Seventy years ago, the First World War raged in Europe. This war, propagandized as "the war to end all wars" and "the war to make the world safe for democracy" is now little remembered. But even less remembered is the Philippine attempt to participate in that war, an attempt which, it was hoped, would prove Philippine loyalty to the United States, and would prove to the world that the Philippines could be numbered among the world's democratic nations. It began on a bright note, but ended pathetically. In one sense it was unrealistic; in another, it was a case of grown men trying to play war.

By the end of 1916, momentous events had taken place for both the Philippines and the United States. The Jones Law had been passed, promising the Philippines eventual independence from the United States; Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, trusting in the abilities of Filipinos, could thus further implement his Filipinization plans.

In the United States, the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, with the loss of American lives, had inflamed public sentiment against Germany. Inquiries regarding compulsory military training in the Philippines were made by Harrison, but President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker "looked with disfavor at the idea."1 Despite the war fever, the U.S. government took its time; it finally broke relations with Germany on 6 April 1917, and entered the war.2

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The Philippine Legislature had gone one step ahead by passing the Militia Act, Act 2715, on 17 March. Authored by Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, this act provided for the creation of a Philippine National Guard, and authorized the Governor General to impose compulsory military service in the Philippines. Filipino males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were to be considered part of the militia and subject to call; those called for active duty would form the Philippine National Guard.\(^3\)

The thrust of the act, as Harrison (and perhaps Quezon) interpreted it, was not anti-German, because in fact the Germans were personally quite popular with the Filipinos. Rather, the act was intended to be a show of loyalty to the United States, to impress upon the Americans that the Filipinos shared the same sentiments as their colonizers, and perhaps to show that the Philippines was worthy of independence as guaranteed in the Jones Law. Instead of sending an independence mission to the United States during the crisis, it would be more prudent to show loyalty through the National Guard, which was offered to help fight the war in Europe. The act also stipulated that the Guard would serve as the basis of the future Philippine Army, a further step towards self-reliance.\(^4\)

The National Guard as envisaged by the act was directly patterned after the United States' own National Guard, which was formally organized as an umbrella organization of state militias. The militias, which all states had, were a reserve military force; when called on for active duty by the federal government, they were officially known as the National Guard.\(^5\) The Philippines as a colony was not entitled to have a militia of its own, so the offer of raising a Philippine National Guard in effect raised the status of the Philippines to a territory or one of the states themselves.

Six days after the United States entered the war, Gov. Gen. Harrison issued Executive Order No. 35, which put the Militia Act into force and created a Militia Commission. The Militia Commission was composed

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of seven ranking civil and military leaders: the President of the Philippine Senate or his representative, the Speaker of the House of Representatives or his representative, the Secretaries of Interior, Finance, Justice, and Colonels Marcus D. Cronin (Acting Chief of the Philippine Constabulary) and Ralph W. Jones (Assistant Chief of the P.C.). The Militia Commission met in the end of April to discuss organization and mobilization plans. Harrison then cabled President Wilson, offering the Philippine National Guard—25,000 men strong when mobilized—for federal service. Harrison likewise cabled Bureau of Insular Affairs chief General Frank McIntyre to secure legislation which would authorize Wilson to accept the National Guard for service abroad.6

To dramatize the Philippine National Guard offer, and to emphasize Filipino loyalty to the United States, a board was formed with the intent of going to Washington to lobby for the guard. The board, composed of Quezon, Brigadier General Thomas L. Hartigan and General Emilio Aguinaldo, never did go, since Washington had intimated that the time was unwise. But Hartigan, a veteran of the Fil-American War and now an appointed officer of the Guard, and Quezon went to Washington in their personal capacities to meet with Wilson and Baker. On 6 June, two-and-a-half months after Harrison’s offer, with no response from the U.S., Hartigan and Quezon were able to meet both Wilson and Baker. To Quezon, the response was heartening. Wilson responded with “unconcealed enthusiasm” and Baker felt the same way. Quezon proudly reported Filipino sentiment to Wilson: “The Filipino people gladly testify to their faith in the democratic principle that he who is unwilling to serve his country in the hour of need as a soldier is unworthy to govern his country as a citizen. There is no divided opinion among our people as to the duty and the privilege of standing by the United States.” Even the Filipino Veterans’ Association—men who had fought against the Americans in 1899—had volunteered for duty, said Quezon.7

THE LONG WAIT

To Harrison and Quezon, the picture was bright. Wilson seemed happy about the offer, and letters poured in from all over the Philippines

6. Harrison, Cornerstone, pp. 162-63; David, Our National Guard, p. 3; Hill, “Philippine Army,” Part I, p. 53; Part II (December 1936), p. 55; Extracts from minutes of the meeting of the Militia Commission held 4 May 1917, in the Quezon Papers, National Library, Series VII, National Guard, Box 1913-17. Henceforth all references to the Quezon papers are from this series and subject, with appropriate box number cited.

7. Harrison, Cornerstone; David, Our National Guard; Quezon, Good Fight, p. 134.
offering congratulations to Quezon on volunteering for service. One letter 25 February 1917 antedates the Militia Act itself. Three engineers, with theoretical training in explosives, submersibles and aviation, volunteered their services to the Philippines for the war effort. Men wrote in as the days turned to weeks, and the weeks stretched into months. There were high school students, high school graduates, former officers of the Revolutionary Army, Filipinos living in the United States and even Americans who had fought in the Fil-American War. Even Austin Craig offered his services!8

The press reported favorably on the proposed National Guard and legislators tried to outdo each other in volunteering large numbers of their constituents. Senator Juan Villamor went to the Ilocos area and reported that he would be able to enlist ten thousand men from there alone. Bohol reported similarly.9

When the news of the U.S. declaration of war reached the Philippines, Quezon proudly told Wilson that “the people gathered together in meetings and immediately steps were taken to demonstrate that the Filipinos were, without exception, loyal to America. . . . Fifty thousand people answered the call spontaneously and marched to the Malacañang residence of Governor General Harrison and cheered as one man. . . . Our young men are jubilant at the opportunity for military training and service. There are no slackers in the Philippines. We have more volunteers than we shall be able to use.” It was highly optimistic, but Quezon erred in at least one detail. There were fifteen thousand, not fifty thousand men who had sworn their support for Harrison on 5 May.10

The Philippine Department, the U.S. Army command in the Philippines, was initially highly cooperative. Major General Hunter Ligett, the Commanding General, enthusiastically supported the plan, and offered 24,000 extra rifles in Fort Santiago for the use of the Guard. Gen. Ligett was called to service in France, but his successor, Maj. Gen. Charles J. Bailey, was equally enthusiastic in his support. Gen. Bailey cabled the War Department on 16 June to accept the Philippine offer as soon as possible. Other regular U.S. Army officers and men were detailed to

8. See letters in Quezon Papers, Box 1913-17. The first available letter is Mariano J. Salas to Quezon, 25 February 1917. In another letter, Nemesio Roca volunteers to head the cavalry. The letters vary, are written in Spanish, Tagalog and broken English. One sample: “Perhaps you would be surprised to hear from me, who is entirely unknown from each other, didn’t you?” (Serafin Ledesma of La Paz, Iloilo, to Quezon).
9. Manila Times, 25 June 1917; David, Our National Guard, p. 3.
10. David, Our National Guard, pp. 3-4; Harrison, Cornerstone, p. 184.
assist in the creation of the Guard, but "most were immediately ordered to the U.S. for service in France and did not remain long with the insular militia." Gen. Bailey was himself also called to the U.S. in August.\(^\text{11}\)

The original plan called for the creation of three brigades, each of three infantry regiments with attached artillery and service units. Each brigade was assigned its respective area in the Philippines: the first Brigade was to recruit from Manila and southern Luzon; the second covered north Luzon and the third was to enlist from the Visayas. In addition, cavalry, coast artillery and aero units were contemplated.\(^\text{12}\)

By May, Harrison had made the first appointments as the headquarters echelon was created. Formally designated to command the Guard was Ralph W. Jones, a career P.C. officer who had risen through the ranks to colonel, and had won the Medal of Honor in Samar. Jones, who was also Harrison's aide, assumed the post of Adjutant General, with a rank of brigadier general. Other brigadier generals were Manuel Roa, who commanded the second Brigade, and Thomas L. Hartigan, who commanded the Third Brigade. Other commissions followed, several of them prominent men. Antonio C. Torres, who later became Chief of Police of Manila, was appointed lieutenant colonel. Julio Infante and Rafael Garcia of Revolutionary War fame were colonels. Majors were Manuel X. Burgos, Sr., Jose A. de los Reyes (who later became Chief of Staff of the Commonwealth Army), Felipe Buencamino, Jr., Quintin Paredes, Jorge Vargas and Daniel Maramba, among others.\(^\text{13}\)

On 5 June, officers spread through Luzon and the Visayas to conduct medical examinations of officer applicants. On 4 July members of the National Guard in Manila made their first public appearance in a parade, and on 23 July an Officers Training School began in the Port Area. With regular U.S. Army officers or Philippine Scout officers as instructors, 200 officer candidates and 100 noncommissioned officer trainees studied and drilled until 19 September. The officer candidates received ₱0.80 a day as subsistence and transportation allowance, plus an ₱80 clothing allowance, while the non-coms got ₱0.25 daily. The graduates were then sent to the provinces to enlist men, and later provide for one month of training, with planned weekly refresher training afterwards. A ground

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12. Extracts from the Minutes of Meeting of the Militia Commission, 4 May 1917 (quoting Hartigan memo for 26 April 1917), Box 1913-17; General Order No. 2, 24 May 1917, Box General Orders, 1917, both in Quezon Papers.
13. General Orders Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, 14 and 15 for May, June, July 1917; Special Orders Nos. 1 and 22 for July 1917; all in Box General Orders, 1917, Quezon Papers.
course in aviation was also held on Corregidor for thirty men. J.E.H. Stevenot was commissioned a major after the course and sent to the U.S. for flight training. To encourage civil officials to join the Guard, Harrison issued Executive Order No. 58 on 17 July which allowed these officials to be granted leave from their posts while they trained in the Guard. Upon leaving the Guard honorably, they would resume their posts. As a further incentive, the salary was to be whichever was higher, the Guard pay or the civil job pay. The National Guard was beginning to function, even if there was yet no call from the U.S. government.

Since there was no official response from Washington, Harrison cabled Secretary Baker on 14 June, renewing the offer of 25,000 men and promising organization by 30 September if necessary. "An early acceptance is desirable as quality of personnel will be improved when it is known that foreign service is certain," he added. There was still no official call from the U.S. Harrison later wrote, "All through the provinces the flower of the youth were preparing to volunteer, and many of the leaders were impatient to be up and doing." Quezon later noted that the mood in the Philippine Department had changed with a change of commander: "Despite the sympathetic support of the War Department, for reasons unknown to us the military authorities in the Philippines were very slow in providing the civil government with the necessary help for the training and equipment of the National Guard."16

PROBLEMS

Things were not as rosy as Harrison or Quezon had thought. Several problems developed, which hindered the development of the National Guard.

In the Philippines unforeseen friction between individuals developed. In at least one case, a question of civil versus military authority came up. The commanding officer of the Third Infantry Regiment, Col. Julio

14. Special Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 18, 23 and 84, for June, July and November 1917, Box General Orders, 1917, Quezon Papers. S.O. 18 gives details of the parade; S.O. 23 gives subsistence pay rates. Also: David, Our National Guard, pp. 6-7; Hill, "Philippine Army", I, p. 55 and II, p. 60; Harrison, Cornerstone, p. 163. Philippines Free Press, 7 July 1917, has a photograph and description of the parade; is reproduced in part in Florante G. Pascual, "Remember the National Guard?" Philippines Free Press (21 May 1966).

15. Hill, "Philippine Army," I, p. 56; Orders 5, 2 August 1917, in Box General Orders 1917, Quezon Papers.

16. Memorandum from General Jones, 11 November 1917, Box 1913-17, Quezon Papers; Harrison, Cornerstone, p. 163; Quezon, The Good Fight, p. 135.
Infante, and the governor of Iloilo, Hilado, did not see eye to eye. Quezon would write Hilado to cooperate with Col. Infante. Later, Infante and Hilado would write back saying things were going well, but then the disagreement would start anew.  

Some individuals actually discouraged young men from joining the Guard. The Division Superintendent of Schools, A.M. Wiley, told prospective officer trainees that they would be sent to Europe right away, implying danger and death without adequate training. General Jones wrote the various garrison commanders to submit the names of persons who worked against the Guard. One reply submitted the names of eight such men in Batangas and Bauan, Batangas.  

R. McCulloch Dick, editor of the *Philippines Free Press*, questioned the loyalties of the militiamen. Federalization of the Guard meant an increase in pay from P12 to P60, plus a free uniform and good food:

And just watch 'em when the call comes. Talk about a dearth of patriots for the Guard! Why, the moment the news gets around that you can get P60 a month and your belly full by enlisting, just see them come—see them streak for the recruiting office! Behold the cochero drop his frying pan, the cargador his pinga, the escribiento his pen, the farmer his bolo. See them hit the high places! . . . Talk about manna from the skies! . . . Flanders mud, you say, and being blown to pieces by a Black Maria [a German artillery piece]? Why, at P60 a month our Juans and Pedros and Dalmacios will eat Flanders mud and dance ragtime to the tune of the Black Marias.

The editorial was accompanied by a cartoon, “The Grand Rush for the Guard,” showing Filipinos lining up at a recruiting station, while others came running in from the fields.

Harrison did not take this assault on his pet project lightly. He filed deportation charges against Dick, a British national, whom he branded an “undesirable alien” and a “menace to the peace and safety of the community.” The editorial itself was called “obstructionist.” Dick, who was given the summons while playing golf at Intramuros, coolly finished his game (below par) and then pooled a battery of American lawyers to

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17. See, for example, Quezon to Infante, 16 Nov 1917; Elpidio Quirino to Infante, 7 December 1917 and other letters, Box 1913-17, Quezon Papers.
18. Captain Pascual Gonzalez to Assistant Adjutant General, National Guard, 19 December 1917; Eliseo Claraval to Quezon, 26 October 1917, Box 1913-17, Quezon Papers.
defend his case. Several other individuals rose to defend Dick and the right of the press to criticize. 20

Harrison considered the *Free Press* piece part of an army plot to hinder the development of the National Guard, for the U.S. Army in the Philippines had itself become obstructionist. Gen. Bailey had been replaced by Brig. Gen. Robert K. Evans, a retired general who had been sent to command the Philippine Department. His command was a garrison “from which substantially all the American soldiers had been withdrawn,” and Gen. Evans, “discredited and embittered at being left behind in the Philippines,” balked at plans which would erode his command. The 24,000 extra rifles which had been promised the Guard by Ligett and Bailey were sent back to the U.S. by Evans, and 1,000 obsolete rifles stored in Fort Santiago were secretly condemned and dumped into Manila Bay. Evans discouraged Philippine Scout officers from applying for the Guard, and at times even forbade communication with the militia headquarters. Army medical officers, whom the Guard was short of, were denied the Guard. Unfortunately for Harrison, Evans would remain Commanding General of the Philippine Department for a whole year, until August 1918. 21

Dick, in his *Free Press* editorial, mentioned a “dearth of patriots for the Guard.” Despite all the optimistic pronouncements of the first few months following the offer, the National Guard suffered from a shortage of officers throughout 1917, especially in the captain and junior officer brackets. Most of those who presented themselves were “not men of the type we should like to have,” noted Gen. Jones, but they were all the volunteers available at that time. With the Division at war strength, 924 officers were needed. As of 13 January 1918, only 354 were immediately available, of which only 200 were ready for war service. Jones hoped to get about 275 officers from the Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary, but that still left a shortage of 449 officers! There were suggestions, such as imposing obligatory service, so that Filipinos would have to serve. It was even suggested that government employees be required to join, and that they would, hopefully, provide half the strength of the guard. 22

20. Pascual, “Remember the National Guard?,” p. 63; Hill, “The Philippine Army”; Charles R. Hamilton to Quezon, 22 March 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers; interview with Frederic S. Marquardt (associate editor of the *Philippines Free Press* in the 1920s), 10 April 1987, at the Manila Hotel. Quintin Paredes, as Solicitor General, handled the deportation case and recommended that Harrison issue the deportation order. Details of the case can be found in Lourdes Paredes-San Diego, *Don Quintin of Abra*, (n.p.: privately printed, 1985), p. 26.


22. Memorandum from Gen. Jones, 13 January 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers; incomplete letter (no signature block) to Quezon, 6 January 1918.
Since there was no concrete action from Washington, not many were induced to join after the initial enthusiasm. Lack of U.S. action may have dampened the spirits of prospective volunteers, but for many others, joining the Guard would mean leaving stable jobs or newly opened business opportunities resulting from Harrison's Filipinization program.

Even within the Guard, there were problems. A system of military justice was adopted to maintain military discipline. The first case requiring court martial was that of a medical corpsman who had tried to sell two khaki shirts (government property). He was fined $5.00. More serious was the second case, a cook who went absent without leave, and who had failed to settle a debt to the Guard. He was meted thirty days’ confinement.

Some Guard officers felt they were not receiving the necessary respect they deserved. One officer, who was not saluted by a P.C. man, made the constable march three or four times in front of him, saluting each time. Gen. Jones had to issue a memorandum stating, in part, that if Guard officers conducted themselves in a dignified manner, respect would come naturally. "It is well not to be overparticular about small matters," Jones advised his officers.

On 19 January 1918, it seemed the long wait was over. More than nine months after the initial offer, Jaime C. de Veyra, Philippine commissioner in Washington D.C., cabled Quezon: "Philippine National Guard Bill passed by the Senate."

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

To Harrison and Quezon, the delay in Washington was inexplicable. Unknown to them, the U.S. Army was highly sceptical of the whole plan, just as Gen. Evans in Manila was.

The Bureau of Insular Affairs under Frank McIntyre was sympathetic with Harrison and supported the project. A few legislators were also supportive of the offer but desired changes in the military forces in the Philippines. Senator Horace M. Towner suggested combining the Philippine Scouts, the Constabulary, the Regular U.S. Army in the Philippines and the National Guard. He and others saw too many military
organizations in the Philippines. Quezon and Harrison had been eying a similar move, but in the end, the Army had final say.26

The War Department was not entirely enthusiastic about the offer. After twenty years' experience in the Philippines, military thought at that time was that Filipinos made good soldiers only when under American leadership. If under native leaders, “these troops were a failure as a fighting force,” due to their lack of discipline. Brig. Gen. Henry Jervey, Director of Operations of the War Plans Division, felt that “Filipino leadership did not inspire confidence in the Filipino soldier.”27

The exodus of American officers and men from the Philippines to fight in Europe caused the War Department much concern. Brig. Gen. Rafael Crame, first Filipino chief of the Philippine Constabulary, took command on 17 December 1917, and the number of Filipino officers in the P.C. increased. The Army jealously guarded the integrity of the Philippine Scouts by not allowing Filipinization in the officer ranks. But the increasing numbers of Filipinos in the armed forces, and the reduction of American forces in the Philippines caused the War Department much worry.28

The war in Europe seems to have occupied the minds of the War Department initially, and it was only in December 1917, after some discussion, that it pushed for the passage of a bill recommending that Wilson call the Philippine National Guard to federal service.29 The act was approved early the next month, and Wilson signed it into law on 20 January 1918. Subsequent moves by Quezon, Harrison, McIntyre and Baker to allow Philippine Scout officers to serve in the National Guard alarmed conservative military circles, who felt that the Philippine Scouts might be compromised as a force.30

After the Philippine National Guard act was passed, the proposal of calling the Guard into federal service was sent to the War Plans Division for further study. A month later, Col. O. W. Ketchum, acting director of the Division submitted his findings and recommendations. The War Plans Division, he wrote, “could see no possibility of utilizing the insular

28. Ibid., p. 168.
29. Ibid., p. 170.
militia for any purpose during the current war.”31 It was put as bluntly as could be.

Explaining his stand, Col. Ketchum stated that the U.S. did not lack men for its armed forces. The Philippine National Guard could be useful only if it “offered greater value, greater availability for service or greater economy.” The Guard did not offer any of these. Fresh American troops had far greater value than any native force, with perhaps the exception of the Philippine Scouts. If, as proposed, the National Guard was to be commanded by Filipinos, things would be even worse, because the Filipino officers were “without experience and with the limitations of their race.” Furthermore, there was no way to check fitness or to exact discipline in such a short time.32

Col. Ketchum then studied possible uses of the Guard, if it were to be called to federal service. The U.S. Army needed men on the Mexican border, but using the Guard there was out of the question, since a delicate balance was being maintained there, and the “introduction of a Filipino force as undisciplined as the Mexican one across the border defies logic.” The racial tension there would be heightened, since the white southerners would hardly be able to differentiate the Mexicans from Filipinos.33

Using the militia to substitute for the regular U.S. Army garrison in the Philippines was likewise ruled out. “While no one questions the loyalty of the Filipinos, the organization of militia units in rural communities might well arm one clan, faction or tribe to the detriment of another and foster political turmoil. The Division, moreover, retains the belief (learned from hard experience) that the Filipino by custom and inclination lapsed into banditry. Often the possession of a rifle proved sufficient incentive.”34 It had taken great effort to disarm the Filipinos; to arm them again would negate all the earlier work.

The War Plans Division recommended that the Philippine National Guard not be called into federal service. Rather, they suggested that the Philippine Scouts be expanded into a full-fledged division. The Scouts had been organized into battalions and now, if the Filipinos wanted to show their loyalty, they could join the proposed Scout division.35

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 175.
34. Ibid., p. 176.
35. Ibid.
Gen. Jervey agreed with most of the findings, but did not fully close the door on the Filipino militia, realizing the political implications of rejecting the guard outright. He ordered the reorganization of the Philippine Scouts into regiments, and forwarded Ketchum’s study to the acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Peyton March. Gen. March officially accepted the War Plans Division proposal on the scouts on 2 April, and communicated this to the Philippine Department.

Harrison and McIntyre, who had not been consulted on this matter, immediately protested loudly. Harrison cabled the Bureau of Insular Affairs on 6 April, reiterating the Filipinos’ sincerity and capability of raising a full division for service abroad. Harrison did not see why the National Guard and the Scouts could not be developed independently of each other, and requested McIntyre to bring the matter to Pres. Wilson as soon as possible. McIntyre forwarded Harrison’s cable to Gen. March, and eventually it reached Wilson.

Wilson was sympathetic to Harrison, and although the War Plans Division defended its stand, it eventually had to soften its position since Wilson, Baker, McIntyre and Harrison supported the Philippine offer. Gen. March eventually cabled Gen. Evans in Manila that, while it might not be practical to employ the National Guard outside the Philippines, it could be called into the service of the U.S. for a period of training. The decision to accept the Guard for training, with no plans for overseas service, was thus a face-saving measure, keeping the U.S. Army and Harrison reasonably satisfied. The War Department made one more stipulation, though, to keep the Guard under control: all officers (whose appointments would have to pass through the department) above major were to be Americans.36

RENEWAL OF EFFORT

The passage of the Philippine National Guard Act now enabled the members of the Guard to look forward to federal service when the call came. On 5 February, rules and regulations governing enlistment were issued. A central committee was formed to oversee national enlistment, while subcommittees in the provinces were established. The table of organization was clarified in order to conform with the current U.S. Army regulations, with the more expensive elements dropped. A quota system per town and per province was set out. Approximately five

36. Ibid., pp. 183-84.
percent of the eligible male population was to be called for service, with a further 2.5 percent enrolled as back up members.37

Nine days later, Baker cabled Gen. Evans to submit his requests, since Evans was still apparently holding back. The requests for action, though, were to be “based on continuing in warm climate at least until next winter and on the use of supplies available in the Philippine Islands.”38 The Guard was thus not going to France in the immediate future, and little material help could be expected from the U.S.

The last day of March saw Pres. Wilson approve an act (opposed by army men who feared for the Scouts) allowing Philippine Scout officers to accept appointments in the Philippine National Guard. While a few officers availed of this opportunity, Gen. Evans’s obstinacy limited Filipino officer transferees.39

Gen. Evans’s foot-dragging prompted Harrison to accost Evans once and for all. He wrote Evans using his official stationery and added “Commander in Chief” under his title as governor-general. “You have expressed yourself as doubtful of our ability to obtain the required number of volunteers, but there is no doubt whatever in our minds on this part,” he wrote. Conditions in the Philippines, he explained, were different from the United States. Party leaders in the Philippines were able to mold public opinion to a great extent, and could thus influence men to join the Guard. (Oddly, Harrison did not mention patriotism as a driving force for volunteers). He lengthily explained the rationale behind the Guard, and added, “Your predecessor was in full accord with the idea and . . . we had no idea that you would offer any objection.”40

Harrison also probably complained to the War Department, for on 3 April Gen. Evans was sent a cable urging that “every assistance” be given Harrison and the Guard. With no change in Evans’s posture, Harrison

37. General Orders No. 9, 5 February 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers. Members of the Central Committee were: Sen. Juan Villamor (chairman); Mr. M. P. Leuterio; Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Jones, Adjt. Gen., NG; Brig. Gen. Rafael Crame, Chief of Constabulary; Mr. Francisco Enage, Chief of the Executive Bureau; Dr. W. W. Marquardt, Director of Education; Dr. Vicente de Jesus, Bureau of Health; Mr. Vicente Aldanese, Bureau of Customs; Dr. Francisco Calderon, Philippine General Hospital; Rep. Pedro Aunario (secretary).
Each town had to raise about 0.5 percent of its population. This percentage is based on a report (ca. early February 1918) of towns in Iloilo with populations and planned quotas. The town of Iloilo, with 37,811 residents, was to raise 189 men; Jaro, with 20,208 residents, was assigned a quota of 101 men, and so on. Report on towns, populations and quotas of Iloilo, ca. early February 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers.
39. Ibid.
40. Harrison to Commanding General, Philippine Department, 17 February 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers.
fired off a cable to Baker: "Since arrival of present Department Commander, there has been a consistent and determined effort along lines directly retarding instead of facilitating federalization of our Philippine Division."  

Eventually Gen. Evans would be replaced by a more sympathetic general, Gen. H. A. Greene, but this would be on 6 August almost four months after Harrison fired off his complaint. And this only after Harrison complained to Baker again: "Let us have all Scout officers and men who will volunteer . . . Filipinos cannot understand delays and our explanations worn threadbare."  

Despite all the blocks, Harrison kept his hopes high. He even hoped to be commissioned as a major general to command the Guard himself. Quezon and Osmeña supported Harrison on this, and cabled McIntyre and Baker their desire to have Harrison appointed. Harrison even wore a major general's uniform in one of the Guard's parades, and, when the time came, submitted his name at the top of the list of officer recommendees to the War Department. Although Harrison often signed as commander-in-chief of the Guard, he had no military rank. Thus he could only recommend. A subtly worded reply to Quezon's and Osmeña's cable of support from McIntyre dampened Harrison's dreams. While the Secretary of War appreciated Harrison's work, command of the National Guard "must, when taken up, necessarily be decided on purely military grounds."  

Hopes were still high, though, that the Guard would be able to see service overseas. Gen. McIntyre had written to De Veyra on 13 February that "no definite plan has been determined in the use of the Philippine Division at the front," but the next day De Veyra, forwarding this information to Quezon and Osmeña, added optimistically: "It is said that the immediate plan is to send the Philippine Division to Hawaii." As late as 23 May, by which time Washington had decided to keep the Philippine Division in the Philippines, rumors in San Francisco had it that the War Department was planning to send the National Guard to France.  

43. Hill, "Philippine Army," II, p. 56; Frank McIntyre to Jaime C. De Veyra, 13 February 1918; cable, De Veyra to Quezon and Osmeña, 14 February 1918, both in Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers.  
44. Ibid. (both letter and cable); David, Our National Guard, p. 12.
The long period of waiting had proven too much for several Americans with previous military training who had applied for the Guard. They grew tired of waiting and went to the U.S. to join the U.S. Army instead.  

ENLISTMENT

Enlistment of recruits began late in February or early March. Quezon, probably with the Infante-Hilado disagreement in mind, wrote the provincial governors stressing cooperation with military officers. Quezon also emphasized the urgency of enlisting doctors, veterinarians and other professionals for the Guard. Letters from the various provinces soon came in mentioning excellent civilian and military cooperation and the smooth flow of enlistment proceedings.

On 23 April Harrison was given authority from Washington to organize the Philippine National Guard, preparatory to being called to U.S. service. Washington assured Harrison that the War Department would supply regular officers and the use of facilities already in the Philippines. The Militia Commission met on 14 May to reorganize the National Guard along current U.S. Army tables of organization, with the Philippines divided into military districts to facilitate orderly enlistment. The more expensive units—the cavalry, coast artillery and aero squadron—were to be suppressed, that is, not formed. It was also at this time that word was received from Washington advising of the decision to limit Filipino officers to the rank of major.

A second officers' training school was held from 5 July to 5 October, to train officers according to U.S. Army standards. There were 1024 officer candidates but only 437 noncommissioned officer trainees. All the graduates of the first officers' training school were there. Since merit was to be the sole basis for admission into the reorganized Guard, they had to submit for regradation according to U.S. Army lines. Professional

46. Eulogio Rodriguez (governor of Rizal) to Quezon, 4 March 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers, and other similar letters in the same box.
47. David, Our National Guard, p. 12. De Veyra seems to have learned of the call to organize a bit later, as he cabled the news to Quezon and Osmeña on 26 April. Cable, de Veyra to Quezon and Osmeña, 26 April 1918, Box April-July, 1918, Quezon papers.

With the limitation in rank of Filipino officers, there was the problem of what to do with Brig. Gen. Roa. The War Department's emphasis on merit was publicized, but how Roa's face was saved is not known. Cable, Jones to Hartigan, 17 May and 23 May 1918, Box April-July 1918, Quezon Papers.
U.S. Army instructors taught the officer candidates at the Port Area, where the first Officers’ Training School had been held. The physical plant and facilities proved insufficient though, and the school was later moved to Fort William McKinley. Col. Dennis P. Quinlan, the camp commandant, subjected all trainees to the same harsh conditions. He trained them all as privates, at first, then gradually raised the level.  

The Officers’ Training School began with several days of speeches to build morale and provide inspiration. Harrison, Quezon, Rafael Palma, Teodoro Sandiko and other prominent personalities spoke on the importance of the Guard and the responsibilities of the men. A parade on 23 July ceremonially opened the school, followed by actual training and instruction. Subjects ranged from military service and tactics to administrative, military and international law. Hygiene and sanitation were stressed, and a subject called “civil liberty” was also taught. In the last month of the school, practical military subjects such as trench warfare, gas attack, musketry and bayonet training were introduced. Oddly though, there was no training on adapting to temperate climates, winter warfare or camouflage, implying no action in Europe. English was the official language, and those who were deficient in it had to take supplemental courses. Those who desired a second language could take French or Spanish. Col. Quinlan instituted a daily lecture on Filipino-American bravery to boost the morale of his men. Unfortunately for him, the lectures were considered boring and the trainees jokingly called them the “gas attack.”

The Aero Squadron had achieved progress before it was decided to suppress it. Maj. Stevenot had returned from training in the U.S., and had brought back a plane given the Philippines by the Curtis Company. Maj. Stevenot had also become an employee of the same company, and returned to school others in the use of aircraft (probably a Curtis aircraft). The newly-formed Aero Club of the Philippines (organized in October

49. Ibid; Memorandum from Quinlan to Governor General, 23 July 1918; Memorandum, Capt. S. L. Weld, 22 July 1918, Box April-July 1918; Training schedules for 7 September, 14 September and others, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers. Some of the speeches and introductions of the guest speakers are in the April-July Box, Quezon Papers.

The school adopted a grading system as follows: 15 percent each for physical qualities, intelligence, military leadership and character; and 40 percent for general value to the service. 75 percent in all categories was necessary for commission. (Orders 11, Officer Training School, 26 August 1918, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers).

At least one case of cheating occurred in camp. Jose Gamboa was caught using a crib sheet in an exam and was expelled, after his sentence was read in front of the whole corps. (Orders 28, 24 September 1918, in Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.)
1917 by Harrison and Gen. Evans) offered to promote and develop aviation in the Philippines, believing that mastery of the air was crucial in winning wars. Graduates of the 1917 ground school were recommended for flight training in the U.S., but the War Department advised that training planes were too few even for Americans who wanted to fly. The National Guard's Aero Squadron thus remained grounded until disbanded, and the plane which Maj. Stevenot brought was eventually lost in a crash.\(^5\)

The Guard paraded (again!) on Occupation Day, 13 August 1918, but behind the pomp lay numerous difficulties that the Guard was still facing, even with the call to U.S. service imminent. Gen. Jones realized that, as in 1917, enthusiasm for enrollment in the Guard was not as high as had been hoped for. "We have been disappointed," Jones wrote to Quezon in February, "at the small number of applicants for the commissioned personnel of our Medical Department."\(^5\) By July, things had not changed, and Jones urged Quezon to appeal to doctors to join the Guard, emphasizing that the government, which had subsidized their education, now needed their help. By September, there was still no improvement, and Gen. Jones prepared an essay which he would release to the press if no other means could be found to recruit doctors. In the essay, titled "A Disgraceful Situation," Jones lamented that doctors who had schooled under government expense would now not leave their lucrative professions for the country. These "slackers" were a shame to the profession, Jones stated.\(^5\)

Other professionals were not joining the Guard either. Gen. Jones noted, "The difficulty is not one of obtaining numbers, but quality. Soldiers can be recruited easily. . . ." Jones proposed that citizens be told of their duties and obligations to their country. He suggested that Quezon ask professional groups like the Congress of Engineers, Congress of Doctors, Congress of Veterinarians and the Philippine Columbian to encourage their members to join the Guard.\(^5\)

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51. Memorandum from Dennis Quinlan, 6 August 1918, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers; Jones to Quezon, 20 February 1918, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers.

52. Memorandum, Jones to Quezon, 30 July 1918, Box April-July 1918; Jones to Quezon, 26 September 1918, with Jones, "A Disgraceful Situation" attached, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.

53. Jones to Governor General, 20 June 1918, Box April-July 1918, Quezon Papers. In the same box is a draft resolution from the Philippine Columbian Association, forwarded to Quezon by Jose A. Santos, so apparently Jones' request was granted by the Philippine Columbian at least.
"College-educated Filipinos are not applying and have not applied," lamented Jones. "Fifteen of the very best [in the Guard] are asking to be released." One reason for this situation was Harrison's Filipinization policy, which opened up many lucrative jobs. Several Americans had also joined the U.S. Army, leaving other job opportunities. And the long delay in federalization had demoralized many. "Many gave up work to enter the Guard," wrote Jones, "and were obliged to find new work to tide them over the recent delay. Some find it impossible to obtain work because employers realize that service is but temporary." In the case of doctors, joining the Guard meant "considerable financial sacrifices," but ideally this should have been played down in the name of patriotism.

Some government bureaus were themselves proving uncooperative. The Director of Public Works told his engineers that service in the bureau was as important a service to the country as service in the National Guard; hence, it was not necessary to join the Guard. Gen. Jones found only the Directors of Health, Education and Forestry, the chief of the PC and the UP president cooperative. "The best I can say of the other bureaus is that they have been passive," Jones wrote Quezon.

Many towns were slow in raising their quotas of men. In Solana, Cagayan, James C. Scott, a government official, spoke to boost interest in the Guard, but also censured the town for not being able to raise its share of men. Only one adult had appeared for enlistment, although forty high school boys (too young) had tried to apply! The call for applicants for the second Officers' Training School brought only a trickle of applicants. By 28 September, when mobilization was in full swing and little more than a month remained before federalization, the Guard was only 38.6 percent of its full strength. Some provinces had dismal reports. Albay, with a quota of 800 men, had raised only 21. Bohol had only 25 men in the rolls, but a quota of 1000! A few provinces scored high. Isabela even exceeded its quota and Negros Oriental and Abra were short just a few men, but the overall record was poor. Even Cebu was only able to raise 74 men out of a quota of 2000!"
Worse, some of the men who had initially enlisted changed their minds and did not report when called. Gen. Jones attributed this to the influence of wives and relatives, but he sought to change that by instituting an oath in which the enlistee pledged to report for duty when called.\textsuperscript{57}

Quezon and others went around the country speaking on behalf of the Guard, and Quezon even wrote an article in a national school paper, explaining why men had to join the Guard.\textsuperscript{58} The quotas seem to have been filled by November. Provincial boards picked some and others joined voluntarily.

One of the men picked for officer training by the provincial board of Negros Oriental, Perfecto Ganhinhin, had an additional reason for joining. He hoped to go to Europe and meet relatives of his great grandfather, a Frenchman who had lived in the Philippines. Many others who joined the Guard wanted to go abroad. Others were taken by the romance of a military uniform. Victor Buencamino, a veterinarian who had studied in the U.S., was attracted by the propaganda. Posters showing Tomas Claudio “whipped up a strong feeling against the Germans,” and the sight of soldiers training on Wallace Field, “all agog over the prospects of seeing action in Europe,” was inspiring. Dr. Buencamino joined the Guard, and “discovered to my joy that being a vet was a short cut to acquiring the rank of lieutenant colonel . . . I did not have to sweat it out training like foot soldiers at Wallace Field.” He would don his uniform once in a while, because “somehow you felt important when you were in uniform.” He recalled further, “I was full of anticipation, for I saw this as a chance to visit Europe once more, all expenses paid.”\textsuperscript{59}

Other Filipinos began wondering why there seemed to be discrimination against Filipino Scout officers, since hardly any Filipino Scouts had been appointed as officers of the Guard, even those who had graduated from West Point. Prior to August, this was understandable, since Gen.

\textsuperscript{57} Jones to Quezon, 25 March 1918 and proposed oath, attached, Box January-March 1918, Quezon Papers.

\textsuperscript{58} See, for example, H. S. Townsend (Division Superintendent for Schools, Batangas), to Quezon, 6 March 1918, inviting Quezon to speak on the National Guard, Box January-March, 1918; and The Public News Review, (a paper for public and private schools), vol. 3, extra no. 5, 18 September 1918, p. 3 in Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.

Evans was still commanding the Philippine Department, but in October it was still a problem. The War Department’s policy of not allowing Filipinos above the rank of major was also questioned. An anonymous Filipino writing under the pseudonym “Juan de la Cruz” asked why, in the National Guard, Americans were promoted and given field positions, while PC colonels were, in effect, demoted.60

In the regional camps, there was corruption. In Camp McGrath in Batangas, the men were not paid their subsistence allowances. Instead they were told that their allowances went to support the canteen which was privately run. The canteen, however, offered less than what the allowance could buy outside.61

Of the officer trainees, who would be the backbone of the Guard, Jones wrote Quezon that “we, of course, do not expect to make officers out of them in three months.” There was an abundance of high school graduates, but there were not enough men for the important positions of captain and first lieutenant company and platoon commanders. “Juan de la Cruz” alleged that a full 60 percent of the officer nominees for the Guard were physically, morally or mentally unfit for service. “Oh, pobre Philippine National Guard!” ended “Juan de la Cruz”’s letter. In frustration, Jones wrote, “I have no solution to offer.”62

MOBILIZATION

After all the preparations and the accompanying obstacles, actual physical mobilization began in the first week of October 1918. As the second Officers’ Training School ended (only some 830 officers and non-commissioned men made it), leases for a camp site for the National Guard were worked out, and members of the school, together with bakers and bandsmen who had been training at Fort McKinley, marched out to the new camp. It was named Camp Tomas Claudio, after the first Filipino to be killed in World War I, (Claudio had been a student in the U.S. when the war broke out and had enlisted in the U.S. Army; he was sent to France

60. Rafael Gregorio (U.S. Army) to Quezon, 10 July 1918, Box April-July, 1918; “Juan de la Cruz” to Quezon, 15 October 1918 Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.
61. Esteban Lopez to Quezon, 10 July 1918, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers. Lopez, the trainee who filed the complaint, asked Quezon to look into the matter.
62. Memorandum, Jones to Quezon, 30 July 1918, Box April-July, 1918; “Juan de la Cruz” to Quezon, 15 October 1918, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.
and was killed there). The camp had hardly anything but a name at the time of the transfer. Supplies arrived late, after the more than 1,500 officers and men had marched in.

A shortage of officers in charge was quickly felt. Alva J. Hill, who had assisted in working out the leases, and had verbally been promised an appointment to captain in the Quartermaster Corps, was detailed to serve as acting quartermaster because the chief quartermaster, Thomas J. Wolff, was arranging for equipment to be sent from Manila. When Hill arrived in the camp, he found no one in charge, and became acting officer in charge by force of circumstance. Tents, food and other equipment began arriving with papers missing. Assistants to aid in the disbursement were absent. Hill cut red tape and managed to hammer out some order from the confusion almost single-handedly. Eventually the other officers arrived and the camp was organized. Throughout October and November the camp was levelled and cleaned, and barracks and other buildings erected.

The rest of the 14,000 men began to arrive from the provinces shortly after. This marked "the first time in the history of the Philippines that a native army had ever thus been mobilized from all the provinces." The different regional groupings had difficulty communicating with each other, even with English as the official language. Men often resorted to sign language, "bamboo English" (some words in Spanish with bits and pieces of various dialects interspersed). Hill observed that "occasionally fights would occur among the men through misunderstandings; and on one or two occasions riot calls were sounded due to clashes between different hostile groups."

The training that the men had been given previously was not sufficient, as some of the troops were still unfamiliar with modern sanitation. Hill had to arrest and punish men "for committing unsanitary nuisances about the camp, although the poor fellows did not know how to deposit themselves and simply followed their provincial customs." An influenza epidemic spread, and on 9 November, 650 cases of flu were reported, with 162 other medical cases undergoing treatment in the camp hospital. Hygiene had to be taught to those who were unfamiliar with modern

63. Some 6000 Filipinos, living in the U.S., enlisted in the U.S. military or naval forces. Sixty-one, in addition to Claudio, were killed in action. David, Our National Guard, p. 17, lists the names of those who died.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., II, p. 52.
methods. Toothbrush drill was actually held, where the men drilled "by the number," as in rifle drills. Venereal disease did not appear though, owing to the policy of keeping the men busy, and of policing the neighboring barrios. So busy were the men, in fact, that according to one officer, they looked forward to rest and sleep at night.67

Mobilization was to be completed by 1 November 1918, but delays pushed it back to 11 November. Despite the end of the war, Washington federalized the Philippine National Guard on 20 November. Supposedly due to slowness in the cable service, the news was received in Manila only on 30 November, nine full days after the war ended!68

With the federalization orders came the officer appointments from the War Department. The commanding general was Brig. Gen. Frederick Day. Other generals were Dennis P. Quinlan and Ralph Jones. Harrison was not appointed at all and Manuel Roa was eased out of position. Hartigan, who had been so instrumental in the early days and had stayed in Washington to lobby for the Guard, was likewise not appointed. (He could have been commissioned as an officer of public relations, but he apparently did not want that.) Gen. Jones and Quinlan did not get along, however, and their hostility towards each other would surface once in a while. It may have had to do with professional rivalry. Quinlan was an Army man, while Jones was a Constabulary officer.69

As stipulated by the War Department, no Filipinos were appointed to ranks above major, with one exception: Lt. Col. Vicente R. Barros, a West Point graduate and a scout officer. All in all, there were a total of 576 officers, 110 of whom were Americans and 14,235 men.70

One final parade was scheduled, on 14 November. Every man was to be given U.S.-government-issue uniforms and equipment, and this was to be the grand parade with the Guard federalized. As it turned out, though, the parade was not one that would inspire Filipinos to rush to the recruiting stations, as Dick had so humorously put it in February. The uniforms and equipment, being surplus or rejects, were incompatible with Filipinos. Many men had not worn shoes before, and the shoes they were now provided with did not fit. "It became necessary in many cases to force a number 8C shoe on a 6EE foot, notwithstanding the protests

67. Ibid., I, p. 60; II, p. 54-55.
68. Ibid., I, p. 61; II, p. 52; Harrison, Cornerstone, p. 166.
and discomfort of the recruit," remembered an officer. Cavalry leggings (when there was no cavalry in the first place!) were too large. Campaign hats were so big that "rolls of paper were inserted to serve as hat pads." Uniforms were of various shades of khaki or olive drab, and some were so old that "the sleeves burst out and the seams ripped away every time the men tried to get into them," and almost all were too large.71

The result, Alva Hill noted, was "both amusing and pathetic." He described that day:72

A large number of the men were instructed to purchase tennis shoes from the post exchange to wear on the march from Camp Claudio to Luneta... and to carry their leather shoes, and to make a change just before passing in review. Others marched in their bare feet until reaching the Luneta, carrying their shoes, leggings and rifles or wooden guns over their shoulders. To those of the men who had been clerks, teachers, students, etc., it was truly humiliating to be thus shabbily dressed and equipped, and to pass in review before thousands of spectators somewhat as a burlesque, masquerade or ragamuffin parade. They had no opportunity to press the wrinkles out of their clothes, nor any money to hire a tailor to cut their uniform to fit. It was laughable, and yet was pitiful to see patriotic young men (who had volunteered to give up their lives, if need be) thus shamefully displayed and made the brunt of both jokes and bursts of laughter.

And so the Philippine National Guard was at last federalized. Needless to say, there were no more letters of application or recommendation that Quezon received.

UNDER FEDERAL SERVICE

The same day of the pathetic parade, Gen. Jones disappointedly wrote the Militia Commission, "The end of the war, while a most happy occasion, has upset most decidedly our plans." He discussed possibilities for the Guard. Perhaps it could still be sent overseas. Perhaps it could be included in the budget for 1919 and allowed to continue for at least a year, and maybe even become the basis of the future Philippine Army. Ironically, Jones also noted that there now was a surplus of doctors rather than the shortage which he had so desperately tried to remedy.73

71. Ibid., II, pp. 53-54.
72. Ibid.
73. Memorandum, Jones to Militia Commission, 14 November 1918; Jones to Quezon, 1 November 1918, both in Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.
Officers and men were asked late in November whether they wanted to leave the Guard immediately or whether they would stay. If they wanted to stay, would they stay beyond the training period? About one third of the guard, or 5,317 officers and men, replied that they wanted to stay beyond that training stage. It was not very encouraging for those who wanted to keep the Guard going.

It was eventually decided that the Guard would spend three months in training, with one month to be fully paid for by the U.S. government, and the remaining two months to be shouldered by the Philippines. The U.S. government wound up paying $515,000 for the one month, while the local administration chalked up a whopping $2,406,000 for the remaining two months! In addition to the monetary expense, Harrison noted, “how much they [Filipinos] expended in unrequited sentiment and in disdainfully accepted good-will will never be known.”

The three-month training went on. One officer remembers how, on night sentry duty, he was specifically ordered to check the sleeping men so they wouldn’t go home! He was told: “Count them—to make sure!” Night challenges showed the quality of English spoken by the cadets: “Who is you? Who is you are?” challenged one inspector (an officer) of a sentry one evening.

Not all of the three months were study, though. Every Friday there was a musical program, usually performed by the same three men, for the entertainment of all.

At the end of the third month, 20 February 1919, “a division of well-trained Filipino soldiers, each of whose service was prompted by a deep loyalty to the United States and a firm conviction in the righteousness of the allied cause” was mustered out. Dr. Buencamino noted: “That ended my dream of becoming a member of the first Filipino expeditionary force to a foreign land.”

Several men joined the U.S. Navy and the Philippine Constabulary, which had opened enlistment booths outside Camp Tomas Claudio, while the officers remained in commission for some time more, keeping the Guard’s headquarters running while it was needed. And needed it was, for there were brought before it claims for damages, back pay, property lost and damaged, and so on.

74. Memorandum, Jones to Quezon, 4 December 1918, Box August-December 1918, Quezon Papers.
75. Harrison, Cornerstone, p. 167.
76. Perfecto Ganhinhin interview, 2 December 1985, Surigao City. Mr. Ganhinhin recalls that they were not paid in the National Guard, but everything they needed was provided for.
77. Ibid.
While the National Guard never got close to the war it had trained for, it nevertheless had its casualties. One hundred eighty-four men did not return home alive. One hundred seventy-six died in the influenza epidemic or of broncho pneumonia. Two men died from violence (not caused by the war!) and six died from other causes.  

All eventually ended happily for the survivors. Gen. Jones, carrying his rivalry with Gen. Quinlan even beyond the Guard, filed trumped-up charges which led to a general court martial for Quinlan. The charges could not be substantiated and Quinlan was acquitted. The deportation charges against R. McCulloch Dick dragged on and eventually were dropped when Harrison left the Philippines.

The Philippine Legislature had also offered funds for the construction of a torpedo boat destroyer. The ship was built in San Francisco and commissioned after the Armistice as the U.S.S. Rizal, and sailed on a training cruise with an all-Filipino crew. However, probably due to the inexperience of the crew, the ship's engines burned out on this cruise and had to be overhauled. More useful were the tons of coconut shells collected and converted into charcoal by the Bureau of Science. The U.S. Army had indicated that it needed these for gas masks.

On 1 February 1920, the Philippine Senate passed a resolution granting medals and insignia of service to former National Guard members. Even though they had not been through campaigns or battles, the former National Guardsmen could now consider themselves veterans. Some of the officers formed a National Guard Association, which met annually. They would later try to make themselves useful by providing advice to Quezon at the birth of the Commonwealth, when the Philippine Army was being born. But this advice does not seem to have been taken seriously. Quezon lamented that the Guard had been disbanded; he would have to start from scratch. Joseph Ralston Hayden declared simply that the Philippine National Guard was "of little permanent military value to the Philippines." Nevertheless, in 1936 the veterans had a grand reunion with Harrison as guest of honor, and many memories were relived and exchanged.

80. Ibid., II, p. 57, 59.