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The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency, by Linn

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What does it all mean? Jones is an investigative journalist and a good one in my estimation; he is neither an ideologue nor a prophet. But from the mass of detail which he presents, certain conclusions emerge. One is the extent to which the movement has sunk roots in Philippine society. He sees this not only in remote villages where it has eliminated cattle rustlers, imposed land reform and provided rudimentary social services which the people never knew before; and not only in the urban labor movement. He sees large numbers of the urban middle and upper classes making their accommodations with it, whether out of conviction or of convenience: landowners, professionals, journalists, clergy and religious, "some bishops," and many, many politicians. Thus he suggests that, as the Spanish and American colonizers coopted the Filipino elite "from above," many are now in the process of being coopted "from below."

Although he sees the NPA fighter as better disciplined and more committed than the Philippine soldier, ultimate military victory will not come for the NPA, he believes, without access to heavy weapons; and it is not clear whether its efforts to obtain such weapons will succeed. If not, and the war drags on, morale and recruitment could suffer. Yet, he feels, without fundamental social reform—which is nowhere on the horizon—the movement could sputter on for decades.

Here he overlooks, in my estimation, the conclusion of other students of revolution who find that ultimate success often does not come from the military strength of the insurgents but from divisions among the elite and a loss of the will to fight among the military. This point of view would underline the importance of the process of cooptation noted above.

His final thoughts are arresting and sobering: that whatever happens to the CPP/NPA as we know it, it has set the agenda on major issues for Philippine society; and it has raised the expectations and the hopes of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of Filipinos who have hitherto known only poverty, ignorance, misery. Thus, he concludes: "Even if the CPP and its forces never triumph, and the New People's Army fades into oblivion, in these heightened expectations lie the seeds of future unrest and revolution."

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THE U.S. ARMY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902. By Brian McAllister Linn. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989. xv + 258 pages. Maps.

In this detailed study of the American military response to the struggle of the Filipinos to rid themselves of their new colonial rulers, Brian Linn shows he knows the literature, primary and secondary, pertinent to his subject. His conclusions, summarized in chapter six, are a sober restatement of what has

always been held by the more balanced historians of the Philippines, but till now not adequately documented, namely, that there was never a "national" or unified resistance against the Americans; rather, it "was essentially regional and decentralized (p. 166)."

Unfortunately, the title itself, the use, in the early pages, of a phrase like "Republican Army," and the frequent mention of "orders" issued by the Filipino revolutionary leaders without any reference to their effectiveness or how extensively they were accepted, tend to confuse. Besides, the study concerns Luzon, with nary a word about the Visayas and Mindanao. One then expects more from the title than the book actually offers, and the reader is initially left with the impression that the Philippine-American military confrontation at the turn of the century was a war between two equally sovereign states. The question is precisely whether it was a "war" or an "insurrection." But this is another topic altogether, not the author's concern.

The heart of the study is a meticulous analysis of American reactions, some successful, others not so, to the challenge of the Filipinos who refused to accept the new colonizers. Ill-equipped and ill-trained, the Filipinos surprised the Americans with a bravery that cannot be denied. If one remembers that the former were fighting on familiar terrain, in a climate they had known since birth, and supported by a sympathetic populace at least suspicious of the new invaders, one can see why the American effort was no lark.

Despite more sophisticated war *materielle*, the Americans did not have any clear advantage over the barefoot and bolo-wielding enemy. Personality problems among their leaders, the lack of a unified strategy and inadequate communications when there were any, the difficulty of operating away from their supply bases, and more seriously perhaps, the lack of medical services—these were some of the obstacles that almost nullified and certainly prolonged the American effort to pacify the Philippines.

After an introductory chapter (whose title, "The Philippine War," as mentioned, can be questioned), Linn divides his subject into four chapters devoted to the different strategies of the Americans in four regions of Luzon: First District, Department of [Northwestern, not just Northern] Luzon—the two Ilocos provinces, La Union, Abra, and Mountain Province (Benguet, Bontoc, Lepanto); Fourth District, Department of Central [not Northern] Luzon—Pangasinan, Principe (today Aurora and part of Quezon province), Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac; Second District, Department of Bicol [not Southern Luzon]—the Bicol provinces; and the Second District, Department of Southern Luzon—Cavite, Laguna, Tayabas, Batangas.

The differences in approach were dictated by the local situation. In north-western Luzon, for example, the revolutionary government was in control, abetted (though the book does not clearly show the evidence) by Aglipay's schismatic group, and American leadership naively thought the establishment of a democratic civil government would win over the people. Towns were reorganized, schools were opened. But the Americans were quickly disabused when taxes were imposed. An agricultural society, with hardly any industry or trade, the region did not produce the minimum to pay the salaries of the new government officials. Manila was slow to confirm appointees or approve

the payments, and there were not enough American personnel to supervise the program. But more importantly, the people were still suspicious of the newcomers. Outside of the towns, the guerillas were in control, and Americanistas were either threatened or liquidated. In more than one case, the newly appointed town officials were the guerilla leaders themselves.

The situation in Bicol, or the Third District, was different. There the local leaders refused to engage in open fighting, but having withdrawn to the mountains with much of the civilian population, resorted to random sniping at the enemy.

This situation did not last long. Life in the mountains was not easy, and the guerilla leaders did not have an extensive civilian base to support the movement. Ports were under American control, ensuring continued abaca exports, and American enclaves surrounded the towns, although the guerillas controlled the rural areas as elsewhere, due to inadequate American personnel. Fortunately, the Americans decided on a more intensive pacification campaign, aided to a great extent by the town presidents they had appointed and the clergy, both of whom urged the population to befriend the newcomers. An added factor was the general coolness among the Bicolanos toward the Tagalog leaders. Soon schools, markets, and other civic projects were set up, proving to the people that American rule was "tolerable and even potentially beneficial" [sic] (p. 118).

Different approaches were taken in the other two Tagalog regions. But perhaps the key was the decision to stop supporting the local elite and make them responsible for any anti-American activity. Earlier, their cooperation was sought, but the Americans soon found out that they were playing a dual role, *amigos* when it suited them during the day, guerillas at night. This change in strategy turned the tide, and except for Malvar who surrendered last, resistance eventually ended.

There are a number of errors that a second edition should correct. A few examples: "Guitterez" (p. 39) is most probably Gutierrez; "Anicela" (p. 44), Aniceto; "Sandahatan" (*passim*) Sandatahan; "Malabog" (p. 105), Malibog; etc.

Linn deserves congratulations for his painstaking research. The present book will give ultra-nationalist or simplistic historiographers a pause. Except for the reservations mentioned in this essay, the book is recommended.

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FOLK ARCHITECTURE. Text by Rodrigo D. Perez III, Rosario S. Encarnacion, Julian E. Dacanay, Jr. Photographs by Joseph R. Fortin and John K. Chua. Quezon City: GCF Books, 1989. 264 pages. illus.

Folk Architecture is a good example of how not to design a book. The elements for a good book are all there. Text by leading authorities: Rodrigo Perez III, who recently published a monograph on Philippine architecture for the CCP series on the Seven Arts, Rosario Encarnacion who collaborated in the now classic *Philip-*