The Quezon-Winslow Correspondence:
A Friendship Turned Sour

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ROLANDO M. GRIPALDO

INTRODUCTION

When Manuel L. Quezon (b. 19 August 1878) set foot on American soil on 24 December 1909 to succeed Resident Commissioner Pablo Ocampo, he was thirty-one years old. His immediate concern was to study the English language since he wanted to participate in the discussion of Congress in relation to Philippine matters and his ultimate objective as resident commissioner was to obtain Philippine independence as a matter of natural right to self-determination through a peaceful and legal way.¹

Alfred Erving Winslow (b. 19 November 1839) was seventy years old in 1909. He was an active businessman engaged in the "importation of chemicals and manufacturers' supplies."² He accepted the secretaryship of the Anti-Imperialist League in 1898, the year the league was established. Winslow's purpose as an American citizen, who believed with Abraham Lincoln that "no man is good enough to govern another without that other's consent"³ and who believed in freeing the United States from

³. Ibid., p. vii. See Storey to Quezon, 31 May 1927. Unless otherwise specified all letters and cables used in this work are taken from the Quezon Papers at the Philippine National Library. The Quezon Papers are divided into thirteen series and though the bulk of the Quezon-Winslow correspondence, which began in 1910 and ended in 1919, is...
its "heel of Achilles" in the Pacific, was to obtain Philippine independence as a moral obligation.

Quezon lived in Washington, D.C., where Congress was situated, while Winslow lived in Boston, Massachusetts, his hometown, where the Anti-Imperialist League was founded. We owe it to the distance between Washington and Boston and to the common political interest of Quezon and Winslow that the correspondence between them — at least the bulk of it — came into existence.

**THE FRIENDSHIP**

It is difficult to ascertain when the friendship between Quezon and Winslow exactly began. Quezon vigorously sought the friendship of the Anti-Imperialist League, whose most active member was Winslow, because he not only needed all the help he could muster in order to influence prominent leaders of Congress and the American public opinion to support Philippine independence, but he also needed a helping hand in explaining to the Filipinos back home whatever adverse problems the independence issue might have in Congress. In fact, when it was clear to him that no independence bill would be discussed in the 1911 first regular session of Congress, Quezon requested Winslow to write *La Vanguardia* and *El Ideal* in order to encourage the Filipinos "by telling them of our hope in the Democratic promises," otherwise the nonaction of Congress might lead to a disastrous effect, such as the defeat of the Nationalist party in the next elections. In a letter to Winslow, Quezon explained thus:

found in Series V (General Correspondence), some can be found in Series VI (Correspondent's File), Series VII (Subject File), and Series IX (General Miscellany). Since most of the communications used in this paper are taken from Series V, only those taken from the other series will be cited as such. Spelling errors were corrected in each quoted correspondence.

4. Winslow to Quezon, 4 August 1914; 17 September 1914; 22 October 1914; 16 November 1915; and 5 February 1916. Harrison to Winslow, 8 May 1913. Winslow to Harrison, 29 April 1918. Theodore Roosevelt likewise held this view. See Storey to Quezon, 31 May 1927.

5. From the time Quezon and Winslow began their correspondence in 1910 up to 1917 Winslow stayed in Boston; in 1918 he moved to New Haven, Connecticut, where he resided until his death four years later.

6. Quezon to Winslow, 17 May 1911 and 26 March 1912.

7. Quezon to Winslow, 8 July 1911 and Winslow to Quezon, 10 July 1911.
What I meant to say is that if [the Filipinos] were not informed by you of your valuable work and my recent campaign, as well as of the result we have already accomplished — the written, and otherwise promises made to us by leaders of both houses of Congress — and the good expectation we have for the future, the non-action of Congress might be exploited by our enemies to the detriment of those who are keeping alive among the people the clamor for independence, to wit, the Nationalist Party. But I am positive that a letter from you, informing my people of what we expect to get, will clear up the situation and all the combined efforts of our opponents to kill the enthusiasm of my people will be fruitless. The Filipinos have such a faith in your league and in your altruistic motives that they do not discuss any information coming from your quarters. 

What will therefore be shown in this section is whether Quezon received the committed friendship of the Anti-Imperialist League, at least, through Winslow.

Although Commissioner Benito Legarda, Sr. introduced Quezon to the House of Representatives in January 1910 and was immediately sworn in, it took five months of studying the English language initially through a tutor, then through reading newspapers, magazines, and books with the help of a Spanish-English dictionary, and through attending social functions without an interpreter, before Quezon was able to deliver his first message to Congress on 14 May 1910. It was probably this message that caught the attention of Winslow because after acknowledging the benefits received by Filipinos from the American government, Quezon still pleaded for immediate independence coupled with neutralization. This particular message was all the more significant from the perspective of Winslow if we bear in mind that prior to Quezon neither Commissioner Legarda, who was a Progressista, nor Commissioner Ocampo, who was a Nacionalista, publicly sought Philippine independence in the halls of Congress.

Through the invitation of the Anti-Imperialist League Quezon spoke before the Beacon Society of Boston on 4 February 1911. The speech impressed Winslow so much that he held Quezon in high esteem:

8. Quezon to Winslow, 11 July 1911.
I want to say to you again in a more formal way what I said this morning in regard to the profound effect which you produced upon a group of solid businessmen quite impregnable to sentiment but to be convinced only by a simple demonstration of truth. This I think you most effectually made, and I am sure that you have won many converts among men who had been previously totally indifferent to your cause or absolutely inimical to it.

Let me congratulate you again and renew my assurances of cordial regard and respect.¹⁰

In a letter to F.W. Childs, who accompanied Quezon in the latter's New England speaking engagements, Winslow reiterated his great admiration of Quezon:

From my own experience of the effect produced by Mr. Quezon in Boston, and from what I read in the Republican of Springfield describing his speech . . . [before the Board of Trade of Springfield], I was prepared for the most effective results of his appearance . . . I quite agree with you that his trip was a most important means of influencing public opinion, especially as Mr. Quezon's earnestness, eloquence and magnetism was so great. I only wish such expedition could be made in all parts of the country.¹¹

Except for a slight misunderstanding on a report quoting Quezon to have favored a “protectorate” for the Philippines,¹² Winslow was satisfied with Quezon's performance during the entire year of 1911.

Firstly, Quezon initiated the move in Congress for a “declaration of Philippine independence [to be] made by the House regardless of what the Senate might do with it”¹³ and despite setbacks¹⁴ the move finally bore fruit when in December 1911

¹⁰. Winslow to Quezon, 6 February 1911. See also Winslow to Quezon, 18 January 1911.
¹¹. Winslow to Childs, 21 February 1911. Regarding Quezon's personal magnetism, see also Winslow to P. R. Cruz, 15 March 1912, Series VI.
¹². See Winslow to Quezon, 28 February 1911; 4 March 1911; and 8 March 1911.
¹³. Quezon to Winslow, 13 March 1911.
¹⁴. The effect of Quezon's move on the ruling Democratic members of the House was minimal since they did not consider the independence issue a pressing matter. Once, through the constant prodding of Winslow, William Jones thought of convening the insular committee in order to discuss what action to take in regard to Philippine Independence (Winslow to Quezon, 25 April 1911), but decided later he could do nothing about it during the present session (Winslow to Quezon, 16 May 1911). Quezon explained to Winslow in a letter of 17 May 1911 that Jones did not want to proceed with the introduction of the bill in the House during this session of Congress because: (1) he was “afraid to hurt the cause of Philippine independence by starting to do something without finishing it completely,” and (2) since he took it to be a “very serious matter”
Congressman William A. Jones, the chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, decided to draw up together with Quezon, the bill on Philippine independence.\textsuperscript{15}

Secondly, Quezon sent out a circular letter to members of Congress on 21 June 1911 soliciting their views on Philippine independence and proposing two alternatives: one was to give independence to the Philippines as soon as a stable government was organized, i.e., within two years after the passage of the independence act; the other was a gradual transfer of the colonial government to the Filipinos within a period of eight years (or less). Both schemes would include neutralization.\textsuperscript{16} The result was gratifying to Quezon because the majority of the respondents were in favor of Philippine independence in spite of expressions of non-committal by many as to the alternatives.\textsuperscript{17} Winslow could not suppress his enchantment on the matter and said to Quezon:

\textit{You have conceived and executed many fine ideas, but I think this circular letter of yours is the best thing you have done. You certainly will have a statue on the Luneta one of these days!}\textsuperscript{18}

In June 1911 the executive committee of the Anti-Imperialist League passed a vote of appreciation to Quezon for his "extraordinary services."\textsuperscript{19}

Thirdly, Quezon delivered various speeches in several places.\textsuperscript{20} He wrote articles and letters to various newspapers. He hired Clyde H. Tavenner to head his publicity bureau.\textsuperscript{21} Later he hired H. Parker Willis, a professor of economics and politics, to take charge of the publication of a Philippine review with Quezon as editor, the initial issue of which was planned to come out on 30 December 1911.\textsuperscript{22} Aside from supporting financially Jose involving "the welfare of 10,000,000 people," it should be considered very carefully and he was not yet ready for the task. In the caucus held on 14 June 1911 the Democrats considered the Philippine issue practically a minor matter (Quezon to Winslow, 19 June 1911).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Quezon to Winslow, 11 December 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Quezon to members of Congress, 21 June 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Quezon to Winslow, 28 June 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Winslow to Quezon, 29 June 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Anti-Imperialist League to Quezon, 29 June 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Aside from his speeches in some New England states and in Congress, Quezon spoke before the Tammany Society of New York on 4 July 1911 and the Universal Races Congress in London on 27 July 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Quezon to Winslow, 21 March 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Quezon to Winslow, 7 December 1911 and 10 December 1911. Willis to Quezon, 19 December 1911.
\end{itemize}
Mañibo's New York-based magazine, the *Philippine Review*, Quezon requested James H. Blount of Macon, Georgia, to write a book on the American occupation of the Philippines.

Finally, Quezon was instrumental in converting many of those opposed or indifferent to the Philippine cause, some of whom were members of Congress. Quezon also supported Winslow's plan to remove from the Philippine Commission Dean Worcester whose prejudices against the Filipinos were detrimental to the Philippine campaign for independence.

All the above activities convinced Winslow of how invaluable Quezon was. As a matter of fact, when he heard from Quezon's secretary, A. M. Opisso, that Quezon was sick of influenza, Winslow immediately wrote Quezon to take care of himself: "Your health is not only of personal but [of] national and even international importance."

Towards the end of December 1911 Winslow pledged his full friendship and wholehearted support to Quezon. He said:

My dear Friend:

With my own hand and in paper unofficial, I wish you health and happiness and . . . all . . . measure of success in your patriotic and noble work — with which I hope to cooperate as long as I live.

I am faithfully yours,
(Sgd.) Erving Winslow

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**THE COMMON POLITICAL POSITION**

In a draft letter to President William H. Taft on 29 March 1910, Quezon was interested only in Philippine autonomy, apparently as an initial step to Philippine independence. He argued that since the Filipinos without exception were dissatisfied with many features of the colonial government primarily because of the wide

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23. Quezon to Winslow, 30 August 1911.
24. Quezon to Winslow, 14 July 1911 and 15 July 1911.
25. Quezon to Winslow, 16 June 1911. "As a result of this trip [through Vermont]. I am inclined to think that the mass of the people, whether Republicans or Democrats, are in sympathy with our cause." See also Quezon to Winslow, 8 July 1911 and 10 December 1911. Winslow to Quezon, 6 February 1911.
26. Winslow to Quezon, 11 May 1911 and 17 May 1911. See Quezon to Winslow, 31 March 1911 and 19 May 1911.
27. Opisso to Winslow, 14 December 1911 and Winslow to Quezon, 15 December 1911.
28. Winslow to Quezon, 29 December 1911, Series VI.
disparity between the salaries of American and Filipino civil servants and the imposition of excessive taxation, the colonial government should refrain from unnecessary spending and the people should be reassured by the institution of a senate, similar to the one proposed for Porto Rico with the consent of Taft's administration. It was important that in the case of the Philippines, as it was in Porto Rico, a separation of the administrative and legislative departments of government be instituted. The members of the senate, who may be citizens of the United States or the Philippine Islands, were to be elected by senatorial districts. Quezon knew of the Progresista resolution submitted to President Taft on 6 February 1910 which petitioned the United States for an express and solemn declaration of its "unswerving purpose and intention . . . to grant the Filipino people their independence" and to deliver to them the whole territory intact. Quezon apparently believed that his position for Philippine autonomy through the establishment of a Philippine senate was more acceptable to the Taft administration than the Progresista position contained in its resolution. In a similar letter dated 25 April 1910 and addressed to the Secretary of War, J.M. Dickinson, Quezon and Legarda stipulated, in addition to the establishment of the Philippine Senate and the reduction of optional, and elimination of unnecessary, governmental expenses in the Islands, that Congress make a definite declaration as to the purpose of the United States in those islands. Unfortunately, for fear of breaking his personal relation with Taft and contrary to his previous understanding with Quezon, Legarda refused to sign it. The following month – with the Assembly and Progresista resolutions on hand – Quezon made up his mind to petition the U.S. Congress for immediate Philippine independence coupled with neutralization and supported this petition by a speech in Congress on 10 May 1914.²⁹

Winslow's political position, on the other hand, may be traced as far back as 1898. As a counter-plan to the U.S. annexation of the Philippines, the Anti-Imperialists presented three options: (1) protectorate, (2) neutralization, and (3) independence. Win-

slow chose the second option which meant that the Philippine Islands would be "set free and their peace guaranteed by the powers just as had been done for Switzerland, Belgium, and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg."30 Winslow discussed this at length in his work, Neutralization: A Policy by which any Responsibility Incurred by the United States in the Philippine Islands may be Discharged.31

The protectorate position as enunciated in 1898 by Reverend Charles G. Ames consisted of "a home form of government — state or territorial" — headed by "a governor-general and backed by soldiers or sailors." The independence position, on the other hand, which was the most popular counterproposal among members of the Anti-Imperialist League, was prominently endorsed by the Republican senator of Massachusetts, George Frisbie Hoar, who believed that the Philippines should be set free to work out its own salvation provided all foreign governments would keep out of the Islands, i.e., the United States should enforce the same Monroe Doctrine on the Philippines as it was enforcing on Mexico, Haiti, and the South American republics. Other proponents of the independence position, however, would prefer the Philippines to have a stable government first before granting it independence.32

We may highlight the common political position of Quezon and Winslow through the following incident. In February 1911, Winslow wrote Quezon:

Please write me at once just a word to say what your opinion would be of a protectorate of the Philippine Islands by the United States, looking, of course, to future independence instead of neutralization. (You know pretty well what our views are.)33

When Quezon did not immediately reply, Winslow followed this up:

I wrote you February 28th because you had been quoted as favoring, or at least looking with complacency upon the establishment of a "pro-

33. Winslow to Quezon, 28 February 1911.
tectorate” of the United States over the Philippine Islands instead of independence and neutralization. I could scarcely believe it to be true because such a student of history as yourself knows as well as I do that protectorates of a strong nation over a weak one never end and are tantamount to ownership.34

In reply Quezon told Winslow that he “gave no ground whatever to be quoted as favoring, or at least looking with complacency, upon the establishment of a protectorate of the United States over the Philippine Islands instead of independence and neutralization.” He believed that the wrong impression about his political beliefs could have arisen during the hearing conducted by the House Committee on Insular Affairs in connection with the friar land inquiry. Among the views he expressed were the following: (1) that if the Philippines were granted independence, then American investments would be preferred there to other foreign investments and that American investments before Philippine independence “might postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the matter of independence,” because American investors in the Islands opposed independence for fear their investments could not be adequately protected;35 (2) that the Filipinos were capable of administering their own affairs today and ought to be declared independent immediately; (3) that some six years ago there was a great diversity of opinions as to when the Philippines should be made independent — ten, fifteen, or fifty years — but not much difference now: “I can point to not more than six men who would be in favor of the retention of the Islands by the United States for not less than fifty years;” and (4) that the Filipinos were generally in favor of neutralizing the Islands after the grant of independence although some of them would favor American intervention as in the case of Cuba. It may have been the last point that generated the wrong impression because Quezon favored either plan — neutralization or intervention — provided independence was immediately granted. As Quezon himself explained it:

Perhaps my affirmative answer to Mr. Jones’ question: “You would be content with either plan if you could get immediate independence?” is what caused the impression that I am for American protectorate. You

34. Winslow to Quezon, 4 March 1911.
will notice, however, that I stated twice, answering Mr. Parson’s questions, that the general opinion in the Philippines is that the Islands be neutralized. . . . the main fact I wanted to impose upon the members of the Committee is that the Filipinos want immediate independence. . . . I am almost inclined to say that I will take the independence of the Philippines anyhow, with or without neutralization, with or without protectorate, if it is national independence. That is to say, if we are allowed to govern ourselves, to enact and enforce our own laws without the intervention or supervision of any other authority and to enjoy all the privileges and rights of an independent country, we would take the risk of an absolute, non-guaranteed independent government, rather than remain any longer under the present control of the United States, because it will, in my mind, last forever if it is not relinquished at once.

However, the most satisfactory solution for the Filipinos of the Philippine problem is the immediate declaration of Philippine independence by the United States, such independence being guaranteed by an international agreement neutralizing the Islands. This is what has been and is advocated by my party, and what the Filipino people think that the United States is morally obliged and pledged to do.36

Quezon in other words preferred independence coupled with neutralization as the “most satisfactory solution” to the Philippine problem under the prevailing circumstances, but should this prove difficult to obtain, he preferred as a last recourse immediate independence with or without protectorate, with or without neutralization.

Winslow thoroughly understood Quezon’s frame of mind, but he reminded him of the great importance of neutralization:

I cannot tell you how much I am obliged to you for your giving me so much of your time in writing me a full answer. I see exactly what you said and how it was you said it, but my feeling remains pretty strong that it is necessary to insist upon neutralization first, last, and all the time. A protectorate of the Philippines by America would be the present condition perpetuated or made worse. America is about as capable of conducting a protectorate over a weaker country as a cat is over a mouse.37

36. Quezon to Winslow, 6 March 1911.
37. Winslow to Quezon, 8 March 1911.
THE BREAKUP

Four important disagreements between Quezon and Winslow eventually led to the breakup: (1) Quezon's acceptance of the invitation to be a member of the executive committee of the Philippine Society; (2) the choice of the governor-general to replace William Cameron Forbes; (3) the passage of Jones Bill No. 2; and (4) the delay in the campaign for independence by the first Philippine Mission. The first three were settled, but their emotional effect on both Quezon and Winslow was cumulative. The last disagreement was the final blow.

QUEZON'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINE SOCIETY

The Philippine Society was an organization of Americans and Filipinos. Quezon explained to Winslow that he joined the society in order to present at the first session of the executive committee the proposition whether or not it would favor Philippine independence because, according to Quezon, the essential basis of better understanding between Filipinos and Americans was the recognition of Philippine independence. If this proposition would not be considered, then Quezon would retire from the society and publicly state that the society was antagonistic to Philippine independence. Quezon's first intention was to decline to join the society, but later thought he could better be informed of the movements of the enemy by being inside.38

Despite this explanation Winslow wanted Quezon to withdraw from the society since it was "composed of persons favoring retention..."39 Quezon requested Winslow to show the papers to Moorfield Storey, the president of the Anti-Imperialist League, and ask his opinion.40 After giving the letters to Storey, Winslow wrote Quezon that the announcement of the latter's connection with the society would poison the minds of his (Quezon's) countrymen and do him harm here in the U.S. everyday that it continued.41 On 4 May 1913 Quezon declined to change his plans.

38. Quezon to Winslow, 29 April 1913.
39. Winslow wire Quezon, 1 May 1913.
40. Quezon to Winslow, 2 May 1913.
41. Winslow to Quezon, 3 May 1913.
and offered five reasons for it.

First, the society was organized either to oppose Philippine independence or to take in pro-independence advocates so that through a fair discussion of different views, an accurate knowledge about the Philippines could be presented to the American public. If the first case obtained, then Quezon could expose the falsity of the society's announcement that it was "non-partisan." And if the second case obtained, then the pro-independence advocates should not allow their opponents to monopolize the field. In either case, Quezon believed his joining the society was advisable provided he would be in a position to be at par with his opponents and since he was a member of the executive committee which managed the society, that requirement was satisfied.

Second, it could be argued that without Quezon joining the society, that society was clearly partisan; but it could also be argued that such would not be the fault of the society if the invited pro-independence proponents refused to join.

Third, it was necessary that pro-independence advocates should know who their real enemies were and should ascertain the means they used in waging their campaign. So joining the society would afford Quezon ample opportunity to come into contact with them and learn something about them.

Fourth, although the question of Philippine independence was already settled with pro-independence proponents, it was not settled with many Americans and it was not wise to allow their opponents to get the ear of the American public without themselves presenting their side in the same forum.

And fifth, to denounce the society as being against Philippine independence could be more effective if one who was a member resigned from it after he had determined the society's partisanship rather than not joining the society and denouncing it from the point of view of an outsider.

Quezon then said he resented that those with whom he worked doubted him and that Winslow should not listen to his (Quezon's) enemies such as the Herald correspondent in Manila who attributed lack of sincerity to him (Quezon) in his advocacy for Philippine independence because of his joining the Philippine Society. If, Quezon went on, the Anti-Imperialist League disapproved his action and they (Quezon and the league) could no longer work in harmony, then the executive committee of the
league would please notify him to that effect and he would instantly tender his resignation as a resident commissioner. He would rather do this than change his action when he believed he was right.42

It was Winslow's turn to explain himself. He said that his justification of the recall of Governor General Forbes in his letter to members of the House of Representatives on account of Forbes' connection with the Philippine Society and the need to hasten the promotion of the Philippine cause, lost its point because of Quezon's adherence to the society.43

In response Quezon wrote:

If I have said anything in my letter of May 4th which might have offended you, please forget it. I was under the impression that your faith in me has weakened due to the letter of the Herald correspondent at Manila and I was very much hurt, as you will understand. Let us consider the incident closed and it will not be long before we find out whether I was right or wrong.

One of the first effects of joining the Philippine Society is my having been designated as one of the speakers at the banquet that the Society will hold in New York next month wherein Mr. Taft and General Right will be among the other speakers. I have of course accepted the invitation. In fact, I have used the offices of a friend of mine to have the Executive Committee invite me to be one of the speakers. I wanted to have this opportunity of meeting Mr. Taft and General Right and in their presence tell the American people what I think of their doings in the Philippines. I do not believe that I could have had this opportunity if I had not joined them and you may be sure that as soon as the banquet is over I shall no longer be a member of the Society.44

The following day the executive committee of the Anti-Imperialist League sent Quezon a vote of confidence appreciating "his undertaking to explore and expose the real purposes of the Philippine Society from the inside. . . ."45

After the June meeting of the Philippine Society, Winslow wrote Quezon:

Of course I saw the report of the dinner in the "New York Times" where you seem to have done excellently well, but no report is given as

42. Quezon to Winslow, 4 May 1913.
43. Winslow to Quezon, 6 May 1913.
44. Quezon to Winslow, 8 May 1913.
45. Winslow to Quezon, 9 May 1913.
to your proposed action in publicly retiring from the organization.  

Three days later Quezon resigned from the society.

THE SELECTION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

Democrat President Woodrow Wilson, who succeeded Republican President William H. Taft in 1913, decided to replace Governor General William C. Forbes and favored for the position of Oscar Terry Crosby. Quezon’s objection to Crosby as the next governor general of the Philippines consisted in his belief that the latter was recommended by New York financiers and the influential men of the Army while Winslow’s objection to Crosby lay in his conviction that Crosby’s loyalty to the Philippine cause was doubtful. Quezon and Winslow both wanted Storey to be the governor general but when Quezon presented his name to President Wilson, the president objected to his old age.

Winslow submitted four names to Quezon to be presented to the president: John Lind, Jacob Gould Schurman, Henry Wade Rogers, and Louis F. Post. Lind was in Mexico and could not be appointed as soon as possible. Schurman was a Republican. Rogers and perhaps Post would still be presented to the president. On 20 August 1913, while Winslow cabled Quezon not to relax support for Storey because a physician’s certificate was obtainable, Quezon on the same date cabled Winslow: “Harrison nominated for governor with my strong endorsement. Have pledged the cordial support of Filipinos. I will accompany him to Manila.”

Two days later Quezon explained to Winslow how Harrison was appointed. He said that Harrison was an Anti-Imperialist and when Harrison went to Quezon on the 15th of August to request Quezon’s withdrawal of his objection to Crosby,
who was Harrison’s friend, Quezon proposed instead that Harrison become the governor general. As Quezon put it:

[Harrison] was so surprised that he inquired if I was serious about the proposition. I answered him that I would be the happiest man on earth were he appointed to the position. With his assent secured, I laid the matter before Mr. Jones, who welcomed it, and asked to see Mr. Bryan [the Secretary of State] which he did. I myself conferred with the Secretary of State the next day [August 16th] and he asked me to submit Mr. Harrison’s name in writing; accordingly, the same afternoon I wrote a letter, a copy of which I enclose herewith for your confidential information. Mr. Underwood, Mr. Hitchcock and other leaders of the Senate and the House also got busy on Mr. Harrison’s behalf, and the day before yesterday his nomination was in the hands of the Senate which unani-
mously confirmed it yesterday.54

On the 23rd of August Quezon was glad that Winslow was among the first to congratulate Harrison. Three days later Winslow explained: “Your initiation of Mr. Harrison’s appointment ought to remove all doubts.”55 Unfortunately, on the 27th of August Winslow sent Quezon an unflattering letter. In reply Quezon was brutally frank:

May I know what do you mean by saying that my remarks upon the occasion of the Congressional reception in honor of Mr. Harrison have been taken as a “serious surrender”? Who has placed such a foolish as well as unwarranted interpretation to my language? I assure you that those who were present and heard me, far from believing that I was sur-
rrendering my views, knew that, while paying a compliment to Harrison, my main topic was to remind him that we expect him to promote the cause of Philippine independence, which is the only question uppermost in our mind. No paper in Washington, and all of them were represented in the gathering, gave to my words such a significance as you say has been given to it. But if any paper or any person believes what you say, I do not propose to dissuade them. If what I have done so far to help the cause of my country has not been enough to prove that I am a patriot, nothing that I could do in the future will. Those who do not believe in me now will never believe in me, and, to be frank, I do not care for the opinion of those who do not trust me. This is how I feel in the matter, expressed in

54. Quezon sent the message to Willis and Storey on the same day, 22 August 1913. See Quezon to Winslow, 27 August 1913.
55. Winslow to Quezon, 26 August 1913.
... I selected Mr. Harrison because of all our friends he had the influence of Congress to secure the confirmation of his appointment. The sincerity of Mr. Harrison's position with regard to independence is proven by the fact that, when still in the beginning of his career, being a young man just out of college and with some military ambitions because he was a volunteer during the Spanish-American War, he refused to accept a commission as Captain in the Army to go to the Philippines, because he did not believe then, any more than he does now, in the subjection by force of my people. This fact alone would justify my indorsement of Mr. Harrison, and should convince any one that his appointment to the Governorship-General of the Islands will not cause me to "surrender."\textsuperscript{56}

Quezon also wrote Storey about the incident:

I have today received a letter from Mr. Winslow containing a statement which, reflecting as it does upon my official conduct, I desire to bring to your attention.

In this letter, which bears date of the 27th, Mr. Winslow, referring to my remarks upon the occasion of the reception given by the House of Representatives in honor of Mr. Harrison, tells me that they have been taken as "a serious surrender." Such words, coming from Mr. Winslow, who is intimately familiar with my work in this country, have indeed astounded me. But this is not the first, or the second, or the third time that Mr. Winslow has seen fit to make insinuations of this character; thus, they cannot but be vexing to me, to such an extent that I fear that should Mr. Winslow, either privately or in his official capacity as Secretary of the Anti-Imperialist League, allow a repetition of these occurrences, I might see myself placed in the sad necessity of discontinuing my correspondence with him....

For the sake of all concerned, I would request you to speak to Mr. Winslow about the subject, as I feel sure that your wise counsel will clear away all the misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{57}

The next day, August 29, Quezon informed Winslow he would be back by December, on time for the discussion of the Jones bill. He was sorry Winslow could not go with him and Harrison. The following day Winslow cabled Quezon: "Bon voyage envy Harrison and yourself each others company and magnificent reception."\textsuperscript{58}

As suggested by Quezon in his letter of August 28th, Storey

\textsuperscript{56} Quezon to Winslow, 28 August 1913.
\textsuperscript{57} Quezon to Storey, 28 August 1913.
\textsuperscript{58} Quezon to Winslow, 29 August 1913 and Winslow wire Quezon, 30 August 1913.
discussed the matter with Winslow. Since Quezon accompanied Harrison to Manila, Winslow communicated with Quezon's secretary, Maximo Kalaw, whose reply read as follows:

... Mr. Quezon resented your attitude toward him several cases when you disapproved of some of his courses of action, as in the Philippine Society case. At this last instance it was not so much your disapproval which he resented as the tone of your disapproval. But I need not tell you that he did this, for he showed that resentment in his letter to you. However, all this was healed up afterwards with mutual explanations...

When he really changed toward you [it] was after the appointment of Mr. Harrison. Here was when Mr. Quezon's feelings were hurt. He considered Mr. Harrison's appointment as his greatest personal triumph in America. He was practically, outside of the President, the one person responsible for the appointment of the Governor. Bryan himself recognized this fact and he called up the Governor and asked him to thank Mr. Quezon for the support Mr. Quezon had to Mr. Harrison. Yet you took this triumph very coldly, to his mind, not even, so far as I remember, congratulating him on his good work. More than that, you interpreted his speech at the reception given in honor of Mr. Harrison as "a serious surrender." This really made him mad, for he had heard nothing but praise for his speech, and nobody there had ever given that interpretation to his remarks.59

On 11 October 1913 Winslow sent Quezon an apology:

In view of the chances and changes of this mortal life, I want to set down a word which I trust may cause your forgiveness of any bygone offense, such as some correspondence, or lack of it, may have suggested.60

THE PASSAGE OF JONES BILL NO. 2

Jones Bill No. 1, though reported out favorably by the Committee on Insular Affairs, was not discussed in the House in 1912 because the House was busy with the appropriation bills and the friar land bill.61 During the break, Quezon went home to the Philippines and was reelected resident commissioner. When he

59. Kalaw to Winslow, 10 October 1913.
60. Winslow to Quezon, 11 October 1913.
returned in January 1913, Woodrow Wilson was the new president, having been elected in November 1912.

The strategy that Quezon wanted to adopt in presenting an independence bill was one of expediency. The issue to him was practical. He knew that Jones Bill No. 1 would not be acceptable to President Wilson. The first time he sought an audience with Wilson — then the governor of New Jersey — on 4 March 1912, the latter met him for only a few minutes and frankly told him he (Wilson) did not think the Philippines should be given immediate independence because its inhabitants were not homogeneous in civilization, although he was open to being convinced and willing to know more about the Philippines. Quezon earlier considered Wilson an opponent, but Winslow, who believed that Wilson was the most probable Democratic presidential candidate, insisted that Quezon should try to win Wilson to their side by sending him (Wilson) a memorandum of information about the Philippine Islands. Since the administration at this time was Republican the strategy adopted by both Quezon and Winslow was adversarial in nature, i.e., putting pressure on the administration in order for it to respond favorably to their demands.

When Wilson won the nomination in June 1912 as the Democratic standard bearer during the party convention at Baltimore, Quezon realized that the rules had changed. Where before he had only the Democratic leaders of the House to talk to for the possible passage of Jones Bill No. 1, now he noticed that Chairman Henry of the House Committee on Rules would not issue a special rule without consulting Governor Wilson and Chairman Jones of the Committee on Insular Affairs would not introduce an independence bill without the consent of Governor Wilson. Besides, because the November election was fast approaching and the

62. Wilson's early speeches, viz., the 1912 nomination acceptance speech, the Staunton speech, and the annual message, were consistent with his position favoring ultimate, but not immediate, independence. In Staunton particularly, Wilson merely expressed the "hope" of possibly depriving the Americans of the Philippine frontier. See Villanueva, "Quezon and the Jones Bill No. 1," p. 65. See Winslow to Quezon, 16 August 1911 and Roy C. Curry, "Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 41 (1954): 436.

63. Quezon to Winslow, 5 March 1912.
64. Quezon to Winslow, 17 August 1911.
65. Winslow to Quezon, 16 August 1911 and 8 December 1911. See also Winslow to Quezon, 27 March 1912; 1 April 1912; and 8 April 1912. Quezon to Winslow, 29 March 1912; 5 April 1912; and 19 April 1912. Quezon, *The Good Fight*, p. 121.
American public was not in favor of Philippine independence, Governor Wilson advised his leaders to concentrate on important and livelier issues without mixing them with minor issues like that of Philippine independence. Upon the election of Governor Wilson as president, Quezon decided to change the adversary strategy to one of expediency.

In December 1913 Quezon went to see Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, in search of a practical solution to the independence problem. He was in a tight predicament, having three forces to contend with: first, he must satisfy the clamor for independence by Filipinos back home or reap a critical backlash that he was not doing much for a definite independence legislation; second, he must satisfy the Anti-Imperialists of America who vigorously agitated for immediate Philippine independence; and third, he must get the approval of President Wilson, who favored ultimate, but not immediate, independence. Having these in mind, Quezon told McIntyre — with apparent deliberateness in order to create the impression he agreed with Wilson that immediate independence was out of the question — that an early grant of independence would indeed be a mistake because he (Quezon) was convinced Japan had designs on the Islands. (This was in fact the same reason he gave on 12 December 1913 to the American Consul General in Yokohama, who promptly reported their conversation to the State Department.) The impression was important in securing Wilson's approval for an expedient independence measure. In another meeting with McIntyre in January 1914, Quezon left suggestions for an independence measure he believed would be acceptable to the Filipinos back home, to the Anti-Imperialists of America, and to President Woodrow Wilson.

66. Quezon to Winslow, 5 April 1912.
67. See Curry, "Wilson and Philippine Policy," pp. 441-42; Bonifacio Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule 1901-1913 (Hamden: Shoestring Press, Inc., 1968), p. 174; Gerald E. Wheeler, "Manuel Quezon and Independence for the Philippines: Some Qualifications," The U.P. Research Digest 2 (1963): 13. See Henry Hollis to Winslow, 14 May 1914 and Quezon to Wilson, January 1914. That Quezon was not exactly serious about "Japanese designs" on the Philippines, see an undated news item (probably 1914) titled "Eloquent Plea for the Filipinos," where Quezon argued that the Philippines was in no danger from Japan, Quezon Papers, Series XI (Newscloppings). See also Rubi Tanaka to Quezon, 29 January 1915, Series VI and Quezon to Tanaka, 19 February 1915, Series VI, where Quezon said:

"...so far as I am informed, the people of the Philippine Islands do not share the view that Japan intends to seize the Philippines either now or after they shall have
Since he firmly believed that without the help of the President no independence bill would ever be approved by Congress and since Jones held the same view, Quezon then tried to confirm what exactly the President wanted for the Philippines. On 19 January 1914, Quezon went to see Wilson who practically told him he would not endorse an independence bill specifying a date of independence and identifying the steps to be taken before granting independence although "he would entertain a proposition for a bill providing for a further step in self-government and, in this bill, commit Congress to the policy of Philippine independence." In a letter to Storey on 12 February 1914 Quezon explained his impression about what the President had in mind. He emphasized to Storey that the question was not what bill would best suit them, but what bill would suit the President and still could be accepted by them. It was either they would introduce a bill acceptable to the President, or there would be no legislation at all. Quezon was positive the Democratic leaders of the House had no intention of changing the President's mind and at the same time he recognized the danger of not securing an independence legislation during the present session because (1) in the coming Fall elections the Democratic party may lose control of both Houses of Congress; (2) assuming the Democratic party would continue in power, the Democratic leaders would then be preparing for the presidential election and might feel better off with the tariff, currency, and trust issues without mixing

been granted independence by the United States. So far as I am concerned, I assure you that after careful deliberation and study I am of the opinion that if the Philippines be granted independence, Japan will not only respect that independence but will refuse to permit any other nation to interfere therewith."


68. Quezon to Winslow, 17 January 1914. See also Quezon to Winslow, 8 May 1913.
69. Quezon to Winslow, 19 January 1914. Salamanca noted (Filipino Reaction, p. 283) that Wilson acknowledged receipt of McIntyre's memoranda dated 29 December 1913 and 17 January 1914 regarding the latter's conversations with Quezon in a letter to Secretary of War Lindley Garrison on 21 January 1914.
70. Quezon prepared his own independence bill and sent it to Storey for comment. When the latter objected to some of its features, Quezon explained to him on February 12th the political strategy he was presently pursuing.
them with the Philippine issue; and (3) if Congress died out without passing a Philippine bill, the Democratic party would feel even less responsive in the future to call an independence legislation than it does now. Quezon therefore insisted that they better accept any kind of bill provided it was in the right direction rather than to insist on what they wanted to have and get nothing at all. He suggested that if a provision in the bill for a definite time could not be had, then they better secure a declaration such as the one contained in the Democratic platform at Baltimore which pledged to grant an autonomous government to the Philippines, subject to the supervision of the United States, exercised through the governor general, with a provision that it was the intention of the United States to grant Philippine independence as soon as a stable government was established. This to Quezon was the maximum obtainable from the president, if it could be obtained at all.

Winslow’s Objections. Storey agreed with Quezon’s suggestion.71 Winslow also agreed with Quezon’s plan.72 But when Quezon sent the bill prepared by Jones to Winslow on 5 May 1914, Winslow vehemently objected, calling it a “mere programme for a perfectly indefinite ‘apprenticeship’.” Apparently, Winslow did not understand what he had agreed with Quezon, for he still talked about an independence bill with neutralization: “How could you, dear Mr. Quezon, send [the bill] to me, with apparent toleration of the complete abandonment of our former position? No Republican need object to such a bill as this which leaves things as they are to drift into permanent colonialism.”73 Winslow then sent Quezon his joint resolution amending Senator Overman’s independence resolution by providing for the neutralization of the Philippines. It was Quezon’s turn to vehemently object to the joint resolution: (1) Quezon did not believe the joint resolution went further than the preamble contained in the Jones bill and he did not think it accomplished as much as the bill; (2) the promise of independence in the joint resolution, in so far as it set no definite time for the granting of independence, was as vague as the promise made in the preamble of the Jones bill; (3) the joint resolution made the establishment of an

71. Storey to Quezon, 16 February 1914.
72. Winslow to Quezon, 19 February 1914.
73. Winslow to Quezon, 6 May 1914.
independent Philippine government dependent upon the ratification of the neutralization treaty, which was rather a stiff requirement, for it assumed Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Japan and China were ready to sign such treaty, and moreover that the U.S. Senate would be disposed to ratify by two-thirds vote such treaty; and (4) it was senseless to consider the Philippines neutral pending the ratification of the treaty as the joint resolution stipulated, because a "neutralization of a country can only be accomplished by neutralization treaties." Quezon suggested that the Philippines should first be made independent before it would be made neutral. Then he went on:

I said that the Jones bill goes further than this Joint Resolution because while the promise of independence is as vague, that bill at least places definitely in the hands of the people of the Islands the power to elect their legislature. Your Joint Resolution would leave things in the Philippines as they stand.  

On 14 May 1914 Quezon reiterated to Winslow his expediency argument. The issue was a practical one: a bill acceptable to the administration or none at all. It was Storey who replied on behalf of the Anti-Imperialist League: "... it is better to leave matters as they stand and continue the agitation rather than accept such a measure as is now proposed." He sent Quezon his joint resolution for Philippine independence and neutralization. Winslow, on the other hand, wrote that the Jones bill would be "worse than nothing." Quezon said that Storey's joint resolution was better than Winslow's, but its defect lay in making the establishment of an independent Philippine government dependent upon the neutralization treaty of the U.S. with European and Asiatic powers: "Why cannot the United States alone grant Philippine independence and then neutralize the Islands?" Quezon then presented his own joint resolution making the Philippines independent first and then afterwards requesting the U.S. to open negotiations for a neutralization treaty with European and Asiatic powers. He emphasized, however, in a postscript that he was not trying to have anybody introduce his resolution because he knew it could not meet the approval of the President. Jones had already

74. Quezon to Winslow, 13 May 1914.
75. Storey to Quezon, 15 May 1914.
76. Winslow to Quezon, 16 May 1914.
proposed to the President something along these lines to no avail.\textsuperscript{77}

Winslow, however, wanted Storey's joint resolution introduced in the Senate: "We are making appeal to the President, [to] Mr. Bryan, and [to] some twenty-five senators — for the joint resolution" and in an earlier letter, "We are writing a number of letters to Democratic senators . . . We must fight. Can't you see the President?"\textsuperscript{78} After having seen the President on the 25th of May, Quezon reported to Winslow that Wilson regretted having included no legislation for the Philippines in the program of the present session because the American people demanded for the anti-trust legislation and he (Wilson) could not promise an independence legislation during this Sixty-third Congress until he had held a conference with the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, and the Secretary of War.\textsuperscript{79}

Winslow's counter-strategy to Quezon's expediency was to continue the adversary technique. As early as January 1914 Winslow told Quezon that the President may also be influenced by the pressure in his party as he was to some extent in the appointment of members to the Philippine Commission.\textsuperscript{80} He reiterated this in his letter to Quezon of June 2nd. The President, he said, was certainly actuated by public or party demand in the preference given to legislative measures, but if a sufficient number of prominent Democrats should go to him and demand that a simple pledge of independence ought to be made immediately, he would probably accede to such urgency. It was not a matter of what the President may choose to do, which should be waited for in humble submission. It was a matter of whether we could have those who "shared our convictions present them forcibly to Mr. Wilson."\textsuperscript{81} Winslow therefore suggested to Quezon to provide him with a list of senators and representatives strong enough to attack President Wilson.

In a meeting between Jones and Wilson, however, the latter declared himself in favor of a new Jones bill, which was "about

\textsuperscript{77} Quezon to Storey, 18 May 1914.
\textsuperscript{78} Winslow to Quezon, 20 May 1914 and 19 May 1914, respectively.
\textsuperscript{79} Quezon to Winslow, 27 May 1914.
\textsuperscript{80} Winslow to Quezon, 19 January 1914. See Winslow to Quezon 27 May 1914; 3 June 1914; and 8 June 1914.
\textsuperscript{81} Winslow to Quezon, 2 June 1914.
the same” as the one Quezon sent to Winslow and Storey not long ago except for a few minor changes which the President wanted to have made. Quezon insisted on his original expediency argument. The bill was not ideal and from the theoretical standpoint Quezon did not like it, but the situation was a practical one. It was a question of taking what they could get now or taking it later (perhaps) during the Wilson administration, or not taking it at all. In Quezon’s mind the situation was very clear: “We should take what we can get now and use that as a basis of further work.” Quezon was certain President Wilson would not do anymore for the independence movement than was indicated in the Jones bill. He requested Storey that this bill should not be opposed by the Anti-Imperialist League unless the league had very seriously considered the matter, in which case the bill would have great difficulty in passing or would not make it at all. Storey was accommodating. He was not sure about the ultimate result of the bill, but it certainly was a step in the right direction and it was a great gain for the bill to commit the United States to ultimate Philippine independence.

On 17 June 1914 Quezon wrote Winslow that the bill would be introduced next week. In response Winslow said: “I see you think we have to live and die by the Jones bill.” Quezon suggested to Winslow not to oppose the bill. Meanwhile, Winslow inquired from Willis, Quezon’s friend, whether the time had not come to disregard the Jones bill and go ahead with some special resolution which Winslow believed he could get passed in the Senate. Willis urged Winslow to “wait until the work that was now being done through Mr. Jones could be brought to some definite end.”

Quezon wrote Winslow on July 31 that his support of the Jones bill and the policy of the present administration was “dictated purely by patriotic motives.” He was convinced Wilson was an Anti-Imperialist and in about four years he believed Wilson would come out boldly for a bill granting complete indepen-

82. Quezon to Storey, 6 June 1914.
83. Storey to Quezon, 9 July 1914. For a clearer meaning of the phrase “step in the right direction,” see Storey to Quezon, 16 February 1914 and Quezon to Storey, 19 February 1914.
84. Winslow to Quezon, 19 June 1914. This bill was finally introduced in the House on 11 July 1914. See Congressional Record 51 (11 July 1914): 12001.
85. Quezon to Winslow, 19 June 1914.
86. Willis to Quezon, 8 July 1914.
dence. It was therefore wise to help him and not embarrass his administration." In reply, Winslow said: "I joined in the assurances you desired because you desired them." Then Winslow shifted his adversary argument to one focusing on the future activity of the Anti-Imperialist League. What would it be? He cared little for the Jones bill, believing it would work out into a colonial establishment or permanent protectorate. He reiterated his position as to the future of the Anti-Imperialist League in his August 11th letter. If the Jones bill passed, how would the league agitate for independence? To support the "stable government" was not agitation: "What methods of agitation are open to the League now and for the next few years?" Without such agitation the league and the cause would die. In a letter to Willis, Winslow argued that agitation for independence was ruled out because the "proof of the pudding" was in the test, i.e., years of stable government. In another letter Winslow asked Quezon how many years would it be to have a "fair trial" for the Philippine government to prove to the United States it was now stable — four, five, ten, twenty-five years? Agitation for independence would then be a disturbance to the "trial." Winslow also considered the Jones bill as a backward step from the first Jones bill. In a burst of frankness Winslow virtually called Quezon a dictator.

Filipino Support of Quezon. Quezon knew he had the support of the Filipino people. He told Winslow: if the Filipinos "had not accepted the present bill, they would have had no bill at all. Is it better not to have any legislation rather than accept the present bill?" But Winslow kept on saying the Jones bill was a complete turn-around; in fact, a Progresista program. In what seemed to be a desperate gesture, Quezon wrote Winslow:

87. Quezon to Winslow, 31 July 1914.
88. Winslow to Quezon, 4 August 1914.
89. Winslow to Quezon, 6 August 1914. See Quezon to Winslow, 7 August 1914.
90. Winslow to Quezon, 11 August 1914; Winslow to Storey, 15 August 1914.
91. Winslow to Willis, 15 August 1914. See Willis to Winslow, 14 August 1914.
92. Winslow to Quezon, 15 August 1914; 22 August 1914; and 2 September 1914. See Quezon to Winslow, 17 August 1914.
94. Winslow to Quezon, 11 September 1914.
If my previous correspondence with you has not been able to make you understand and accept as wise my position, I can see no use in further discussing this matter between ourselves, because, apparently — your mind and mine — are fully made up. Before adopting the attitude which I have taken with regard to the bill, I had considered every side of the question with absolute knowledge of the whole situation. My attitude is justified by persons whose loyalty to the cause of Philippine independence I have no reasons to doubt. [The Jones bill is] better than nothing.\(^9\)

Winslow must have realized now that Quezon's firmness rested on the support given him by the Filipino people back home. On September 17, he felt the Filipinos as represented by *El Ideal* and *La Vanguardia* were compliant, fickle, or light-minded for supporting the Jones bill.\(^9\) Even when the House passed the Jones bill on 14 October 1914, Winslow continued to criticize it. He called the preamble a "mere idle vaporing," which when struck out would reveal a setup of a colonial system, which was not exactly an occasion for anti-imperialist rejoicing.\(^9\) He even considered the Jones bill a hindrance to a stronger independence bill since many Republicans in these days of war had absorbed Harrison's notion that the Philippines was America's "heel of Achilles" in the Pacific.\(^9\)

In the Senate Quezon noticed that there was a growing sentiment in favor of a stronger declaration of Philippine independence, which prompted him to say that Winslow may be right after all.\(^9\) On 11 January 1916 Senator Clarke of Arkansas introduced an amendment to the Jones bill (now Senate Bill No. 381) providing for Philippine independence not later than two years within which a neutralization treaty would be negotiated by the United States with world powers; failure to obtain it would mean the United States alone would guarantee Philip-

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95. Quezon to Winslow, 16 September 1914.
96. Winslow to Quezon, 17 September 1914 and Quezon to Winslow, 3 October 1914.
98. Winslow to Quezon, 16 November 1915 and 5 February 1916.
99. Quezon to Winslow, 10 January 1916. Jones Bill No. 2 (H.R. 17856), though favorably reported in the Senate on 2 February 1915, was not discussed on the floor. Jones promptly reintroduced it in the House on 6 December 1915 as H.R. 1 and Senator Hitchcock introduced it in the Senate on 7 December 1915. See *Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs* 364-740-J.
pine neutrality. With the intervention of President Wilson this amendment was amended to provide independence in two to four years and to make the grant of independence dependent on the judgment of the President on the basis of external and internal factors affecting the Islands. Clarke presented these changes on 24 January 1916.\textsuperscript{100} Though Quezon lobbied for the passage of the Clarke amendment, he was endorsing only the idea of setting a period when independence was to be granted. He was upset by a certain feature of the amendment authorizing the President "to postpone the granting of independence and submit the whole question again to Congress." He wanted this feature eliminated,\textsuperscript{101} but apparently thought that this could be done in the House. On February 2, he cabled Osmeña that the Clarke amendment passed the Senate by one vote. The following day Osmeña cabled Quezon requesting that he convey to Senator Clarke his congratulations and the gratitude of the Filipino people. On that same day Quezon informed Osmeña that the Clarke amendment that passed had no neutralization proviso because it was stricken out by a vote of 53 to 31.\textsuperscript{102} Four days later Quezon wrote Winslow that Senator Shafroth could tell him that he (Quezon) did all he could to help the passage of the Clarke amendment. Although the neutralization plan was defeated, he consoled Winslow by saying that he believed the Filipinos should be men enough to take independence with all its responsibilities. He considered it puerile to urge independence and then beg for protection from the United States or from several countries through neutralization treaties. Besides, an independent Philippines could propose a treaty of neutralization with countries interested in the Far East.\textsuperscript{103}

When Quezon explored the possibility of eliminating the most objectionable feature of the Clarke amendment because, as he said, it was an invitation to the opponents of independence not to accept the action of the present Congress as final, he was made to understand that any change in the amendment may defeat

\textsuperscript{101} Quezon to Wilson, 10 February 1916.
\textsuperscript{102} Quezon to Osmeña, 3 February 1916. \textit{Congressional Record} (2 February 1916): 1997-98.
\textsuperscript{103} Quezon to Winslow, 7 February 1916 and 8 March 1916. See Winslow to Quezon, 9 February 1916 and 10 February 1916.
the whole legislation for the Philippines. Upset by such development, he wrote President Wilson about the whole thing on 10 February 1916 and while he informed Wilson that in a choice between no legislation or the Clarke amendment in its present form he would take the latter, he felt so bad that he became ill and took to bed on Sunday, February 13th.104

Meanwhile, the opposition to the Clarke amendment was strongly building up which made Quezon believe it was going to be defeated.105 But he did not change his attitude in supporting the Clarke amendment because he had earlier agreed with Jones and the President to go ahead with it.106 On 2 March 1916 the House Committee agreed to report favorably the Senate bill without amendment. Quezon’s position at this time was to have the Clarke amendment pass the House107 and its defects be made the subject of future legislation. In a letter to Winslow, Quezon said:

the bill should be enacted at all events, and that its defects should be made the subject of further legislation. My attitude on the floor of the House will be to oppose any amendment proposed to the bill, and there is complete understanding on this subject between Mr. Jones and myself.108

On April 4 Quezon cabled Osmeña that President Wilson was now definitely committed to the Clarke amendment. The President believed the bill would pass within a month.109 Approved in a House caucus by a vote of 135 to 35, the Senate bill appeared to have a chance of becoming a law.110 The House voted on the Clarke amendment on May 1st and the next day Quezon reported to Winslow the defeat of the Clarke amendment: “Everything

105. Quezon wire Osmeña, 21 February 1916.
106. Quezon wire Osmeña, 22 February 1916.
107. Quezon to John Switzer, 16 March 1916.
108. Quezon to Winslow, 26 March 1916.
109. Quezon wire Osmeña, 4 April 1916.
looks gloomy now, and I do not know what to do." On May 5th Quezon wrote a friend in New York that while he was disappointed at the defeat of the Clarke amendment, he would be satisfied if they passed the original Jones bill. Since Winslow had seen how a bill with a definite date on Philippine independence having the support of the President and the Democrats in a House caucus was defeated by a majority vote (213 as against 165), he had no excuse now for not supporting the original Jones bill with the House preamble. A Senate committee headed by Shafroth and a House committee headed by Jones met to agree on the retention of the House preamble without changing a single word thereof. The Senate passed the bill on August 16 while the House passed it two days later. The President signed it into law on 29 August 1916.

PHILIPPINE MISSION'S DELAYED INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN

It was Quezon, now the Senate President, who started the possibility of an early campaign for Philippine independence. Upon learning of Wilson's reelection, Quezon wrote Winslow in November 1916 that he would leave for the United States in February "to see the situation there and to take the necessary steps for the campaign. We shall have to start to get the Legislature to recognize the independence of the Philippines." He reiterated this in December. But apparently Winslow was not convinced of an independence campaign that early. It was only after a year, i.e., on 10 December 1917, that Winslow agreed with Quezon's idea. The Anti-Imperialist League believed that:

the presentation of a permitted Philippine independence should be ready for sanction by the afterwar council of world adjustment, so that the ap-

112. Quezon to Harry Howland, 5 May 1916.
113. See Quezon to Winslow, 3 May 1916.
114. Quezon to Winslow, 21 July 1916.
115. Quezon wire Harrison, 16 August 1916 and Quezon to Harrison, 18 August 1916.
116. Quezon to Winslow, 16 November 1916.
117. Quezon to Winslow, 7 December 1916.
plication to Congress should be prepared without delay. If this opportu-

Quezon was gratified that Winslow’s interest in the early reali-
zation of Filipino aspirations was still unflagging and sincere. Winslow and Storey wrote Harrison that while the war in Europe was going on it would be best for the Filipinos to consider the form of government to be adopted and to take advantage of the favorable moment for presenting to the United States the prayer that the promise of independence be fulfilled. On the death of William Jones, the Anti-Imperialist League issued a resolution pledging their devotion to Jones’ deepest hope for the Filipinos, viz., that everything would “serve to hasten the hour when they shall be granted complete independence.” Winslow repeated this message to Harrison, quoting Resident Commissioner Jaime de Veyra, who agreed perfectly with the suggestion that Philippine independence be granted in time for ratification by the after-war council, and Speaker Sergio Osmeña, who believed the Philippines was “capable of leading an orderly existence, efficient both in internal and external affairs, as a member of the free and civilized nations.” Winslow urgently wrote Quezon in July 1918:

You have to consider how you will organize a new government, whether you will call a constitutional convention and what you will endeavour to frame and what treaty, if any, you wish to maintain with the United States...

The plan should be submitted to the U.S. government and receive the approval of the president.

On October 4 Winslow was emphatic to Quezon: the forecast implied the possibility of a Republican majority in the House and even in the Senate, such that to avoid “permanent colonialism,” the application for and the grant of independence should be accomplished before 4 March 1919. On November 5 the Republicans won a majority in both Houses of the U.S. Congress. Two

118. Winslow to Quezon, 10 December 1917.
119. Quezon to Winslow, 16 January 1918.
120. Winslow and Storey to Harrison, 5 April 1918.
121. Storey and Winslow, Anti-Imperialist League Resolution, 27 April 1918.
122. Winslow to Harrison, 29 April 1918.
123. Winslow to Quezon, 10 July 1918.
days later the Philippine Legislature passed a concurrent resolution creating the Independence Commission. On November 28 Storey and Winslow cabled Quezon: "Elections indicate pressing importance your petition [for independence] immediate presentation before January." Quezon replied that the petition had already been sent to President Wilson.\(^{125}\)

Quezon left for the United States in December 1918 and got married in a Hongkong church on December 17. Invited to speak during the twentieth annual meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League on 17 February 1919, Quezon predicted the passing away of the league:

I am optimistic enough to believe that I am witnessing the last annual meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League, in so far, at least, as your meetings deal with the Philippine question — for it is inconceivable to me how the granting of Philippine independence can still be further delayed.\(^{126}\)

On March 13 Winslow asked Quezon to clarify the purpose of the Philippine Mission of which Quezon was the chairman. Was its purpose changed from promotion of early independence to the cultivation of commercial relations as reported in the papers and by official and private sources?\(^{127}\) Quezon replied that the Philippine Mission had come primarily for the purpose of securing independence.\(^{128}\) When it was clear to Winslow that nothing would happen despite the mission's presence in the United States because Wilson was in Europe, busy campaigning for his League of Nations, he considered in effect the campaign for independence virtually lost:

Nor have I any interest with the Republican party in whose hands, through the delay in asking for it, the independence of the Philippines now rests . . . The pro forma continuance of a campaign for independence cannot continue long.\(^{129}\)

In reply Quezon wrote:

\(^{125}\) Quezon wire Jaime de Veyra for Winslow and Storey, 3 December 1918. See Storey and Winslow wire Quezon, 28 November 1918.

\(^{126}\) Taken from an undated and incomplete handwritten speech Quezon prepared at Hotel Bellevue, Boston, in 1919, Series IX.

\(^{127}\) Winslow to Quezon, 3 March 1919.

\(^{128}\) Quezon to Winslow, 22 March 1919.

\(^{129}\) Winslow to Quezon, 26 March 1919. See also Winslow to Quezon, 8 April 1919.
Yours of March 26th is at hand. I confess I do not understand its meaning and I should not try to, except for the fact that I realize that whatever its meaning is, it is prompted by a sincere desire on your part to see the Philippines an independent country. We must, however, expect from those with whom we have been working heretofore to show proper regard and respect for our doings and not to annoy us with insinuations that we have deserted the cause. Before our people, before the world and before our own conscience we have assumed the responsibility of securing the freedom of our country and we are doing what in accordance with our best light we should do.\textsuperscript{130}

In a letter to Storey, Quezon said:

I am sending you copies of a letter from Mr. Winslow, dated March 13th, my answer thereto, Mr. Winslow’s rejoinder of March 26th and my reply to it.

It was my experience as Resident Commissioner to have occasionally been called a traitor by Mr. Winslow. Of course, he never used the word, but my files are filled with letters from him insinuating that I have deserted the cause of my people. This is, therefore, not a new experience and the only reason why I am placing this correspondence before you is in order to avoid a breach between the League and the Filipino Mission at a time when we need its most absolute cooperation.\textsuperscript{131}

Having lost faith, however, in Quezon and the Philippine cause, Winslow appeared to have circulated talks that Quezon and Osmeña had betrayed the Filipino people whose primordial desire was immediate, absolute and complete independence coupled with neutralization. These unfortunately reached Quezon’s attention. After having declared that he intended to return in December 1919 to pursue the campaign for Philippine independence because the Philippine Mission had successfully impressed upon the members of the Senate Committee on the Philippines and the House Committee on Insular Affairs the necessity of taking some action on Philippine independence, Quezon said to Storey in a letter of 8 June 1919:

I am not writing Winslow. I have noticed that he has been insinuating lately that the leaders of my party, including Speaker Osmeña and myself, are not keeping faith with our people. Such insinuation as this com-

\textsuperscript{130} Quezon to Winslow, March 1919, Series VII. This was probably on the 27th of March.

\textsuperscript{131} Quezon to Storey, March 1919, Series VII. Possibly written on the same day Quezon replied to Winslow, i.e., March 27th.
ing from those with whom we have worked so long is unbearable. I hope the Anti-Imperialist League will not do us this great injustice.\(^{132}\)

**Conclusion**

The friendship-turned-sour between Quezon and Winslow is a classic example of two friends sharing a common goal, only to disagree as to the strategy of achieving it and eventually to part ways—in bitterness. Both protagonists may not be at fault. If Winslow was impatient about the delay in the political action for Philippine independence, it was because he wanted to see the fruit of his labor while still alive. In a letter to Quezon in February 1918 Winslow said: “I am 78 years old, and this is the reason why I hope . . . for some quick action—for I want to see the thing through, and there are reactionary influences.”\(^{133}\) If Quezon, on the other hand, replaced the adversary strategy with the expediency one during Wilson’s term, it was because of his strong conviction that an independence bill could be obtained only when supported by the administration.\(^{134}\) Barely two-and-a-half years after the passage of Jones Bill No. 2 Quezon was again in America exploring the possibility of a campaign for Philippine independence without necessarily embarrassing the Wilson administration. Though Winslow interpreted this as a delay in the independence campaign, for it should have been done a year earlier in 1918, Quezon considered it within his timetable of four years.\(^{135}\)

Quezon’s pronouncement in 1919 on the probable death of the Anti-Imperialist League in his farewell talk during its twentieth annual meeting in Boston was mistaken, for the Anti-Imperialist League continued to function up to its twenty-second and last annual meeting on 17 November 1920.\(^{136}\) Winslow, how-

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\(^{132}\) Quezon to Storey, 8 June 1919.

\(^{133}\) Winslow to Quezon, 22 February 1918, Series VI. A year later Storey suggested to Quezon to push as hard as Quezon could so that—with the cooperation of “all”—independence may be assured: “I should die happier if it were done.” Storey to Quezon, 5 April 1919, Series VI.

\(^{134}\) In 1921, Quezon expressed his philosophy of expediency thus: “One should have principles and fight for them, but at the same time should be practical trying to get results. . .” Untitled Quezon manuscript, 12 July 1921, Series VIII (Speeches, Articles, Statements, Reports, Interviews, Book File, and Messages). Cf. Gerald E. Wheeler, “Manuel L. Quezon and the American Presidents,” *Asian Studies* 2 (1964): 237.

\(^{135}\) Quezon to Winslow, 31 July 1914.

\(^{136}\) The Anti-Imperialist League usually held its annual meeting in November since
ever, was definite as early as 1919 that the league was already moribund when he said on March 25 that the delay in asking for Philippine independence by Filipino leaders made the campaign for it virtually a lost cause, because the Republicans were now in control of Congress. It was just a matter of time and when Winslow died on 10 March 1922, the Anti-Imperialist League practically died with him.¹³⁷ On 13 July 1922 Quezon contacted Storey on the advisability of organizing an association of Americans for the purpose of promoting the Philippine cause. Though Storey welcomed Quezon’s idea,¹³⁸ nothing came out of it. Storey made a last-ditch effort at reviving the Anti-Imperialist League in 1927, but before it could really get started, death overtook him two years later.¹³⁹ The only consolation the league members had in 1922 was the hope that David Haskins, Jr., the treasurer of the league, entertained when he said:

The [Anti-Imperialist] League still lives, but is not active. Most of its members are dead, and the few of us who are still alive are now along in years. But we still hope and pray that the Philippines will some day become an independent nation.¹⁴⁰

it was founded on 18 November 1898, but it held its 20th annual meeting in February 1919 with Quezon as guest speaker.

¹³⁸ Storey to Quezon, 17 July 1922. See Quezon to Storey, 13 July 1922.