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Andam-Mouswag: A Lesson Learned?*

JOHN P. McANDREW

In the municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, about 20 kilometers east of Cagayan de Oro, a people lived in the small barrio of Nabacaan. The barrio had a total land area of 138 hectares and was occupied by about 146 families. Affected by the growth of Cagayan de Oro City, the people were able to participate in the benefits of commercial industry as they continued more traditional pursuits of farming and fishing. Strong kin networks characterized most of the area and, together with assistance from benevolent patrons, insured support in times of need. Over a period of years, if not generations, the people of Nabacaan had achieved an effective relationship with their environment.

Nabacaan was also located on Macajalar Bay, a body of sheltered deep water offering an excellent site for a port accommodating ocean-going vessels. It was out of the typhoon belt and close to the electric-generating Maria Cristina Falls. In short, Nabacaan was an ideal site for a development project. Recently, the barrio of Nabacaan was transformed into a multi-million peso Japanese plant.

While the coming of the industrial plant in Nabacaan will have an impact on the entire province of Misamis Oriental, the interest of the present article is restricted to the Nabacaan residents who moved to the Kalingagan relocation site to make way for the construction of the plant. Its purpose is to analyze the development of strategies by which a people adapt to change arising from or co-occurring with compulsory relocation. Those who have relocated to Kalingagan have been for the most part the people of

*This article is based on work done for a thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Ateneo de Manila University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, major in anthropology.

the barrio, and while theirs is not the only story one can tell, it is one that we hope can be told with some profit.

EVENTS LEADING TO RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN KALINGAGAN

In October 1973, President Inchiyo Fujimoto of Kawasaki Steel Corporation or Kawatetsu visited the Philippines and applied for permission to construct a sintering plant in the country.¹ Clearance for the construction of the plant, to be located in the Province of Misamis Oriental, was granted by the Philippine government in January 1974.² Plans for the construction of the sintering plant were later expanded to include provisions for an entire industrial estate. On 13 August 1974, Ferdinand E. Marcos created under Presidential Decree No. 538 the Philippine Veterans Investment and Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) Industrial Estate, an area of 3,000 hectares located in the municipalities of Tagoloan and Villanueva in the province of Misamis Oriental.³ The development of the Industrial Estate was placed by the same decree (P.D. No. 538) under the administration and management of the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate Authority, a subsidiary agency of the Philippine Veterans Investment and Development Corporation. Immediately after P.D. No. 538 was issued, the Kawasaki Steel Corporation (KSC) leased approximately 144 hectares of the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate and began construction of the plant known as the Philippine Sintering Corporation.⁴

1. Sintering is a necessary pre-step in the process of steel manufacturing. Iron ore is mixed with limestone and coke breeze and heated until sinter pellets are formed. This raw material is then ready for use in the blast furnaces.

2. The granting of the clearance was greatly facilitated by the ratification of the Philippine-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation on 27 December 1973. This treaty was signed in 1960 and immediately ratified by the Japanese Diet but at that time the Philippine Senate refused to act on it, charging that the agreement was heavily in favor of Japan and would open the Philippines to Japanese economic invasion.

3. Major laws, enacted in an attempt to boost national development efforts and enhance capital formation such as the Investment Incentives Act, the Foreign Investments Law, and the Foreign Trade Zone Law, are applied to the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. In short, the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate is conceived as a Free Trade Zone. The development of the 3,000 hectares is expected to take 10 years. When fully developed, that is, in 1985, there should be about 10 heavy industries, 40 medium-scale industries, and 100 light industries.

4. The sintering plant has an annual capacity of 5 million metric tons of sinter geared to meet the requirements of KSC's integrated steelworks. The plant's iron ore

As early as 22 March 1974, as plans for the sintering plant materialized, Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor through Memorandum Order 414 established the Inter-Agency Task Force to plan, coordinate, and supervise the relocation of the residents of Barrio Nabacaan, Villanueva.⁵ One of the responsibilities of the Task Force was to choose an adequate relocation site for those opting to accept government assistance in relocation. Two possible alternatives were offered: participation in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) resettlement program in Bukidnon, or relocation within a 6-kilometer radius from the industrial estate. Eight possible areas were considered by the Inter-Agency Task Force before the site in Kalingagan was chosen.

Kalingagan is a sitio of Villanueva located 7 kilometers from the poblacion, 500 meters above sea level. The actual relocation to Kalingagan was accomplished in two phases. Residents who chose to be relocated in Kalingagan were temporarily housed in bunkhouses for a period of about 9 months. Upon completion of the initial dwelling units, the water works system, and the widening of the road leading to Kalingagan, the people were moved to this site. The new community as well as the project itself came to be known as Andam-Mouswag, a Cebuano phrase which means "ready to progress."

THE ANDAM-MOUSWAG PROJECT: A NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN RESETTLEMENT

The Andam-Mouswag Project was conceived by the Inter-Agency Task Force as a new approach to human resettlement: affected residents would not simply be displaced to a peripheral area and given basic housing assistance, but would become members of a community that would provide the means for social reintegration and more productive economic growth. It was not to be a Nabacaan in the mountains but a challenge to reorient existing values and patterns of behavior within the national development plan for the industrial estate.

will come from Australia and Brazil while the limestone will be transported from nearby Bohol. In addition to the sintering facilities, the plant is equipped with large-scale port facilities and modern handling installations capable of servicing bulk ore carriers of the 150,000 to 250,000 d.w.t. (deadweight tonnage) class. At a total construction cost of ₱1.6 billion, it represents the largest single industrial investment in Philippine history.

5. The Task Force, under the direction of Secretary Melchor, was an attempt to bring together various government agencies to facilitate the resettlement of the relo-

THE ANDAM-MOUSWAG PHILOSOPHY

The rationale of the Andam-Mouswag project was based on the principle of choice in development. The Task Force admits that this concern for freedom of choice began not before, but after, the government's decision to establish an industrial estate in northern Mindanao. However, it points out that, in the exercise of eminent domain, the principle of due compensation was maintained and incorporated into the Andam-Mouswag philosophy.

ANDAM-MOUSWAG: A SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNITY

Andam-Mouswag was envisioned as a self-contained community where the new residents would provide labor for the industrial estate, as well as look to the agricultural hinterlands as a source of their food supply. More significantly, though, they would become active participants in a community that would rely on itself to generate economic stability through cooperative enterprise. This would avoid the dehumanizing experience of becoming a dormitory-town for factory workers. A viable internal economy would ensure some autonomy from the industrial estate and at the same time provide alternative forms of employment. As a means of activating this ideal, a series of economic projects were initiated:

1. *Loom weaving*. Financed by the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB), this project provided for contracts with private individuals who each leased one unit from the Andam-Mouswag Office. The initial training programs were conducted by the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC). Weavers were to be employed on a regular basis and the finished products exported.
2. *Sericulture (silkworm raising)*. This project was envisioned as a means for farmers in the resettlement area to generate more income by raising silkworms at their homesites without having to sacrifice their main occupation. Andam-Mouswag provided

cates. It was composed of representatives from the Philippine Veterans Investment and Development Corporation (PHIVIDE), Presidential Assistant on Housing and Resettlement Agency (PAHRA), Bureau of Public Works (BPW), Bureau of Public Highways (BPH), People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), National Housing Corporation (NHC), Department of Social Welfare (DSW), and the 52nd Engineering Brigade.

a building for the training center and farm space for the mulberry nursery with the Philippine Textile Research Institute (PTRI) providing technical assistance and silkworms.

3. *Dairy processing plant.* This aimed to provide additional income to farmer-relocatees by encouraging them to undertake backyard dairy farming under the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) buggalo murrah dispersal program.
4. *Communal tomato farm.* Funded by a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), this project was designed to provide additional income to farmer-relocatees by accelerating production through modern technological agriculture.
5. *Corn compact farm.* This project, also funded by PNB, sought to accelerate corn production through modern agricultural technology.
6. *Peanut farming.* Initiated independently by the Mother's Club, this project was assisted by the Task Force which allowed the use of 2 hectares of idle lands in the area.
7. *Meat processing project.* Begun in October 1975, and financed by a loan from the DBP-DSW rural home industries financing program, this project was to provide supplementary income to housewives without forcing them to leave the relocation site.

The socioeconomic programs introduced by the Task Force were meant to provide the basis of a self-generating economy. At least in the early stages of the program, the projects would supplement the basic incomes of the relocatees while encouraging cooperative self-help. A rather large staff of young idealistic men and women were recruited to coordinate these programs and also to provide social services and employment assistance for the relocatees. To prepare the relocatees for eventual work in the industrial estate, a manpower training program was begun, its operations coordinated with those of the Mindanao School of Arts and Trade in Cagayan de Oro City.

SELECTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND EXPANSION OF THE SITE

One of the factors in the selection of the site was its distance from the industrial estate. At 500 meters above sea level beyond the 6 kilometers radius of the Kawasaki Sintering Plant, the Ka-

lingagan site was determined to be at the zero pollution level. Another factor was the projected growth of the industrial estate in an area of 3,000 hectares. Only 144 hectares were leased to Kawasaki for the construction of the plant. The construction of other industrial plants in the area would generate further development and at the same time necessitate the relocation of other residents. The Kalingagan site, with an area of 500 hectares, was designed to accommodate all families ultimately relocated from the industrial estate. It was also to serve as relocation center for those families affected by other government projects such as the widening of the Iligan-Cagayan-Butuan road.

Long-range plans for Andam-Mouswag included provisions for extensive dwelling units, market and transportation facilities, a church, a high school, and even a commercial center. These physical structures were to be interspersed with open spaces and parks to provide an aesthetic dimension to the overall functional layout. However, the first phase of the program was limited to preparing the Kalingagan site for the relocation of the Nabacaan residents. The road from Villanueva poblacion was widened, land in Kalingagan was leveled, and some 136 dwelling units were constructed. An elementary school and a community center were built, along with some office buildings. A system of pedestrian footpaths separated from motor vehicle roads was also developed. The road system itself, consisting of cul-de-sacs and single loops, was designed as an alternative to the more impersonal grid pattern. These infrastructure inputs were made at a cost of ₱9 million. Electricity was installed in the area by the Cagayan de Oro Electric Power and Light Company (CEPALCO) for an added ₱740,000. Water was supplied from the nearby Napapong Spring. The waterworks system, built at a cost of over ₱5 million, was subsidized in part by the Kawasaki Corporation.

THE VIEWPOINT OF THE RELOCATEES

The construction of the Kawasaki Sintering Plant in Misamis Oriental has been steeped in a controversy that can be considered from two perspectives: the contribution of the Kawasaki Plant

as an impetus to national industrial development,⁶ and its impact on the development of the local community.⁷

The writer visited Andam-Mouswag in May 1976 to gain a better understanding of the relocatees' viewpoint.⁸ The following accounts may be considered fairly representative of the community. The stories of Jose and Bising are particularly significant as they typify the largest group living in the area, the relocatees from Nabacaan and Katipunan who did not own land. Hopefully, this presentation of case study accounts will allow a deeper understanding of the relocatees' viewpoints.

MANUEL

Manuel, one of the former community leaders of Nabacaan, was in his middle fifties at the time of the interview. He had owned about 2 hectares of land in Nabacaan, and recounted the history of Nabacaan's relocation with evident frustration at the final turn of events. He recalled the arrival of the early surveyors in the

6. Philippine government officials contend that the plant is part of a national plan to build up an integrated steel manufacturing industry in the Philippines. The critics, on the other hand, question Kawasaki contribution to national industrial development as the plant is a 100-percent Japanese-owned corporation with total annual output of 5-million tons of sinter to be shipped to Japan to supply the needs of the blast furnaces there. It is further argued by some that neither the Japanese government nor Kawasaki is necessarily ready to cooperate with steel plant projects in the Philippines.

Critics from Japan have also been quite vocal about the pollution effects generated by the plant. They claim that Kawasaki is building the sintering plant in Mindanao because of the public opposition to a new sintering plant in Chiba, the home of Kawasaki's industrial center in Japan. They have charged Kawasaki with exporting pollution to the Philippines, and have attempted to dramatize their concern in the movement's more recent slogan, "Don't Make Mindanao Another Chiba." Often quoted is Kawasaki's response to a suit filed by Chiba citizens against them at the first court session of 22 September 1975:

Although a sintering plant is an indispensable part of a steel plant, it also produces more air polluting materials than any part of the plant. Therefore, we at Kawatetsu have decided to build the new sintering plant in a foreign country instead of within Chiba. The new sintering plant is now under construction in Mindanao the Philippines, as part of Japan's economic aid to that country.

7. Some critics claim that local residents, particularly those of Nabacaan and Katipunan, have suffered unjustly and unnecessarily in the name of national development and progress. Specific charges concern the procurement of land and the relocation of the residents. The critics maintain that pressure was brought to bear on the residents of Nabacaan to sell their land under the threat of expropriation. They also contend that these residents, especially the small landowners, were misrepresented by a former Senator who acted as their lawyer. It is further argued that the people of Nabacaan, especially the poor and landless, were forced to relocate to Kalingagan, an area not compatible with their former ways of life.

8. At that time the project was already under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA). Some 136 dwelling units had been constructed, while 119 families had signed amortization contracts on house and lots.

barrio, with their evasive answers on the purpose of their survey. Once the barrio people learned that a Japanese plant was to be constructed in Nabacaan, questions of land values and relocation arose. At first, landowners were asking ₱8 to ₱10 per square meter for their land. At this time former Senator Emmanuel Pelaez was contracted principally by the larger landowners to act as the lawyer for the people of Nabacaan. It was agreed that he would get 10 percent of all the negotiations.⁹ Later there was a threat to fix the price of land at ₱1.50 per square meter. Manuel was away at the time but when he returned he was outraged. A final settlement of ₱3 per square meter was reached, but not at all to the satisfaction of Manuel.

One of the proposed areas for resettlement was in Bukidnon. There each family was to receive 6 hectares of land, a carabao, and housing assistance. Manuel was impressed with the proposal and even went to Bukidnon with the vice-mayor of Villanueva to consider the possibilities of resettling there. Eventually he decided against the move because of the suspected presence of rebels in the area. One place that did interest Manuel as a possible relocation site was located just nearby, in the adjoining barrio of Katipunan. There, also close to the sea, lay a 40-hectare uninhabited coconut plantation. The owner was willing to sell the land at ₱3 per square meter. However, the people of Nabacaan were told that it was not a good place to live in because of pollution coming from the sintering plant. Later, however, a Japanese representative of the plant told them that there would be no problem from pollution. Those local officials who had gone to Japan with Kawasaki also remarked that people in Japan were living close by the plants. "So what is happening? It's just business," concluded Manuel, "the land in Kalingagan was bought up for ₱0.30 per square meter, while the land in Katipunan would cost ₱3 per square meter.

According to Manuel, construction work on the plant began at once. Those residents waiting to be resettled to Kalingagan lived in bunkhouses just outside of Nabacaan for about 9 months. While some of the men worked at the construction site, most of the community people were idle and consequently were forced to meet some of their daily living expenses from the money re-

9. Compensation payments to landowners and residents of Nabacaan amounted to ₱6.9 million.

ceived in compensation for their lands and houses. Cramped quarters in the bunkhouses were also a source of discomfort, but the community endured the inconvenience in the hope of better things to come. Manuel maintained that they were first promised free housing, water, and electricity in the relocation area. As events progressed they learned that they would be charged for all three. Houses would cost ₱27,000 if payment were made in cash. Amortization schemes payable on 25 to 30-year basis would increase the total payment to ₱48,000. This did not include the cost of enclosing the first storey of the two-storey units. When Manuel considered the investment demanded in the proposed housing plan, he and other Nabacaan residents offered to build their own houses on lots provided by the Task Force. This request was refused. The houses, argued the Task Force, had to be uniform.


Upon moving to the Andam-Mouswag area, it became apparent to the new relocatees that the houses were designed for electric or gas stoves. Such conveniences they could not afford. Constructing the more familiar "dirty kitchen" outside of one's home seemed like the practical solution to this problem.¹⁰ Manuel and other members of the community approached the master planner of the project and requested that a design be made for a uniform "dirty kitchen" in Andam-Mouswag. This request was refused. At the time of the interview, people built their own "dirty kitchens," each distinctive in shape and size, from packing crates solicited from the Kawasaki Corporation.

Manuel, a leader in the Nabacaan community, often approached the Andam-Mouswag Office about specific promises made to the relocatees. Frequently, he maintained, his complaints were not considered because the persons who made the early promises were no longer with the program. "Ok, if we could speak directly to the President about our situation, but we couldn't get to him," he lamented. "At least when the war ended we were able to return to our place. Now there is no place to return to!"

JOSE

Jose was born in Nabacaan and had lived there all his life. In his late thirties, he was prematurely bald, though wiry and strong

10. Dirty kitchens, common in rural Philippines, are open fire hearths usually constructed outside of one's house.



housing plan he said other Nabacaan residents offered to build their own houses on lots provided by the Task Force. This request was refused. The houses, against the Task Force, had to be uniform.


Nabacaan was located on Macajalar Bay. People were able to get fish and shells from the sea and earn extra money by harvesting coconuts. Recently, the barrio of Nabacaan was transformed into the Kawasaki Sintering Plant, its pier extending into the bay (1 & 2). Nabacaan residents were relocated in the sitio of Kalingagan, about 9 kilometers from their former home, 500 meters above sea level. The site was called Andam-Mouswag and was prepared for the Nabacaan relocatees at a cost of more than P14 million (5 & 6). Upon moving to Andam-Mouswag, residents constructed dirty kitchens outside of their homes as alternatives to electric or gas stoves which they could not afford. They also planted vegetables as well as corn on empty lots around their houses but the yield was less than what they had gathered from their former residential lots (3 & 4).

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the Andam-Mouswag Office about specific promises made to the Nabacaan community. He mentioned his complaints were not taken seriously because the persons who made the early promises were not from the community. "OK, if we could speak directly to the person who made the promises, we could get to the bottom of the situation. But we couldn't get to him. He was not from the community. We were able to return to our place. We were able to return to our place."





of build. Married and father to five children, Jose was a fisherman and also helped to harvest coconuts in Nabacaan. He had a small house in the barrio but he himself did not own the land. At the time of the interview he was working for the CDCP at a flat rate of ₱10 per day. The work of CDCP at the construction site was just about finished and he had applied for work at the Philippine Sinter Corporation.

Jose regarded the relocation process on the whole somewhat skeptically. He maintained that in the early months of the relocation program they were promised free housing, water and electricity. At the ground-breaking ceremony in Andam-Mouswag they found out that things would be different. The houses cost ₱27,000 in cash and ₱50,000 on the installment basis. The promise that there would be work for the wives and young children in the relocation area was also not realized. He had hoped that his wife and oldest son would be able to work, maybe in the loom-weaving or sericulture project. The rate was to be ₱8 per day. Up to that time, though, neither his wife nor his son had work. Jose contended that they were, in fact, looking for high school graduates to train. "How many high school graduates are there from Nabacaan?"

Jose was also initially in the Corn Compact Farming Cooperative. With the Andam-Mouswag Office acting as guarantor, the cooperative was able to secure a loan. The request of the group was that the money be kept with the barrio captain of Nabacaan. Members of the compact would buy a cow to plow the field and pay back the loan themselves. This request was not acceptable to the Andam-Mouswag Office. The money was to be kept in the office and each member would receive ₱8 a day when he worked on the farm. Neither would the office agree to buy a cow. The initial land preparation on the corn compact farm was done by tractor paid for out of the loan. Jose reported that the first crop was a failure and the people still had outstanding debts.

Without extra income, day-to-day living had become difficult. Jose insisted that ₱10 a day was not enough to live on, especially with the payments for house and water. As yet they had not installed electricity. The installation fee was ₱65. They just used a kerosene lamp. From his earnings he also had to pay ₱1.50 a day for transportation on the Andam-Mouswag bus.¹¹ If the bus broke

11. Subsequently, transportation on the Andam-Mouswag bus was made free for all relocatees.

down he had to hike to work and also hike back. There were times he left the house at five o'clock in the morning and did not return until nine or ten in the evening.

Life in Nabacaan was much better. There were no problems in Nabacaan. They could get fish and shells from the sea and just had to buy rice. Jose also planted string beans which his wife sold in the market. His wife was also able to earn some extra money by raising chickens. His older children also helped out. In Andam-Mouswag his wife and children had no productive work. Jose felt that Andam-Mouswag was not a good place for his children because here they merely ran around without doing anything worthwhile. The climate in Kalingagan had also dried up their skin. True enough, living by the sea made them dark, but their skin was smooth. Jose maintained that some of his neighbors had already moved back to Villanueva. He himself nurtured thoughts of going back to the life by the sea.

BISING

Bising, 34, and her husband were from Katipunan, the barrio adjoining Nabacaan that was partially included in the land leased to Kawasaki. They themselves were not landowners. At the time of our talk her husband was working for the CDCP. His earnings with overtime averaged about ₱400 a month. He had applied at the Philippine Sinter Corporation but had yet to be accepted.

In Katipunan, Bising's husband used to be a tuba gatherer. In fact, they worked as a team, with Bising transporting and selling the tuba in Cagayan de Oro City some 20 kilometers away. On a good day they were able to sell three *taro* at the rate of ₱20 per *taro*.¹² From this amount a small percentage was paid to the owner of the coconut trees and some were deducted for transportation, but they still had a relatively lucrative business. Bising reported with pride that they were able to keep their children in school. She had two children in high school and two more in elementary. At the time of the interview the family relied entirely on the salary of her husband. The promise that there would be work in the relocation area had not been fulfilled. She worked on the communal tomato farm in Andam-Mouswag, but this had not

12. One *taro* (a local measure) is equivalent to 5 gallons.

been enough. She also planted *tankung* and camote in the lot area around her own house but the yield was small compared to that from their previous garden in Katipunan. Since they could not collect fish, crabs, and shells from the sea, they had to purchase more of their daily food.

Despite their immediate struggle, Bising could look to the future and see possibilities in the community of Andam-Mouswag. However, her hope for what might come was tempered with real concern. "If there is work here and the community grows, then we could prosper. But if we are not given work, I don't know. Our debt for the house will increase and maybe we will be evicted."

ANDAM-MOUSWAG: 1976

In late July 1976, the writer returned to Andam-Mouswag and conducted a sample survey with more than one-third of the household heads permanently residing in the relocation area. The survey questionnaire set out to understand the development of strategies by which a people adapt to change. The following is a presentation of the findings gained from the relocatees interviewed.

COMMUNITY AND INTEGRATION

Although survey responses, by and large, indicated that the situation in Andam-Mouswag was critical for most households, community-wide action had not been mobilized effectively. Relocation had brought about a disruption of the traditional lines of influence and authority within the community. Local leaders residing in the relocation area had lost status. Before the relocation program began, respective barrio captains and selective patrons had been seen as the accepted community leaders in Nabacaan. In Andam-Mouswag the local representative of the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) who had shown himself sympathetic to the difficulties of the people, and who had authority as a staff member, was seen by the majority of the Nabacaan and Katipunan residents as the accepted community leader.

The majority of people interviewed in Andam-Mouswag had come from communities where they were obliged to take some part in the day-to-day life of the community, whose well-being

had been, at least in some small part, due to their own efforts. In Andam-Mouswag they had been structurally inhibited from expressing themselves as socially responsible people. While there was a council of leaders in the relocation area, real positions of power and authority had been pre-empted by the relocation agencies. Frustrated and resentful, the people had been torn by self-pity and a feeling that, as a community, they could do little to effect change or direct policy in the relocation program.

SUBSISTENCE PATTERNS

The prevailing notion that most of the relocatees earned their livelihood in Nabacaan as simple fishermen was not borne out by the data gathered. The primary occupations of the respondents were formerly in the areas of agriculture and agri-business, semi-skilled wage work, and small business. However, while a rather large number of respondents had work in their previous places of residence, many were not working at the time of the interview. Those who had work in Andam-Mouswag were predominately men under the age of 50. Since the coming of Kawasaki, reliance on agricultural work had rapidly given way to work generated by the construction of the new sintering plant although it soon became clear that the relocatees would be hard-put to rely entirely on this work for their subsistence. Previous ways of supplementing incomes such as collecting fish and shells from the sea or harvesting coconuts were no longer possible in Andam-Mouswag. Nonetheless many relocatees fell back on traditional, though now less rewarding, pursuits of small-scale farming and gardening. Without available work for the whole family, many relocatees became idle, dependent on the salaried income of one family member.

Those relocatees who had been able to generate sufficient cash income had managed to support themselves in the relocation area. Those relocatees who had not been able to exploit the new environment had not fared as well. Without resources and opportunities they remained on the periphery, precariously holding on to their right to live in the relocation area. Many had simply moved back to the lowlands of Villanueva. For some, it was complete abandonment. For others, a pattern emerged whereby they maintained part-time residence in Andam-Mouswag and part-time residence closer to their sources of income.

FAMILY ORGANIZATION

The data indicate that significant changes could be taking place among patterns of family organization. Traditional patterns of organization that have dictated and supported respective roles in the family unit, particularly those linked to subsistence, could be breaking down as families become more dependent on salaried incomes. Before relocation, the system was general, stable, flexible, and personal. Individual family members were dependent on the entire family which in turn was dependent on its patrons. After relocation, the system became specific, unstable, inflexible, and impersonal. Without traditional means of supplementing incomes, individual family members have become dependent on family members with wage incomes who in turn have become dependent on their employers. Those household heads who have salaried work in Andam-Mouswag are predominately men under the age of 50. Many of their wives do not have work. Older household heads who once had work now look to their sons and daughters to provide the salaried incomes for the household. These factors could lead to shifts of status among family members. Salaried workers could assume more importance in the family. Non-working members could lose status.

PATRON-CLIENT TIES

The survey findings also give evidence of some change taking place within patron-client relationships. Many Nabacaan and Katipunan residents who used to approach their former patrons in times of need now frequently approach the Andam-Mouswag staff with the same needs. They approach the Andam-Mouswag staff with the same expectations and in the same manner that they used to approach their patrons. This at least tentatively substantiates a hypothesis that the writer wanted to test: that the Andam-Mouswag staff has become a substitute patron for many of the Nabacaan and Katipunan residents.

As a consequence of this transference, conflict has arisen in role expectations. The relocation staff look upon themselves as administrators and community developers. As administrators, they expect the relocatees to meet monthly amortization payments on houses and lots as provided in the terms of their formal contracts.

They also expect them to meet monthly water payments and to repay loans which the relocation authorities have signed as guarantors. As community developers, the staff is there to assist the relocatees in securing employment and to encourage them to become involved in the various socioeconomic programs set up in the area. The people wanting to establish a personal, diffused patron-client relationship with the relocation staff are often confused and frustrated.

Previously, as barrio people they provided extra goods and services for their patrons who in turn guaranteed their subsistence and security. Former patrons provided additional means of income, allowed the people to live on their land, and in times of crisis or emergency were there to help. On the other hand, the relocation staff is self-sufficient. They do not expect the relocatees to provide extra goods and services. Neither do they want to accept the patron role placed upon them. From the people's point of view the relocation authorities do not guarantee subsistence and security. Socioeconomic programs have failed to provide necessary supplementary income. At the same time the staff insists that payments be met on houses and lots, aggravating existing difficulties and threatening their very security in the relocation area. The substitution of bureaucratic personnel for traditional patrons may go a long way in explaining much of the conflict and tension experienced by the staff and the relocatees in their interactions with one another.

HOUSES AND LOTS

Ownership of one's own house and lot within the context of a self-developing community was basic to the plan developed by the Inter-Agency Task Force for a new human resettlement in Kalingagan. While most of the relocatees did not have security of land tenure in their previous places of residence, the majority did own their own homes. If ownership of one's own house is an accepted value, most of the relocatees had achieved this before moving to Andam-Mouswag. Their former homes were considered by the relocatees as adequate for their needs as their new homes in the relocation area. Lots in previous places of residence were also judged as adequate by almost all of those interviewed. However, almost two-thirds of the relocatees found their lot areas in

Andam-Mouswag to be less than adequate. For while lots in Andam-Mouswag had been designed as residential, the relocatees as a whole did not evaluate them by this standard but rather according to a size sufficient for growing supplementary fruits and vegetables. Although judged inadequate in these terms, many relocatees actually did plant vegetables — some even planted corn. This caused some conflict with the Andam-Mouswag staff who had encouraged instead the planting of flowers for the beautification of the community.

The housing units constructed in Andam-Mouswag are of four basic types. All of the units are of panel-lock construction, with concrete foundations and plywood interiors. Each unit has piped-in water and a flush toilet. As of 1 July 1976, 10 monthly payments should have been made on houses and lots in Andam-Mouswag, but the mean delinquency rate of relocatees at that time was 5.5 months. The failure of the relocatees to meet their amortization payments involves more than simply the lack of available cash on hand. The amortization scheme (see table), which calls for a substantial increase in payments after the first 5 years is impractical for most of them. Unless it is radically revised and events can clarify more precisely the future of the program, the relocatees will more than likely continue to be delinquent in their payments.

IDENTITY WITH A RESIDENTIAL AREA

Prior to relocation, the people were one with the life around them and enjoyed the support of their kin, their friends, and their patrons. They knew what was expected of them and what could be expected of others. Life was relatively simple; the people lived near their sources of livelihood and had acquired the skills to insure subsistence. Sudden and forced change to a new residential area disrupted the people's sense of identity with their former neighborhoods. Forced to leave a neighborhood setting that had considerable meaning as the localization of social networks and as a place where they belonged left them disoriented and with a sense of loss.

The pervasiveness of negative reactions to the new habitat is quite forcibly brought out by the data. Almost all of the relocatees interviewed felt that life was worse or much worse in Andam-

Amortization Arrangements	House Type			
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
1. Total Cost	₱ 24,020.00	₱ 27,220.00	₱ 27,720.00	₱ 26,720.00
2. Total down payment payable in 5 years	2,402.00	2,722.00	2,772.00	2,672.00
a. Monthly amortization 1st year	25.02	28.35	28.88	27.83
b. Monthly amortization 2nd year	25.02	28.35	28.88	27.83
c. Monthly amortization 3rd year	40.03	45.37	46.20	44.53
d. Monthly amortization 4th year	50.04	56.71	57.75	55.67
e. Monthly amortization 5th year	60.05	68.05	69.30	66.80
3. Remaining balance payable in 6th to 25th year or 6th to 30th year with 6% interest	21,618.00	24,498.00	24,948.00	24,948.00
a. Monthly amortization 6th to 25th year	154.88	175.51	178.74	171.29
b. Monthly amortization 6th to 30th year	139.24	157.84	160.74	154.94
4. Total payment if 25-year term	39,572.93	44,844.58	45,668.90	44,021.06
5. Total payment if 30-year term	44,188.24	50,074.14	50,994.05	49,154.00

*These amortization arrangements were designed by the Inter-agency Task Force for individual houses and lots in Andam-Mouswag (Andam-Mouswag, 1975).

Mouswag when compared to that of their previous places of residence. To middleclass outsiders this might come as surprise, since all of the residents had panel-lock homes, piped-in water, flush toilets, and access to electricity. Facilities in the barrio surely could not have been on par with this. As a matter of fact, the relocatees did consider their housing units and facilities in Andam-Mouswag to be quite adequate; but they also considered their previous housing units and facilities as generally adequate for their needs.

To rank a barrio house with limited facilities on par with a panel-lock home complete with modern facilities may seem irrational but in the context of a total social, ecological setting, it is not. The people did not necessarily idealize their former homes as some of the responses indicated. What they did value, however, was the combination of free land use for home sites and gardening, availability of additional occupations, nearness of kin and patrons, access to transportation and market facilities, and easy reach to the sea. This combination of factors strongly supported their way of life. It provided the people with a place of residence within a setting of subsistence and security. For the relocatees their immediate neighborhood was far more important to them than the condition of their housing and its facilities.

Standards set for housing and facilities in the relocation area have had their own consequences. The data indicate that while few relocatees had to pay for water in their previous places of residents, all had to pay for water in Andam-Mouswag. Many found it difficult to meet these payments. While no relocatees found it difficult to pay for lighting in the previous places of residence, many in Andam-Mouswag found it so. Amortization payments on house and lots had not been met as indicated by the high delinquency rate. The standard of dwelling units and facilities in the relocation area would seem to have placed additional financial burdens on the relocatees without alleviating the trauma associated with the sudden break from old and familiar neighborhoods.

CHANGE IN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The master plan of the Andam-Mouswag relocation project was based on the projected economic growth and development of the industrial estate. Rapid industrialization in the area was envisioned

as a modernizing force that would penetrate the very core of traditional life transforming a provincial society into a modern and progressive one. Ambitious in scope, the Andam-Mouswag program sought to create an environment that was both sensitive to the needs of the relocated people and compatible with life styles characteristic of modernizing communities.

The assumptions underlying the Andam-Mouswag plan are very similar to those of environmental determinism. Both see the physical environment as a major determinant of society and culture. Within this frame of reference people who come into contact with a changed physical environment are expected to change their attitudes and values. Modern planned environments will thus lead to modern life styles and a better quality of life. The validity of these assumptions is seriously questioned by the findings of this report. As has been seen, modern dwelling units and facilities in the relocation area did not revolutionize the lives of the people. In the experience of the Andam-Mouswag relocatees, moving into better housing units did not improve the quality of their lives, at least in the beginning.


It is perhaps meaningless to ask whether or not a planned physical environment as such improves the living conditions of its inhabitants. A more profitable approach is to inquire into the dynamics at work between a particular, defined environment and the people who live in it. What aspects of the physical environment have what impact on its inhabitants within the context of their lives and the choices open to them? If we accept Clifford Geertz's contention that there is an interplay between socio-cultural and environmental factors, the tendency to see one factor as determinant or dominant will be eliminated.¹³ Questions on quality of life might then be phrased in terms of effective environments¹⁴ or intersystem congruence.¹⁵

In the case of the Andam-Mouswag relocatees, their former places of residence provided an intricate and complex habitat that served as the effective environment of a people. The community

13. Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 9.


14. Herbert J. Gans, *People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968), pp. 4-11.

15. William Michelson, *Man and His Urban Environment: A Sociological Approach* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1970), pp. 26-31.




BUS TERMIN

Long-range plans for Andam-Mouswag included provisions for a public market, bus terminal, and downtown area. Modern planned environments were thought to lead to modern life styles and a better quality of life. These plans never materialized.



DOWNTOWN AR



had achieved an effective interlocking between their society and their physical environment. Over a period of years the people had tested their environment and developed strategies to insure their subsistence and security. The physical environment did not inhibit the people from pursuing what they considered to be the good life. On the contrary, it strongly supported this pursuit.

People who choose to move to residential areas with modern facilities have, for the most part, already achieved a degree of social and economic mobility that allows them to make the move. They select a community that fits their way of life and enables them to attain what they have desired. While the move to Andam-Mouswag put people into contact with panel-lock homes and modern facilities, it did not provide them with the means to support a new life-style. Without adequate resources the people have not been able to achieve an effective articulation with the environment so carefully designed and laid out for them by the planners. The greater tragedy is perhaps that time-tested strategies for exploiting former habitats are no longer practical or possible in the new environment. No wonder that reference to the quality of life in the relocation area did not evoke comment on housing and facilities but centered on such issues as availability of work, adequacy of income, and access to sources of livelihood.

The relocated households which have been the most successful in establishing themselves in the new environment are those with relatively adequate resources. This includes a small group of former landowners, a small group of established tenant farmers, and households with adequate income from salaried work. Households from Nabacaan or Katipunan which have not been able to rely on salaried incomes have had particular difficulty in establishing themselves in the new environment. In brief, those relocatees who have had the necessary resources to alter their styles of life have adjusted best to the new environment. This, of course, does not mean that they desired a change, only that they were prepared to meet it when it came upon them.

The residents of Andam-Mouswag who have made the most successful adjustment to the environment are the households who were awarded houses and lots in Andam-Mouswag despite the fact that they were not directly affected by the relocation program. Those in this group were mainly professional people with educational and income levels higher than that of the average relocatee.

Some of them had been associated with the Andam-Mouswag community for sometime as teachers or businessmen, or as relatives of the original relocatees. Unlike the relocatees, these households voluntarily chose to move to the Andam-Mouswag site. They were not only financially prepared for a change in life style; they actively desired to make one. To reside in Andam-Mouswag and to take advantage of the opportunities offered there were deliberate choices calculated to improve the quality of their lives. For some, it was a chance to own their own homes. For others, it was an opportunity to set up a business. For all, it was an option they purposely pursued. Not unexpectedly, the non-relocated awardees expressed greater satisfaction with the new residential environment than did the relocatees for whom the area was specifically designed.

CHANGE IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The way the relocatees have adopted to change in their social environment is again best viewed as an interactive process. Of paramount concern is the dynamics involved between the national planners and the people themselves. It is impossible to understand what has happened in Andam-Mouswag without a consideration of how the relocation agencies have affected the lives of the people and conversely how the people have affected the ongoing implementation of the relocation plan.

As in other compulsory relocation programs, planning for resettlement in Andam-Mouswag began only shortly before the actual construction of the plant. While the Task Force was anxious to inaugurate a novel experiment in human resettlement, it was also under great pressure to relocate the people as quickly as possible. Given these constraints, the relocation staff had little time to plan and execute a satisfactory transition from old to new habitats. As a result, resettlement became a crash program, full of stress for all involved including the administrators.

In an effort to minimize the resistance of the affected families, the Task Force set out to overcome fears and suspicions by extolling the merits of its planned program. Promises and commitments were voiced time and time again. Unfortunately many of the individuals who made promises did not speak for the Task Force as a collective entity. Their promises could and would not be

backed up. This points to some lack of coordination among the various agencies which made up the Task Force. Of more consequence, it placed the Task Force in a position where they lost credibility in the eyes of the people.

Despite difficulties encountered early on in the project, the Task Force seems to have been genuinely convinced of the soundness of its program and the feasibility of its long-range plan. As an entity mandated directly from the Office of the President it had presumably the political strength and financial resources to pursue its goals unhampered. In fact, some critics maintain that the Task Force operated too independently without proper deference to local political leaders and PHIVIDEC officials. While this might explain some of the later criticism directed at the Task Force, it is helpful to keep in mind that at one point in time the Task Force felt itself capable to command the necessary resources for actualizing its dream of a self-contained, progressive community in Andam-Mouswag.

The dream or vision of Andam-Mouswag had two key components: to create a physical environment conducive to human resettlement, and to provide a comprehensive program for economic and social development. Priority was given to the first agenda. Roads had to be widened, land leveled, houses built, and a waterworks system installed before the people, who had been temporarily housed in bunkhouses, could be relocated to the planned site. Economic development, while considered an integral part of the program, was not pursued with the same intensity. To some extent the Task Force was limited in its capability to provide an extensive economic development program for the relocatees. It could assist them in gaining employment with the subcontractors and Kawasaki but it could not guarantee that they would have jobs. Most relocatees were unskilled and despite the fact that they had first priority at Kawasaki, they could be passed over for other more qualified workers. If for no other reason than maintaining good personal relationships with the local community, Kawasaki was anxious to absorb relocated people into its work force. But conditions were set. Only one member from each family would be hired and this person had to be under the age of 50. All applicants were also required to pass a physical examination. When difficulties arose in gaining employment at Kawasaki, the relocatees became increasingly frustrated and vented much of their anger and resent-

ment at the people who had relocated them.

The Task Force's own alternative to economic self-sufficiency was the setting up of cottage and home industries in the relocation area. It also initiated experiments in communal farming. These socioeconomic projects were designed to provide supplementary income for the relocatees while encouraging cooperative self-help. Unfortunately the programs never made a serious impact on the community because some demanded extensive training, others were strictly regulated by funding agencies, and many were just too contingent on complex production and marketing expertise. Whatever the specific reasons for failure it becomes all too apparent that the programs were planned independently of the people without an adequate appreciation of their basic needs or ways of doing things. Although initially responsive to the socioeconomic programs the relocatees gradually realized that the projects could not generate immediate and assured returns. From their point of view, the projects as designed and implemented by the relocation authorities lacked relevance to their real problems and immediate concerns.

The struggle of the relocatees to develop an effective relationship with the Task Force whereby they could insure their subsistence and security was further complicated by a change of administration in the project. On 1 August 1975, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was established by P.D. 757 and assumed authority for all major existing housing programs including that of the Task Force. This change in administration had serious implications for the Andam-Mouswag project. In terms of its position in the national bureaucracy, the Andam-Mouswag program became just one of the myriad projects sponsored by the NHA. Where once the Task Force staff had pursued the program with a single-minded resoluteness and idealism, the new administration approached the management of the program more cautiously. Where earlier financial inputs had been substantial and were likely to continue if the Task Force were to keep its vision alive, the NHA with constraints on its own budget limited its financial commitment to the program. Where the Task Force had maintained a rather large field staff, the NHA in July 1976 cut back 50 percent of its staff in Andam-Mouswag.

Though the relocation phase of the program had been completed by the time of the NHA takeover with consequent cut-backs

in funds and personnel, nonetheless, the approaches of the two administrations diverged sharply. The Task Force was intent on developing a self-sufficient, modern community in Andam-Mouswag. The NHA, with housing as its mandated priority, was disposed to manage Andam-Mouswag as a housing project. As a consequence economic development programs suffered. The people whose ability to maintain their amortization payments depended on this type of program became by force of circumstance negligent beneficiaries of a housing scheme.

The lack of integration and accountability for policies pursued among the various agencies was readily manifest once the Task Force became defunct. One might approach the NHA on specific policies and promises made by the Task Force, but the NHA was in a position to disclaim responsibility for the actions of its predecessor. The PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority was also in a position to exonerate itself from accusations directed at mismanagement of the relocation project. The PHIVIDEC, as the designated authority to buy and lease land contained within the Industrial Estate, is responsible for all land transactions but not specifically for the relocation of residents once their land and/or houses have been purchased. Industrial investors, such as the Kawasaki Corporation, deal directly with PHIVIDEC. They, too, are not legally accountable to the local community for effects generated by the transfer of land.

The relocated community whose social environment was once characterized by personal, familiar, though to be sure unequal, ties has found itself burdened by more impersonal, unfamiliar, and complicated bureaucratic structures. Individual relocatees particularly men under the age of 50, those with skills or those with status, have had some success in exploiting personal resources within these structures. But the community as a whole has become paralyzed, unable to articulate its own world of meanings or mobilize an effective relationship with its social environment.

ANDAM-MOUSWAG: 1977¹⁶

Early in 1977, 20 relocatees who were not maintaining full-time residence in Andam-Mouswag and who failed to meet their

16. The following accounts were gathered from project reports and from personal conversations with the Andam-Mouswag staff.

monthly housing payments found their houses padlocked. On 4 April 1977, these units were formally repossessed and notification of cancellation of contracts/awards was served by the general manager of the National Housing Authority. By 30 June 1977, five more housing units were repossessed in Andam-Mouswag. Some of the repossessed housing units were then occupied by persons not formally awarded houses and lots in the area. Of the 127 households residing in Andam-Mouswag as of September 1977, 32 were not directly affected by the relocation program. Interestingly enough, over 300 households had applied for houses and lots in Andam-Mouswag. Many of those applicants were retired employees of the Del Monte Company.

In March 1977 the Philippine Sinter Corporation became operational. As of 31 July 1977, the total number of people living in Andam-Mouswag and working at PSC was 79. This included household members of the new awardees as well as the original relocatees. At that time PSC employed approximately 600 workers.

A survey taken by the Andam-Mouswag staff in July 1977, indicated that outside of those working at PSC a good number of the working residents of Andam-Mouswag were engaged in small-scale farming. Work with the subcontractors had been effectively completed. A group of mothers was self-employed in the meat-processing program. This project was one of the few ongoing socioeconomic programs in Andam-Mouswag. Other socioeconomic projects, for example, loomweaving and sericulture, had not been active. The dairy processing plant was not yet operational. Some residents still continued to work with the Tomato Farmers association although a rather large outstanding debt threatened its future.

In this researcher's own survey, those who had salaried work were predominantly men under the age of 50. This was confirmed by the July 1977 survey. Those not working at PSC were farming, running small sari-sari stores, or unemployed. Overall, the Andam-Mouswag survey indicated that unemployment was still a problem in the relocation area. Many of those eligible for the labor force were not working. In most households only one member of the household was working.

As of 1 July 1976 10 monthly payments should have been made on houses and lots in Andam-Mouswag, but the mean delinquency rate of the relocated was 5.5 months. As of 1 September

1977, 24 monthly payments should have been made on houses and lots in Andam-Mouswag. Of the 119 original relocatees, 95 still had contracts on houses and lots at this time. The mean delinquency rate of the relocatees as of 1 September 1977 was 17 months.

On 17 June 1977, the Andam-Mouswag Office began to cut off the water service of those households who were delinquent 6 months or more in their payments. Most of the water services actually disconnected were those of the repossessed units. However, some relocated households with valid amortization contracts had their water cut off. According to one progress report, the cutting off of water service connections desired to facilitate an increase of water payments. The effect was negligible. As recorded in the 1 September 1977 statement of accounts, the majority of the relocatees were still delinquent more than 6 months in their payments. In fact, the mean delinquency rate for the relocatees at that time was 10.7 months. As of 1 July 1977, the flat rate was raised from ₱5 to ₱7 a month.

At the time of the 1976 survey, the Andam-Mouswag Project operated two mini-buses which made the round trip from Kalingagan relocation site to the poblacion of Villanueva. Until June 1976, the round trip cost ₱1.50. In June 1976, the trip was made free for all residents of Andam-Mouswag community. More recently, the Andam-Mouswag mini-bus service has been discontinued. The PSC operates a shuttle bus to and from the relocation site for its own employees. Residents who are not employees of the PSC must rely on the infrequent public utility jeeps passing through Kalingagan each day making the round trip from Cagayan de Oro City to Claveria, Misamis Oriental.

Andam-Mouswag still does not have its own public market. Some of the community residents are thinking about constructing their own temporary market in the area. Until now marketing is done in the poblacion of Villanueva. Once a month, though, there is a *tabo*, or coming together, of local people in Andam-Mouswag to buy and sell various food products.

The next project envisioned in the industrial estate is the construction of a National Steel Plant. This will involve the purchase of 711 hectares of land in the estate and the relocation of 754 families. Although the Andam-Mouswag Project is originally intended to accommodate all relocated families from the industrial

estate, it is extremely doubtful that subsequent relocation will take place there. Plans are already being considered by local officials and PHIVIDEC authorities to relocate families within the lowland areas of Villanueva and Tagoloan. What will become of Andam-Mouswag? There are suggestions from NHA personnel to provide low-cost housing for the relocatees who cannot afford to pay for the present type of housing in Andam-Mouswag. These relocatees will again be relocated and their housing units awarded to higher-income households. To stimulate development in the area, there has also been the reconsideration of an earlier proposal to transfer the provincial capital of Misamis Oriental to the Andam-Mouswag site. Another suggestion is to establish a Golf and Country Club complex at the site. Clearly it is yet to be resolved whether Andam-Mouswag can be an ongoing program without negating its original commitment to assist the relocatees.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL PLANNERS

When the planners drew the blueprints of the relocation program, they anticipated the people's ability to respond effectively to their plans. The planners seemed to have expected that the relocatees would be able to pursue their livelihoods, pay their rents, and even achieve a higher level of living. Events in Andam-Mouswag point to the contrary. The relocatees have not been able to attain the present goals of the relocation program. Given what is known about the goals of the program and the experience of the people, what may be inferred?

The Inter-Agency Task Force approached the local community in Misamis Oriental with a double agenda. It sought to provide the Nabacaan community with the means whereby they could fully participate in the industrial development plans of the area. At the same time, the Task Force was charged with a specific task and it was operating under a time constraint to relocate the people as quickly as possible. Development would come but first the people had to be relocated. In effect the community was forced to sacrifice its present way of life on the premise that the industrial estate would bring progress and development to the area. This imperative seemed reasonable enough to the national planners. The fact that the people "resisted development" and "refused to modernize" only reinforced the planners' bias that the people did not properly

understand and appreciate what was being done in their own interest.

Given what is now known about the complexities associated with compulsory relocation, indigenous resistance to relocation no longer appears to be an untenable position but a valid response that should be taken with the utmost seriousness.

To date no governments have shown the capacity to deal effectively with the complexities associated with compulsory resettlement especially when a complex development program is initiated at the same time . . . For the moment, the lesson for developers and social engineers is that compulsory resettlement is a drastic step, inevitably accompanied by a transitional period of suffering. It should be used as a development strategy only after an intelligent and extensive examination of alternatives has been completed.¹⁷

Implicit in the Andam-Mouswag approach to human resettlement is also the conviction that human settlements are best designed by professional planners. Plans for the Andam-Mouswag Project were in fact developed by middle and upper-class professionals based on middle-class standards and corresponding life styles. The relocatees were expected to conform to the standards set by the planners in order that they could transform their own life styles and achieve a better quality of life.

The fact that this did not happen provides some measure of support for the notion that particular arrangements of physical environment are congruent with some social conditions and life styles and incongruent with others.¹⁸ In the Andam-Mouswag Project, planners overconfidently and unrealistically applied middle-class standards to the very real and different needs of the relocatees. To be effective, planners must rise above their own class-biases to an appreciation of the intricate and complex adaptations that a people, especially those living on a subsistence basis, have made with their social and physical environment. This writer is not arguing against more adequate human settlements but advocating that facilities planned be designed more closely within the frames of reference and with the participation of those people who will use them.

While the Andam-Mouswag relocatees were called upon from

17. Thayer Scudder, "The Human Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development and Resettlement," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 2 (1973): 55.

18. Michelson, *Man and His Urban Environment*, pp. 26-32.

time to time to choose among certain alternatives presented to them, this type of participation could not be construed as direct involvement in the planning and policy-making process. From the outset the Task Force assumed the entire burden of the project. Once they were replaced, the fragility of their plan became all too obvious. Had the relocatees been part of the basic power structure from the beginning, the policy-making orientation of the program would have no doubt been quite different. Active participation might have ensured greater continuity in the project. If successful adaptation depends in large measure on one's belief that he can manage his environment, and on the evidence that proves to him that he is indeed doing so,¹⁹ direct and active participation surely could not but have helped the relocatees in making a smoother transition from their old to a new habitat. As it was, the relocatees were at best only able to cope with the change taking place in their lives. For many this meant abandoning the relocation site, and subsequently, whatever assistance they might have claimed from the relocation authorities.

REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In trying to present an accurate description of the experience of the Andam-Mouswag relocatees, this study has by necessity considered the impact of the relocation program on the effective environment of the community. The writer's intent has not been to belabor the difficulties in the program but to point out the complexities involved in compulsory relocation. To make the Task Force the scapegoat for all of the ills associated with the project is a much too facile and unproductive exercise. Serious reformulation of basic orientations and convictions is needed on several levels if the lessons learned from Andam-Mouswag are to take root and make themselves felt in future policy.

Compulsory relocation inevitably involves the infliction of pain. Where policy does involve either the active infliction or the passive acceptance of pain, this fact requires a justification in terms of moral rather than technical necessity. Human beings have the

19. Mary R. Hollnsteiner, "People Power: Community Participation in the Planning and Implementation of Human Settlements," *Philippine Studies* 24, 1 (1976): 8.

right to live in a meaningful world. Respect for this right is a moral imperative for policy.²⁰

The principle of right to meaning has almost opposite implications. In modern society it implies the right of the individual to choose his own meaning. In premodern society it implies his right to abide by tradition. Modernization everywhere involves a rupture in the order of meanings. Consequently, in any situation undergoing modernization, it is often unclear which of the two versions of the right to meaning should pertain – the right to choose freely or the right to be left alone in one's given way of life.²¹

This dilemma continues to confront national planners, perhaps more acutely in Third World countries where sheer survival depends on the soundness of development strategies pursued. Often-times the tendency has been to give priority to economic development programs at the cost of sacrificing the traditional world of meanings. It is to this orientation of policy that we address ourselves. The issue is not how national planners and social scientists can come together to plan, for instance, the most humane compulsory relocation program, but how both groups can develop the deep and inner conviction that people themselves have a right to determine along what lines they will pursue their own development. Thus Peter Berger:

It is not for the outsider (be he scientific observer or policy maker) to impose his own conception of rights and value priorities. His first task is to listen, as carefully as he can, to the manner in which these matters are defined by the insiders. The fact that this is not always easy, especially because of the ambiguities brought into play by modernization, provides no alibi for ad hoc impositions. Minimally, what is urgently required in the area of development policy is respect for the varieties and the inner genius of traditional ways of looking at reality.²²

This approach does not necessarily defend the continued existence of a given way of life. It is important to understand that modernity does not appear in the traditionalist's world view only as a threat. It also appears as a promise of a longer life, an opportunity to increase material goods, even as a way of achieving liberation and fulfillment. The reaction to modernization is fre-

20. Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 139, 166.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-69.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.

quently quite ambivalent, a complex mixture of revulsion and attraction. While modernization poses a potential threat to security and subsistence, it also holds the promise of a better life. The viability of development strategies will largely depend on the outsiders' capacity to appreciate countermodernizing resistances and to create institutional arrangements to accommodate them.²³

One way of reconciling the differential approaches to meaning is to create intermediate structures that take cognizance of developmental priorities both on the national and local community levels. This approach demands that national planners actively encourage the growth of strong people's organizations. People come to a better understanding of the issues confronting them and are best able to participate in the planning process if they have developed a sense of community and have organized themselves into associations. Accepting the legitimacy of people's organizations and their right to participate in the planning process is also an explicit acknowledgement of the indigenous right to meaning.

Planning then should be sensitive to the particular concerns of the local community as well as to the more comprehensive goals and imperatives of the nation. Social scientists can help by providing both the local community and the national planners with the benefit of their research. If, for example, compulsory relocation presents itself as an acceptable alternative to both the national planners and the local community, projected plans may well consider the lessons that have already been learned. A plan that seeks to create a self-sustaining system of development must relate the objectives of the relocation program to the interactive process operative in the social, economic, and ecological adaptations of the people. The relation of life style to its setting must also be considered with the effects of forced change. Moving into a neighborhood conducive to the community's original life style would seem to enable its members to overcome their residential change without forcing them to alter their life styles before this might be desirable. Above all, in emphasizing the familiar, the relocation authorities should keep their plans simple and encourage the people to get back on their own feet as soon as possible.

To this point the writer has attempted to provide a general approach to the complex and sensitive issue of compulsory relo-

23. *Ibid.*, pp. xvii-xviii.

cation. Attention must now be focused on the Andam-Mouswag Project itself. While the NHA has embarked on some innovative programs in its brief existence, it has failed to deal resourcefully with the Andam-Mouswag program in Misamis Oriental. Nonetheless, it is perhaps unfair to lay the entire burden of the program on the NHA. The time is long overdue for differences of opinion to be put aside and for all those involved in the industrial development program, namely, the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, the Kawasaki Corporation, local political officials, and the NHA, to enter into a serious dialogue with the Andam-Mouswag relocatees. Authorities must be prepared to make significant modifications in the present program. This might mean a thorough revision of the housing amortization scheme. It will surely mean a fresh approach to the problem of unemployment and perhaps even assistance to those who have opted to move back to the lowland. While this plan of action might seem impractical and unrealistic to some, only through such an effort can the Andam-Mouswag program renew its commitment to the relocatees and signify as its name implies that it is "ready to progress."