Bringing in the Brigands
The Politics of Pacification in the Colonial Philippines, 1902–1907

This article examines two case studies of resistance that occurred after the Filipino-American War, one in Luzon (led by Macario Sacay) and one in Cebu (led by Quintin and Anatalio Tabal), in an effort to explain the differing outcomes. The efforts to defeat these resistance movements and pacify these areas are analyzed within the context of the emerging Filipino-American politics at the provincial and national levels during the first decade of American colonial rule. It is argued that the colonial government’s success in crushing resistance to its authority cannot be fully comprehended without understanding the role played by prominent Filipino politicians in these endeavors; significantly, a colonial peace served both elites.

KEYWORDS: AMERICAN COLONIAL RULE · RESISTANCE · ACCOMMODATION · PACIFICATION · COLONIAL POLITICS
One of the most misunderstood and misrepresented stages of twentieth-century Philippine political history is the “period of suppressed nationalism,” the period from the end of the Filipino-American War (late 1901) to the opening of the first elected national legislature, the Philippine Assembly (October 1907). It has been depicted by nationalist historians as an era dominated by the repressive policies and actions of the American imperialist regime, as the new colonial masters forcibly imposed their will upon the now conquered Filipino people (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1973, 280–302; Constantino 1975, 241–49). There is much to support this interpretation, but there are other ways to look at the political developments of this phase of Filipino-American interactions. This article proposes another interpretation of this critical period of transition and provides a broader context for interpreting the role of the first generation of Filipino national politicians.

The period of suppressed nationalism is generally associated with five acts passed by the Philippine Commission after the establishment of the civil government under William H. Taft (4 July 1901). The first of these acts, on 18 July 1901, authorized the organization of a national police force, the Philippine Constabulary, which was launched in August of that year. The other four acts, which became laws for varying periods of time, were the Sedition Law (November 1901), the Brigandage Law (November 1902), the Reconciliation Law (June 1903), and the Flag Law (September 1907). There can be little doubt that the organization of the constabulary and the implementation of these laws were intended by the commission to suppress Filipino nationalism and insure the colonial government’s control over the society. To assume that support for these acts and for the overall objective of securing peace and order under U.S. rule was exclusively an American concern is where the interpretation begins to become complicated. By this time, many wealthy and educated Filipinos shared with the Americans the desire for peace and order, which was persistently stated to be an essential criterion for expanded Filipino participation in the emerging colonial government. The creation of the constabulary and the passage of all four of these repressive acts, for example, were enacted by an eight-man commission that included three Filipinos (Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, and Jose Luzuriaga). Filipino opinions had already become prominent at the highest levels of decision making and were well incorporated into these and other colonial enactments. Over the next five years (1902–1907), politically engaged Filipinos would become increasingly reliant on the constabulary and increasingly implicated in the implementation of all four repressive acts.

The period began with the enactment by the Philippine Commission of the Sedition Law in November 1901, which, among other things, made it illegal for Filipinos to advocate the independence of their country. The implementation of the Sedition Law at this time indicated, from the Commission’s viewpoint, that the war of resistance had ended and a more general “rule of law” could now be imposed by the new colonial authorities. All varieties of continued resistance were now to be treated as sedition: to be contained by the recently-established constabulary and punished through the expanding court system, institutions that increasingly recruited Filipinos into their ranks. The more stringent sections of the Sedition Law were intended to facilitate the enforcement of acquiescence to the new regime and were to remain in force until the U.S. president declared a formal end of the “insurrection.” In July 1902 this declaration was made, resulting in the removal of the “independence clause” of the law and opening the possibility for Filipinos to publicly advocate eventual liberation from the United States. For the next five years, however, colonial officials invoked the earlier version of the Sedition Law in their efforts to curtail what they considered to be radical nationalist activities and to discourage the growth of organizations advocating independence (see Cullinane 2003, ch. 3). Clearly the Sedition Law was intended to suppress Filipino nationalism and enforce a loyalty to the rule of the U.S. over the archipelago.

To these ends the Sedition Law was a failure. Rather than suppress nationalism, this law and the others mentioned above contributed significantly to the spread of nationalist sentiments and to an upsurge of anti-American discourse that decisively challenged the U.S. claim of sovereignty over the Philippines. By the end of the period of “suppressed nationalism,” the sense of an imagined Filipino community had become firmly entrenched—as it had never been before—across the archipelago, with elites from remote municipalities to the colonial capital fully engaged in the rituals of honoring the nation and its heroes and in an upheaval of nationalist discourse that flowed through the first generation of an indigenous press in the vernaculars and in Spanish. The bold enthusiasm of these expressions of nationalist sentiment never ceased to appall and anger resident Americans, especially in Manila, where the chauvinistic American press engaged in what seemed to be an overwhelming struggle to silence the annoying native voice, often in
the context of the rhetorical query: “whose colony is it, anyway?” A pathetic, but at the time significant, victory by the Manila Americans was achieved on the eve of the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly in late 1907, when the Philippine Commission passed the Flag Law. Although Filipinos could and did by this time advocate independence and pursue a discourse of national identity, they had to do so—until 1919—under one flag: the Stars and Stripes.1

Despite the spread of nationalist discourses, a general peace and order was established under American rule by early 1907. This condition, however, did not result from the Sedition Law or any of the subsequent laws aimed at facilitating the pacification process. The pacification of the Philippines after the Filipino-American War must be viewed as a collaborative project of American colonial officials and the first generation of Filipino políticos (politicians), all of whom viewed themselves as nationalists. Emphasis on nationalism (suppressed or advocated) during this period has obscured many of the critical developments and relationships that had a significant impact on the formation of the social and political order emerging under U.S. colonial rule. In the midst of nationalist and imperialist polemics during this five-year period (1902–1907), most of the primary colonial institutions were firmly established: an English-language education system; an examination-based civil service; a judicial system rooted in provincial courts of first instance; a system of municipal and provincial governments based on elections; and, finally, an elected national legislature. By the end of the period, a Filipino provincial and national politics had emerged and the central political figures of the next forty years had been identified: Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon. As argued elsewhere (Cullinane 2003), indigenous elite alliances (suppressed or advocated) during this period has obscured many of the critical developments and relationships that had a significant impact on the formation of the social and political order emerging under U.S. colonial rule. In the midst of nationalist and imperialist polemics during this five-year period (1902–1907), most of the primary colonial institutions were firmly established: an English-language education system; an examination-based civil service; a judicial system rooted in provincial courts of first instance; a system of municipal and provincial governments based on elections; and, finally, an elected national legislature. By the end of the period, a Filipino provincial and national politics had emerged and the central political figures of the next forty years had been identified: Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon. As argued elsewhere (Cullinane 2003), indigenous elite alliances with, rather than struggles against, the representatives of the colonial regime had a greater impact on the nature of Filipino politics than did the legacy of nationalism that emerged from these same years. Between 1902 and 1907, to the dismay of both committed Filipino nationalists and entrenched American imperialists, a Filipino-American collaborative empire was launched.

Neither the Filipino political elites nor the Americans involved in the collaborative politics of this period were themselves united, either politically or ideologically. The Americans in the Philippines at this time represented a variety of different opinions regarding both the future of the colony and the role of Americans in running it. The bulk of the American military personnel who settled in the archipelago, especially those who came to celebrate the “days of empire,” were perfectly content to relegate the native population to the status of colonial subjects and be done with it. For them and their allies among the owners and writers of early American newspapers, the Philippines belonged to the U.S. and there was no reason to assume that the islands would serve any other interests than those of Americans. Even before the end of the war, tensions were apparent between American soldiers and early residents, on the one hand, and the increasingly influential colonial officials, on the other. The rhetorical division was, perhaps, most clearly stated in the military marching chant, “He may be a brother of Big Bill Taft, but he ain’t no brother of mine!” (Wolff 1961, 313). It was apparent by 1902 that the policies of the new governor-general and his backers in Washington D.C. fully intended to empower elements of the indigenous population and to curtail the kind of exploitation anticipated by many American expansionists. In this context, Taft’s efforts to end the war through “attraction” (a policy, ironically, started by the military officers themselves) and to promise a government “for Filipinos” were widely scorned in the American press of Manila. For a majority of the Americans in the Philippines, particularly in Manila, even the early collaborationist members of the Partido Federal (often dubbed “Americanistas”) were not accepted as legitimate participants in the administration of the colony; as for the opponents of the Federalistas, the so-called “irreconcilables,” prison was considered to be the only place for them until they submitted to American hegemony.

The Filipino elites were also significantly divided by wealth, ethnicity, social position, geography, level of education, employment, and political orientation. The most educated among them (the ilustrados, literally, enlightened) were imbued with a vision of national identity (articulated in Spanish) that had been forming in the country for over four decades and had produced a colonial crisis (in 1872), a revolution (in 1896), a three-year war of resistance against the U.S. invasion, and a number of martyrs who were (by 1899) being signed as “national” heroes. Nevertheless, the wealthiest among them were largely conservative, with the most radical elements operating at the fringes, that is, among urban-based salaried employees and a substantial segment of municipal functionaries (the principales) contiguous to the urban areas (Cullinane 2008). Prior to the arrival of the U.S., many of these elites, especially in urban centers, had been engaged in a politics of patronage, through which they sought prestigious positions in the Spanish colonial bureaucracy, as well as in the nascent Republican government.
from 1898 to 1900. The pursuit of bureaucratic office was quick to revive under the U.S. military governors (1899–1901), who were not disinclined to entice leading Filipino intellectuals away from the struggle by offering them high positions in managing the affairs of state. While Taft institutionalized this policy in 1901 and placed it at the forefront of his administration, he also offered Filipino elites much more: the promise of modernity and an electoral path to office and power. In return Taft sought the compliance of Filipino elites and their assistance in ending the resistance.

In Manila the earliest elites to collaborate organized, with some American participation, the Partido Federal (1900), which over the next year established provincial branches throughout the country (see Paredes 1989). By the end of 1902, with a broader elite accommodation to American rule, significant political divisions developed among Filipino elites, aimed initially at competition for bureaucratic posts and, increasingly, for electoral offices, especially in the municipalities and provinces. In Manila aspiring elites sparred with one another through press campaigns and a wide range of social, literary, and political organizations and activities. Adopting a more strident nationalist rhetoric, the anti-Federalista groups rejected assimilation within the colonial political hierarchy. As the war wound down, the Americans offered Filipino elites much more: the promise of modernity and an electoral path to office and power. In return Taft sought the compliance of Filipino elites and their assistance in ending the resistance.

The leaders of the opposition to the Federalistas became increasingly attached to the emerging colonial institutions and were convinced that a more representative system based on elections would improve their position within the colonial political hierarchy. As the war wound down, the Americans had instituted municipal and provincial elections (1901–1902) that within the next four years led to the political transformation of Philippine provinces and the emergence of political elites who sought approval from both American colonial officials and a highly restricted electorate located in bounded municipal jurisdictions. With the war over, the U.S. conducted a census of the archipelago in 1903 and published its results two years later (1905). At that time Gov.-Gen. Luke Wright announced that if peace prevailed for two more years a national legislative body would be formed and its delegates elected from districts based in the provinces, including two delegates from Manila. Between 1905 and 1907, a far more intense competition developed among Filipino elites, especially in Manila, with all the groups expressing their loyalty to the colonial system, while at the same time positioning themselves for success in the coming elections (set for 30 July 1907).

The prospect of a national-level elected legislature presented the opposition with the opportunity to displace the Federalistas, not simply as the group favored by the colonial authorities but also as those with a mandate from a now empowered indigenous electorate, an electorate composed entirely of the male members of the municipal elites of every province. By 1906 representatives of the emerging Partido Nacionalista were highly motivated to participate in a range of activities that would guarantee a smooth transition to the establishment of an elected legislature. The pursuit and elimination of “brigandage” played an important part in these developments.

**Brigands and Their Pursuers**

On 4 July 1902 U.S. Pres. Theodore Roosevelt formally declared that peace had been restored in the Philippine Islands and that the “Philippine insurrection” had come to an end. Most of the military leaders of the subdued Philippine Republic had been killed, captured, or surrendered, many having taken advantage of the amnesty offered by the new colonial rulers in late 1901. The last of the republic’s recognized generals, Miguel Malvar, surrendered in April 1902 and by this time Filipino elites everywhere had abandoned the military struggle and were seeking accommodation with the colonial authorities.2

All subsequent acts of resistance were officially viewed by the Americans and their political allies among the Filipinos as bandolerismo or brigandage. The change in terminology was abrupt and significant, as lingering insurrectos (insurgents) and revolucionarios (revolutionaries) were transformed overnight into ladrones, tulisanes, and bandoleros (outlaws or brigands), regardless of their political motivations. In addition, groups with religious or millenarian visions or messages, those referred to variously as pulajanés, babailanes, or coloram—the so-called fanatical sects—were now also categorized as brigands. For most Americans there was no effort to discriminate among former revolutionaries, “religious fanatics,” social bandits, or the growing number of brigands (criminals) who had emerged since the collapse of Spanish rule in the mid-1890s; they were all lumped together under the category of bandolerismo or, in the popular American lingo of the day, “ladronism.”

As the nomenclatures suggest, these rebellious groups varied considerably in their professed motivations, objectives, and operations, as well as in their relationships with the inhabitants of the countryside. Although similarities in motivational patterns and expressions of “nativism” can be found in
all these groups, their struggles were local or regional in focus and at no time did any of them form national linkages that threatened colonial rule. The colonial government, nevertheless, quickly set out to eliminate all challenges to its authority, with particular attention to movements that propagated or professed more ambitious political objectives.

In November 1902, as it became apparent that peace and order had not been established, the Philippine Commission passed the Bandolerismo Statute, often called the Brigandage Act, making it clear that the days of amnesty for insurgents was over and all subsequent resistance to the constituted authority would be dealt with as serious violations of the criminal code. The statute imposed strict punishments on any band of three or more brigands who used force and violence or would “go out upon the highway or roam over the country armed with deadly weapons” for the purpose of committing crimes. Members of such bands or anyone giving them support, if convicted under the new law and within the newly reorganized courts, would be punished “by death, or imprisonment for not less than twenty years” (Philippine Commission 1904, 1:34–35; Barrows 1914, 3).

Between 1902 and 1907 bandolerismo was widespread and occupied much of the time and efforts of the newly established Philippine Constabulary. The constabulary was composed of Filipino soldiers, organized during these early years under American officers most of whom were mustered out of the U.S. Army. The constabulary worked closely with the newly elected municipal presidentes (mayors) and provincial governors, and with local police, emerging as the primary peacekeeping force. The difficulties of tracking down and capturing brigands led the Philippine Commission in June 1903 to pass the Reconcentration Act, making it possible to set aside the habeas corpus clause of the criminal code in designated provinces in order to permit the constabulary to reconcentrate the population into protected villages (early twentieth-century “strategic hamlets”). With the “friendly” population forced into zonas, constabulary and police forces could more effectively “search and destroy” the brigand bands outside the reconcentrated areas. The military campaigns against bandolerismo resulted in the application of harsh tactics that included indiscriminate arrest, detention, maltreatment, torture, and killing of noncombatants, especially in those areas where the writ of habeas corpus was suspended. In describing these measures, the later Philippine Commissioner, Charles Elliott, ironically reminded his readers of the strong criticism raised in the American press against the reconcentration policies of the Spanish general, Valeriano Weyler, in Cuba in 1897. In so doing, Elliott (1917, 27) made no attempt to suggest that the U.S. application of the policy was less harsh but simply stressed that “such camps were strictly legal under the laws of war.” While the application of the Reconcentration Act in several provinces had a devastating impact on the rural inhabitants, it had only a limited success in bringing in the brigands. In fact, the most significant outcome of the implementation of this act provided the major issue—military atrocities—that for a brief period in late 1905 united Filipino elites of all political persuasions in a common outcry against the repression committed at the orders of American constabulary officers (Cullinane 2003, 136–42, 246–51).

In most contemporary as well as historical accounts bandolerismo is said to have been eventually brought under control by the constabulary, with Americans praising the vigorous efforts of the dedicated colonial police force and cooperative native officials, while nationalist histories criticized the entire endeavor as an example of imperialist intervention and the use of brutality in crushing popular movements (Forbes 1928, 1:202–3, 222–34; Constantino 1975, 250–80; Agoncillo and Guerrero 1973, 287–90). It will be argued here, however, that politics, rather than military campaigns and reconcentration tactics, became the most successful means of curtailing bandolerismo, particularly for those “brigands” referred to as ladrones políticos or, as one constabulary officer put it, “the flotsam and jetsam from the wreck of the insurrection” (Shurtevant 1976, 119).

Although the Brigandage Law did not officially distinguish former revolutionaries from other dissidents, high-ranking colonial authorities and military officers were particularly concerned about groups that claimed affiliation with the old Katipunan, the revolutionary movement that launched the revolt against Spain and formed the core of the resistance against the Americans in the Tagalog area up to 1902. Because the Katipuneros propagated a popular cultural-informed ideology, described and analyzed by Reynaldo Ileto (1979) in his Pasyon and Revolution, they represented a more immediate and deep-rooted threat to the colonial peace and order, that of rekindling the armed struggle for kalayaan (“liberation”). Philippine Commissioner Elliott (1917, 34) explained that many of the ladrones operating in the Manila area in 1905 “had a more political tinge,” because some of their leaders “had formerly been officers of the insurgent army and had the sympathy of many of their old followers.” There was, therefore, a greater urgency
to eliminate groups such as these in order to prevent a general resurgence of resistance to U.S. rule. Despite their awareness of the political motivations of several of these groups, high-ranking American officials and their Filipino allies consciously constructed the leaders of these organizations as deceptive, as men attempting to manipulate the population to conceal their criminal intentions. Taking refuge in the laws they had enacted, the leading American officials found it more effective to promote a campaign against criminals than against misguided freedom fighters. Thus, Elliott (1917, 34) stressed that some of the leaders of “brigand” bands assumed “the convenient cloak of patriotism” and hid “under the titles of defenders of the country and protectors of the people,” proceeding “to inaugurate a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin.”

Significantly, the persistence of dissident movements of all kinds posed as serious a threat to the majority of Filipino elites as it did to the American colonial officials. After 1902 the large majority of Filipino municipal and provincial elites had acquiesced to the new colonial condition and increasingly engaged in local politics through the newly implemented electoral system. Continued unrest and rebellion disrupted economic conditions and complicated local elite interactions with American colonial officials and institutions. In some cases local elites found themselves in the middle, misused by constabulary officers and attacked by ladrones. Moreover, some among the local officeholders were viewed by political dissidents as traitors to the cause or as class enemies, increasing the possibility of attacks against their property and placing their lives in danger. For much of this period the incumbent governors of two critical southern Tagalog provinces, Juan Cailles (Laguna) and Mariano Trias (Cavite), were former officers in the republic’s army; likewise, the governor of Cebu (1902–1906), Juan Climaco, had been one of two major officers in the struggle with the Americans in that province. Most Filipino elites, from village to provincial capital, had very little common cause with die-hard revolutionaries, absolutely no sympathy with the leaders of popular uprisings of any kind, and feared the depredations of brigands. Like it or not, an increasingly large number of municipal and provincial elites viewed the constabulary as protectors of property and of those who held official positions in local politics and government. The Bandolerosismo Act permitted prominent provincial politicians, whether former Republican officers or not, to criminalize all those involved in continued resistance and to work with the constabulary and local officials in bringing “law and order” to their provinces. In so doing, the efforts to eliminate “brigandage” permitted provincial governors to improve their relationships with the colonial authorities and generally build stronger ties with their municipal constituents (Cullinane 2003, 283). In areas where provincial governors failed to address the problem, the incumbents frequently lost the confidence of American colonial authorities and in some cases appear to have found it more difficult to secure reelection.

In Manila, where the situation was quite different and more fluid, most wealthy and educated Filipinos, regardless of their pre-1902 affiliations with the Philippine Republic, had chosen accommodation with the new colonial government, especially by the start of 1903 when it was increasingly apparent that the government’s alliance with the Partido Federal was beginning to unravel. As noted, the more outspoken nationalist adversaries of the Federalistas were enthusiastically responding to the new political opportunities emerging through a more open politics of patronage and the promise of elections for a national legislature. Few, if any, aspiring Filipinos of the greater Manila area had any intention to jeopardize their careers by giving support to any of the armed resistance forces operating in the provinces surrounding the city. There were other, less threatening avenues for the expression of nationalist sentiments and for actions that challenged the colonial rulers and their current allies, including journalism, radical drama, organizing demonstrations and commemorations (as for Rizal), establishing labor unions, engaging in anticlerical polemics, and promoting the Iglesia Filipina Independiente.

For resident Americans and most colonial administrators, these nationalist endeavors were initially viewed as significant threats to the imposition of U.S. rule over the archipelago. By 1904 and 1905, however, several leading figures in the colonial government developed a more discriminating assessment, realizing that many of the opposition leaders were not revolutionaries but simply well-intentioned intellectuals antagonistic to the government’s support for their political adversaries, the Federalistas. As the relationship between the Federalistas and the upper echelon of the American colonial administration declined (see Cullinane 2003, ch. 4; Paredes 1989, ch. 8), several high-ranking officials (in particular, Harry Bandholtz, an ambitious constabulary officer, and W. Cameron Forbes, the Secretary of Commerce and Police) began to establish close working relationships with the more moderate oppositionists, especially those who had already demonstrated
their cooperation and administrative skills in elected provincial offices (in particular, Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon). Despite their continued discomfort with the professed goals of the opposition, several influential American officials began meaningful working relationships with proponents of more strident nationalist sentiments and ceased to be threatened by what came to be viewed by them as practical rhetorical positions professed for particular political objectives. Moreover, within the context of American tutelage, it was difficult to condemn the Filipino quest for national identity within a framework of an emerging discourse on freedom and democracy. For several American officials the most important criteria upon which to judge an aspiring Filipino leader were his cooperativeness, his ability as an efficient administrator within the established legal system, and his willingness to “play the game” with dominant figures in the colonial hierarchy. Not unexpectedly, these American officials bonded most effectively with young Filipino lawyers.

Despite the sporadic unrest in the countryside, Manila in 1905 was a city of wealthy property owners and businessmen (Filipinos, Chinese, Europeans, and Americans), middle-class salaried employees, students and intellectuals, and a rapidly growing working class. Within this cosmopolitan society was a small coterie of would-be political leaders, most of whom were well-educated and economically self-sufficient. For these men the most obvious response to bandolerismo was to participate in the colonial government’s effort to eliminate it altogether, whether the groups were led by those advocating independence or by criminals.

The emerging interaction among Filipino political elites and American colonial officials was at the center of the campaigns to end the continued resistance and rebellions during the period 1902–1907. By 1905 the most influential participants in these endeavors were those aspiring to leadership in what would become the Partido Nacionalista. Two cases, in particular, highlight the political contexts of bringing in brigands: the negotiated surrenders of Macario Sakay, the “president of the Tagalog Republic,” and of the brothers Quintin and Anatalio Tabal, the most prominent figures of the so-called pulajanes of Cebu Province. The struggle against both groups was long and frustrating and in both cases the leaders eventually surrendered to the authorities, bringing to an end resistance to American colonial rule in the provinces concerned. In both cases the surrenders occurred within significant political contexts and had lasting political consequences.

The Sacrifice of Macario Sakay

On 21 July 1906, after nearly two months of speculation and intrigue, it was confirmed in the American press of Manila: the infamous “ladron chiefs” who had been the scourge of the southern Tagalog area since the end of the insurrection were now in custody, being held in “steel cages,” awaiting trial at constabulary headquarters in Manila (Manila Times, 21 July 1906, 25 July 1906). The leader of the band, Macario Sakay, described in the American press as a slight, somewhat effeminate 27-year-old native of the Tondo district of Manila, had been involved in revolutionary activities since the early 1890s. As an early member of the Katipunan under Andres Bonifacio, Sakay was fully integrated into the movement to liberate the Tagalog area from Spanish rule and to resist American imperialism. As a committed Katipunero and a dedicated advocate of the movement’s message, Sakay exhibited a determination to work for the realization of kalayaan, the ultimate liberation of the Tagalog people and, by extension, all Filipinos. He was the key figure in the revival of the Katipunan movement in the Tagalog area after 1902. In May of that year he was proclaimed president of the Tagalog Republic based in the southern Tagalog area and was committed to continuing the resistance struggle against the Americans and their allies among the Filipino elites (Ileto 1979, 216–18; see also Abad 1955). For Sakay and his officers the ideals of the Katipunan had been betrayed by many who were once their companions in the field, and it was their task to revive the movement both in terms of disseminating the message and by striking out against those in league with the Americans.

Under the leadership of Sakay and his two closest associates, Julian Montalan and Lucio de Vega, the Tagalog Republic achieved a remarkable success. These so-called brigands eluded hundreds of constables and defied the civilian authorities for more than four years and at times even threatened the security of municipalities and villages surrounding Manila itself. By 1906 the American authorities and most Filipino landed elites and municipal officials of these provinces were anxious to bring an end to the constant threat to their communities and increasingly offered their support to the efforts to capture Sakay and his followers. Great excitement, therefore, permeated Manila and its environs when the surrender of Sakay was finally announced in American and Filipino newspapers.

As the drama unfolded over the next few weeks, the two communities, American and Filipino, quickly divided over what should be done with the
The operation that led to Sakay’s surrender began in early May 1906, when the ambitious acting director of the constabulary, Col. Harry H. Bandholtz, approached Dr. Dominador Gomez, one of the most outspoken “nationalists” in Manila, to solicit his assistance in bringing about the surrender of this “outlaw” band. Representing himself as the head of the newly established Partido Popular Independista, Gomez enthusiastically joined the effort, and before long results were being made. Gomez’s participation in the efforts to end the Sakay rebellion was characteristic of many “radical nationalists” of Manila most of whom had been attempting to form political parties that sought the approval of the leading American authorities for several years. By withholding recognition of “nationalist” political parties, the American governors, following the policy established by William H. Taft in 1902, engaged in a patronage politics that favored more moderate Filipino aspirants to political office. In this political milieu Gomez had become the bête noire of American officials and much of the Manila press. His participation in the capture of Sakay was clearly intended to convince the Americans that he was sincere in his desire to eschew rebellion in favor of emerging electoral institutions.

With the assistance of Gomez and his associates, contact with Sakay was soon established through correspondence and couriers, and a number of alleged promises and arrangements were made. In mid-June Gomez, Bandholtz, Sakay, and several of the latter’s officers met in a village of the municipality of Tanay (Rizal province), southeast of Manila, and negotiated a surrender agreement. For the next month and a half, the three (Sakay, Gomez, and Bandholtz) moved between Manila and remote mountain villages to negotiate the surrender of the remainder of Sakay’s forces, in particular Montalan and De Vega.

Throughout the period of negotiation, the constabulary remained silent on the terms of the surrenders, while Gov.-Gen. Henry Ide assured the public (that is, the American public) that “no promises of immunity” had been made. Few believed, however, that Sakay and his officers would have surrendered unconditionally, as conviction of bandolerismo carried the death penalty. Not until it was certain that Sakay was behind bars and scheduled for trial did the American press of Manila express its praise for the actions of those involved and demand the execution of the “outlaws.” The Filipino press (in particular El Renacimiento) was openly critical of the government and of Gomez, arguing, as noted, that Sakay and his followers were legitimate representatives of the revolutionary army, that concessions had been made to get them to surrender, and that the government was not honoring its word. Editorials called for leniency for those under detention and accused Gomez of betraying Sakay and the other rebels.

When the trials and appeals of Sakay and his officers were concluded early the next year (1907), four of the “brigands” were sentenced to death by hanging. After a vigorous outcry for executive clemency from many residents of Manila, including emotional appeals from Gomez himself, the new governor-general, James Smith, commuted the sentences of two of the men to life imprisonment, but refused to alter the court’s decision in regard to Sakay and De Vega. On the morning of 13 September 1907, both men were hanged in the prison yard at Bilibid. The last words of Macario Sakay, the “ruthless brigand,” were reported to have been: “Farewell. Long live the Philippines!” (Manila Times, 12 Sept. 1907, 13 Sept. 1907; Abad 1955, 101).

**Bringing in the Tabal Brothers**

At the same time in Cebu a similar drama was unfolding but with very different outcomes. After months of negotiations between the young energetic...
provincial governor (elected in 1906), Sergio Osmeña, and the leaders of the most notorious of Cebu’s so-called pulajanes, the stage was set for the final act. On Sunday morning, 22 July 1906, some 3,000 residents of Cebu City made their way to the village of Guadalupe on the edge of the rolling hills that surround today’s provincial capitol. There in the vicinity of the old church, the festive crowd gathered to witness the long-awaited event: the surrender of Quintín and Adol Tabal and their band of men. Quintín Tabal, depicted as “the Sakay of Cebu,” had “for ten years,” wrote The Manila Times reporter, “occupied himself with the profession of a bandolero and general cut-throat, his head quarters [sic] being in the mountains of the Island of Cebu” (Manila Times, 6 July 1906). These brothers, explained the head of the local constabulary force, “were the principal bandit chiefs of the Province and were implicated in and directed many if not all the raids on isolated towns on this island.” He concluded that “some forty or fifty murders beside innumerable robberies are laid at their door” (Manila Times, 1 Aug. 1906).

The Tabal brothers and their following had been active in the mountainous interior of Cebu before the provincial rebellion against Spain on 3 April 1898, by which time they commanded considerable respect as prominent residents and landowners in the upland areas around Sudlon, where they operated beyond the reach of Spanish control. When Spanish reinforcements arrived to crush the Tres de Abril rebellion in Cebu City, the Tabals assisted the fleeing rebels of the lowlands, providing them with food and refuge in their highland redoubts, and fighting with them against the punitive Spanish forces sent to pursue them. In 1900 and early 1901 the Tabals were part of the local forces that first resisted the American occupation of the province, again providing refuge to the rebels in their remote mountain stronghold. For reasons that remain unclear, they later split from the elite-led resistance fighters and formed a separate group in conflict with both the recognized forces of the Philippine Republic and the Americans during the last year of the struggle. By the end of 1901, all the officers and soldiers affiliated with the republic had surrendered to the Americans and, by 1902, many were fully engaged in a politics of accommodation with the new colonial government.

After the end of the Filipino-American War, the Tabals remained at odds with many of the new authorities of the municipalities of the coastal lowlands and were alleged to have engaged in periodic raids on villages and towns (poblaciones) between 1901 and 1906. Their use of amulets (anting-anting) and red uniforms, and accusations of inexplicable acts of violence, contributed to the Tabals being labeled as pulajanes and tulisanes in the Filipino press, and as fanatics in the American press (Mojares 1999, 175–77). In 1904, for example, the Cebuano press reported on the depredations being committed by the Tabal brothers and praised the residents of west-coast municipalities who were forming detachments of voluntarios to protect their homes and crops from these marauding tulisanes. By this time, the emerging political elites of Cebu City and the municipalities of the province had no sympathy whatsoever with the bandoleros operating throughout the island, and many worked closely with the constabulary to capture the Tabals and eliminate what was viewed by most to be the threat of outlaw bands. Although the reputation of the Tabal brothers as evil cut-throats seems to have exceeded their actual crimes, most of the brigandage committed by groups from the interior was credited to them. By mid-1906 they were the most infamous ladrones in the province and their surrender was of great concern to the American authorities and most of the municipal and provincial elites. The newly elected provincial governor of Cebu, Sergio Osmeña, quickly attached great importance to ending the continuing violence and concentrated his efforts on capturing or obtaining the surrender of the notorious Tabal brothers. In this effort, it is clear that Osmeña fully intended to pursue the Tabals with all the military and political maneuvers at his command.

One of the most interesting aspects of the case of the Tabal brothers is that they were clearly depicted as brigands in most local accounts before 1906. If captured or surrendered as ladrones, it would have been difficult to prevent the court from imposing on them the maximum sentence of death, as prescribed by the law. Their only hope of survival or clemency was for them to be reconstructed as irreconcilable insurrectos. Unlike Sakay, however, the Tabal brothers had no Katipunan connections and their link to the army of the republic was tenuous at best, especially since the revolutionary forces had actually fought against them in the midst of the war with the Americans. Nevertheless, for political reasons, it would become useful for Osmeña and his supporters to portray them as rebels gone astray. Osmeña’s efforts to this end were greatly facilitated by the local press of Cebu City, in particular the newspaper Ang Suga, owned by his then political ally, Vicente Sotto. At the time, Ang Suga was the most popular periodical in the central Visayas. Before, during, and after the surrender of the Tabal brothers, Ang
Suga ran lengthy, front-page articles stressing that these alleged pulajanes were really salin sa kagubat (remnants of the revolution). Shortly after their surrender, Adoy Tabal was interviewed by an Ang Suga correspondent and explained that it was, indeed, nationalistic sentiments that had driven him and his brother into their long resistance to the authorities (Ang Suga, 23 July 1906, 25 July 1906; Ang Camatuoran, 21 July 1906, 24 July 1906, 16 Oct. 1907; Cebu Courier, 5 Oct. 1907).

Among the assembled onlookers on that Sunday morning in July 1902 were nearly all the prominent Filipino and American officials of the city and province, including Col. Wallace Taylor, the American commander of the regional headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, who was accompanied by a detachment of his men fully armed. As the band of about fifty former brigands, all dressed in new clothes for the occasion, walked down the trail to the Guadalupe chapel there was some understandable apprehension among those gathered for the occasion. But trouble was not in the script for this carefully orchestrated event. Instead, Quintin and Adoy Tabal, both wearing grey suits, hats, and—as was particularly noted—shoes, led their followers to group themselves around Governor Osmeña for a formal photograph. After the picture taking, the members of the group set down their weapons alongside the road (nine rifles and an array of mga pinuti or swords) and then stood erect with their right hands raised in the air. At that moment, Governor Osmeña signaled the provincial secretary to administer the oath of allegiance to the American colonial government. While the American constabulary officers watched in disbelief, the crowd, irate American complained in The Manila Times, 24 July 1906; Cablenews-American, 25 July 1906). Only two days later, enthusiasm over the surrender of the Tabals was beginning to wane, particularly among the Americans of Manila and Cebu who began to suspect that a bargain had been made with the “outlaws” and that they could avoid punishment. What had been announced as the unconditional surrender of a band of murderous ladrones did not correspond with the special treatment the Tabals were receiving at the hands of the local government officials in Cebu. While some American constabulary officers insisted these men were “outlaws of the most infamous kind,” Ang Suga, as noted above, went to great lengths to depict them as revolutionaries (mangugubat), men loyal to the Filipino cause of 1898 and not pulajanes at all (Ang Suga, 23 July 1906, 25 July 1906; Manila Times, 1 Aug. 1906). One irate American complained in The Manila Times of the “Cebu burlesque,” where cutthroats were being worshiped as heroes and for this, he insisted, the government owed the people an explanation. As events developed over the next few months it was clear that a tacit deal had been made somewhere along the line, one that would eventually result in the Tabal brothers obtaining a complete pardon from the same governor-general that later rejected clemency and sent Sakay to the gallows. Early in 1907 Quintin and Adoy Tabal, “the ruthless brigands,” returned to their mountain homes where they lived out their lives as peaceful, law-abiding citizens. In a 1928 interview with Federico Mangahas, Sergio Osmeña, then a well-established political figure, looked back on his role in bringing in the Tabal brothers and proudly boasted: “Not one served a term; I got them all pardoned by the governor general” (Mangahas 1959, 68).
Interpreting the Politics of Pacification

In the end, the colonial government hanged the genuine revolutionaries, labeling them brigands, and released the would-be brigands, allowing them to be labeled repentant revolutionaries. The contradictions inherent in the differing outcomes of these two cases can only be understood when their political contexts are closely scrutinized. It is not surprising that concessions (real and imagined, and all later denied) would find their way into negotiated settlements, particularly with American military officers who had considerable experience in such matters from their efforts to conquer and pacify American Indians. The more interesting aspect of this process was the involvement of the newly emerging Filipino political elites. While their nationalism was restrained, but not suppressed, the nascent Nacionalistas clearly participated in the suppression of dissident groups, whether political, messianic, or criminal.

There were, as suggested, substantial political advantages to facilitating the colonial pacification campaign, with the pattern of political negotiation having been well established during the Filipino-American War. Peacemaking became one of the major activities that brought early Filipino office-seekers together with American military and civilian authorities. Indeed, competition among collaborating elites over who among them was better placed to negotiate with those still in the field was an important factor in the early political maneuvering that led to the formation in 1900 of the Partido Federal, the Manila-based party that initially advocated even greater involvement of the newly emerging Filipino political elites. While their involvement of the newly emerging Filipino political elites. While their involvement was exaggerated, the party leaders devoted considerable energy both to encouraging the surrender of resistance leaders and to publicizing their involvement in the suppression of dissident groups, whether political, messianic, or criminal.

With the termination of the Filipino-American War in 1902, two major political developments occurred: (1) the rise of more nationalistic political opposition groups in Manila aimed at displacing the Federalistas; and (2) the emergence of provincial political networks organized to win elections. These two separate developments merged in the election for the Philippine Assembly in 1907, resulting in the establishment of a Filipino national politics in which the leading provincial politicians took control of the new legislative body and the first national political party, the Partido Nacionalista. In addition to consolidating their control of Filipino national and nationalist politics, the new leaders displaced the Federalistas as the primary collaborators with the American colonial authorities. From the outset the interaction between these aspiring political elites and the Americans was one of give and take: Americans sought peace and order and acquiescence to their major political and economic policies for the colony; Filipino elites sought security for their social and economic positions in the indigenous society and a greater share in running the colony. In the exchange, Filipinos succeeded very early in obtaining considerable control over local politics and government. What they gave up in national sovereignty and long-term economic and cultural subordination, they gained in local autonomy and, by 1907, the ability to ensconce themselves in key national-level positions (seats in the national legislative assembly and high bureaucratic offices). By this time they had both consolidated their positions in the colonial government and established political mechanisms and relationships that permitted them in most cases to avoid colonial scrutiny.

During these formative years—the era of “suppressed nationalism” (1902–1907)—bringing in the brigands was an important arena of political interaction and in building political networks, both among Filipino voters (all elite males) and American colonial authorities (in Manila and at the provincial level). Most of the leading provincial politicians of the day worked hand-in-hand with the constabulary in efforts to pacify the countryside. For the Filipino politicos there were two levels of concern in this matter: (1) the need to establish peace within a particular political jurisdiction in order to satisfy one’s constituents among the municipal and provincial elites, most of whom sought an end to rebellion and brigandage and the restoration of an economic peace; and (2) the need to cooperate with the larger colonial design to achieve peace and order and, thereby, strengthen one’s alliance with the representatives of the colonial order, both in the province (usually with the constabulary officers and judges) and at the capital in Manila (most often with members of the Philippine Commission and the governor-general’s office, or the executive department).
In this interaction Dominador Gomez was somewhat disadvantaged by comparison to Sergio Osmeña. At the time of his involvement in bringing in Macario Sakay, Gomez had not yet established a political constituency, since no elective positions existed in Manila until the Assembly elections in July 1907. His motivation to get involved was most likely multipurposed, but was primarily aimed at improving his relations with the American colonial authorities by demonstrating his commitment to pacification through his efforts to facilitate Sakay’s surrender. Gomez had never been involved in the armed struggle, having resided in Spain for the decade that spanned the 1896 revolt and the end of the war with the Americans. After 1900 Gomez emerged as an anti-American propagandist among the Filipino exiles in Madrid. Upon his return to the Philippines in early 1902, he quickly established for himself a reputation as a “radical” with “seditious” tendencies.

To the American officials and their Federalista colleagues, Gomez was an irresponsible troublemaker with an inflated ego and lofty political ambitions. By working with constabulary chief Bandholtz, it appears that Gomez hoped to improve his relations with the Americans while helping to create the political stability that was a prerequisite for holding the elections for the Philippine Assembly, where he fully intended to play a leading role.

Gomez miscalculated in two ways: (1) he underestimated the threat that Sakay and his popular political movement represented to the Americans and their closest allies; and (2) he overestimated his ability to convince the leading American authorities that he was anything other than an untrustworthy political irritant. For the Americans, the execution of Sakay had two positive outcomes: (1) it eliminated a potentially dangerous rebel and sent a clear message to anyone willing to follow in his footsteps; and (2) it discredited Gomez within the nationalist circles of Manila and resulted in a temporary setback for the ambitious político’s plan to capture the leadership position in the Asamblea Filipina.

Gomez’s so-called betrayal of Sakay was less a betrayal and more an act of deception. Gomez was never in league with Sakay, neither politically nor ideologically, let alone in terms of class or intellectual standing. In fact, Gomez’s effort to convince Sakay that his surrender would hasten the granting of independence to Filipinos by encouraging American concessions was, from Gomez’s self-serving perspective, perfectly sincere. Likewise, Gomez’s critics, the politically-motivated intellectuals connected to El Renacimiento, were neither allied with Sakay nor opposed to the efforts to bring an end to the violence surrounding his activities; their criticisms of Gomez were rooted largely in their political struggles with him in the emerging politics of Manila. By mid-1906 it was clear that the two coveted seats representing Manila in the Assembly would be won by candidates from the anti-Federalista opposition, an opposition that was at the time completely disorganized. For the next year, in anticipation of the Assembly elections in July 1907, at least three “nacionalista” factions surfaced to compete for these seats. In this struggle the prominent El Renacimiento group maneuvered to overcome the challenge of Dominador Gomez for leadership both of the nascent Partido Nacionalista and in the legislature. Gomez’s disastrous involvement in Sakay’s surrender and eventual execution helped to tilt the balance in favor of his rivals for control over the party, ultimately preventing him from winning a seat in the legislature’s first session. The victors in the Manila election of 1907 (Fernando Ma. Guerrero and Justo Lukban) benefited from both the executions of Sakay and De Vega (by publicly condemning the act) and the demise of Gomez (by discrediting him). Ironically the other winners were the American colonial authorities, who eliminated the Tagalog Republic and contributed to Gomez’s political defeat.

In the final analysis, Gomez was the only one who was actually betrayed; he was betrayed by the American officials who failed to reveal to him their intention to have Sakay executed. Had Sakay obtained immunity or even a prison sentence, rather than the death penalty, Gomez would have emerged as a less despicable figure, one who had contributed to the peace process rather than the man who sold Sakay down the river. If so, it would have been more difficult for his political adversaries among the Manila opposition to discredit him, since they too had sought an end to Sakay’s continued resistance. Gomez’s only tangible reward, it seems, for helping to pacify the colony was some needed cash supplied by a grateful colonial government (Salamanca 1968, 179, 287).

For Osmeña, a politician with a growing constituency, involvement in the surrender of the Tabal brothers served two specific purposes: (1) the affirmation of his leadership over the newly emerged political elite of Cebu province, by negotiating the end of the prolonged hostilities between upland dissidents and the socioeconomic elites of the coastal lowland municipalities; and (2) the expansion of his alliances with American colonial authorities, by demonstrating his commitment to peace and order and his efficient handling of his province’s “brigand” problem. Since 1901 Osmeña had established...
solid credentials as a nationalist intellectual, journalist, and activist, both in Cebu and in Manila. At the same time, Osmeña had built up a lasting political constituency among provincial and municipal elites of his province and devoted considerable effort to influencing and later controlling local elections, which by 1906 had become the basis of political power under the new colonial regime. In addition, he dealt closely and conservatively with American authorities both in his province and at the national level, establishing a reputation as a progressive and efficient administrator. In 1906, despite his affiliation with the nascent Partido Nacionalista of Manila, he had emerged as a trusted collaborator, widely acknowledged by prominent American officials as one of the future national-level leaders of his people.

In granting clemency to the Tabal brothers, the colonial authorities were willing to go along with the last-minute effort to reconstruct them as revolutionarios and with the tacit deals Osmeña had made in negotiating their surrender. Although William Cameron Forbes, commissioner and secretary of commerce and police, admitted in his diary in 1906 that the youthful governor of Cebu had “indulged in doubtful practices to get in the ladrones,” Osmeña was never reprimanded and Forbes did not publicly criticize the final pardon given to the Tabal brothers. Forbes’s colleague, Col. Harry Bandholtz, head of the constabulary, who at the time was working to secure the death penalty for Sakay, was not only uncritical of Osmeña but willing to protect him from the criticism of others. In 1907 Bandholtz praised the way Osmeña, as he put it, “yanked the pulajan element into shape” in Cebu and expressed no objection to the scenario that set the “brigands” free. The neat plan, however, was nearly ruined by the American judge of Cebu, Adolph Wislizenus, who, unaware of or unwilling to comply with any special arrangements, condemned the convicted Tabal brothers to death by hanging. Upset with this decision, Bandholtz privately referred to Wislizenus as “a buttinski of the worst kind” and declared his disapproval of Osmeña’s work in Cebu. Bandholtz moved quickly (though unsuccessfully) to use his influence to have Judge Wislizenus transferred out of Cebu. In the end, the final decision fell upon Gov.-Gen. James Smith. Although he must have been reluctant to set these “notorious ladrones” free, the highest-ranking American official found it expedient to grant a personal favor to Osmeña, who at the time was the leading Nacionalista candidate for the speakership of the Philippine Assembly. In the larger political context it was a minor concession to an influential leader who would soon play an important role in the colonial government. Outraged, the American press of Manila and Cebu condemned the pardon of the Tabals, viewing it as a travesty of justice (Cullinane 2003, 260–62).

Sakay and his followers, who represented the non-ilustrado movement associated with the revived Katipunan, were sacrificed by nearly everyone involved, as the Filipino political elites prepared themselves for the influential role they would soon play in the new colonial milieu and, in particular, in the soon-to-be inaugurated national legislative body. Only one month after Macario Sakay and Lucio de Vega were marched to the gallows, the Asamblea Filipina was inaugurated with much pomp and circumstance, less than a mile away from the prison yard where, behind the towering walls, Sakay bid farewell to his nation and its people.

By 1907 the colonial peace had been established in the lowland Christian provinces, not so much by repressive acts and the defeat of dissident groups or by the decline of the ideology of resistance that gave birth to the Katipunan and other groups, but by the cooperation of Filipino elites from municipality to national capital. At the end of 1907, Osmeña, as Speaker of the Assembly, became the head of the Partido Nacionalista, a national political coalition whose platform demanded “immediate, complete, and absolute” independence for the Philippines. At the same time, Gomez, his political opponent, insisted that Osmeña’s nationalist sentiments were insincere and that he, Gomez, was the more appropriate spokesman for the Filipino cause of independence. In effect, both men willingly, indeed enthusiastically, participated in the demise of those non-elite-led movements that threatened their political control and did not share their method of achieving national independence; such movements had to be sacrificed in order to insure a peace that protected their positions in the society and guaranteed them political participation and leadership roles in the emerging colonial government. Unrest, outbreaks of rebellions of many varieties, and various forms of resistance continued to permeate the archipelago throughout American rule. As they rose up, they were crushed one at a time by the might of the Filipino-American empire.
It is important here to point out that Osmeña's university classmate and life-long political partner On two of these raids, see Tingog sa Lungsod, 26 July 1904; and Ang Camatuoran, 24 Sept. 1904. For an overview of the pulajan movement in the Visayas, see Mojares 1976 and Mojares 1999, 171–85. Perhaps the most obvious evidence that they were considered "brigands" and not "rebels" in support of the republic derives from the frequent references to the major efforts of Lt. Mateo Luga in the mountains of Toledo; it was alleged (mistakenly) here that Luga’s forces killed Quintin Tabal (El Pueblo, 9 Feb. 1901). Resil Mojares reports that as early as March 1900 officers of the republican army were pursuing the Tabal brothers and others as “America spies.” By May 1901, both Quintin Tabal and the “brigand Adoy Tabal” were said to have “joined the enemy and ‘abused the indulgence of the revolution’” and were, as a result, being pursued as “renegade insurgent chiefs.” See Mojares 1999, 65, 169–70. On two of these raids, see Tingog sa Lungsod, 26 July 1904; and Ang Camatuoran, 24 Sept. 1904. For an overview of the pulajan movement in the Visayas, see Mojares 1976 and Mojares 1999, 171–85. Perhaps the most obvious evidence that they were considered “brigands” and not “rebels” in support of the republic derives from the frequent references to the major efforts of Lt. Mateo Luga in the mountains of Toledo; it was alleged (mistakenly) here that Luga’s forces killed Quintin Tabal (El Pueblo, 9 Feb. 1901). Resil Mojares reports that as early as March 1900 officers of the republican army were pursuing the Tabal brothers and others as “America spies.” By May 1901, both Quintin Tabal and the “brigand Adoy Tabal” were said to have “joined the enemy and ‘abused the indulgence of the revolution’” and were, as a result, being pursued as “renegade insurgent chiefs.” See Mojares 1999, 65, 169–70.

The prohibition against the flying of the Philippine flag remained in force until 1919, when the Filipino-controlled legislature (Senate and House of Representatives) repealed the law and permitted the Philippine flag to be flown alongside, but lower than, the U.S. flag.

Although most historians consider Miguel Malvar to be the last official “general” of the republican army to surrender, several historians of the Bicol region argue that the last republican general to surrender was Simeon Ola, who held out until September 1903.

The Philippine Scouts (created in February 1901), which were an elite branch within the U.S. Army in the Philippines, also participated, when necessary, in the campaigns to eliminate rebels and brigands operating throughout the Philippines during this same period.

This depiction was not unique to American colonial officials. In his description of Manuel Quezon’s triumphs against the “bandits” of Tayabas, Carlos Quirino (1971, 74) stressed that these “lawbreakers were masquerading as revolutionists who refused to recognize American sovereignty.”

For a somewhat hagiographic, though useful, account of the Tabal brothers based on local sources, see Savelton 2006.

See, for example, the report that Quintin Tabal, the cabecilla of a group of bandidos and tulisanos, along with his brother Adoy Tabal, engaged in an encounter with the revolutionary forces under Mateo Luga in the mountains of Toledo; it was alleged (mistakenly) here that Luga’s forces killed Quintin Tabal (El Pueblo, 9 Feb. 1901). Resil Mojares reports that as early as March 1900 officers of the republican army were pursuing the Tabal brothers and others as “America spies.” By May 1901, both Quintin Tabal and the “brigand Adoy Tabal” were said to have “joined the enemy and ‘abused the indulgence of the revolution’” and were, as a result, being pursued as “renegade insurgent chiefs.” See Mojares 1999, 65, 169–70.

On two of these raids, see Tingog sa Lungsod, 26 July 1904; and Ang Camatuoran, 24 Sept. 1904. For an overview of the pulajan movement in the Visayas, see Mojares 1976 and Mojares 1999, 171–85. Perhaps the most obvious evidence that they were considered “brigands” and not “rebels” in support of the republic derives from the frequent references to the major efforts of Lt. Mateo Luga in the mountains of Toledo; it was alleged (mistakenly) here that Luga’s forces killed Quintin Tabal (El Pueblo, 9 Feb. 1901). Resil Mojares reports that as early as March 1900 officers of the republican army were pursuing the Tabal brothers and others as “America spies.” By May 1901, both Quintin Tabal and the “brigand Adoy Tabal” were said to have “joined the enemy and ‘abused the indulgence of the revolution’” and were, as a result, being pursued as “renegade insurgent chiefs.” See Mojares 1999, 65, 169–70.

It is important here to point out that Osmeña’s university classmate and life-long political partner and adversary, Manuel Quezon, also made his own important contribution to bringing in the brigands as governor of Tayabas in 1906, an achievement that was carefully worked out between the young governor, the constabulary officers of the province, and various municipal elites and provincial authorities. Quezon was greatly praised for his efforts and his success in this endeavor contributed to his credibility as an efficient and dedicated administrator, a reputation that had been tarnished in his earlier position as fiscal of Mindoro. See Quirino 1971, 74–75; Philippine Commission 1907, 2:201–2; Philippine Commission 1908, 1:270. 2: 292–93; Cullinane 2003, 283.

References


**Michael Cullinane** is associate director, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 207 Ingraham Hall, 1155 Observatory Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 USA. He is also associate faculty in the History Department of the same university, where he teaches courses on Southeast Asia. He is the author of *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908* (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003). <mmcullin@wisc.edu>