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Reynaldo Silvestre

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Imperialism and Filipino Nationalism

REYNALDO SILVESTRE

Imperialism and nationalism are two terms quite widely used in our modern times. Used as they are almost exclusively for the propagandistic activities and aims of competing ideologies that presently confront the world order, these terms have become suffused and overlaid with emotional meanings that becloud the vision of both the scholar and his reader. Thus, imperialism is now regarded as something entirely evil by those who are or have been its objects, while those who are or have been, or, having plans of being imperialists regard imperialism as entirely justifiable, if not entirely good. On the other hand, nationalism, or specifically the *mobilizing energy* of nationalism, has been exploited so often as a vehicular force by movements and ideologies and individual 'strongmen', that nationalism and its manifestations have become suspect in the view of western democracies. This is because "nationalism is not only a fact; it is a power. Few things in the modern world has been able, as nationalism has to release such wild energies from multitudes previously passive and inert; and to drive them to attempt and achieve projects previously thought to be beyond the bounds of possibility."¹ Hence, in the West "nationalism is now often denounced as being a divisive and anarchistic force — bad enough at any time and intolerable in the atomic era. From this the moral is drawn . . . that the Asian and African peoples should resign themselves to recognition that the world has arrived at a time of interdependence which renders a demand for sovereignty absurd."²

1. Horacio de la Costa, S.J., *The Background of Nationalism and Other Essays* (Manila: La Solidaridad Publishing House, 1965), p. 9.

2. Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February, 1960), p. 24.

The suspicion, then, with its concomitant of overt suppression, threats of aid withdrawal, tariff barricading, and 'quota' reductions including simple name-calling, have touched so sorely on nationalist nerves that they in turn over-react with damage to both concepts of national honor and national property. This over-reaction, however, does not dissipate, nor does it mitigate the force of attacks on it. On the contrary, the 'righteous indignation' of nationalists merely satisfies the critics of nationalism as to the correctness of their actions against it.

On this level, therefore, we find nationalism caught in a pincer movement of deadly power: the slashing blade of exploitation from the extreme left, with the equally slashing blade of over-reacting suspicion and fear from the extreme right. The lot of the modern nationalist is an unhappy one — domination from its friends and exploitation from its enemies.

However, it would be ill-considered to make the facile conclusion that imperialism is the evil counterpoise to the 'good' of nationalism. For considered objectively as expressions of historical force, we come to the general thesis of this paper, that imperialism and nationalism are facets of the same historical phenomenon — the will of a nation-state to realize its ultimate fulfillment in national power.

The preservation of the national character, and more particularly, the development of the creative faculties is the supreme task of the nation. In order to fulfill this task, the nation needs power that will protect it against other nations and will stimulate its own development. In other words, the nation needs a state. "One nation — one state" is thus the political postulate of nationalism; the nation state is its ideal.³

But though the nation needs the power of the state for the sake of its preservation and development, the state needs the national community in order to maintain and increase its power. "The feeling of affinity, the participation in a common culture and tradition, the awareness of a common destiny, which are of the essence of national sentiment and patriotism are transformed by nationalism into a political mysticism in which the national community and the state become superhuman entities, apart from and superior to their individual members, entitled to abso-

3. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (4th ed., New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), p. 155.

lute loyalty and, like the idols of old, deserving of the sacrifice of men and goods."⁴ However, the distinction is carefully made that for nationalism to coincide with imperialism it is necessary for a given nation to have attacked, even though abortively, another nation for the main purpose of acquiring material advantage from that nation — whether in terms of tribute, territory, 'open ports' or the like. It serves quite conveniently at this point to offer the examples of imperialist Nazi Germany and its 'Nationalist Socialist Party', and the Tojo War Party of imperialist Japan with its Zen-Buddhist ideological core.

It is at this point that the second general assumption of this paper may be stated: that imperialism, involving, as it usually does the conquest of a weaker by a more superior culture, historically leaves behind it in its wake institutions that accelerate the development of the conquered culture to the level of the conquering one. The acceleration may be relatively slow, for the conquering nation preserves its superiority for a time counted in generations, but nevertheless the acceleration is there, and its tendency is to protect a development in terms of the conquering culture. Thus, Indonesia is developing along the cultural lines of Holland; India, Ceylon, and the rest of the British Commonwealth pursue British cultural ideals; while the Philippines is 'westernized' in Hispano-Yankee terms.

NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

To clarify our discussion, it would be useful to define nationalism and imperialism, at the same time laying down the conditions for their existence and growth.

"Several generations of scholars," comments one writer on nationalism, "have devoted their efforts to the task of clarifying the meaning of nationalism. Despite their labors they have not been able to achieve a unanimity of definition."⁵ Snyder tried to explain what was common in the definitions of the different branches of learning but it soon became evident that national-

4. *Ibid.*

5. Louis Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 4.

ism has been defined in a rather condensed form, partly from the point of view of that particular field.⁶ .

This mode of attack has given us a wealth of empirical data, as well as excellent techniques for the qualitative recognition of characteristic features of nationalism, configurations of its symptoms, or typical sequences of nationalistic behavior. This approach, however, has not . . . been able to link nationalism with any accuracy with the results of other social sciences. Not only was there some mutual ignoring of results behind the safe barriers of departmental boundaries, but the many serious attempts to utilize the other social sciences ran all too often into incompatibilities between the structures of the concepts used by each.⁷

This same incompatibility of concepts has hampered progress along the second broad line of attack:

the treatment of some limited features of nationalism as particular cases within the broad field of each special science. Good work was done on national languages as a problem in linguistics; on national settlement patterns as a problem in geography; on national governments and international relations as a subject of political science; and on 'monetary nationalism' as a problem in monetary theory. Yet the pieces of the puzzle remained unassembled, and . . . very often did not fit together.⁸

The inevitable consequence was that nationalism came to be widely accepted as a mere 'state of mind' with doubtful tangible

6. For a historical and critical understanding of nationalism, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), especially part two; Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955). A useful survey of data from European history is offered by Boyd Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955).

Other aspects or problems of nationalism are illuminated in Ines Claude, *National Minorities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955); John Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government* (London: Longmans, 1960); and in Margaret Perham, *The Colonial Reckoning* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962).

Psychological aspects of nationalism are treated in Leonard Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) and much of the recent relevant literature from the behavioral sciences are surveyed and summarized in Otto Klineberg, *The Human Dimension in International Relations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964).

7. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (2nd paperback ed., Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), pp. 15-16.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

roots. "Nationalism is a proud and boastful habit of mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hostile attitude toward other nations; it admits that individual citizens of one's country may do wrong, but it insists that one's nationality or national state is always right."⁹ This type of nationalism is easily recognized "by the tremendous arrogance inherent in its self-concentration, which dares to measure a people, its past and present, by the yardstick of exalted inner qualities and inevitably rejects its visible existence, tradition, institutions and culture."¹⁰ Hence, it is "the driving force behind continental imperialism"¹¹ and the "precise perversion of a religion which made God choose one nation."¹²

However, this identification of nationalism as a new tribalism on account of its exclusiveness, is at the very least, questionable for "exclusiveness is common to all human groups and the two are not the same, nor even related phenomena."¹³ It is also important to note that neither Hayes nor Arendt who have dichotomized nationalism into 'aggressive' and 'moderate' varieties have ever attempted to restrict the term to the former.

Similar arguments could be advanced against another dichotomy, the one drawn between patriotism and nationalism which describes the former as 'holy' and 'natural', the latter as 'wicked' and 'artificial'. To Saint-Simon, nationalism is nothing else "but national egoism, ferocious and absurd"¹⁴ and patriotism in con-

9. Carlton Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 275. In a later work, apparently influenced by near contact with World War I, he wrote in the preface of *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), that what he had dealt with was the "extreme militant type of contemporary nationalism, its nature, its historical rise, and its inherent danger for the future."

10. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1951), p. 227.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

13. Benjamin Akzin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson University Press, 1964), p. 75.

14. Cf. Jacob Talmon, *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), p. 279. See also the similar views of Thorstein Veblen and John Robertson in W. Sulzbach, *National Consciousness* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), p. 11. For an interesting discus-

temporary Russia has been described as “. . . a unique and exceptionally intense form of nationalism . . . often mushrooming into chauvinism and messianism.”¹⁵ As to the artificial nature of nationalism Michels has the following to say: only “love of one’s homeplace . . . springs spontaneously from a personal concrete and close of familiarity of life and experience” while patriotism “with its comprehensive feelings rising far above homely customs and manners is an *a priori* abstraction.”¹⁶

But those who harp on the artificial nature of nationalism fail to see “that this kind of ‘artificiality’ is nothing artificial. The same assertion could be made . . . of any ideology or social philosophy which ever got hold of any segment of mankind.”¹⁷ And those who insist on the distinction are oblivious to the fact that since the beginning of the nineteenth century, patriotism has been an integral part of nationalism and cannot be meaningfully separated from it.¹⁸ Thus, Doob characterized patriotism as a ‘psychological state’ consisting of predispositions (feelings, attitudes, beliefs) and specific demands, and nationalism as manifestation of this state ‘in action’.¹⁹

Generally, then, critics of the above dichotomies point out that the lines drawn between the ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’

sion on the usage of this word in the early eighteenth century, see Robert Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America 1760-1800* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), chp. 1.

15. Frederick Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. viii; 4; 11.

16. Robert Michels, *First Lectures in Political Sociology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 156.

17. Akzin, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

18. See Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, *Nation Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 27-33; Sir Reginald Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism: A Study* (London: Collins, 1954), p. xiii; Harold Guetzkow, *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization* (Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1955); Luigi Sturzo, *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1946), p. 5; and Bernard Joseph, *Nationality: Its Nature and Problems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 20-21.

19. Doob, *op. cit.*

aspects of nationalism are at best tenuous,²⁰ and that distinctions between 'healthy' and 'pathological' nationalism are "scarcely applicable today when nearly all peoples have become nationalistic."²¹ While nationalism has become "a dirty word signifying at best a pathological variant of patriotism and at worst a reactionary brand of authoritarianism," this emphasis on aggressive nationalism obscures the fact that "not only most of the nationalist movements of early nineteenth-century Europe, but also many later ones, and a large proportion of the expressions of nationalism of all periods in England, the United States, and recently, Latin America do not represent this type."²² Besides, there is no way of measuring 'excessive' from 'reasonable' nationalism, hence, no meaningful distinction between the 'normal' sentiment of nationality and the 'pathological state' of nationalism can be established. Finally, "there is no reason to assume that if the nation were to lose its hold, the next stage would work any appreciable advance toward a more desirable world."²³

But nationalism no doubt has remained a catalyst for national integration and an inspiring force. "It makes for national unity and . . . acts as a curb upon the superior instincts of individuals, and of classes and professions."²⁴ But while optimists may feel that this undesirable 'state of mind' could be wiped out by force or persuasion, and that then the way toward lasting and harmonious world order could be achieved, and pessimists, on the other hand, may assume it to be ineradicable as part of the supposed fundamental irrationality of human beings, "the real sources of nationalistic thought and action — the sources which might reproduce nationalism again after any temporary suppression — these, however, have remained largely uncharted."²⁵

20. Salo Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1947), p. 3.

21. Shafer, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

22. Arthur Whitaker, *Nationalism in Latin America: Past and Present* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 3.

23. Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," p. 24.

24. Hector Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. vii.

25. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

In layman's language, nationalism has been defined as *that* which holds a people together in common support of national objectives.²⁶ A belief on the part of a large group of people that they comprise a political community, a nation, that is entitled to independent statehood, and a willingness of this group to grant their community a primary and terminal loyalty.²⁷ It therefore, involves a consciousness of belonging to a nation (existent or in the realm of aspiration) or a nationality, and a desire, as manifest in sentiment and activity, to secure or maintain its welfare, prosperity, and integrity, and to maximize its political autonomy.²⁸

While these definitions are sufficient for parlor discussions, they portray the passive aspect of nationalism, without projecting clearly the dynamic nature and the organic force that is the essence of nationalism. For nationalism is not merely the will to be free from foreign influence, it is also, when the material and ideological conditions warrant, the will to dominate other countries, other people as well.

Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to the conclusion that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one can. This is not a law we Athenians made ourselves, nor are we the first to act upon it since its establishment. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it in existence for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as that which is now ours would act in exactly the same way.²⁹

The reason for this general inclination of all mankind for a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death," is "not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without

26. Frederick Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations* (2nd ed., New York Macmillan, 1962), p. 20.

27. Richard Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Panama: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 3.

28. James Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 425.

29. Cf. Arthur Woodhead, *Thucydides on the Nature of Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 2.

the acquisition of more.”³⁰ Thus, to the above definitions of nationalism, let us incorporate a compelling statement asserted by the French nationalist, Charles Maurras that nationalism is “the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady *increase* of national power.”³¹ (underscoring supplied)

Let us not be overly pious by demurring from this view, for if we could follow this view, history amply demonstrate that we would. This aspect is not clearly apparent to us, laboring as we still do with the mentality of the having-been-oppressed in which we view ourselves as the victimized, the exploited, the maligned. We are still ‘freshly’ victimized, so to speak, by the ‘evil’ that is imperialism to even consider the possibility that in our historical turn, we too may become imperialist with all the rationalizations of ‘just cause’, ‘just war’, ‘national honor’, and ‘national imperative’ to justify our every act, our every move. Power,³² of course, is transient but only in the sense that it changes hands — not its nature: the dominant, whoever is playing the part, will always be on stage; but with power gone the will that animates all faiths dies with it.

If the Romans had not built an Empire, then the Carthaginians would have. If the Russians had not done so, then the Swedes or the Poles. Every generation, grappling with the especial circumstances it has inherited, produces its own contestants for the stakes of power. Opportunity has few doors, and most of these are already manned. This must be so — and what does it serve, or whom, to debate whether or not it should be so? The

30. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, edited with an introduction by Michael Oakshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), p. 64.

31. Quoted in Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, p. 165; see particularly pp. 202-212.

32. Power consists in having the ability to ensure that others are prepared to do what you want them to do; it is derived from an accumulation of certain qualities flourishing in a favorable environment. Power is natural and its exercise inescapable, whether we like it or not. The best that society has been able to do is to mitigate the crudity of such a doctrine, to acknowledge as desirable the ultimate force of high ideals, and to exhibit a preference for benevolent power as being most acceptable to mankind, and in consequence, the most permanent and useful type of power. Cf. Woodhead, *op. cit.*, 104-105.

world will not wait for the hesitant, and will never belong to the half-hearted.³³

Imperialism, meanwhile, is the *deliberate* exploitation of another nation for the purpose of gaining either material or strategic advantage, with its concomitant of prestige and self-esteem. "Inequality in the level of civilization and civilizing energy"³⁴ are its very essence.

... the term was originally connected with the word *Imperator*, and was frequently associated with the ideas of dictatorial power, highly centralized government, arbitrary methods of administration, and in general with the ideas of Caesarism and Bonapartism. In this sense it is now almost obsolete. For our purpose, it may be taken to mean simply the rule or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one state, nation or people over other similar groups, or ... the disposition, urge or striving to establish such rule or control.³⁵

Thus defined, it is equally applicable to ancient and modern political control of the kind described.³⁶ "Taken in this sense, imperialism is probably as old as recorded history."³⁷

The policies that in ancient times led to the foundation of the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Persian empires were imperialistic in the political sense. So were the conquests of Alexander the Great and the policies of Rome in the last century before the Christian era. The Arabian expansion in the seventh and eight centuries showed all the earmarks of imperialism. Pope Urban II used the typical ideological arguments in support of an imperialistic policy when, in 1095, he expressed to the Council of Clermont the reasons for the First Crusade in these words: "For this land which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth, and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage war, and that very many among you perish in civil strife." Louis XIV, Peter the Great, and Napoleon I were the great imperialists of the modern precapitalist age.³⁸

33. Archibald Thorton, *Doctrines of Imperialism* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 50.

34. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 62.

35. William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1935), Vol. I, p. 67.

36. For the origin and recent changes in the meaning of the term, see E.M. Winslow, *The Pattern of Imperialism: A Study in the Theories of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and Richard Koebner and Helmut Schmidt, *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).

37. *Loc. cit.*

38. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

All the imperialist nations, from Egypt down to Athens, Rome, England, Spain, Germany, the United States, and Japan, always had either active or passive support from those elements of the nation representing either the consensus or the political power or both. The Egyptians conquered in the name of their god-kings; the Athenians on the principle that "the strong take what they can, and the weak give what they must"; Rome conquered to 'civilize' the 'barbaric' world; England merely conquered, usually that "trade could follow the flag"; Spain conquered "for God and country"; Germany for *Lebensraum*; the United States "to fulfill its manifest destiny"; Japan for "The Emperor". All of them, however, became imperialists as a result of the coincidence of three factors:³⁹ the capacity to engage in an extended conflict the faith in that capacity, and, the will to power. "What the precapitalist imperialist, the capitalist imperialist, and the 'imperialistic' capitalist want is power, not economic gain . . . Personal gain and the solution of economic problems through imperialistic expansion are for all of them a pleasant afterthought, a welcome by-product, but not the goal by which the imperialistic urge is attracted."⁴⁰ Thus, historic evidence points to the primary of politics over economics, and the rule of financiers over international politics is, indeed, "a newspaper fairytale, almost ludicrously at variance with facts."⁴¹

*39. Our method of investigation is simple: to analyze the birth or beginnings of imperialism by means of historical examples which may be considered typical.

40. *Loc. cit.*, p. 48.

41. Joseph Schumpeter, *Business Cycles* (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939), Vol. I, p. 495, note 1.

When writing his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.) in 1916, Lenin did not claim, as so many of his disciples have done, that an exposure of the economic motivation of empire builders would by force of logic alone demolish the empires they had built. He stops to remark that there are "non-economic aspects of the question" which he is not going to touch, "however much they deserve to be dealt with" (p. 19); and he refers to without illustrating "the numerous 'old' motives of colonial policy" (p. 146). He criticizes Karl Kautsky's identification of the *political* part of imperialism as a striving for annexations: "It is correct, but very incomplete, for politically imperialism, is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction" (p. 201).

Underlying the factors mentioned above, however, is the essence of our thesis: popular support by the elements of the nation representing its decision-making group. "For nationalism realizes its full potential, develops its strongest emotional pull, only when its proponents export it to the world outside, there to measure their own attainment with those of the peoples of that place."⁴² To this we may add general public support, which it is true, disappears when reverses and defeats press close to home, but which is quite clearly present when troops march out to martial music and victory bulletins come home from the front. In this sense, imperialism becomes an extension of nationalism in its field of operation, transforming itself into a living thing capable of being grasped by a majority. Hence, we may state as a principle that in discussing or analyzing nationalism and imperialism we are actually confronted by a force, organic in nature, constituted by the will-to-be and will-to-grow of a given nation; and nationalism is that stage of the national will that is concerned with 'setting up house' or, using the human being as an analogy, it is that stage of the national will representing the struggle to stand free in one's own right. And when this will-to-be develops, it develops as the will-to-grow, and at this stage we have imperialism. In other words

. . . they are not in reality two different classes of phenomena, but two different phases in the development of the same phenomenon; that as soon as the first type of nationalism has attained its primary object in the identi-

This curious generalization he does not work out, perhaps because its working out might have complicated his stand against Kautsky: for Lenin's insistence that imperialism is a phase in the economic process, that the balloon of capitalism will soon burst from overinflation and that the time of the social revolution of the proletariat is at hand, directly rebuts Kautsky's declaration that imperialism is a *policy* and therefore, like all policies made and carried out by ordinary men, exposed to good or to bad luck, capable of good or bad handling, of meeting either success or failure. Thus, although concentrating on the economic part of imperialism, Lenin on his own showing did not suppose that, product and stage of capitalism though it was, imperialism had nothing in it but a single-minded drive for monopoly and profit. It would have been odd if he had thought so, since he openly acknowledged his debt to English mentors, with J.A. Hobson's work on *Imperialism* (1902) in pride of place. Cf. Thorton, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

42. Thorton, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

fication of nation and state, it is, as a result of that very fact, liable, given certain favourable conditions, to take on the characteristics of the second type. As a result of the very logic of the national idea, which implies that the nation has certain indefeasible rights, the ideology of nation and that of State are then fused in a single whole in which the original ingredients are indistinguishable.⁴³

FILIPINO NATIONALISM

Having established our base of general considerations, let us now consider the particular, concrete development, and nature of Filipino nationalism. We relate to this the role of imperialism in the development of Filipino nationalism. For this purpose, let us recapitulate an essential definition of nationalism as given by Snyder:

Nationalism — a product of political, economic, social, and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history — is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiments of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and in some cases, having a common religion.⁴⁴

Without going into an exhaustive and detailed demonstration, we may with confidence accept as accurate and as valid the above concept of nationalism. It should be noted carefully that nationalism is regarded as a *product* of definite historical phenomena, and not as something mystic, unexplainable, nor beyond the scope of factual and clear description. What then are these historical phenomena?

First, a nation must come into existence.⁴⁵ But what is a nation in the modern sense of the word?

43. A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 331.

44. Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

45. The word 'nation' has a long history. In former times the chieftain of an Irish clan was called 'captain of his nation' and it was usual to speak of 'savage nations'. Originally *natio* meant a backward, exotic tribe, approximately what we describe as natives, which comes from the same root. *Nationes ferae* (Sallust), *natio servituti nata* (Cicero), *innumerabiles et ferocissimae nationes* (Hieronymus). Varro uses *natio* for a breed of cattle. Great civilized peoples were called *gens*, and the Roman people as the

The word 'nation', in the fullest adaptation of the term, means, in modern times, a numerous and homogenous population (having long emerged from the hunters and nomadic state), permanently inhabiting and cultivating a coherent territory, with a well-defined geographic outline, and a name of its own — the inhabitants speaking their own language, having their own literature and common institutions, which distinguish them clearly from other and similar groups of people, being citizens or subjects of a unitary government, however subdivided it may be, and having an organic unity with one another as well as being conscious of a common destiny. Organic, intellectual and political internal unity with proportionate strength and a distinct and obvious demarcation from similar groups, are notable elements of the idea of a modern nation in its fullest sense.⁴⁶

The size of its territory or the number of its people, however, are not of paramount significance, for tiny San Marino can vie with much greater Spain in fierceness of nationalism. But, it must be sufficiently distinct from its neighbors for it to have a fully developed sense of self-identity, such that it could conceive of itself as an entity in its own right even without recognition of its identity by other neighboring nations. In addition, such an entity must have an economy sufficiently viable to enable it to support its population from its own natural resources and its own industries, or, with an export industry sufficient to supplement basic material requirements not sufficiently available at home. Finally, such an entity, to be considered a nation should have a central political government, ruling over a people who conceive

bearer of sovereignty called itself *populus*. In the Vulgate *natio* and *gens* means the Gentiles, while the chosen people is the *populus*. In the Middle Ages English writers designate the English people usually as *gens Anglorum*, and it seems exceptional when Matthew Paris speaks of the English as a nation with a patriotic accent. Roger of Wendover calls the Scot and the Welsh barbarian nations and describes the troops of the Emperor Frederick I as *cohortes diversarum nationum*. In universities the students were divided in *nationes* which formed autonomous corporations. In the first centuries after the Middle Ages the word 'nation' was used in Germany and France for designating the higher, ruling classes in opposition to the *Volk* or *people*, which correspond to the English word 'populace' or 'common people'. Mazzini understood by nation a people with a mission, and spoke of the ascent of a people to the capacity and dignity of a nation. Cf. Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics: A Study in the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 6-7.

46. Francis Lieber, *Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York: 1868), pp. 7-3.

of themselves as a single ethnic entity, who think in terms of 'we'. "For the growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of people into a common political form. Nationalism therefore presupposes the existence, in fact or as an ideal, of a centralized form of government over a . . . distinct territory."⁴⁷

Under the determining scope of these aforementioned conditions, when may we consider nationalism to have come into existence in the Philippines? Could we place it in March of 1521? At that time, historical data available lead us to the conclusion that this archipelago, this necklace of 7,000 gems, existed as a geographical unit, peopled by individuals sharing a common racial stock, but completely lacking in either political unity or common national sentiment. "There was no national feeling before the coming of the Spaniards to the Philippines in the sixteenth century. There was in fact no such thing as the Philippines, for this political entity was then composed of more or less independent communities with their rulers, customs, and laws which varied from community to community."⁴⁸ Hence, upon these multidivided principalities or *barangay* aggrupations, came the first imperialists to visit these shores as far as the 'Philippines' is concerned — the Spaniards.

Without repeating herein well-known historical accounts of battles, revolts, blood, and treachery, suffice it for us to penetrate the heart of the matter by noting how Spain, for reasons of convenient administration, gave this archipelago the political structuring that we still have today with but superficial, not far reaching modifications, for significant changes were undertaken by Filipinos guided by both love of country and western political systems. Spain gave us, although entirely for her own purposes and for her own benefit, the essential element for the existence of nationalism — a common political structure. Now this is a delicate point, but it must be noted that had it not been for the

47. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 4.

48. Teodoro Agoncillo, "The Development of Filipino Nationalism," *Progressive Review*, No. 7 (1965), p. 2.

political centralization brought about by Spain there would not, in all probability be any Filipino nationalism to speak about today. "What were then numerous independent communities became geographically united and named after King Charles I's son, later to become King Philip II of Spain."⁴⁹ Of course, the distinction must be made that Spain did *not* consciously create our nationalism. Rather, having been bound together, so to speak, by Spain, we came to consider ourselves — Visayans, Tagalog, Ilocanos, and so forth — as one people, having as perhaps our first binding and common national sentiment our mutual grievances against Spain.

Aside from a political structure that had over the peoples of this archipelago a centralizing and unifying effect, Spain again, no matter how unwillingly, or unwittingly, became a channel to the ocean of the world's ideas, which through Spain and our great men who went abroad to other countries and to Spain itself, came pouring out upon our land, bathing us in our all-enveloping spiritual force that resulted in the last essential of nationalism — dreams, hopes and aspirations shared in common. When we realize that these dreams, hopes, aspirations, and goals constitute the very fire of nationalism, and all that constitutes its mobilizing energy, then we realize the true greatness of a Rizal, a del Pilar, and a Mabini. For they expressed and clarified the yearnings of a people. They gave us the spiritual direction without which we would have been nothing more than a restless mob.

Yankee imperialism is significant in the development of Filipino nationalism only in so far as it carried forward or allowed, the cultural flow begun in Spanish times. "The Americans took in the Filipinos as partners — junior partners maybe, but partners nevertheless — in the great democratic experiment that had never been tried before in the history of colonialism."⁵⁰ Thus, the ideals of "representative government; the separation of powers; the concept of public service as a public trust; a civil service based on merit; training for citizenship in a system of general educa-

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

tion accessible to all — these bulwarks of the American constitution [which] became the bases of our own political system,"⁵¹ are important to the Filipino nationalist only in so far as they furthered the development of a common tongue, a common set of ideals, common aspirations, and world contact. In short, neither the Spaniards nor the Americans desired it, indeed even fought us and hurt us and killed us to prevent it, they nevertheless must be considered the first catalyzers that resulted in the birth, growth, and fashioning of the Filipino soul.

THE INTERPLAY OF NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

We have laid certain general principles that set forth the nature and the relation of and between nationalism and imperialism. We have tried to demonstrate that nationalism and imperialism may be anti-thetical, but are nevertheless manifestations of one and the same phenomenon — the will to be and to grow of a given nation.

Analyzed against this framework, Filipino nationalism may be considered as the *will to be* of the Filipino people. Perhaps, after the political structuring fashioned by Spain, the first beginnings of Filipino nationalism may be said to have been negative in nature, inasmuch as it was chiefly a reaction against the foreign body of imperialism. But while

the negative or 'anti' character of nationalism in a colonial setting is simple enough to explain . . . it is by no means unique to colonialism. Everywhere the national 'we' has been to a considerable degree defined by contrast to the alien and opposing 'they', and in most instances no operationally significant statement of what the nation stands for can be expected. Indeed this may be held to be a standard feature of all nationalism . . .⁵²

However, with the growth of sophistication in our thinking, as exemplified in the writings of Rizal and his fellow Propagandists, nationalism began to take on a more lasting and a more fundamental character: instead of being merely directed against a particular enemy, instead of having to have a particular enemy, Filipino nationalism has developed into a continuing national force representing our determination as a people to be masters

51. de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

52. Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," pp. 5-6.

of our destiny, resisting at the same time with appropriate measures, both the attacks of enemies and the impertinences of friends. In other words, Filipino nationalism has progressed to the point of maturity, wherein to exist, it need not have an enemy around.

. . . the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century was a sign that the Filipinos had matured as a people both spiritually and politically; and if that movement issued in the tragic violence of the Revolution, this was because the ruling power either failed to read the sign, or refused to recognize it. Spain, or to speak more accurately, Spanish officialdom insisted on treating Filipinos as children when they were no longer children. They were no longer children because they had learned from Spain itself the rights and obligations of maturity. Yet this was precisely what Spain could not or would not concede — it is thus that we must interpret the Philippine Revolution of '96.⁵³

Henceforth, Filipino nationalism is but the necessary expression of national purposiveness dependent on national resources of men and material to carry us forward to our desired goal. Perhaps when that day of light shall dawn, that golden day of understanding, trust and cooperation shall have at last enlighten all men, *then*, nationalism shall become an anachronism or merely a curious relic of man's bloody past. But for as long however as that bloody past is *still* the bloody present and for as long as man remains a threat to the life and integrity of his fellowmen, then, for just as long will nationalism continue to be one of our most essential, most fundamental, and most rightfully demanding concern.

In all the stages of its development, however, imperialism, through the political and educational institutions it developed and left behind, and through its having been our channel to the outside world, has been the unwilling, but effective catalyzer of Filipino nationalism.

53. *Loc. cit.*