." Forsaking the "Oriental traditions of humanity and morals," they had abandoned themselves to the debilitating effects of "Anglo-American materialism," "hedonism," "epicurism," "excessive esteem toward the

¹ Claro Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation, People's Publishers, Manila, 1946, p. 12.
² This is essentially an application of the policy enunciated by the Total War Research Institute. See Exhibits 1335, 1336 of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
"weaker sex" and the excesses of "American individualism, liberalism and democracy." The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in the Philippines, proposing to "speak frankly" in his much publicized warning to the nation, said, "So long as you are unable to free yourself from the obsession for that Americanism which has undermined your life and vitality, you will continue to deteriorate spiritually and will finally be led to the very brink of racial extinction."

The Japanese Military Administration lost little time to rectify the situation. Barely a month after the Japanese entry into Manila, an education policy seeking to change the Western orientation of the public school system was promulgated. The instructions on school textbooks, later issued by the Director-General, called for the compilation of new textbooks "to meet the changed circumstances;" they also established as a condition for the use of the old textbooks in the meanwhile the elimination of "improper and unsuitable parts." While the Philippine-American forces were making their last stand in Bataan and Corregidor, the Textbook Examining Committee, composed of Filipino and Japanese members, were meticulously identifying every Western outpost of word, picture, song and symbol in the schoolbooks. Considered as improper and unsuitable were a multitude of things: Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Gettysburg Address, The Lady of Shallot, St. George and the Dragon, The Star-Spangled Banner, The Thanksgiving Day, George Dewey, A Letter of Thomas Jefferson to His Daughters, Washington's Birthday, Theodore Roosevelt, The China Clipper, descriptions of English farming methods, all references to the Commonwealth, all numerical calculations of Western currencies. Intriguingly, Silas Marner was singularly licensed to plague the schoolboy even under the New Order.6

The general public were not neglected. Needless to say, all media of mass communication came under military control. All books and other forms of publication in circulation in the country were subject to review and possible confiscation.

Streets, roads, bridges, towns and public sites honoring American names were given other names: Heiwa for Dewey, Koa for Harrison, Daitoa for Taft, and Banzai for Jones. As a step to the eventual removal of the English language from its established position, Tagalog substitutes were found for English terms and expressions commonly used in official correspondence. Exhortations to the public to forsake old literary interests were not lacking; the most prominent among them was a hortatory pictorial essay appearing in a Sunday magazine supplement contrasting the old predilection for books "ranging from mystery thrillers to Freudian psychoanalysis" in the bad pre-war years with "the demand for hard information on Asia found in illustrated histories, fact digests and encyclopedias."

In theory, it was never the policy of the Japanese to eliminate entirely all traces of Western cultural influence. However, due either to the exigencies and the black-and-white character of propaganda, or to the need to compensate for what they considered to be the appalling Filipino habit of "reliance upon Western nations," the Japanese seemed at times to look darkly at everything Western in the Philippines with the exception of Western science, which they approved, and the Western-introduced Catholic religion, whose faithful they hoped to win.

In any case, it was a simple matter for the Japanese regime to impose, totally or partially, a cultural blockade on the Philippines. But it was a somewhat more arduous task to scale the hostile walls, capture the citadel and direct the subjects to new cultural loyalties.

A member of the Japanese-sponsored Filipino officialdom once made a brief reference to the problem facing the Japanese on this score, and its solution. "Diverse races and different nations," he said, "live in Greater East Asia. All of them fortunately fall under the same denominator: Orientals. Their common problem is therefore to crystallize, to consolidate, as it were, the hemispheric sentiment . . . ."

---

All through the years of the Occupation there was an assumption, officially held and apparently unchallenged, that beneath the variety of differences among the nations of Greater East Asia was a substratum of culture shared by all who were called “Orientals”. What this culture was never really received adequate description. There were references to “common ancestry, geography and destiny.” There were also references to traditional manners and customs, to “Oriental moralism”, or to some distinct sense of values. Sometimes, being Oriental seemed simply being virtuous and being true, as General Homma said, to “the innate qualities of honesty and fortitude, diligence and hardworking and frugality and thrift, that pulse in the veins of we Oriental peoples.”

Perhaps it is best to regard the “Oriental culture” so zealously promoted by the Japanese not as something already in being but as something yet to be achieved. The Total War Research Institute in Tokyo seemed to have hinted as much when it said, “the aim is to build up the moral culture of the Orient . . . Under the Greater East Asia Union, the construction of morality, the fostering of original abilities and the fusion of cultures shall be the common ideal.”

It may be said that in practice the tendency was to identify “Oriental culture,” or the core of it, with the Japanese. It was the propagation of Japanese culture which would focus “hemispheric sentiment” on Japan.

To prepare the Philippines for the contemplated importation of the more substantive articles of Japanese culture, the nation had to be encouraged to learn the Japanese language. It was this task which received the greater portion of the Japanese effort at cultural engineering in their brief military residence in the Philippines. The Director-General of the Military Administration asked a convention of provincial Governors and municipal Mayors to take note especially of the “stress laid upon the propagation of the Japanese language which lately had been designated one of the official languages of the Philippines.” “When it is realized,” he continued, “that the Japanese language is destined to become the common

\[7\] Exhibit 1336, p. 5.
tongue within the vast limits of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and that in the reconstruction of the Philippines there will be no medium other than Japanese for the introduction of Oriental culture and new knowledge, the importance of acquiring the language will require no further emphasis.”

It was with some pride that a common Japanese dictionary for Southeast Asia was introduced. “The books,” the notice declared, “made in handy pocketbook size, contain approximately three hundred of the most simple yet practical Japanese words . . . The covers of the books are very attractively colored with a picture of Mt. Fuji and the flag of the Rising Sun, while the contents contain colored illustrations with a description in Japanese and translations in either Thai, Burmese, Malayan or Tagalog.”

The Japanese language had another thing to commend itself to the population. It was claimed that the misbehavior of some Japanese soldiers in the occupied countries was caused largely by misunderstandings arising from linguistic confusion. A statement of this decidedly forceful inducement was made in an article which appeared at the inauguration of the learn-it-yourself “Japanese (Language) Corner” of the Sunday Tribune Magazine. The author of this article, apparently a Filipino newspaperman, recounted how on an assignment to interview the officers of the first detachment of the Japanese soldiers to reach Manila he was able to remove himself from the menacing point of a Japanese sentry’s bayonet.

“Komban wa,” we greeted him as we opened the door and came to meet him with upraised hands. “Anone”, we said watching his reaction and the glitter of the bayonet point. “Oh no—Watak’shi wa, Hiripin shimbun-jin des’. “So des’ ka?,” said the sentry. Since then, we have roamed far and wide in the occupied areas, particularly in Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Rizal, in the performance of our duty. And our little but ever-increasing Japanese vocabulary has been of great help and has even saved us our car twice and our friends on several occasions.

---

9 Tribune, Oct. 19, 1942, p. 3.
10 The Sunday Tribune Magazine, Feb. 15, 1942, p. 3.
The Japanese seemed little dismayed by the task of teaching, in the midst of a war, an entire nation in the use of an admittedly difficult language. They publicly expressed confidence that in no time at all the Filipinos would be conversing in Japanese. Hisashi Enosawa made it known that he considered the Filipinos, like the Swiss, born linguists. "With such linguistic facility," he said, "my Filipino friends ought to be able to master conversational Japanese within a short time, say, six months of earnest application." The advertisement for the daily Japanese language half-hour over the radio was somewhat more optimistic. "It is guaranteed," it said, "that if the listeners tune in regularly everyday, they will be able to understand Japanese used in everyday life at the end of the course." The course ran for four weeks.

It was primarily in the schools, public and private, that the Japanese hoped to spread the official language of the New Order. The student population during the war years was not inconsiderable. In the public sector alone, about a third of the elementary school children and approximately half of the secondary were back in school by 1943. How many of the enrolled students actually received instruction in the language is not easy to determine. Certainly, the lack of instructors made it impossible to reach all of the public school students, let alone the private school students who had constituted in the pre-war years a little more than one-half of the total school population. The Normal Institute reopened to instruct teachers in elementary Japanese could graduate only one hundred and twenty public and forty private school language teachers every three months. Much therefore depended on the efforts of Japanese civilians and soldiers in the provinces to teach the school teachers. There the arrangement seemed less than satisfactory. A Japanese national would teach a group of school teachers who, while still receiving instruction, would share their new linguistic acquisition, such as it was, with other teachers or the school children.

---

11 Tribune, May 24, 1942, p. 4.
Some of the adult section of the population received attention. Each town of the eleven provinces of Central Luzon held Nippongo classes for government officials and employees. Selected minor executives and ranking employees of the government were asked to attend government institutes which sought to teach the civil service the new official language as well as "to rejuvenate (it) spiritually, morally and physically." The Prisoner of War Rejuvenation schools, the Philippine Constabulary Training School, the KALIBAPI, the neighborhood association and other such organizations also dispensed language instruction.

It is not possible to tell precisely how far, beyond the propagation of the Japanese language, the Japanese intended to go in making the Philippines into the image of Japan. The fortunes of war proved a fatal midwife and the Japanese-conceived "New Philippines", as yet formless, was aborted.

It would seem that the Japanese intended in the first instance to cultivate among the Filipinos a general receptivity to a miscellany of things Japanese—from Go to the Manyoshu to the "Nippon Woman's Code of Ethics". The mental furniture of the literate Filipino, which was Western before the War, was to be made Japanese. As world history once seemed to the Filipino to revolve around Western history, the new historical perspective, if the curriculum of the belatedly revived College of Liberal Arts of the state university is to be any guide on this point, was Japanese or at least Asian. Magazine articles, when not displaying interest in Philippine folklore, exhibited a decided preference to cap a point with a line from Basho rather than from the Bard. Occasionally, cultural missions of Japanese musicians, novelists and artists made their widely publicized descent upon Manila.

The local elite, which had considered matriculation in the capitals of the Western world the better part of a proper education, were to be re-directed to the universities of Tokyo. As a manifest of this policy, the Japanese began to send the sons of the more prominent families in Manila to Japan on grants provided by the Japanese government-sponsored International Student Institute which in the war years sought to bring pro-
mising Asian students to Japanese universities with a "view to providing dependable leadership for [their] nations." Fifty-one Filipino students were accommodated on this program, at least twenty of them being admitted to Keio University.13

For other less favored students, the Philippine Cultural Institute was established in the city of Tagaytay offering to college graduates free board and lodging, clothing and living allowance, and an introduction to Bushido. The general run of students received the attention of the Committee for the Establishment of Japanese-Philippine Cultural Relations, an organization inspired by the Marquis Tokugawa and incorporated into the Ministry of Education. Its assorted functions were "to disseminate correct information through books and publications, addresses and lectures, films and pictures, exhibits of industrial products and works of literature, art and science (of) the Philippines and Japan; and to promote the establishment of chairs on Japanese and other Oriental culture(s) and languages in important universities and higher institutions of learning, to work for the revival of the Philippine ancient cultural heritage, and for the promotion of Greater East Asia athletic meets and other gatherings." Its first project, possibly betraying its primary function, was the production of a pamphlet bearing the unequivocal title, "What We Should Learn from Japan."14

The Japanese found the Filipinos, as a consequence of the "baneful influence of America" and the loss of "original abilities," decidedly lacking in character. They were explicit on this point: They saw "frivolity," "idleness," "gambling and speculation," "excessive love of ease and pleasure," and the "shirking of effort and duty." Their prescription was "a spiritual reformation," "a moral rejuvenation," a return to "frugality," "simplicity," "manliness," "the spirit of sacrifice" and above all the "cult of labor."

How was this to be achieved? It would seem that the Japanese saw part of the answer in the introduction of some

13 See Foreign Students in Japan, A Special Report Prepared by the Education Research, General Headquarters, Supreme Command for the Allied Powers.
14 Tribune, Oct. 19, 1942, p. 3.
of those measures which in Japan had met with some success. "What We Should Learn from Japan" were those things which in the judgment of the Japanese had given them social cohesion and national strength.

There was first, education. Schooling, as it had been in Japan since the early Meiji period, was to be the instrument of the state for character formation, vocational training and political indoctrination. The Director-General, paraphrasing the recently promulgated educational policy, contrived to compare unfavorably the old policy with the new.

The U.S. has established schools in the country but purposefully neglected to establish vocational schools which were absolutely necessary for the cultivation of the national strength of the Philippines. In the spiritual aspect, too, little importance has been attached to the sense of duty which requires endurance and sacrifice; instead, the Filipinos have learned self-indulgence and physical pleasure through the encouragement of individual rights.

Second, there were the KALIBAPI and the neighborhood association. The Kapisanan Sa Paglilingkod Sa Bagong Pilipinas was an adaptation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The latter organization was established in Japan when the Army openly assumed full political control of the country in 1940. Replacing all political parties, it organized the influential elements of the country the better to mobilize them for the pursuit of the Army's policies. The KALIBAPI similarly was the only political party recognized by the Japanese military regime. Membership in it was a necessary qualification for appointment to any government office. Its function was to "secure [the] unification of the Filipino people . . . [and to] coordinate [their] activities and services" for those goals which were either encouraged or allowed by the Japanese military. Among these goals was "the development . . . of the people socially, spiritually, physically, culturally, economically or otherwise."

The neighborhood association, which was somewhat tentatively introduced in the Greater Manila area, had a more

---

16 Official Journal, Vol. IV, pp. VI-VII.
ancient precedent in Japan and, indeed, in China. During the Tokugawa period, the *gonin-gumi* was established as a unit of collective responsibility and mutual concern. It was composed of five households who were in several things responsible for one another's behavior. In the 1930's this device for social control was revived under the name of *tonari-gumi* (neighborhood association) and its size and assorted functions somewhat modified. The *tonari-gumi* was introduced in the Philippines apparently as a measure for maintaining peace and order and as an organization for the rationing of rice.

Finally, there was the new Japanese-sponsored constitution. While this constitution was similar in many respects to the one drafted in the American period, on at least one major point it bore a striking resemblance to the Meiji Constitution. Like the Japanese political document, it stressed emphatically the idea of service to the state. Its section on education read, “All schools, colleges, and universities shall aim to develop moral character, personal and collective discipline, civic conscience, and vocational skill, secure social efficiency, and teach the duties of citizenship.” The section which had been called “Bill of Rights” in the earlier constitution was re-done and re-emerged under the title, “Duties and Rights of the Citizen,” the identical title of the corresponding section in the Meiji Constitution. As in the Japanese document, the new Philippine Constitution did not declare in legally absolute terms that the rights enumerated “shall not be abridged;” in both constitutions rights were insecurely subject to legislative interference by virtue of such legal formulae as “the limitations imposed by law.”

The official encouragement given to the promotion of indigenous elements in the Philippine culture was no doubt a calculated bid to win nationalist favor for the Japanese regime. But perhaps something more than calculations of policy accounted for the earnestness with which some Japanese exhorted the Filipinos to search for their “individuality” in their pre-Spanish culture.

The Japanese have borrowed extensively, in varying degrees of discrimination, both from the Chinese and Western cultures. They have shown historically a passion for identifying what in their culture is native and what foreign in origin. They have also felt a historic need to reassure themselves often that their cultural borrowings, no matter how numerous, have always been made "uniquely Japanese" through some indigenous principle of integration variously styled, depending upon the period, as "Japanese sense," "Japanese sentiment," "Japanese spirit," and more latterly, "the Japanese Imperial Polity."

When they came to the Philippines, almost out of habit it would seem, they chose to look for the uniquely Filipino primarily and almost solely among those cultural items which were demonstrably indigenous. However, as they peeled off layer after layer of the cultural onion, the search for an identifiable core seemed, to General Homma at least, to yield little satisfaction. This luckless besieger of Bataan and Corregidor was reported to have said with some discouragement: "Days and weeks spent in search of authentic data relating to the original Philippine culture before the coming of the Spaniards proved fruitless and a study of the ancient Philippines must be made from existing religious legends and folklore."

The main reason for the sad state of affairs, according to Masanori Oshima, one of the more distinguished Japanese academicians who did service in the Philippine Research Commission, was "the absence of the preserved records of the people's activities and thoughts." Though the pre-Spanish people of the archipelago had the use of an alphabet, they had written on very perishable materials. Besides, "the conquistadores were said to have systematically destroyed the native writings and artifacts, no doubt prompted by their religious zeal and convenience."

But the sometime professor of Philosophy at the Tokyo Imperial University found something more in the campaign

20 For this and the following quotations, see Oshima's article previously cited, Phil. Review, Nov. 1943, pp. 17-25.
to revive the pre-Spanish culture than the promotion ofTagalog and “folklore.” He saw among the few things which“survived the intervening four centuries of Western predomiance” the traditional “family spirit,” “sturdy in texture anddurable in content.” It was around this that he recommendedFilipino national life be re-arranged.

What drew him towards the traditional family system waswhat he called “the respect for parents.” It was this “moralforce” which in pre-Spanish times had manifested itself inancestor worship. One of the “strangely unrelated vestiges”of this cult was “the universally celebrated Catholic holidayknown as All Saints’ Day.” While this was not precisely Shin-toism, “it is no less ancestor worship, with the difference thatin Japan it is observed throughout the year.”

It was the “dream”, more personal than official, of Oshimathat after the war when the Japanese-sponsored Constitutionof the Philippines would be revised as intended, the Filipino“family spirit” would give efficacious form to the politicalarrangement of the country. “The head of the Philippinegov-ernment,” he said, “might better be called the ‘Father of thePhilippines’ or Apo of the Filipinos.” He would not be popular-ly elected but would be chosen by a group of elders. Neitherwould he be a working chief executive for he would have hisPrime Minister do this for him. His function, if we may say so,was simply to be: for he would be the personal symbol ofnational unity and traditional values.

There are some interesting things to be noted about Pro-fessor Oshima’s proposal. The Apo system, if we may call itthat, bears a striking resemblance to the Japanese ImperialSystem. Like its model it is the expression of a patriarchalstate based metaphorically, if not literally, on ancestor worship;like its model its primary function is to give social cohesionand national unity to a nation as yet existing more in aspirationthan in fact; and finally, like its model, it is a deliberateattempt, in the manner of the “radical right,” to select fromthe “usable past” those elements which would create a futuredifferent from the past it ostensibly wishes to revive.
The proposal is also to my knowledge the only attempt made to illuminate by a concrete example what some would undoubtedly dispute, namely, the internal unity of the Japanese cultural policy. Like some Zen exercise it tries to sweep away in one act all logical divisions and difficulties: The Apo system is not Western; it can conceivably be Filipino; it is certainly Japanese; and according to Professor Oshima it is “Oriental” since it emphasizes the “unique trait common among Oriental politics” — “spiritual and moral kinship”. In a word, the propagation of the Japanese culture and the selective promotion of the ancient Philippine culture are not necessarily contradictory, or competitive or even different policies.

Professor Oshima’s article was published in the last days of 1943. By then he was on his way back to Japan, and the Japanese “cultural campaign” would soon after be compelled by the advance of American forces to dissolve in the military.

This footnote to the history of the Japanese Occupation has labored to discover in one aspect of the political behavior of the Japanese in the Philippines a pattern analogous to that which they had manifested in their own homeland. The point to be made is an obvious one. It is: During a period of national expansion, locomotion does not leave behind, as if they were some forgotten baggage, the nation’s memory and tradition; or if you prefer, the Japanese who came to the Philippines were Japanese. Were this sufficiently considered when the story of the Occupation is told, perhaps in the end we shall discover that there were few things the Japanese did here which they had not first done in their own country.