newly-created Malaysia, which of course included Sabah. On 20 September 1963, Macapagal received an Aide-Memoire from American President Kennedy pressuring him both to recognize Malaysia and to condemn Indonesian violence against the new state — with a none-too-subtly veiled threat of an American aid cut-off (p. 79–80). Men like Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez and Ambassador Salvador Lopez, and presumably Macapagal himself, resented such threats greatly; but eventually Macapagal was forced to give way to these multiple pressures, including those applied by vested interests within the country, and the Sabah Claim was shelved.

No one — least of all Mr. Sussman — would want to imply that Maphilindo was not an honest effort at regionalism, by Asians and on behalf of Asians. Neither would one want to make such a statement about ASEAN; it is most certainly Asian in origin, intent, and, as Ms. Solidum effectively points out, in mode of operation. On the other hand it seems strange to ignore the fact of outside interference, and even of the interference of internal interest-groups. The making of foreign policy decisions is indeed a more complicated process than the statements that issue from the mouths of politicians in the end would lead one to believe.

Ms. Solidum is extremely optimistic about the growth of regionalism as shown in ASEAN, and she has every reason to be so, especially in the light of recent developments, for ASEAN does show a pronounced growth in positive attitudes toward cooperation. And from this point of view, the book is successful; it does, after all, do what it sets out to do, and it does it well. But in the final evaluation of ASEAN, we cannot afford to ignore outside pressures. ASEAN is with us, and it is Asian, but as Alejandro Lichauco recently pointed out in a symposium in the University of the Philippines, on ASEAN and the Philippine National Interest, it is an organization peculiarly open to outside manipulation. And as long as it sets its sights on pleasing multinational corporations, as it seems to be doing at present, it will be even more vulnerable to foreign pressures. Future scholars will find it necessary to take these pressures into consideration.

Susan Evangelista


Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos is an encyclopedic treatment of the first two decades of American presence in the Philippines (1899–1920). It comprehends the entire period of military rule (1899–1913) and the initial years of civil government in Moroland (1913–1920). The military period involves the administration of three famous
American military leaders: Gen. Leonard Wood (1903–1906), Gen. Tasker Bliss (1906–1909), and Gen. John Pershing (1909–1913). Their contributions, although different in the degree to which militarism was used, are seen in the context of American efforts to neutralize "Moro" reactions by negotiations. The resulting Bates Treaty in 1899 held the peace in Sulu until 1904 when it was abrogated at the instance of the United States. The abrogation, which came after the pacification efforts in the north ended with American sovereignty recognized and established, freed the American forces for operations against Moroland.

The policy which emerged out of the initial years of turbulence was to balance coercive and persuasive methods, a contrast to that of the Spanish policy of military force. Thus, the author sees the pre-1903 period as a balanced approach to continuing Moro resistance. General Wood never hesitated to use the gun, but he was not at all insensitive to the use of conciliatory measures in dealing with compromising Muslim leaders. Similarly, General Bliss, who was as military in character as Wood, is portrayed as one who dealt with the "Moros" with "soft gloves" and earned the reputation of the "peacemaker." The last phase of military rule, which was marked by General Pershing's use of military power to humble the Moros, is treated as a necessary step to peace and order. Hence, the establishment of civil government in 1914 is shown as a result of the accomplishments of the military period. To show a balance in treatment, every now and then the discussion of various encounters, although definitely more costly to the Moros than to the Americans, is spiced by American conciliatory gestures, so that the sanguinary record of American military rule in Moroland has to be seen in the context of the social, economic, and political reforms introduced in the civil regime.

The civil administration, which began with Gov. Frank Carpenter (1913–1920) and coincided with the Democratic era in American politics, is portrayed as a period of educational, economic, political, and social activities resulting in improved American-Moro relations but, paradoxically, in worsening Christian-Muslim relations.

The summary, synthesis, and conclusion offer these generalizations: (1) that however violent might have been the pursuit of American mandate over Moroland, the Moros by 1920 had accepted American rule for what it could offer in human welfare and progress; (2) that the Moros were drawn more and more toward harmony with American colonial rule and became less receptive to Filipino rule; and (3) that Moro leadership was partly, if not largely, to be blamed for the violence and sufferings in Moroland.

The sources used by the author are primary and archival, drawn mostly from the U.S. National Archives, the U.S. Library of Congress, and other depositories. The references to some secondary sources, particularly to Muslim writers, tend to create a pro-Muslim perspective, somewhat unflattering to Filipino leadership. In effect, by a selective process the author suc-
ceeded in creating the impression that the Moros would have been better off under American than Christian or Muslim Filipino rule.

And yet, as one looks at the extent to which periodization is used, the range of bibliographical coverage involved, and the manner by which theoretical validation is arrived at, it seems that several issues can be raised.

First, the confinement of critical and comparative analysis to the period from 1899 to 1920 leaves the author's observations and conclusions somewhat obscured and weakened by the renewed armed conflict between 1920 and 1941, particularly in Lanao and Sulu and, to a lesser extent, in Cotabato. In fact, it was during the later period, which began with the governorship of Leonard Wood (1921–1927) and ended with that of Frank Murphy, that numerous clashes between the colonial government and the Moros took place. In 1927 the “Tahil Uprising” shook the peace and order in Sulu just as, since the 1920s, Lanao had been plagued by a series of disturbances such as the “kutah fights” in the late 1930s. Likewise, in the 1920s Cotabato saw the outbreaks of the “Santiago Trouble” (1924) and the “alangkat movement” (1927). Thus, by any gauge, the armed disturbances in various areas of Moroland were reactions to the established American colonial order. And whatever gains in Filipinization were achieved in the Harrison Era (1913–1920) were negated by the reactionary policies of Governor-General Wood, whose distaste for Filipino leadership was as strong as his distrust for the Moro character.

Second, the thesis that the Moros had increasingly become anti-Filipino is at best inconclusive. It is negated by the bifurcation of Moro reactions into pro-colonial and pro-native, particularly in Lanao where the Usungan pro-American group was opposed by the Ibra pro-Filipino faction. In fact, Ralph Thomas in his doctoral dissertation, “Muslim But Filipinos” (1975), pursues the Filipino character of Muslim behavior and suggests integration as the basis of national policy. His study, which covers the period from 1917 to 1947, elaborates the old thesis of Filipino leadership that the Moros were Filipinos, notwithstanding their violent conflicts with the Christian Filipinos. In a sense, however, he shares Gowing’s feelings that the Moros had to be civilized. On the other hand, Gowing’s study finds support in George Jornacion’s dissertation, “The Time of the Eagles: The United States Army Officers and the Pacification of the Philippine Moros, 1899–1913” (1973). Jornacion’s study pursues in seven chapters the American policy of “force and paternalism.” It presents the positive role of American militarism in Moroland. However, it can be assumed quite reasonably that Gowing’s, Thomas’, and Jornacion’s studies are theoretically in opposition to the reviewer’s Sulu Under American Military Rule, 1899–1913 (1967) which is referred to by Gowing in his original dissertation as a “petty nationalist” interpretation.

Finally, the apparent lack of oral literature or traditions in critical analysis, such as reproduced in Cephas Batesman’s manuscript of legends and folktales and in secondary works as well, somewhat weakened what otherwise would
have been a valid observation of an anti-Christian, hence anti-Filipino, pattern in Muslim reaction. This becomes more and more apparent as one examines the numerous letters of Muslim datus and sultans in the Pershing Files and other official papers in the Library of Congress, the Michigan Historical Collections, and the U.S. National Archives. The letters, by their simple character, can be generally classified into pro- and anti-colonial views. Unfortunately, Cowing does not seem to have shown this important aspect of historical methodology which could have proved in a much more reasonable and convincing way what he considers to be America’s "mandate over Moroland."

Samuel V. Tan


The book is a comparative discussion of management in China and the United States. Specifically, it pinpoints apparent differences in the patterns of wage and salary determination and administration through the technique of job evaluation, performance appraisal, and organizational development between China and the United States.

The book has a number of interesting pieces of information. One, for example, is that in the Chinese context, the main objective of job evaluation is to establish a more equitable distribution of income by limiting the pay grades to as few as eight levels. The central idea is to minimize wage differentials to preclude the influence of market forces in setting up wage rates. Another is that the administration of the performance appraisal, a program which supplements job evaluation, is decentralized and accomplished informally through workers' participation. This means that workers appraise their fellow workers on the basis of job factors, such as physical strength, technical skill, age and experience, and political attitudes. And finally, in the aspect of worker's motivation, the thrust of the Chinese is toward the imposition of the primacy of moral incentives over material incentives. The Chinese maintain that moral incentives are an antimarket strategy of wage formation.

The author presents this comparative study of management in a scholarly style. However, he occasionally interrupts his exposition of an interesting subject with a denunciation or critique of certain aspects of American management. Perhaps the author could have given a more extensive discussion of the similar aspects of job evaluation, performance appraisal, and organizational development between the two cultures, to have a well-balanced exposition. In the American viewpoint, for instance, one of the basic objectives of job evaluation is to establish fair and equitable pay, as well as to