Prior to his appointment as acting Magistral Canon of the Manila Cathedral, Father José Burgos held the position of ecclesiastical fiscal or attorney in the archbishopric of Manila. His duties in the latter position can be gathered from an indorsement that he made in April 1869 concerning the petition of a wealthy landowner named José Bonifacio Roxas to establish a chaplaincy in the barrio of Looc, Nasugbu, Batangas. The papers on this case were taken from the Ayala Archives in Makati, which had copied them from the archives of the archbishopric in Intramuros. As a matter of fact, an examination of the latter would undoubtedly yield other documents on Burgos still unknown to local historians.

The second series of documents in this article were taken from the Archivo del Servicio Histórico Militar located at No. 9 Martínez de Alcalá in Madrid some six years ago when the author last visited Spain in search of documents on Father Burgos. These documents supplement those published earlier by the two Jesuits, Rev. John N. Schumacher and Nicholas P. Cushner in Philippine Studies.1

Don José Bonifacio Roxas was one of the leading businessmen of the country during the second half of the last century. His father, Domingo Roxas, an opulent creole who was persecuted by the administration for his libertarian ideas, was suspected of complicity in the abortive revolt of Andrés Novales in 1823, in the uprising of Apolinario de la Cruz in 1841, and in the subsequent mutiny of the Tayabas regiment in Manila two years later. As a result he perished from an

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1 17 (1969), 457-529.
illness while incarcerated in the dungeons of Fort Santiago. Don Domingo had purchased the Calatagan and Nasugbu estates in Batangas, and the former was ceded to his daughter, Margarita who married Antonio de Ayala, and the latter to Don Pepe, as José Bonifacio was called by his friends. A third child, Mariano, inherited other properties located in Laguna.

Don Pepe possessed his father's business acumen, but wisely shied away from politics. He developed the hacienda in Nasugbu, improved the sugar mill by importing the latest machineries from England and France, and subsequently purchased the former Jesuit hacienda in Makati, which has become the flourishing business-residential community of today. Part of the Nasugbu hacienda was the barrio of Looc, near the Cavite boundary, which could be reached only over mountain trails or by banca around the Punta de Fuego. As a good Catholic, he wanted the residents of Looc to enjoy the benefits of religion.

Thus, on Sept. 8, 1868, he petitioned the church authorities for the establishment of a parish chaplaincy in that barrio, promising to build a house for the priest with stipend of 240 pesos a year. The parish priest of Nasugbu, Father Melecio Zalvidea, indorsed the petition favorably but added that a suitable chapel with all religious implements, a cemetery, and a salary of 360 pesos a year should be given. Rev. Pedro Leyba, the Forane Vicar, concurred and the case was referred to Father Burgos for final recommendation. Burgos substantially agreed with the parish priest, although he toned down the conditions and reduced the stipend to 300 pesos.

Don Pepe agreed to Burgos' terms, but on condition that once the number of tributes in Looc increased from 240 to 500, his financial obligation would cease, and that the 300 pesos he would give annually would be reduced by whatever sum the state would give the chaplain. Archbishop Gregorio Melitón Martínez objected to the terms of Don Pepe, and as a result the latter on October 6, 1869, withdrew his petition. Thus did the inhabitants of Looc fail to get a chapel and a priest for their spiritual needs.

The indorsement of Father Burgos follows:

Government Stamped Paper
Years 1868 and 1869
Indigents

Your Illustrious Excellency:

The undersigned fiscal, in compliance with the preceding request of Y.I.E., has the honor to submit his report as follows:
Don José Bonifacio Rojas, owner of Hacienda Looc, a barrio in the town of Nasugbu, Batangas, in his respectful and reasonable request dated September 18, 1868, which is the subject of this case, makes known to Y.I.E. the need of providing the inhabitants of that barrio — which presently consists of 240 double tributes — with a secular chaplain who will administer to their spiritual needs, especially during the last moments of life.

The number of residents therein, the great difficulties that have to be met in order to bring to that barrio the solace of religion — whether by land or by sea — all form valid reasons that have obliged Mr. Rojas to direct to Y.I.E. the said petition.

And to influence your generous feelings in favor of his petition, this gentleman has promised to give the said chaplain an endowment of 240 pesos annually besides a house to live in.

The petition has been forwarded to the learned parish priest of Nasugbu, who found it in line with his own desires after relating extensively the obstacles and difficulties in communications between Looc and the mother town, and he has pleaded with Y.I.E. for a chaplain in Looc in the same manner as that now done in the hacienda of Calatagan.

I am forwarding to Y.I.E. the requirements which he believes should be met before granting the petition; conditions which the undersigned fiscal will take up later.

This petition has been referred to the Vical Forane, who has expressed his own opinion, in view of the reasons advanced by Mr. Rojas and the parish priest, agreeing that the 20 pesos monthly the petitioner has promised to give are not sufficient for a decent living.

In view of these recommendations, and knowing of the tremendous distances that separate barrios from their mother towns, the difficulties in communications because of wide rivers or poor and rugged roads making it impossible to reach destinations at certain times of the year, — not only by hearsay but having actually accompanied Y.I.E. in diocesan visits
the undersigned fiscal is of the belief that Y.I.E. can accede to the pious desires of Don José Bonifacio Rojas by placing in the barrio of Looc a priest with permanent residence; because as Mr. Rojas says it takes four hours on horse from Nasugbu, and that the trip is highly hazardous and difficult, according to the learned parish priest.

But we raise the question as to whether said cleric would be a coadjutor of the parish priest of Nasugbu or a curate chaplain independent of the latter, without being canonically separate but vested with the necessary powers for the proper spiritual administration, as if he were tending his own parish.

It would be more convenient to place in Looc a pastor in the role of a curate chaplain independent of the parish of Nasugbu, and not a simple coadjutor subordinated to the latter.

The reason for this, as Y.I.E. knows, is that there are many barrios in the same situation as Looc which for even more compelling reasons could ask for a pastor to administer to their spiritual needs, and there would be no alternative except to grant their request. Nevertheless, to give in to their demands would be impossible, because the insufficiency of priests would not permit to have one in each of these barrios, nor is it possible for the coadjutors in towns to reside in the barrios: practically all the towns have six or seven times more inhabitants than the barrios, towns which in a few cases are lucky enough to have three assistants to each parish priest.

Nevertheless, without touching these inconveniences, Y.I.E. could name a curate chaplain; that is, a cleric who would not be a parish priest but who would have the powers for the cure of souls.

The reason for this is very simple. For such appointments certain requirements have to be met, which are for greater part impossible for the barrios to fulfill; with the result that it would be doubly difficult to accede to one but not to others who would sometimes have greater reasons for granting their requests resulting in injustices and favoritism.
The institution of curate chaplaincies in the category indicated is furthermore based on a law of the Indies. Law II, Book I, Title I of the Laws of the Indies states: "Provided our Viceroy and Governors believe that the natives working at the textile and sugar mills lack religious instruction, and that by reason of distance to have them go elsewhere for such instruction is an inadequate remedial measure; and it being deemed convenient that their religious knowledge be regulated; and provided further that their prelate is in agreement, we hereby command that an order be issued stating that said instruction be given them at the expense of the grantee-owners of such mills."

It is true that this law speaks only of the sites of textile and sugar mills; however, considering that the preceding Law 10 — which states generally that in distributed areas and dwelling places of natives and other places without income, a priest should be installed in accordance with the royal patronage, and that the Christian doctrine be taught—cannot be interpreted so literally so as to exclude areas where land is cultivated, or land which nowadays is devoted to other industries, since the purpose of the law was to encourage natives to work by granting them the immense advantage of not having to travel to distant places for the spiritual benefits of religion.

The conditions that should serve as the basis of the grant of a curate chaplain asked for by Mr. Rojas should be as follows: That the owner of the hacienda, whoever he may be, promise in writing to assign to the chaplain at least 300 pesos annually or 25 pesos monthly. That he build a chapel proportionate to the number of inhabitants of the barrio, which will include all that is needed for religious functions, particularly in the holy sacrifice of the mass; and it should have the appearance and security corresponding to such holy and respectable purpose. That he will build for the curate chaplain a comfortable and ample house on a lot which can yield rice for the priest and his dependents. That he should cede another piece of land properly located sufficient for a cemetery, and to leave around the chapel space sufficient for its atrium,
with the latter at a convenient distance from the nipa house. That all these conditions be made to the satisfaction of the Vicar Forane, who will take care of informing Y.I.E. about them.

These are the necessary conditions, Y.I.E., which in the undersigned's humble opinion are requisite, and all the rest should be considered superfluous and inopportune as indicated by the parish priest of Nasugbu.

With the above conditions, and subject always to the opinion of Y.I.E., this fiscal is of the belief that Y.I.E. can dispose of favorably the petition of Mr. Rojas. But a word of caution, and it should be in writing, that notwithstanding compliance with the above conditions, no owner of the hacienda should believe he has the right to intervene in affairs concerning the salvation of souls; nor in private affairs, or in the administration and care of the things ceded for the service of the faith; otherwise such meddling will produce continuous grounds for serious conflicts and great scandals.

Notwithstanding these views, Y.I.E. with a more learned criterion can determine whatever pleases him best.

Manila, April 4, 1869.

*Exc. and Ill. Sir,*

(Sgd) DR. JOSÉ BURGOS

II

The suppression of the Cavite mutiny of 1872 was effected in a quick and ruthless manner. Lt. Col. Luis Roig de Lluz, in his diary of operations dated Jan. 23, 1872, and kept in folder "1872-1-1-1-15" at the Archivo del Servicio Histórico Militar, stated that on the morning of the day following the uprising, at 8 a.m. Sunday, Jan. 21, two native regiments under the leadership of the Commanding General Felipe Ginovés left Manila aboard three commercial vessels. While these ships rounded the point at Cañacao to land their troops, the gunboat *Bulusan* kept firing on the fort where the rebels had entrenched themselves. By 10 o'clock the loyalist troops had landed and entered the town of Cavite. Infantry columns, which had assembled on Calle Real (the main thoroughfare), then marched to the headquarters of the Princesa 7 regiment, but found it empty. Loyalist troops quickly surrounded the fort and left no avenue of escape open.
An hour later, the auxiliary vessel Filipino, also from Manila, landed its artillery pieces, and began firing at the fort for all that day and night. Twenty loyalist guards were placed at the pier, known as *panaderos*, in order to prevent rebels from escaping through the sea. Nine of these rebels were caught that night trying to escape by that route. By nightfall of that day, rifle fire from the rebels in the fort had diminished, while their cannons had ceased firing, presumably from lack of ammunition.

The assault on the fortress started at dawn the next day, Monday. The emplacement of the artillery was done by 5:30 a.m. and firing commenced at sunrise. Four cannons controlled the two avenues of approach to the fort, while two others fired directly on the thick wooden door of the fort to demolish it. Meanwhile, two infantry columns advanced to the fort; one column carried scaling ladders which were placed against the walls as soon as the artillery attack had ceased.

Loyalist forces entered the fort's portals as if they were on parade. They advanced to the tunes of martial music, and the assault began with shouts of “Viva España”. The punitive practice of *paso a cuchillo* then followed. All rebel soldiers who did not surrender immediately by throwing down their arms were bayonetted or killed on the spot. Some 30 to 40 of the insurgents died this way. Around 40 others were made prisoners, while a few succeeded in escaping by hiding in dark recesses of the fort. In the room to left of the entrance of the fort, the loyalists found the wife of an artillery lieutenant wounded in the arm, while a priest from the San Juan de Dios hospital was found unharmed, “whose life was undoubtedly respected because of the habit he wore.” A company of infantry was immediately drawn from the two regiments to tour the province to insure that peace once more reigned and to reinforce local garrisons wherever needed. The loyalists forces suffered three dead and 18 wounded.

By noon of January 23, all the rebels who were still alive were brought back to Manila aboard the commercial vessels to face a summary court martial. The suppression of the Cavite mutiny had been brought to a successful end, concluded Col. Roig.

In the same folder is a report of Governor General Rafael Izquierdo to the Minister of War, dated Jan. 23, 1872, giving what he believed were the reasons for the mutiny:

From the summary of information received — that is, from the declarations made before the fiscal — it seems definite that the insurrection was motivated and prepared by
the native clergy, by the mestizos and native lawyers, and by those known here as abogadillos. Some are residents of Manila, others from Cavite, and some from the nearby provinces.

The instigators, to carry out their criminal project, protested against the injustice of the government in not paying the provinces for their tobacco crop, and against the usury that some [officials] practise in [handling] documents that the Finance department gives crop owners who have to sell them at a loss. They encouraged the rebellion by protesting what they called the injustice of having obliged the workers in the Cavite arsenal to pay tribute starting January 1 [1872] and to render personal service, from which they were formerly exempted.

To seduce the native troops, they resorted to superstition with which the indios are so prone to believe; persuading them that the Chief of State (hari) would be an ecclesiastic and the rest of the clergy who backed the uprising would celebrate daily for its success. Thus the rebellion could not fail because God was with them; and those who would not revolt they would kill immediately. Taking advantage of the ignorance of those classes and the propensity of the indio to steal, they offered [to those who revolted] the wealth of the Spaniards and of the regular clergy, employment and ranks in the army; and to this effect they said that fifteen native battalions would be created, in which the soldiers who revolted would have jobs as officers and chiefs. The lawyers and abogadillos would direct the affairs of government, of the administration and of justice.

Up to now it has not been clearly determined if they planned to establish a monarchy or a republic, because the indios have no word in their language to describe this different form of government, whose head in Tagalog would be called hari; but it turns out that they would place at the head of the government a priest; and there were great probabilities —nay, a certainty — that the head selected would be D. José Burgos, or D. Jacinto Zamora, parish priests of S. Pedro of Manila.
All the Spaniards, including the friars, would be executed except for the women; and their belongings confiscated. Foreigners would be respected.

This uprising has roots, and with them were affiliated to a great extent the regiments of infantry and artillery, many civilians and a large number of mestizos, indios and some ilustrados from the provinces near the capital.

To start the revolution, they planned to set fire to the district of Tondo. Once the fire was set and while the authorities were busy putting it out, the regiment of artillery with the help of the part of the infantry would seize Fort Santiago of this capital and [they would then] fire cannons to inform the rebels of Cavite [of their success]. The rebels in Cavite counted on the artillery detachment that occupied the fort and on the navy helped by 500 natives led by the pardoned leader Camerino. This person and his men, located at the town of Bacoor and separated from the fort of San Felipe by a small arm of the sea, would cross the water and reach the fort where they would find arms and ammunition.

The rebels [in Cavite] made the signals agreed upon by means of lanterns, but the native civilians [in Bacoor] although they tried it, failed because of the vigilance of the [Spanish] navy that had placed there a gunboat and armed vessels.

Loyalists who went to arrest the parish priest of Bacoor found an abandoned vessel loaded with arms, including carbines and revolvers.

The uprising should have started in Manila at midnight abetted by those in Cavite, but the rebels of this city went ahead of time. The civic-military Governor of Cavite and the

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2 Casimiro Camerino had led an agrarian revolt several years earlier, and had been pardoned by Gov. la Torre; he was made a leader of about 30 of his men who served as guides to the army in chasing outlaws in Cavite. On Feb. 19, 1872, the military court found him guilty of complicity in the mutiny and sentenced him to death by the garrote. Ten of his companions were sentenced to jail for ten years.
commander of Regiment 7 took very timely precautions; they knew how to keep the soldiers loyal (although these had been compromised) and behaved with valor and gallantry, obliging the rebels to take refuge in the fort of San Felipe.

Such is, Your Excellency, the plan of the rebels, those who guided them, and the means they counted upon for its realization. For a long time now, through confidential information and others of a vaguer character, I have been told that since 1869—taking advantage of a group that had left behind plans for an uprising, but was not carried out because of the earthquake of 1863—there existed in Manila a junta or center that sought and found followers; and that as a pretext they had established a society for the teaching of arts and trades. Months ago I suspected it indirectly, giving an account to Your Excellency in my confidential report No. 113 dated August 1, [1871] to which Your Excellency has not yet replied.

It has also been said that this center or junta received inspiration from Madrid, where newspapers of advanced ideas flourish; to sustain them subscriptions are [locally] solicited; in effect, newspapers such as El Eco Filipino were sent here from Madrid, which were distributed by persons now imprisoned, and whose articles thundered against everything that can be found here.

As in the case of my worthy predecessor, I have continuously received anonymous letters, but because I was confident that I could put down and punish any uprising, I gave no credit [to these reports] in order not to cause alarm; and instead continued a vigilant watch wherever possible within the limited means at my command. I had everything ready [for any untoward possibility], taking into account the limited peninsular force which composes the army.

3 Father Pedro Pelaez was pinpointed as the leader of this group of conspirators. He was the forerunner of the three martyred priests, and would undoubtedly have been brought to trial had he not died at the altar of the Manila Cathedral during the earthquake of 1863.

4 See my article, “El Eco Filipino,” in the Philippine Colophon (July-December 1965), pp. 3-5.
The trial of those suspected of having taken part in the Cavite mutiny proceeded rapidly. On Jan. 22, Izquierdo reported to the Overseas Minister by cable that the following were imprisoned in Fort Santiago and held incommunicado: the priests José Burgos, Agustín Mendoza, Mariano Gómez, and Feliciano Gómez; likewise the civilians Joaquín Pardo de Tavera, Enrique Paraysó, Antonio Regidor, José María Basa and Pío Basa. "I am personally convinced that they alone are the authors of the suppressed rebellion in Cavite," he said. If found guilty, he favored their exile to the Marianas. "It is indispensable and urgent to extirpate from the root the focus [of treason] of these dozen wretches, the only ones who do not see with pleasure the Spanish domination. It is urgent and necessary to deport them, the only ones capable of seducing the unwary and of producing conflicts like the recent suppressed uprising."

The Gaceta de Manila, official government organ, in its issue of Monday, Jan. 22, announced: "Inhabitants of the Philippines. On the night of the 20th, a handful of deluded [persons] from the artillery and navy who garrisoned the Cavite arsenal and its fortress, seduced and deceived by a gang of traitors, hapless ingrates to noble Spain, lacking in their sacred oaths and committing outrages and murders, raised the standard of rebellion against the mother country in the said fortress." The rebels, barely totaling 200, had killed the commandant, his wife and other officers, the report added. "The banner of the rebels flew over that fortress for a period no longer than necessary to organize the [loyalist] forces of attack." The relief troops were led by the Segundo Cabo [Commanding General] Felipe Genovés, aided by the naval forces under the frigate Captain, Gen. Manuel Carballo. The loyalist troops took the rebels by assault at 6 a.m. of January 22. The mutiny had lasted exactly a day and a half, twice as long as the attempted coup d'état of Captain Andrés Novales in 1823.

Retribution on the native troops involved in the mutiny was instantaneous. John Foreman, the British historian, relates that when a grizzled native soldier who had joined the revolt refused to shout "Viva España" shortly after it was suppressed, the Spanish colonel of the reinforcements shot him dead on the spot. The Gaceta on Jan. 28 printed an announcement from the Governor General that 41 of the Cavite soldiers had been sentenced to death, but the penalty on 28 had been remitted to life imprisonment. Of the reinforcements,
18 had been killed in the assault and five wounded.\textsuperscript{7} The execution by gunfire of the 13 rebels had taken place at Bagumbayan field in Manila.

The trial of the leaders of the insurrection was held during the first 10 or 12 days of February. Even before the Council of War, or military court martial, was held, the Governor General was requested by the families of the accused to grant clemency, led by Archbishop Gregorio Melitón Martínez in his letter of January 30th, which has appeared in \textit{Philippine Studies}.\textsuperscript{8} But Izquierdo turned a deaf ear; if he had believed that exile was sufficient punishment, his views changed after the trial. Could the reactionary elements have been responsible for the change? He even supported the court's recommendation that Fathers Burgos, Gómez and Zamora "be degraded", but the Archbishop, influenced by the liberal Bishop Francisco Gainza, O.P., of Nueva Caceres\textsuperscript{9} refused to do so; and as a pretext alleged that it was necessary to see the records of the trial before the church could take such a drastic step.

The Archbishop's letter, in reply to that of Izquierdo, follows in the original Spanish together with an English translation:\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Arzobispado de Manila} Num. 4

\begin{center}
\textit{Excmo. Sor = Abrumado por el profundo dolor que me ha causado la lectura de la sentencia adjunta al oficio de V = E = que acabo de recibir, debo manifestarle con el debido respeto que para proceder a la degradación de los Presbíteros D. José Burgos, D. Jacinto Zamora, y D. Mariano Gómez, condenados a muerte por aquella, juzgo indispensable tener conocimiento completo de la causa. Al efecto he de merecer disponga V = E = que se me comunique el proceso instruido por el Consejo de Guerra, en cuya vista podrá formar por criterio propio un juicio acerado, cual lo requiere la imposición de una pena, la más grave que consigna el derecho canónico. Pero se dará, Excmo. Sor., al religioso pueblo Filipino el consternador espectáculo de ver ajusticiar a tres Sacerdotes?}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{7} These figures do not tally with that of Col. Roig. The \textit{Gaceta} probably erred.
\textsuperscript{8} 17 (1969), 516-521.
\textsuperscript{9} Domingo Abella, \textit{Bikol Annals} (Manila, 1964), I, p. 178.
\textsuperscript{10} Marked "4-9-1-14" in the folder found at the Archivo del Servicio Histórico Militar.
Si la ejecución de tan severa sentencia se hubiese efectuado a la raíz del suceso, cuando todavía obraba sobre los animos tan terrible impresion de alevosos asesinatos, y no podía determinarse hasta donde se estendía la acción de los insurrectos, el sentimiento patriótico de conservar la integridad del territorio español, y el instinto de la propia conservación, hubieran impedido oir las supplicas de la misericordia. Mas estinguída la insurreccion, serenados ya los animos, y asegurada la tranquilidad, ¿no me será permitido implorar por segunda vez de V = E= que se mitigue la terrible pena de muerte? Así espero lo hará V = E = cuyo generoso corazón se aviene mejor a los sentimientos de misericordia que al rigor de la justicia. = Dios guarde a V = E = muchos años.

Manila, 15 de Febrero de 1872. =

Excmo. Sor. =
Gregorio, Arzobispo

Excmo. Sor. Gobernador Superior
Civil de estas islas =

[TRANSLATION]

Archbishopric of Manila

Your Excellency:

Overwhelmed by the profound sorrow caused by a reading of the sentence accompanying Y.E.'s communication which I have just received, I am compelled to make it known to you with due respect that to proceed with the degradation of the priests D. José Burgos, D. Jacinto Zamora and D. Mariano Goméz, condemned to death, I deem it indispensable to have a complete knowledge of the case. I beg that a copy of the record of the proceedings of the Council of War be furnished me, as its perusal would enable me to form a correct opinion essential to cases wherein the severest penalty provided for by Canon Law is imposed. But, Y.E., will the devout Filipino people be given the terrifying spectacle of the execution of three priests? If the execution of such a severe sentence had been carried out following the event, when the terrible shock
of the treacherous assassinations were still fresh in the public mind, and the extent of the work of the rebels could not be determined, the patriotic desire of preserving the integrity of the Spanish territory, and the instinct of self-preservation, would have hindered heeding the pleas for mercy. But once the insurrection was extinguished, spirits once more serene, and peace and order assured, may I not be permitted to implore for a second time of Y.E. to mitigate the terrible sentence of death? This I hope Y.E. will do, whose generous heart is more attuned to the sentiments of mercy than to the harshness of justice. God save Y.E. for many years.

Manila, February 15, 1872.

I have the honor to be, Y.E.

GREGORIO, Archbishop

To H.E. the Supreme Civil Governor of these Islands.

The next document in the folder, marked No. 5 and dated a day later, was the reply of Izquierdo denying the Archbishop’s request, claiming that the sentence must be served despite the refusal of the hierarchy to unfrock the three condemned priests, and ordered their execution for 8 o’clock in the morning of Feb. 17. Later on that day of the execution he reported to Madrid that a certain Francisco Saldua, a contractor for the naval base in Cavite, had likewise been garroted. Saldua was said to have been promised clemency in the event he became a state witness, and the news had spread among the population that he had perjured himself to escape punishment, implicating the three priests; but the military authorities decreed that he share the fate of his co-accused.

11 Contained in the folder marked “4-9-1-14”.

12 For the Filipino version of the mutiny and its aftermath read Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, Los Sucesos de 1872, (Manila, 1911); Edmundo Plauchut, “La Algarada Caviteña de 1872”, written in 1877 and reprinted in Manila in 1916; Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Reseña Historia de Filipinas, (Manila, 1906); and Foreman, op. cit. Under the Spanish military law the adverse testimony of one witness was sufficient to convict the accused. A generation later, a Filipino court martial condemned Andrés Bonifacio on the testimony of a subordinate, Pedro Giron, who had turned state witness.
Izquierdo believed it was necessary to fulfill the sentence of the military court to serve as "a salutary lesson in the future to those who intend to rebel against the integrity of the Spanish territory," and added sanctimoniously that "it has been painful to my heart to remain firm and inexorable in denying them the pardon asked of me."

In another report to the Overseas Minister at this time, Izquierdo recommended that "Antonio Vivencio del Rosario, a Chinese mestizo of Laguna, be kept under surveillance"; and that he was "holding the appointment of Cristobal Regidor as civil governor and judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, inasmuch as the suspect was the brother of one of the principal instigators [Antonio Regidor] of the Cavite Mutiny."13

Nine days after the execution of the three priests, Izquierdo wrote to the Minister of War stating that he was sending aboard the frigate Chica the prisoners Maximo Inocencio (who was later to die as one of the 13 Cavite martyrs in 1896) Enrique Paraiso, Crisanto de los Reyes, Cleto Yanci and Corporal Rafael Caldo, so that they could serve their sentences in the penal colony of Ceuta, Africa.14 He warned that a careful surveillance be made of Inocencio and de los Reyes because, as they were reputedly rich, they might try to escape by bribing their guards.

The belief that the mutiny was an excuse to punish the native clergy and residents who were dissatisfied with the Spanish regime was supported by the great number arrested and imprisoned. On March 12, Izquierdo reported to the Overseas Minister that Maximo M. Paterno, a rich Chinese mestizo contractor and father of the Paterno brothers, had asked for a pardon from the King and was willing to put up a bond for his release and guaranteed for his future good behavior.15 Izquierdo also reported that on March 8 the following had been imprisoned for treason:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Clergy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balbino Mauricio</td>
<td>José Ma. Guevara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramón Maurente</td>
<td>Agustín Mendoza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Ma. Basa</td>
<td>Feliciano Gómez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toribio del Pilar</td>
<td>Pedro Dandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justo Tuason</td>
<td>Anacletio Desiderio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicente del Rosario</td>
<td>Miguel Laza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atty. Pedro Camillo</td>
<td>Mariano Sevilla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Contained in the folder marked "4-9-1-14".
14 In the folder marked "4-9-1-14".
15 Folder marked "4-9-1-14".
The following were accused of sedition: Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, Pio Ma. Basa, Valentín Cosea, Manuel Darvia, Bernabe Lovela, and 30 others. Ten of the more than 60 arrested were absolved for clear lack of evidence. The majority, after incarceration, were exiled either to the Marianas, Jolo or the Spanish possessions in Africa.

In a subsequent report dated May 21, Izquierdo said that he was sending to Madrid the proceedings of the courts martial with this observation: “The insurrection in Cavite was nothing but one of the many [uprisings] made that leave no trace, and which produce a disturbance only at the moment of its explosion. No, Your Excellency, the events referred to were the result of a combined plan by local and foreign elements, and by elements as important as the native clergy, lawyers and ecclesiastical persons residing in Manila, who in the majority took part in the conspiracy; in this the disaffected navy was largely implicated, and it was very fortunate for our country that the most irresponsible element in such an infamous movement was the native army.”

How did the enemies of Father Burgos succeed in implicating him with the Cavite mutiny? According to Manuel Artigas, the historian, a mysterious secular priest was seen going around Cavite province and the arsenal presumably laying down the plans for the uprising. Witnesses — undoubtedly false — testified that it was the magistral canon of the cathedral Father Burgos who had made these trips. A certain José Templo, 53, of Lipa, Batangas, testifying before the U.S.-Philippine Commission on Sept. 24, 1900, in Lipa, said that the three martyred Filipino priests were the “victims of the hatred of the vengeful friars, Fathers Abaya, Buendia and others difficult to mention.” Who were these friars and to what monastic order they belonged has been impossible to trace after the lapse of nearly a century.

The voluminous records of the 1872 trials were unfortunately removed from the Archivo and forwarded to the confidential files of the army, either at the Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar at No.4 Fortuny, Madrid, or at the Archivo General Militar in Segovia. For the last decade, Philippine Ambassadors Leon Ma. Guerrero and Luis González have been vainly importuning the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War to secure a microfilm copy of these documents. Rumors are that they have been kept in the same file as the court

16 Folder marked “1872-1-1-1-15”.
martial of Generalissimo Francisco Franco held by the Republican Government at the start of the civil war in Spain, and therefore absolutely inaccessible. At any rate, the official Spanish attitude is: why publish such documents when it will only resurrect anti-Spanish feelings among present-day Filipinos? Nevertheless, Dean Antonio M. Molina of the University of Santo Tomás, who spent months of research in Spanish archives some years ago, told me that he had been able somehow to secure a microfilm negative of these records; and that he hoped to have them published by 1972.