Schoolbooks and Krgs

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This book is a collection of studies attempting to trace the relationship between population growth and economic development in the Philippines. The monograph is the result of two years of research effort by economists and demographers connected with the University of the Philippines who are members of a group known as Economic Research Associates, Inc. (ERA). Research funding came from a grant in December 1971 by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.

The studies vary in complexity and in the background needed for comprehension by the reader. Chapter 2 gives a brief history and pertinent statistics of population growth and of economic development in the Philippines. Chapter 3 is an economic-demographic model studying the effect of population variables on economic variables, and vice versa. It is a model, one of a few in the world and the only one so far in the Philippines, that provides feedback from economic variables (e.g., family income) to demographic variables. Most models trace the one-way effect of population variables (e.g., nuptiality and family planning) on economic variables. With regard to the planning program in the Philippines, its history and description (Chapter 4) and an econometric evaluation of it (Chapter 5) are given.

Additional studies try to measure the effect of population growth on government expenditures, such as on public education and health (Chapter 6) and the effect of family size on family expenditure (Chapter 7). A final chapter (Chapter 8) summarizes the results of these different studies.

The monograph identifies and gives weights to the relevant variables in their effect on population and economic growth policies. While admittedly some pertinent variables, such as female participation in the labor force, are not taken into consideration, the variables that are considered are among the more important ones.

The authors then are to be congratulated for an excellent collection of related studies dealing with the contemporary national goals of economic growth linked with population control.

Glicerio S. Abad


This book, which forms part of a series of studies on military history, was conceived as a specific case of the more general study of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare. "How had the United States Army, an alien intruder, small in number and confused as to its mission when it came to the Philippines in 1898, gained supremacy over the forces of indigenous revolutionaries, skilled in guerrilla warfare and operating in a favorable environment?" (pp. vii–viii.) In contrast to what Professor Gates considers to be the prevalent stereotype of a brutally repressive American campaign
marked by widespread atrocities, his answer essentially is that it was accomplished by a military policy of benevolence and progressive reforms, combined with judicious use of military force.

Gates has done research in an impressively large number of manuscript collections, both official military records and published reports, and papers of individuals involved in the Filipino-American War, as well as in the so-called Philippine Insurgent Records. He sees the period from the occupation of Manila till the outbreak of the war in February 1899 as one in which the American Army set up a reasonably progressive and efficient government in Manila, which was to be the prototype of its later efforts in the provinces after they had been brought under American control. By the end of 1899 American military men felt that the war which had begun in the early part of that year was substantially over, now that Aguinaldo had dissolved the regular army and proclaimed guerrilla warfare. Hence the task for the American army was to pursue the task of organizing local governments in the provinces, and instituting health measures and schools, so as to attract both the subject population and those still in the field to the advantages of a benevolent American rule. By the end of 1900, however, most became convinced that the policy must be reevaluated. In spite of apparent pacification, the guerrillas continued to operate with widespread support from the populace under American rule, even from those who were local officials of the American-sponsored governments. At the end of 1900 General Arthur MacArthur, while rejecting pressure from some military men for a policy of terror to discourage collaboration with guerrillas, outlined a policy which envisaged sterner measures than heretofore, putting the burden of proof on Filipinos of showing their loyalty to the United States. Protection against the guerrillas was to be provided for those living in occupied places, but at the same time severe punishment was to be meted out to any who continued to supply money, intelligence, or other support to the guerrillas. In applying the policy, he said, "the more drastic application the better, provided, only, that unnecessary hardships and personal indignities shall not be imposed upon persons arrested and that the laws of war are not violated in any respect touching the treatment of prisoners." Under this policy widespread arrests took place. Though Gates admits that cruelties and abuses were increasingly practiced by the American military during 1901, those who did so "represented only a fraction of those in responsible positions in the Philippines. The official policy . . . was one of benevolence." (p. 216.) For the U.S. Army continued its efforts to establish schools, improve sanitary conditions, and take other measures for the improvement of life in the provinces, and thus persuade people of American benevolent intentions.

The Balangiga massacre in September 1901, where the American garrison was almost wiped out by the inhabitants of this Samar town in cooperation with nearby guerrillas, threatened to ruin the whole program of pacification. For in reaction to it, General Adna Chaffee, who had succeeded MacArthur, took an increasingly harsh attitude, and his subordinate, General Jacob Smith, proceeded with his program of making Samar "a howling wilderness." According to Gates, Smith's policy of terror in
Samar was ineffective as far as putting an end to guerrilla warfare, and only succeeded in goading already-pacified Leyte into new unrest. A "more benevolent" policy after February 1902 finally brought an end to the war in Samar after the capture of General Vicente Lukban. This post-February "benevolent policy" was a copy of the program then being successfully employed by General J. Franklin Bell in Batangas, the other major guerrilla stronghold. While not advocating torture or burning, Bell proposed a policy of reconcentration of people in American-garrisoned towns, while pursuing everyone outside these areas with relentless severity. The psychological terror and economic pressures soon completely disrupted guerrilla operations and brought about the surrender of General Miguel Malvar in April 1902.

This instance of Bell in Batangas points up one of the major defects of the book. The policies of Otis, MacArthur, and Bell, though representing an escalating degree of severity and harshness are all classified here as "benevolent." Compared to the atrocities committed under Smith's orders in Samar, Bell's policy could be considered relatively more benevolent, but surely this is violating the entire meaning of the word. When it is remembered what a devastating effect Bell's reconcentration policy had on the agriculture of Batangas, and the large numbers who died of epidemics in the reconcentration centers, it is difficult to accept the qualification of Bell's policy as benevolent. After all, it was the application of precisely this policy by Weyler in Cuba which had served as one of the ultimate pretexts for American intervention there against the Spaniards. The constant assertion — in generalities more than in specific analysis of actual action taken — throughout the book, besides being overly repetitious, fails to convince because it is unclear just what is being asserted. Though I think it is quite clear from the evidence presented that there was a "benevolent policy," propounded not only by civil officials but by some of the military, the extent to which such a policy was actually embraced by all, and what is more important, the extent to which it was implemented in fact, is not thoroughly investigated. For better or worse, large numbers of Filipinos did find something attractive in American policy; sheer terror on the part of the Americans could not by itself have brought about pacification, as the experience of the Japanese war later showed. In the reviewer's opinion, though giving solid evidence of this fact, Gates falls into the opposite extreme of underplaying the reality of American military repression in the latter part of the war. Though he admits the existence of atrocities, particularly in the case of Smith, he dismisses them rather perfunctorily with the remark that the perpetrators were punished. If Smith's "punishment" is typical, (he was retired, but without further penalty) one cannot feel the deterrent was very effective. Had the outcry in the United States not been so strong, it is doubtful if Smith would even have been court-martialed.

It would be naive, of course, to believe that Filipino guerrillas were not also guilty of atrocities. The history of guerrilla warfare and its repression has always been a history of terror and counter-terror, of atrocities and reprisals in kind. But this fact accentuates the importance for the thesis
of the book of a point which has not really been investigated in depth. Was it true that the almost universal support that, according to American military commanders, the guerrillas received in some provinces was due to the terroristic practices of the guerrillas towards those who failed to support them, or was it due to secret sympathy with guerrilla aims on the part of the population?

If the reviewer finds the treatment of the above questions less than satisfactory, the study nevertheless provides considerable light on various other aspects of the subject. Gates makes clear that the initiative towards an American policy of attraction for Filipinos came from the military, specifically, General Otis. Moreover Otis appears in a much more favorable light as an enlightened military governor, even if not so successful a military commander. In this view, the subsequent actions of Taft and the civil government towards the promotion of education and other progressive reforms as a means to attracting Filipino support were merely a continuation on a more permanent basis of the directions already taken by Otis. Conversely, Taft appears at times to have been even more ready to advocate the use of harsh measures than some of the military. Indeed, some of the earliest advocates of severity were Americanista Filipinos like Felipe Buencamino. Another point on which Gates challenges the traditional view is the importance of the capture of Aguinaldo towards bringing the war to an end. Rather than this signalling the turning-point in the war, such a turn had already come a few months earlier, with the surrender of such leading Filipino generals as Mariano Trias.

The book will prove useful therefore to the historian who is aware of its limitations, particularly the fact that it is not what its subtitle seems to announce, a history of American military operations in the Philippines, but rather a history of the evolution of American military policy with respect to the problem of ending Filipino opposition to American rule. It is to be hoped that some of the questions it raises will lead towards a badly-needed adequate and comprehensive history of the Revolution and the Filipino-American War. The opportunities offered by the availability of the Philippine Revolutionary Records (Philippine Insurgent Records) in this country after their long detention in Washington, have hardly begun to be systematically exploited.

John N. Schumacher


In the psychological association of the average Filipino Christian black symbolizes something negative — evil, sin, the devil — and white, something positive — good, grace, God. Is it possible that this color association could be due to one's Christian upbringing? The colonial-minded Filipino