Textbook accounts of the 1872 revolt in Cavite generally see it as a mutiny of Filipino soldiers and arsenal workers over local grievances, often portraying it as instigated by the friars with the intention of eliminating the priests and lawyers agitating for reforms. This article, basing itself principally on the extensive account sent by Governor Izquierdo to the Overseas Minister, accepts his characterization of the revolt as a frustrated separatist revolution, while rejecting his conclusions as to the instigators of the revolt. Rather, it points to the real authors who escaped execution because of their Masonic ties to Izquierdo.

**KEYWORDS: SEPARATIST REVOLT • SPANISH COLONIALISM • JOSÉ BURGOS • MASONRY • HISTORIOGRAPHY**
here can as yet be no complete closure on the Cavite Mutiny that occurred in January 1872, since the records of the trials have not yet been found. Although the Spanish government has declared them lost, and researchers have not located any copy in the Philippine National Archives (PNA), rumors of their existence in Spain continue to surface from time to time, but nothing has been found. It seems too that there were once at least some records of the investigations of those accused in what would become the PNA (Artigas y Cuerva 1911, 126–28), though these perhaps perished during the war. Nonetheless, a number of publications in recent years, together with the surviving archival material, now make it possible to come nearer to a definitive history of the mutiny.

Textbook treatments are based on a few often contradictory accounts for the most part, and the only serious book professedly on the subject, Los Sucesos de 1872, although using some valuable documentary sources, only treats its subject in part, and contains spurious and contradictory materials, without arriving at any definitive conclusion (Schumacher 1991, 83–85). Its relatively recent translation into English (Artigas 1996) is likely to perpetuate the weaknesses of Artigas. The lavish praise the translator gives to the book (ibid., xii) is hard to accept. Most textbooks describe it as a local mutiny of Filipino soldiers and workers in the arsenal, reacting to a decree of Gov. Rafael de Izquierdo suppressing the privilege of the arsenal workers to be exempt from the tribute and the compulsory labor obligation. Some see it as a mutiny instigated by the friars so as to implicate the Filipino priests led by Fr. José Burgos, who were calling for the restoration of the parishes occupied by the friars to the Filipino secular clergy. The mutiny would provide the pretext to execute or exile the activist priests and their allies among the lawyers and businessmen agitating for liberal reforms. Some textbooks, basing themselves on a spurious document from Artigas, even speak of a friar resembling Burgos going among the workers and soldiers in Cavite to spur them on to revolt.

The source for these interpretations is generally to be found in the various accounts written by, or inspired by, Antonio Regidor. One of the liberal reformists allied with Burgos, he was exiled to the Marianas and, after escaping and going to Europe, gave sometimes contradictory accounts of the mutiny in various publications.

It will be the purpose of this article to present an account of the mutiny as seen by Gov.-Gen. Rafael de Izquierdo, to examine in the light of present documentation the reality of the extant interpretations of its purpose, and to determine the real instigators of the mutiny.

Governor Izquierdo’s Account of the Mutiny

The military events of the mutiny, together with an account of the nature of the plot behind it, and with his suspicions as to its instigators, are contained in a sixty-page letter of Izquierdo to the Overseas Minister (Ministro de Ultramar), written ten days after the mutiny when interrogations of the captured rebel soldiers and arrested civilians had already taken place (Izquierdo 1872b). It supersedes an earlier brief account, written hours after the suppression of the revolt (Izquierdo 1872a), containing obvious errors, although it too has value. This is the copy left in the archives in Manila when he wrote to the Overseas Minister, preserved here after the end of the Spanish regime. Izquierdo’s comprehensive account—accompanied by a report to him of the acting commander of the Navy, detailing its part (Carballo 1872)—is of great importance, inasmuch as it is a confidential letter to a superior, and possesses great credibility for what in fact had happened, on which he was by this time well informed. There was no reason for him to distort these facts to the Overseas Minister. To be sure, we must examine critically Izquierdo’s preconceptions concerning the liberal movement in Manila, and his impassioned interpretations of the events. Even these, however, are valuable for determining why and when individuals were imprisoned and eventually punished.

Celestina Boncan (1995) has already used this document, but primarily for establishing the military events of the mutiny. Presupposing her thorough account of these events, we will attempt to use the document further to establish the preparation of the revolt and its intended results. I have earlier used this document, but principally toward establishing the innocence of the three executed priests (Schumacher 1981, 23–26). Izquierdo’s account is supplemented with much detail by the later interrogation of Bonifacio Octavo, a sergeant pledged to the revolt, who repented his role and deserted before it happened, only being captured the following September.2

Contrary to later contentious accounts, such as those of Regidor, none of which treat the mutiny as a whole and ex profeso, Izquierdo (1872b, 53–54) maintains that the mutiny in Cavite was not an isolated event but part of a wider conspiracy that in its planning included a large part of regiments 1 and 2, together with the artillery garrisoning Manila. These were precisely
the forces that Izquierdo would send under the command of the deputy Captain-General (General Segundo Cabo), Felipe Ginovés y Espinar, to put down the revolt in Cavite. This involvement of the Manila regiments would be confirmed later by Octavo’s interrogation ([Octavo] 1872, 160).

According to Izquierdo (1872b, 23–24), the revolt was to begin in the early hours after midnight in Manila, with the signal to the rebels in Cavite being given by skyrockets. It has been said that the rebels in Cavite mistook the fireworks from the Sampaloc fiesta for the agreed upon signal (Montero y Vidal 1895, 3:573), but, in any case, they went to arms between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, instead of waiting for the signal from Manila. The plan was to set fires in Tondo so that, while the authorities were occupied with extinguishing them, the artillery regiment and part of the infantry stationed in Manila would take possession of Fort Santiago and signal to those of Cavite by means of cannon shots (contrary to what he had said above about the signal being given by skyrockets). All Spaniards were to be killed, including the friars, except the women, and they would proclaim the independence of the country. (Octavo [1872, 163] likewise would later announce the death of all Spaniards, but in a clarification would say that this was “without failing to except those who would be defenseless or would not resist.”) The artillery and marines in Cavite would rise, to be supported by 500 men under the pardoned bandit chief, Casimiro Camerino, who were waiting in Bacoor (Izquierdo 1872b, 54–55). These reinforcements were prevented from joining the rebels—though the latter had signaled to them by lanterns to come—by the navy stationing a gunboat in front of the narrow strip of land joining Bacoor to Cavite (ibid., 54–56; Carballo 1872, 11–12).

News of the uprising only got to Izquierdo about 1 a.m., through a message brought by the navy, those who had attempted to bring the news by land having been killed, apparently by men of Camerino. He immediately summoned the forces to arms, and by 8 a.m. they set out for Cavite (Carballo 1872, 2; Izquierdo 1872b, 13, 59).

Montero y Vidal (1895, 3:571–72) has a story about a Spanish sergeant who discovered the plot through his lover. According to his story, the sergeant immediately went to report the affair to his superiors, who informed Izquierdo. The latter came and reviewed the troops, instilling fear into those who thought themselves discovered. This would seem to be part of Montero’s penchant for titillating stories on the peculiarities of Filipinos, for he gives it as an instance of how all revolts in the Philippines have been discovered by love.

Role of Anonymous Reports

Izquierdo had no need of such a story to put him on the alert, for on 19 January he had already received an anonymous letter, as had the acting commander of the navy, telling of a revolt planned for that night or the next, simultaneously in Manila and Cavite, and he was still on alert (Carballo 1872, 2–5; Izquierdo 1872b, 58–59). The contents could hardly be more explicit:

I make known to you that, as I was informed this very night, in the market here [Cavite] and in the walls [Intramuros] on Friday or Saturday of this week they will fire a cannon shot in the fort of Manila, the sign of a revolt against the Spaniards. They are taking this occasion since the squadron is not here. The one who is acting as the head of the revolt is the Very Reverend Father Burgos in Manila, and in Cavite the artillery sergeants and the corporals of the native marines. (BNM, ms 13.228; in Tormo Sanz 1977, 70)

It may well be therefore that he reviewed the troops that night and thus instilled in them fear that they had been discovered so that those committed to the revolt held back. That is what happened with the 300 men of the regiment no. 7 in Cavite who were pledged to the revolt. When the rebelling marines and artillerymen invaded their barracks and called on them to join them, their commander rallied them instead to drive the rebels out of the barracks and send them back into Fort San Felipe. They would be the loyal forces fighting the rebels through the night till the regiments from Manila joined them (Izquierdo 1872b, 4–13; Carballo 1872, 6–8). Thus, all three regiments, in Manila and in Cavite, remained loyal to Spain, and the men expected from Bacoor were prevented from joining the rebels. Without those forces, the mutiny was inevitably doomed, though the rebels held out in the fort until it was taken by storm on 22 January.

End of the Mutiny

The assault began at 6 a.m. and an hour later the fort was taken (Izquierdo 1872b, 18–20; Schumacher 1999, 254–56). They found the commander of the fort dead, as well as a maid, and his wife wounded. In the same room was a friar of San Juan de Dios, who had been visiting the commander and whom “those evil men respected, no doubt because of the consideration for the habit he wore” (Izquierdo 1872b, 21).
Izquierdo (1872b, 20–21) also mentions that “two officers who were under arrest in the fort were found, the one dead and the other seriously wounded.” Although he did not identify them or say why they were in that condition, Antonio Regidor would declare that the Spanish lieutenants were named Morquecho and José Montesinos, and that at the urging of Friar Rufián they had commanded the revolting artillerymen. When the loyal troops took the fort, Montesinos was killed, together with Sergeant Lamadrid, the leader of the rebels, while Morquecho put a gun to his head, but only died some time later (Vergara 1896, 14; [Regidor] 1900, 76). They have been identified much more accurately as Lts. Manuel Montesinos and Vicente López Morquecho, both officers of regiment no. 7 (Tormo 1978, 335–40), who were logical men to aid the rebels, who had no officer higher than Sergeant Lamadrid. It appears that Izquierdo was reluctant to admit that there were Spanish officers among the rebels, and chose to pass over their role in silence. In fact, however, at the solemn funeral of the fallen Spaniards, the name of Montesinos (and presumably Morquecho) was not found on the honoring wreaths (ibid.). Their motivation will be discussed below in connection with the true character of the uprising.

In view of several later accounts that placed the cause of the uprising in the suppression of the exemption of the arsenal workers from the tribute and compulsory labor, and even making the arsenal workers to have taken part in the revolt, it may be noted that Izquierdo (1872b, 50–52) mentioned this suppression, but as a mere pretext that the instigators of the revolt had used. Contrary to these accounts (e.g., [Regidor] 1900, 76; Plauchut 1877, 48), he describes the revolt as purely military—excluding thus the participation of the arsenal workers, much more the contention that their strike (Pardo de Távora 1906, 66–71), which in fact only occurred several months later, led to the revolt. The origin of these accounts and their definite refutation have been established in meticulous detail by Tormo (1978, 283–378), who notes that the decree revoking the exemption of the arsenal workers was published only twenty days before the revolt, too soon for the extensive preparation preceding the revolt, as will be seen.

It has also been said that “some individuals of the navy” took part in the rebellion (Montero y Vidal 1895, 573). This misinformation undoubtedly came from the formal addresses Izquierdo published on 22 January, just after the suppression of the mutiny (ibid., 578). No doubt the mistake was based on early reports speaking of the marines (infantería de marina), who in fact had revolted. But both Carballo (1872, 17–18) and Izquierdo (1872b, 47–49) explicitly refute this preliminary assertion in their later documents. In fact, the navy cooperated in putting an end to the revolt. But months later it would develop that the crew of the frigate Berengüela indeed had been committed to revolt ([Octavo] 1872, 165; Izquierdo 1872d), but apparently, like the men of regiment no. 7, they were rallied by their commander and remained loyal.

Similarly, Izquierdo’s early address said that the rebels “scarcely reached 200 men” (Montero y Vidal 1895, 578). But in his later account he specifies less: 38 artillerymen and 54 marines (Izquierdo 1872b, 5, 9).

Preparation of the Mutiny

From the interrogation of Sgt. Bonifacio Octavó the following September, it became clear that the revolt had been planned at least as early as November or December 1871, when Octavo says he was first approached by the marine corporal, Pedro Manonson, who urged him to give his name to a list on a document urging the Filipino soldiers to rebel against Spain. Manonson told him that the list had come from the Caviteño civilian, Francisco Zaldúa. Although Octavo resisted at first, later he met with Zaldúa and Sergeant Lamadrid of the marines, and other noncommissioned officers. Afterward he met with corporals of his regiment no. 7, who assured him that the entire regiment was committed to the revolt, in which he was to be the commander ([Octavo] 1872, 154–55, 158). Although he observed on the day before the revolt that his whole regiment was prepared that day to rebel, he repented having given his name, and deserted before the revolt took place (ibid., 155–56). In his meeting with Zaldúa, he was told that the sergeants, corporals, and soldiers of regiment nos. 1 and 2 (those in Manila) were also committed to the revolt (ibid., 160). It may be seen here that Zaldúa was the key figure in organizing the revolt in Cavite.

It is also clear from what has been seen that there is no probability to Regidor’s assertion that the ones responsible for the revolt, especially when it is seen that it was not merely an affair of Cavite, were Fr. Antonio Rufián of the Order of San Juan de Dios and the Recollect prior of Cavite, Fr. Juan Gómez (Vergara 1896 14–15; [Regidor] 1900, 76). Apart from the fact that it is not even sure that Rufián was in the Philippines at this time, and that Gómez was then secretary to the provincial in Manila, not prior of Cavite (Tormo 1978, 342), it is hardly conceivable that either of these...
two peninsular friars would have instigated a revolt whose first goal was to
kill all male Spaniards, including the friars, and proclaim the independence
of the country (Izquierdo 1872b, 53; [Octavo] 1872, 156, 161). Typically
of Regidor, he has seized on familiar names to give plausibility to his story
(Schumacher 1991, 76).

With regard to Montesinos and Morquecho, it is impossible to say for
certain why they joined the rebels, most likely out of resentment at their
own imprisonment, especially Montesinos, who had been imprisoned for
gambling debts several times and rearrested after escaping (Tormo 1978,
336–39). Their participation in the revolt is a strong argument to support
Izquierdo’s and Octavo’s contention that the revolt was not a mere mutiny
over grievances, but a revolt intending to throw off Spanish rule. For in a
local mutiny these two Spaniards could not expect any leniency, but almost
certain execution when it was put down. If the revolt against Spain succeeded
both in Cavite and Manila, however, they could expect to be free and likely
to hold a high position in the Filipino army. When he saw the revolt fail, it
is not surprising that Morquecho committed suicide.

It was in the interest of all the Filipino authors or sources of the
contemporary accounts of the mutiny—the two Regidor accounts, that of
Plauchut (stemming in larger part from Regidor and/or Pardo de Tavera
[Schumacher 1991, 73–74])—to insist that it was a local mutiny over local
grievances, stirred up by the friars for their own purposes. For it was precisely
as alleged authors of a separatist revolt against Spain that these men had been
deported to the Marianas. Artigas and most subsequent writers have accepted
this depiction of the revolt as being in no way separatist. The evidence from
Izquierdo’s account and that of Octavo indicates the contrary.

**Arrests in Manila and Cavite**

The first arrests had already taken place before the revolt was over, and hence
were not based on interrogations of captured rebels. The Jesuit diary of the Ateneo
Municipal for 21 January reported that Fathers Burgos, Zamora, and Guevara
as well as Pardo de Tavera, Regidor, “and others” had already been arrested
(APTCJ 1872). Izquierdo himself, in his first letter to the Overseas Minister a
few hours after the revolt was put down, added to these Frs. Agustin Mendoza
and Mariano and Feliciano Lopez [sic; evidently a mistake for Gómez], and the
brothers José and Pío Basa, and Enrique Paíña, but omitted Zamora (Izquierdo
1872a). Fr. Mariano Gómez had in fact been arrested on the night of 21 January,
together with his nephew, Fr. Feliciano Gómez (who was living with his uncle
due to sickness) (Gómez 1922, 117), and was not included in the Jesuit report
because the soldiers had still to get to Bacoor to arrest him.

Of great significance for determining whether those punished were
really behind the revolt is Izquierdo’s statement in his letter to the Overseas
Minister, made at a time when no judicial process had begun, nor had he
even the results of the interrogations of prisoners in Cavite. He says:

I do not know what will come out of these judicial inquiries [in Manila]
and of those they are conducting in Cavite; but public opinion, impartial
persons, the evident proofs of moral character, the confidential
reports that I have had about those persons for some time, are all
motives for me of inner conviction that they alone are the authors
of the rebellion put down in Cavite. If their culpability is proved, the
verdict of the law will be inexorable with them. But if, as can happen,
given the circumstances of those who were deceived and seduced,
the abovementioned persons should not turn out to be guilty, I am
also ready to adopt with them a strong measure, their exile to the
Marianas. (Izquierdo 1872a)

Some conclusions may be drawn from this letter. First, that those priests
and laymen in custody had been arrested during the revolt, prior to any
evidence resulting from it. Second, that all were presumed to be guilty of
some complicity in the revolt and deserving of punishment. Third, that some
would receive capital punishment; the others would be punished by exile to the
Marianas. Fourth, that even those who were not proven guilty would
nonetheless be banished to the Marianas. A fifth, that would prove not to
be true, was that these were the only instigators of the revolt. In fact, in the
subsequent days others would be arrested. On 23 January Frs. José Guevara
and Mariano Sevilla were arrested, and on 25 January Bartolomé Serra, all
in Manila, according to reports of the civil governor (Artigas 1911, 159–61).
Others were arrested at different places and times, which do not appear in
the official records surviving.

Strangely, Fr. Jacinto Zamora’s name does not appear on Izquierdo’s
first list, in spite of the Jesuit report. But it seems this must have been mere
rumor. Artigas (1911, 148–49) has unconnected accounts. On the one hand,
his says that Zamora lived with Fr. Miguel de Laza. Since the latter was sick,
Burgos came to visit him, and was arrested there. Presumably not at this time, though Artigas does not make it clear, the house was searched, and a note was found summoning Zamora to a “big reunion . . . the friends will come well supplied with bullets and powder.” On the basis of this Zamora was arrested, though the contents of the note were only a gambler’s expression for coming well supplied with money. Zamora was an inveterate gambler (ibid., 141–42). Artigas also relates another anecdote to show that Zamora was not aware of the Cavite revolt until the next morning (ibid., 148–49). It appears, then, that his house was searched and he was arrested later, but before 31 January, when Izquierdo (1872b, 53) names him or Burgos as head of the revolutionary government. Laza must have been arrested with Zamora, or shortly after, if Artigas’s first anecdote is partially correct. Certainly he appears on 3 February with Fr. Justo Goson [Guazon] and Fr. Vicente del Rosario as additions to those under arrest (Izquierdo 1872c).

Besides the priests, the following lawyers or businessmen had been arrested, in addition to those mentioned earlier: Gervacio Sánchez, Pedro Carrillo, Máximo Inocencio, Balbino Mauricio, and Crisanto de los Reyes (ibid.). Frs. Pedro Dandan and Anacleto Desiderio would be arrested together with Ramon Maurente and Máximo Paterno on 20 February (PNA 1872). At an unknown date, José Basa y Enríquez, who was to receive the highest sentence of banishment to the Marianas, ten years, was added, completing the list of those who would be exiled (SHM 1872).

Izquierdo’s Views on the Instigators of the Mutiny

It is evident from Izquierdo’s various letters that he changed his judgment on who were the real authors of the revolt, though he was resolved to rid the country even of those not found guilty. In his first letter (Izquierdo 1872a) he limits himself to those noted above. In that of 31 January, when investigations had progressed, the name of Feliciano Gómez had disappeared, but others had been added. However, he insisted that “among the prisoners, priests and laymen, are found the principal authors and instigators of the insurrection. As soon as the proofs receive complete justification, they will serve as basis that there be applied to them a merited and exemplary punishment, as severe as the crime committed demands” (Izquierdo 1872b, 49).

The head of the revolutionary government would be “with great probability, almost certainly, Fr. José Burgos or Fr. Jacinto Zamora, priests of the parish of San Pedro of Manila” (ibid., 53). He also, without naming any names, mentioned the junta, which had been in existence “since 1869, taking advantage of elements from the revolt planned in 1863,” whose meetings he had known of through anonymous sources and public rumor, but had not been able to surprise. Nonetheless being confident that he would be able to meet any action on their part, he had continued to watch over the situation (ibid., 57–59).

In his letter of 3 February, when all but a few had been arrested, Manuel Boscasa, the prosecutor in the military tribunal, requested of Izquierdo the record of the eleven priests and eleven laymen on trial (PNA 1872). In reply, Izquierdo answered that all the priests were considered since 1869 to be plotting against Spain, and especially Burgos, Zamora, Guevara, Mendoza, Mariano Gómez, Mariano Sevilla, and Miguel de Laza, all being members of the Filipino club. As for the other laymen named, they have the same records of plotting, but especially Enrique Paraíso, whom “public opinion considers to be one of the principal instigators, authors and directors of the Cavite revolt, in close union and of like purposes with the priests,” Burgos, Zamora, Guevara, Mendoza, and Mariano Gómez (Izquierdo 1872c). What is curious is that Paraíso is especially accused for being the ardent propagator of the “anti-Spanish” newspaper, El Eco Filipino, which indeed he was (Tormo 1973, 99). But to have been such in connection with the priests seems not to be true. For the clergy were in fact supporting the newspaper, El Correo de España (ibid., 113–14, 133). In all the correspondence Izquierdo intercepted, there is no mention of the accused clergy having anything to do with El Eco Filipino. Indeed, as that correspondence shows, the principal correspondent and distributor of that newspaper was the brother-in-law of the editor, José Ma. Basa (Torno 1973, 98–100, 102), who does not receive a mention from Izquierdo here. It seems clear from this letter that Izquierdo is especially focused on the priests, and though he was ready to exile all the members of the junta to the Marianas, who were all “conspiring against the Mother Country,” the five priests he considered to be directly implicated in the revolt, together with Paraíso.

It remains to be seen why this was so. It is most clear in the case of Burgos.

Evidence against Father Burgos

Artigas (1911, 126–30) assembled eight declarations given during interrogations, which he declared he had before his eyes, though they
apparently have disappeared from the PNA today. All of them coincide in 
knowing Burgos as the head of the revolutionary government. For Artigas, 
the unanimity of declarations was only obtained through torture. That is 
possible but unproven. Moreover, he fails to note that one of the declarations 
is not from a prisoner, but from the widow of the commander of Fort San 
Felipe, killed by Sergeant Lamadrid at the beginning of the uprising. Clearly 
she was not tortured, yet testified that “on appearing, Sergeant La Madrid, 
with his face all stained with blood, indicated to her that he was only an 
instrument, because he was moved to it by the parish priest of San Pedro 
[Burgos], who was to be the president of the republic” (ibid., 126–27).9

But there had been other reports on Burgos, presumably coming from 
the preliminary interrogations in Cavite. Barely two hours after taking Fort 
San Felipe, General Ginovés telegraphed Izquierdo: “Take into custody 
Father Burgos, rector of San Pedro, for the good of the service” (Schumacher 1999, 256). Clearly Burgos was singled out for a further reason than his 
having been a member of the suspected junta.

**Key Role of Francisco Zaldúa**

The source and value of such denunciations from captured rebels may be 
seen in the later interrogation of Bonifacio Octavo. Repeatedly he names 
Burgos (whom he had never met) as the principal figure in the planned 
revolt, and includes Gómez, Zamora, and Guevara, as well as Regidor, 
Pardo, and Serra. But when his testimonies are examined more closely, it 
becomes clear that all this he had only heard from Zaldúa, sometimes in 
conjunction with Lamadrid. The only one who supposedly had contact with 
Burgos was Zaldúa ([Octavo] 1872, 155–56, 160–61, 163–64; Schumacher 1981, 26–27). Even Lamadrid had no acquaintance with Burgos except 
through Zaldúa. It is not surprising then that the one declaration from 
Zaldúa reproduced by Artigas (1911, 127) claims that he “brought letters to 
Zamora, who immediately went to the house of Burgos.” The testimony goes 
on with other garbled improbable assertions, but the point is that Burgos is 
named the head of the revolutionary government, aided by Zamora. But it is 
all on the word of Zaldúa. It is Zaldúa, then, who appears as the immediate 
instigator of the revolt, and it is on his word that Burgos and Zamora are 
implicated by Izquierdo. One can recall here the prophetic words Fr. Pedro 
Betrán had supposedly said to Burgos when trying to dissuade him from his 
alliance with the liberals, “perhaps you may not be able to prevent a hand 

doubly criminal from writing your name on a banner waved by deluded men 
and traitors” (Artigas 1911, 211).

A further confirmation for Izquierdo was the anonymous note that he 
and Carballe had received on 19 January, informing them of the forthcoming 
revolt, cited above. Such an anonymous note seems almost certainly to have 
come from a soldier like Octavo, who had been approached by Zaldúa but 
had repeated.

Apart from the gambler’s note that Artigas gives as the cause of Zamora’s 
arrest, and the claim that it was in his house that Burgos was arrested—
 anecdotes that depend solely on Artigas’s assertion (ibid., 141–42)—it is 
not immediately clear why Zamora was arrested. The saying attributed by 
Montero y Vidal to the dying Lamadrid naming him (cf. n. 9) is likewise 
supported. Although the exact membership of the junta is difficult to 
determine with certainty, Zamora apparently had a part in it (Buencamino 1969, 4).10 Montero y Vidal (1895, 3:570) claims that the junta sometimes 
met in Zamora’s house. In any case, by 31 January Izquierdo had received 
evidence that Zamora shared with Burgos the leadership of the revolutionary 
government. It is likely that his source is the declaration of Zaldúa cited above 
(Artigas 1911, 127). Although brief, it gives us an idea of what Zaldúa’s further 
testimony must have been like. For, though it was not known to Izquierdo at 
this time, the declaration of Bonifacio Octavo (1872, 155–56) makes clear 
that Zaldúa repeatedly named Zamora, as well as Burgos, Mariano Gómez, 
and Guevara as members of the revolutionary government. If Zaldúa named 
them to the prospective rebels, it is most likely that he would have likewise 
named them during the rest of his interrogation in his effort to save his life, 
and this would account for Zamora’s inclusion with Burgos. By the same 
token, the charges by Zaldúa against Zamora were likewise untrue.

Fr. Mariano Gómez was one of those immediately ordered arrested, 
no doubt on his reputation as _antiespañol_, and with him his nephew, Fr. 
Feliciano Gómez, apparently for no further reason than that he lived with 
his uncle. Fr. Mariano Gómez quickly moved to the front line of suspects 
when an abandoned boat with arms was found nearby by the soldiers sent 
to arrest him. The implication was that he was responsible for recruiting the 
reported 500 men in Bacoor, who had been unsuccessful in their attempt 
to join the rebels in Fort San Felipe, due to the blocking operation carried 
out by the gunboat _Samar_ (Izquierdo 1872b, 54–56).11 At the same time, his 
name too was included with that of Burgos as one of those involved in the
revolt in the interrogation of Marine Corporal Tolentino, later mentioned as one of the chief conspirators by Octavo (1872, 155; Artigas 1911, 127). He likewise was named in a rather garbled anonymous message received by Izquierdo (Tormo 1973, 138). With this evidence against him, Fr. Mariano Gómez was seen as one of the major instigators of the revolt.

Like Gómez, Fathers Guevara and Mendoza had been sternly admonished in 1870 by the ecclesiastical governor (in the absence of the archbishop in Rome) at the instance of Governor-General de la Torre, as being antiespañoles (Izquierdo 1872c; Schumacher 1999, 264). Mendoza was besides known to Izquierdo as having contributed P7,000 to El Correo de España of Labra and Manuel Regidor (Tormo 1973, 113). Octavo (1872, 156) would later say that Zaldúa had included Guevara with Burgos, Gómez, and Zamora as members of the provisional government. In any case, the key role of Zaldúa is evident, and it is clearer why Izquierdo (1872c) denounces these five together with Enrique Paraiso, as “the principal instigators and directors of the Cavite insurrection.”

**Improbable Complicity of Burgos**

Was there any truth to Zaldúa’s picture of the revolutionary government? It centers on Burgos, and it is to his activity at this time that we must look. In 1870 he had emerged as the chief defender of the Filipino clergy, aided by Guevara, with his series of articles in the Madrid newspaper, La Discusión (Schumacher 1999, 131–81). He continued his attack on the friar orders in La Armonía in 1871 (ibid., 183–93). More importantly, he was the principal moving force behind, and apparent author of, the memorial drawn up by the Filipino clergy, asking for the revocation of the decree of 1861 providing for the compensation to the Recollect friars for the parishes they gave up to the Jesuits in Mindanao with parishes of the Filipino clergy in the archdiocese of Manila ([Regidor] 1900, 74). Moreover, it asked for the return to the secular clergy of the parishes that had been given to the Recollects since 1861. This memorial must have been many months in the making, since it was signed by 185 priests of the archdiocese and 64 clerics and dated 14 February 1871 (AHN 1871a).12 Given the size of the archdiocese, it would have taken at least some weeks to gather all the signatures, even apart from the time needed to compose the memorial itself and to agree on its wording. Since the archbishop included a copy in his letter of 31 December 1870 to the Regent, Marshal Serrano (Schumacher 1999, 36–37, 212–13, 214–37), Burgos must have been occupied in this from early in 1870.

The task of getting this memorial through the complex and corrupt bureaucracy was entrusted to Manuel Regidor, brother of Antonio, who was based in Madrid (AHN 1871b). From time to time he informed Burgos of the slow movement of the memorial through the bureaucracy and the intercessions he had made use of (Tormo 1973, 116–17, 26 Dec. 1871; 131–33, 19 Feb. 1872).13 Tragically, Burgos was already dead, though the news was not yet known to the public in Madrid. The memorial is a splendid testimony to the union and militancy that Burgos had been able to inspire in the Manila clergy; it was also an added motive for Izquierdo to see the clergy as a danger to the state. But what is significant here is that Burgos was putting forth herculean efforts to work within the processes of the Spanish government at a time when he was accused of being the key figure in a separatist revolt.

This argument is further supported by the fact that he was simultaneously engaged, likewise through the mediation of Manuel Regidor, in seeking a canonry within the Manila Cathedral chapter (ibid., 117, 132–33). Regidor likewise obtained for him the decoration of the Order of Isabel la Católica, a position that he considered would make secure his place in Manila (Schumacher 1981, 21). It would not be so. Nonetheless, all this activity, both on behalf of the secular clergy and on his own behalf, is quite unintelligible if he were really involved in a plot to overthrow Spanish rule.

**Gómez’s Separation from Burgos’s Strategy**

Mariano Gómez14 is the most difficult to evaluate. His history as opponent of the efforts of friars to take over Filipino parishes dates back to 1849 (Gomez 1922/1972, 113–16; Schumacher 1999, 46–55), yet he is said in the account of his nephew to have been friendly with friars who knew him (Gomez 1922/1972, 105–6). He is said to have withdrawn from the struggle for the parishes because he and his allies, who had pursued the cause of the secular clergy by lobbying in Spain, where alone they believed it might succeed, “did not agree with the plan of the new generation, who had the tendency to unite themselves, or form a mission of all the patriots, so as, once united, to offer battle in any place whatever” (Gomez 1922/1972, 118; italics added). They saw that “the new generation was taking up the same campaign, but with a different way of proceeding. For this reason they unanimously agreed...
to suspend their efforts in order to give free passage to the new champions of the liberties of the fatherland, whose plan they themselves admired, but were not convinced of the result” (ibid., 115–16).

It appears that this withdrawal was from the strategy captained by Burgos and supported by the Manila clergy, namely, on the one hand to make use of liberals like Manuel Regidor in Madrid to reverse the decree of 1861, and on the other to work with liberals like Pardo and Antonio Regidor in a Manila junta seeking liberal reforms. This is confirmed by the fact that an examination of the signatures to the memorial shows that the signatures of Mariano Gómez and his nephew Feliciano are nowhere to be found. This is the more remarkable when it seems that all, or almost all, the Manila clergy signed, including those of Gómez’s own vicariate of Cavite; even his long-serving coadjutor, Fr. Cornelio Ignacio; and his other nephew, Fr. Manuel Trias.\footnote{15}

However, one must ask if the parish priest of Bacoor, noted for his care of every one of his parishioners, could have been unaware of the men assembled in Bacoor under Camerino, trying to get over to Fort San Felipe, even if the number of 500 is an exaggeration. But whether he sympathized with the recourse to arms or not, and the account of his nephew would insist not, he was nonetheless believed in complicity with it by those who went to arrest him and found the abandoned boat with arms. This knowledge that he would inevitably be suspect would perhaps account for the tranquil way that he went to his execution, unlike Burgos and Zamora, as testified not only by a sympathetic but largely fanciful account like Planchut’s (1877/1972, 53–55), but even by a hostile one like Montero y Vidal’s (1895, 586–87), who can scarcely refrain from grudging admiration. Gómez could reflect that he had been right in refusing to go along with the strategy of Burgos.

Those Sentenced to the Marianas

Some of the other priests, like Guevara and Mendoza, appear to have been sentenced to the Marianas for their prominent part in the campaign for the rights of the Filipino clergy (Tormo 1973, 113–14; Schumacher 1999, 124–31). Others, like Mariano Sevilla and Toribio del Pilar, were implicated because of letters to Burgos (de los Santos 1907, 5). Laza perhaps was arrested because he shared a house with Zamora (Artigas 1911, 141), although as a chaplain of the cathedral he must have been associated with Burgos and Zamora. All these, and the others who were eventually banished, were likely more or less active members of what Izquierdo would refer to as the “junta.” As has been argued above, there is little evidence that such a formal organization existed, but rather an alliance among those who were interested in liberal reforms, whether in church or state.

Such too must have been most of the lawyers arrested. But among the businessmen, José and Pío Basa were singled out. For José Basa was the correspondent and distributor of the newspaper El Eco Filipino, published in Madrid by Federico Lerena, brother-in-law of the Basas (Tormo 1973, 102, 106–11). (Although Pío was arrested with José, it seems clear that he had nothing to do with the paper [ibid., 107–8].) In the words of Izquierdo (1872b, 58), “in its articles it thundered against everything existing here.” It was clearly a liberal reformist paper (Tormo 1973, 104–5) as the interpolated correspondence of Lerena clearly shows, indignant at the “irrational” insurrection, “a horrendous crime” in a country where a revolt could only lead to “a bloody question of races” (ibid., 106, 110). On hearing of the execution of the three priests, it commented that “it seems that it has made them deserving of such a terrible punishment” (El Eco Filipino 1872/1972, 13).

It is curious that, although Izquierdo first connects this newspaper with those already imprisoned, in his later letter he attributes its circulation especially to the priests, and even sees Enrique Paraíso, who did indeed promote the circulation of the newspaper (ibid., 99), as especially linked in this with the priests (Izquierdo1872c). Nowhere in the documents assembled by Izquierdo to justify his measures (Tormo 1973) is there any connection between any of the accused priests and Paraíso or with El Eco Filipino.\footnote{16}

Paraíso, in his interrogation as a prisoner, claimed that he only knew Zamora by sight (Artigas 1911, 142). This newspaper did not make the cause of the Filipino clergy a major concern, as a perusal of all issues before its demise shows, and it had no sympathy for the executed priests, as noted above. Its concern was liberal reforms for the colony.

Although the Basas and the Regidors were apparently on friendly terms—the Basa sister spoke gratefully of the friendship of Manuel Regidor after the arrests of her brothers (Tormo 1973, 106)—it seems that the Regidors and the activist priests were pursuing a course different from that of El Eco Filipino. Manuel Regidor had left the Philippines for Madrid as a result of the revolution of 1868, where he had founded with Rafael M. Labra the newspaper El Correo de España. As has been seen above, he was active in promoting the cause of the Filipino clergy. His brother Antonio, who

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had been studying in Madrid, returned to the Philippines, where he joined others seeking liberal reforms (Manuel 1955, 1:167–70). Already in July 1871 Fr. Agustín Mendoza was sending money to Rafael Labra through Manuel Regidor to promote the cause of the Filipino clergy through a newspaper. The amount not sufficient to found a paper, the funds were applied to Labra’s El Correo de España (Tormo 1973, 113–14). Even after the founding of El Eco Filipino, Regidor was encouraging Burgos to send more subscriptions to El Correo de España, “the only [newspaper] where one can expound his thought at length” (ibid., 133). The two surviving letters of Regidor to Burgos (ibid., 116–17, 131–33) show him busily engaged in the negotiation of the memorial of the clergy and the entrance of Burgos into the cathedral chapter where he could exercise more influence. He refers to his brother Antonio for greater details, which he has written to him. What appears from these letters is that both brothers Regidor were working with Burgos, and their purpose was to work within the government in Madrid, not to be engaged in preparing a revolt ([Regidor] 1900, 74). What is also clear is that there were in Manila two separate groups pursuing somewhat different goals—that represented by José Ma. Basa, and that represented by Burgos and the other activist priests, working together with the Regidors.

Those Sentenced to Ceuta/Cartagena

A somewhat enigmatic figure is Enrique Paraíso. A former government employee, he was an early member of the Masonic lodge of Pandacan (Artigas 1911, 263–65). His alleged connection with the activist priests seems little likely, though Artigas puts him with Fr. Agustín Mendoza in caring for the republican prisoners exiled to the Philippines (ibid.). His spontaneous offer to solicit subscriptions to El Eco Filipino seems in consonance with his activist figure. But there must have been something more to his activity to have caused him, together with Máximo Inocencio and Crisanto de los Reyes, to be sentenced to prison, first to Ceuta in Africa, then to Cartagena. It seems that these, unlike the lawyers and businessmen, were found to be in fact the real planners of the revolt. In all the records of the sentences, these three are sentenced at the same time as the three priests and him who was the immediate instrument of the revolt, at least in Cavite, Zaldúa (Schumacher 1999, 269–74; Tormo 1973, 168–69). Why then were they not executed?

It appears to be their affiliation with Masonry. Regidor affirmed that Izquierdo was himself a Mason (Vergara 1896, 13), which is probable, given that he was one of the generals involved in overthrowing the monarchy in 1868. Hence,

he did not allow that those who turned out to be Masons be condemned to death . . . providing that those who were arrested in the beginning be destined to the Peninsula or to Africa, to suffer the penalty imposed on them . . . For this reason they destined to Ceuta and Cartagena Enrique Paraíso, Crisanto Reyes, and Máximo Inocencio, all three Indios, the first being a brother of the lodge of Pandacan, the two latter, of that of Cavite. (ibid., 15)

If Regidor is correct, it means that these three men, except for the intervention of Izquierdo, were condemned to death. Izquierdo instructed the Inspector General of Penal Colonies in a letter accompanying them to their prison: “to make sure that [they] were made to suffer the real and effective punishment to which they had been sentenced, since they, their accomplices, and families have been known to have contributed the most in facilitating the mutiny” (Boncan 1995, 12; italics added).

Their ten-year sentence, the most severe exile, argues to it being a commutation of the original death sentence, which those others judged guilty of the revolt, the three priests and Zaldúa, were to receive.

Reconstruction of the Revolt and its Aftermath

This conclusion makes possible a further reconstruction of the revolt and its aftermath. Zaldúa recruited the soldiers in Cavite, promising them various incentives, and assuring them that the priests and lawyers were behind the revolt, perhaps even telling them, as Izquierdo (1872b, 51–52) claimed, that the priests were offering masses for the success of the revolt and thus it could not fail. From Zaldúa they would learn that the king was to be Burgos, probably including Zamora with him. Behind Zaldúa, perhaps paying him for his activity, were the two Caviteños, Máximo Inocencio and Crisanto de los Reyes, both wealthy men. Whether the implication of Burgos was the idea of Zaldúa or his backers is impossible to say. The effect would be the same. Paraíso, who lived in Manila, was likely the one who recruited the Manila regiment nos. 1 and 2, whose sergeants and corporals were implicated ([Octavo] 1872, 160), although in the end, like those of regiment no. 7 in Cavite, they remained loyal to Spain. Zaldúa in his interrogation...
seems to have implicated all those who would be found guilty of a capital crime, on condition that he save his life. Not only the dramatic account of Plauchut/Regidor (1877/1972, 54) makes Zaldúa confident of a last-minute pardon for having implicated the priests, but even Montero y Vidal (1895, 3:586 n. 2) notes that he had given information on the priests and others and hoped for a pardon.

The fact that Paraíso, Inocencio, and de los Reyes were the moving force behind the revolt has been said before. Boncan (1995, 11–12) considered their “complicity . . . more plausible” than that of the priests. Gerónimo de los Reyes, great-grandson of Crisanto, drawing on family records and traditions, affirmed directly that these three good friends “were in fact the instigators of the Mutiny” (in Schumacher 2004, 5). Tormo (1973, 11) concluded that “the true instigators of the Cavite revolt were not the native priests whom Izquierdo mistakenly executed but the freemasons whom he did not dare to execute fearing to provoke an international conflict.” None of these authors, however, have explained more fully how the revolt developed. I will try to do so here.

There appear to have been three parties in Manila and Cavite among those attacked by Izquierdo. There were first of all the reformers—those lawyers and businessmen desirous of having the liberties of the Peninsula extended to the Philippines, on the one hand, and the priests agitating for the restoration of the parishes to the Filipino clergy, on the other. Although the two subgroups had different goals, they worked together, and both were represented in Madrid by Manuel Regidor. A second group was that of Federico Lerena in Madrid, and José Ma. Basa in Manila, also agitating for liberal reforms, but much more aggressively, through El Eco Filipino. Although this reformist effort did not differ essentially from the first, both seemed to have worked separately, though unsolicited copies of the newspaper seem to have been sent to others who may have belonged to the first group.17 Thus, one of the charges brought against Máximo Paterno, whose defense was presented by Manuel Regidor and thus was of the first group, was that, on the one hand, he had contributed money to the founding of El Correo de Ultramar [España] and, on the other, that a copy of El Eco Filipino had been found in his possession. Although partially admitting the former, he defended himself on the latter by asserting that possession of a copy of that newspaper did not mean that he was in accord with the ideas of the editors (Gamazo 1873, 6–7).18

The third group was composed of Máximo Inocencio, Crisanto de los Reyes, and Enrique Paraíso as the planners of the revolt, together with those that they would recruit to carry it out. Although Paraíso has appeared as volunteering to distribute El Eco Filipino, he no doubt saw this as a preliminary step to stir up discontent. Perhaps José Basa y Enríquez, himself a Caviteño, is to be associated with this group. He would receive the longest sentence, apart from those with capital charges, though in the Marianas, for reasons that are not clear. Returning to the Philippines after being pardoned, he would be deported again in 1892, and had as his students several of those who made the revolution of 1896, including Emilio Aguinaldo (Manuel 1955, 1:90–92). It would seem that Basa y Enríquez played some lesser role, perhaps such as Zaldúa did, while the real planners of the revolt were the three who employed them.

There are indications that all was not well between the first and third groups. The petition of Antonio Regidor complained that one charge against him was “the declaration of Crisanto de los Reyes . . . who, it seems, has affirmed that he has heard it said that Regidor was engaged in a conspiracy” (Silvela 1872, 7). Artigas (1911, 227) confirms this accusation, citing the actual summary of charges: “That he heard it said that Pardo, Regidor, Zamora, and others were involved in the insurrection.” More telling, in the joint petition elevated by Labra and Manuel Regidor in 1873, they compared bitterly the lot of those banished to the remote Marianas with “those convicted of the insurrection of Cavite, the convicts who have all but admitted having contributed to, and even taken some part in, the bloody insurrection of 1872, were brought in comfortable ships to the very gates of Spain” (ibid., 253).

**Conclusions**

From the facts narrated, we can draw some conclusions:

1. The revolt in Cavite was not a mere mutiny, but part of a planned separatist revolution.
2. The revolution as a whole failed because of the defection of the committed Filipino troops.
3. The planners of the revolution were Inocencio, de los Reyes, and Paraíso.
Although sentenced to death, they were secretly commuted by Izquierdo, for being fellow Masons.

The immediate instigators in Cavite were Zaldúa and Sergeant Lamadrid.

The three priests executed had nothing to do with the revolt.

Nor did the priests, lawyers, and businessmen banished to the Marianas have anything to do with it.

The accounts stemming from Antonio Regidor, although containing many factual names and events, are not reliable narratives of the revolt and its causes.

The removal of the exemption of arsenal workers from the tribute and compulsory labor was not the cause of the revolt, even though it may have contributed to the unrest.

Neither arsenal workers nor any naval personnel took part in the revolt.

One final point deserves to be discussed: how could the three planners of the revolt have believed that it was possible to overthrow Spanish rule in the Philippines? It is evident that their plans did not work out, and that the revolt had no chance of succeeding once the three committed regiments had remained loyal to Spain. But had the 300 men of regiment no. 7 joined with the artillery and the marines, and had they been joined by the 500 men under Camerino in Bacoor, there is every reason to think that they could have taken control of Cavite, given the fact that most of the naval forces were engaged in bombarding Jolo. Had the almost 800 men of regiment nos. 1 and 2 (Izquierdo 1872b, 15) taken possession of Fort Santiago, as planned, it is conceivable that they would take control of Manila. Writing to Admiral Topete, the new head of government in Spain, shortly after the revolt, Izquierdo recalled to him that in the whole country there were only 300 Spanish soldiers against 8,874 native Filipinos (Tormo 1973, 127). If the regiments in Cavite and Manila had gained control of those key points, it was not improbable that Filipino soldiers in other parts of the country might have followed. One need only remember that in 1898, although the Americans held Manila, the revolution in Cavite was followed by revolutionary forces taking possession of the rest of the country, in spite of the fact that the many thousands of Spanish soldiers very greatly outnumbered the 300 of 1872.

In the end, various factors doomed the revolt: (a) the regiments were never really committed to the revolt; (b) the rallying of the regiments by Col. Horacio Sawa in Cavite, and by Izquierdo himself in Manila; (c) the fact that Izquierdo had been alerted to the coming revolt by very explicit anonymous letters; (d) the alert action of Carballo in blocking by sea the men from Bacoor. Finally, (e) it is clear there was little support for a national revolution at this time. Probably none of the lawyers and priests who were banished to Guam had any desire to overthrow Spanish rule; they rather demanded from Spain reforms and justice in the Philippines. The verdict of a Spanish historian of the time on the mutiny is apposite: “The government [Izquierdo] took advantage of the opportunity to silence not only the priests who were putting up a good fight for the recognition of their rights, but also all those laymen who were distinguished then for their love of a liberal regime” (Retana 1908, v).

Only after the years of the Propaganda Movement and the Katipunan would there be significant support for separation from Spain and for independence.

**List of Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AHN</td>
<td>Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHCJC</td>
<td>Arxiu Històric de la Companya de Jesús a Catalunya, Barcelona (Formerly APTCJ, Sant Cugat del Vallès, Barcelona)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APTCJ</td>
<td>Archivo de la Provincia de Tarragona de la Compañía de Jesús Sant Cugat del Vallès, Barcelona (now AHCJC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAH</td>
<td>Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid</td>
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<td>BNM</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Philippine National Archives, Manila</td>
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<td>SHM</td>
<td>Servicio Histórico Militar, Madrid</td>
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**Notes**

1. Although Artigas does not say explicitly where he found these records, and only quotes from them, other primary documents in his book later became part of the PNA. If he really had the full records of the interrogations, it is puzzling why he did not make more use of them in his book. Perhaps he found only a few pages, somehow separated from the full records. Tormo (1977, 218) quotes a draft letter of Izquierdo, sending the original judicial proceedings to the Overseas Minister. By implication, since the delay was due to making a copy, this copy remained in Manila.

2. Although using Octavo’s interrogation and confession ([Octavo] 1872), I considered it probable that some of the account was obtained by threats (Schumacher 1981, 26–27). Corpus expresses a similar skepticism (Artigas 1996, xii). However, a more careful reading of the account makes clear that Octavo professed ignorance to many leading questions put to him with the intention of confirming the correctness of the sentences passed months earlier, disappointing his interrogators.
Thus he disclaimed any acquaintance with any of those exiled after the mutiny ([Octavo] 1872, 157). He deserves to be read critically, but can provide valuable information.

3 Artigas (1911, 111) flatly denies this assertion. Montero y Vidal’s (1895, 573 n. 2) footnote affirming it contains one of his folkloric tales.

4 Antonio Regidor would identify this friar as a lay brother, Friar Antonio Ruiz, and claim that he was forced by the mutineers to remain in the fort to hear their confessions in case of necessity (Vergara 1896, 14–15). In fact, Ruiz was a priest, not a lay brother, and it is not even certain that he was in the Philippines at the time (Tormo 1978, 340–42). The friar may not have been Ruiz after all, and it may be one more case of Regidor hitting upon familiar names to fit his versions of the facts. See Schumacher 1991, 74–77.

5 Guerra’s name must have been a mistake, since the report of the civil governor of Manila for 23 January lists his arrest together with that of Fr. Mariano Sevillana (Artigas 1911, 159–61). For Zamora, see below.

6 Artigas (1911, 115–17) erroneously gives the date of 21 January for all these arrests.

7 This junta or club (the words are Izquierdo’s) was named by Artigas the comité de reformadores. None of those names seems to have been used by the members, whose identity besides is controverted. In any case, “it was doubtful whether this group had any formal organization” (Manuel 1970, 2-48), though Antonio Regidor would speak of a meeting and voting (n. 15 below).

8 However, if we are to believe Regidor (1900, 74), Burgos “helped toward the founding of El Eco Filipino.” This is said merely in passing, giving no indication of how he might have done so. It is difficult to reconcile this with Burgos’s known relationship with Manuel Regidor and El Correo de España.

9 Montero y Vidal (1895, 3:577 n. 2) relates that Lamadrid had made the remark about both rectors of San Pedro parish, thus including Zamora.

10 Although Buenacino, who was a contemporary and key figure of the affiliated Juventud Escolar Liberal, includes various laymen who were not the object of investigation in 1872, his enumeration of the priests coincides with those executed or exiled and includes Zamora.

11 There were such men in Bacoor, but it is not clear that they were actually 500 in number. Elsewhere in the same letter Izquierdo (1872b, 55, 18) speaks of 400 coming from Bacoor toward Kawit.

12 I owe a copy of the original with all its signatures to Dr. Roberto Blanco Andrés to whom I am exceedingly grateful. An unsigned copy of this memorial was published in Schumacher 1999, 214–37. I found it in AHN leg. 2255, exp. 2, where it is with a letter of the archbishop to the regent of Spain, Marshal Francisco Serrano, dated 31 Dec. 1870. It thus appears that the archbishop had a copy of the clergy memorial prior to its signing, which purpose he supported in his own letter. Plauchut (1877/1972, 42) erroneously claimed that this document, supposedly with 300 signatures, was formulated as an act of loyalty to Spain, drawn up by Burgos at the persuasion of the archbishop.

13 The dates of these letters are known from supplementary information provided by Tormo 1977, 48 n. 131.

14 For the correct spelling of Gómez’s name, see Schumacher 2006, 252–53 n. 88.

15 Antonio Regidor (1900, 74) knew of Gómez’s refusal to sign: “He refused to sign it and [refused] to give his opinion.” Regidor claimed that he himself and Fathers Laza and Mendoza, with other laymen, voted against the idea. But, in fact, the two priests did sign (AHN 1871a).

16 However, Tormo in his introduction to this book lists all the Izquierdo documents found in the collection in BAH besides those published here. Among the unpublished ones is a list of subscribers to El Eco Filipino, deemed anti-Spanish (Tormo 1973, 3 n. 531). It is possible that there were priests among them, but I have not had access to this list, nor did Tormo give its contents.

17 After all of both groups were in exile, Labra and Manuel Regidor would act on behalf of Basa also. See Artigas 1911, 242–61.

18 In a later joint petition, Paterno’s lawyer would simply say that no proof of the existence of such a newspaper had been offered (Artigas 1911, 249). Clearly the authorities had confused the name of the newspaper.

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