Contextual Factors in the Analysis of State-Historian Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines

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This article seeks to identify and compare the historical, sociopolitical, and academic contexts that need to be explored in the analysis of the relations between the state and the historian in Indonesia and the Philippines, in particular during the Suharto and Marcos years. It identifies the contrasting patterns and features of the colonial experience that gave rise to: (a) a nationalism that was more hegemonic in Indonesia and fluid in the Philippines; (b) the processes of state formation and state-society relations that set the tone for a more cooperative interaction in Indonesia and more adversarial in the Philippines; and (c) the later development of the history profession, and under a more restrictive atmosphere, in Indonesia than in the Philippines. These factors played a significant role in defining the character, modalities, and contours of the state-historian relations in the two countries.

KEYWORDS: NATIONALISM • PHILIPPINES • INDONESIA • NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY • STATE-HISTORIAN RELATIONS
Among the intense anticolonial atmosphere in the postwar decades, the authoritarian governments in Indonesia and the Philippines sponsored in the 1970s their respective history-writing projects: Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia’s National History; SNI) and the Tadhana (Destiny) Project. One of the purported aims was to produce a “true” nationalist history that could help “repair the damage” wrought by the colonial experience. Primarily because of the context in which these projects were undertaken, they are generally perceived as political tools pure and simple. Undertaken at a crucial juncture of the two authoritarian regimes’ political consolidation, suspicions mounted that these projects were none other than vehicles for regime-justification or self-glorification.

The two projects were ambitious both in scope and intent. The SNI aimed to produce six volumes and Tadhana nineteen volumes of national history covering the periods from geological formation up to the contemporary period, that is, the 1970s. Practically all historians and social scientists of importance in Indonesia took part in the project. Although the same cannot be said in the case of the Philippines, the Tadhana project nevertheless elicited the participation of some of the most brilliant and innovative scholars of that generation.

The SNI was completed in 1975 and was revised a number of times until the 1990s. It is widely known to have articulated the “official history” of the New Order. The Tadhana, in contrast, was never completed. Only five volumes were published, including the first of the two-volume abridgment (Marcos 1977; 1982). Whereas the SNI occupied center-stage in historical discourses in Indonesia, Tadhana was largely ignored in the Philippines. Notwithstanding the amount of scholarly efforts put into this latter project, only a handful of scholars beyond the circle of those who made it seem to appreciate its scholarly value.

The facets of state-historian relations in the two countries are no doubt more varied, encompassing, and richly textured than what can be glimpsed from these two projects. Nonetheless, these projects were important as concrete cases that exemplified at least some aspects of such a relationship. Given that Ferdinand Marcos and Nugroho Notosusanto, considered as an ideologue of the New Order regime, had had a more or less direct participation in the projects, both the SNI and Tadhana offer a rare glimpse of the fascinating areas of state-intellectual relations that remain inadequately explored: the intersections where knowledge and power clash, fuse, restrict, reinforce, or constitute each other. Owing to the differentiated dynamics—sometimes obvious, at other times subtle—between or among scholars, state actors, knowledge itself, and extraneous factors attendant to these projects, these history-writing projects are fertile exploratory grounds.

The purpose of this article, however, is not to discuss these history-writing projects per se but to lay out their context, in preparation for a comprehensive analysis of the two projects. This article seeks to compare and analyze the contextual factors—historical, sociopolitical, and academic—that seem most relevant to understanding the features of state-historian relations in Indonesia and the Philippines prior to the undertaking of these two grand state projects. Given the wide array of pertinent comparative features of the two countries, I will focus on only three areas: (1) the patterns of colonization and the responses to it; (2) state-formation and state-society relations; and (3) the patterns of development of nationalist historiography and the historical profession.

Patterns of Colonization and Nationalist Responses

Both the Philippines and Indonesia used to be considered as having undergone three centuries of colonization. Although subsequent qualifications shortened the period for Indonesia (Resink 1968), the same was not the case for the Philippines. The first Spanish expedition reached the area in 1521, and in 1565 the Spanish presence gradually began to take root, fairly wide and deep enough. The Dutch, for their part, established themselves in Indonesia on a piecemeal basis, depending primarily on their economic interests: Maluku and Batavia (Jakarta) starting from the early seventeenth century, the whole of Java in the eighteenth, a large part of Sumatra in the nineteenth, and the rest in the early twentieth century. The sheer length of time of the Spanish presence in the Philippines almost ensured a more deep-seated impact than was the case of the Dutch on Indonesia.1

There were, of course, other factors.2 The geographical characteristics of Indonesia—its enormous size and its being spread out in three time zones—made it so much less manageable or penetrable than the Philippines, which was not just considerably smaller, with a land area less than one-sixth of Indonesia’s, but was also more compact.3 Likewise, Dutch activities being primarily focused on commerce, at least in the first two centuries, proved less intrusive to the indigenous cultures. Not until the implementation of
the Ethical Policy in the early 1900s was the sociocultural life of a significant portion of the population deeply affected. In contrast, the missionary zeal of the Spaniards that resulted early on in the conversion of a large proportion of the native population ensured that many indigenous lowland cultures were penetrated to their core. Many are convinced that what made indigenous cultures vulnerable to the onslaught of Spanish influences was the lack of cultural, material, and political development in the Philippines before the coming of the Europeans comparable to what prevailed in Indonesia as a result of Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic influences. Although the brand of Christianity that developed in the Philippines may have been infused with indigenous elements, as captured by the term “folk Christianity” (Phelan 1959), undeniably it was predominantly more Christian than folk.

Another main difference lies in number. The Philippines shares with only a few countries the experience of having been under two Western colonizers. What makes the case of the Philippines quite distinctive are the length of time, the depth, and the ambiguity or contrasting impacts of the colonial powers. African countries such as Tanzania may have changed hands from one colonizer (Germany) to another (Britain) but the impact has been nowhere near as sharp or unsettling as in the case of the Philippines when it passed from Spanish to American control. Given the different experiences under the two colonial masters, many Filipinos harbor ambivalent attitudes toward colonialism in general. The term “binationalism” coined by McCoy (1981) may be helpful in describing this attitude. In contrast to the almost unequivocal perception of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia as negative, the same cannot be said of the Philippines where the American colonial period and its legacies continue to be viewed by many with nostalgia and fondness. The ambivalence of Filipinos toward their colonial experience resonates in their nationalisms (McCoy 1981; Curaming 2001; Abinales 2002), in educational policies (Gaerlan 1998; Doronila 1989), in political structures and practices (Paredes 1988), and even in personal views down to this day.

The timing of the national revolution may have also contributed to such ambivalence. Whereas Indonesia saw independence after their revolution, the Philippines had to contend with the coopting and disarming policies of yet another colonizer soon after declaring independence from Spain in 1898. If after fifty years an Indonesian scholar could talk about the “heartbeat of [the] Indonesian revolution” (Abdullah 1997), a Filipino counterpart would grieve over an “aborted nation” (Quibuyen 1999).

One of the Americans’ disarming policies was the mass education program (May 1976, 1980). Figures put it that by 1920 nearly a million children had received education in English and by 1938 the figure was twice as many (Steinberg 1987, 264–65). None among its contemporaneous Southeast Asian neighbors could surpass such figures. Although colonial education created generations of Filipinos forever grateful to the United States in stark contrast with the painful memories of colonial experience under Spain, it also served as a breeding ground for nationalisms of varying shades. The emergence, for instance, of homegrown historians—educated during the American period—with very different nationalist temperaments as exemplified by Zaide and Zafra, on the one hand, and Agoncillo and Constantino, on the other, attested to the ambivalent impacts of American-sponsored education. (The primary difference between the two sets of historians will be clarified below.) The American period, rather than being a crucible of unity, produced still more potential for disputes over nationalism. Indonesian nationalism was (and still is) by no means monolithic. Just as in the Philippines, competing “nations-of-intent” existed then, as they do now (Cribb 2004). The primary difference lies in the distribution of power among the promoters of the competing visions of the nation. Whereas in Indonesia the coalescing of forces allowed one dominant vision to emerge and subordinate the others, such was hardly the case in the Philippines. Up to now, there is no one unassailable “exemplary center” of nationalism in the Philippines. It is continually being disputed. A complex set of reasons explains this situation, but one factor is the ambivalent character of the Filipinos’ colonial experience.

Whereas Indonesia’s nationalist movement the “idea of unity has quickly acquired crucial symbolic value” (Cribb 1999, 16) and “cultural, social and ideological differences” did not hinder “enthusiasm for national unity” (Cribb and Brown 1995, 9), conflict and discord rocked its Philippine counterpart from its beginnings in the 1880s. In both cases the necessity of unity was certainly recognized, but such a recognition did not as easily translate to a unified front against colonialism in the Philippines as was the case in Indonesia. The disputes between José Rizal and Marcelo del Pilar, the groups of Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo, and Apolinario Mabini and the landed oligarchs are but a few early examples that foreshadowed the continued and continuing disputatious character of Philippine nationalism to this day. No sooner had the Americans come to the Philippines, for in-
The idea of cosmopolitan nationalism as an explanatory template for the development of Philippine nationalism, in my view, is preposterous. The division among the Islamists, communists, and other groups was of course serious and deeply rooted, but time and again there emerged a locus of power capable of balancing, if not neutralizing, those sharp divisions. Sukarno’s adept, if ultimately fatal, attempt to synthesize the three competing ideologies of nationalism (nasionalisme), religion (agama), and communism (komunisme) into Nasakom; the Pancasila (literally, Five Principles); and the military’s decisive wiping out of the communists that smothered oppositions, did not have counterparts in the Philippines where competing interests coexisted, held only in tenuous equilibrium by a fragile balance of power. Despite the early beginning of Philippine nationalism, there was nothing comparable to the Sumpah Pemuda or Pancasila, two important markers of Indonesian unity and nationalism. Marcos’s (1979, 1980) was perhaps the first attempt to propose what amounted to a Filipino ideology, but due to his unpopularity it was dismissed as nothing but a self-serving ploy.

Megan Thomas (2002) has noted the “peculiar” character of the earliest period in the development of Philippine nationalism. She argues that right at its very inception Philippine nationalism was infused with a high level of cosmopolitanism that was difficult to find in many other colonial societies. According to her, whereas in many other colonial societies the “middle class” that led the nationalist movement were in between two poles, the colony and the metropole, Filipino nationalist leaders were in between multiple centers, which included Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, Belgium, France, and so on. In her words: “They were not located between A (colony) and B (metropole), or even mediating between them, but instead traveling between multiple centers: not existing on the margins so much as existing in more than one place simultaneously” (ibid., 4). According to her, the fairly extensive travels by these early nationalists (ibid., 75–118) exposed them to stimuli other than those in Spain and the colony, which afforded them multiple viewpoints that tamed the parochial tendencies of many anticolonial nationalisms, including that of Indonesia.

The idea of cosmopolitan nationalism as an explanatory template for the development of Philippine nationalism, in my view, is preposterous. Metanarrative is in the mind. Conceptual order is always retrospective whereas historical processes are open-ended. However, the fact that the Philippines has emerged in the twentieth century as a “truly” global nation with more than 8 million (out of 88 million) of its people scattered in practically all corners of the world lends the idea of cosmopolitanism a heuristic value as an organizing, as opposed to explanatory, principle. For the purpose of this article, this idea highlights the more than superficial roots of the fluid and multiple character of Philippine nationalisms.

Viewed from the perspective of the development of Philippine nationalism, the degree of unity evoked among early Indonesian nationalists by the notion of “Indonesia” was quite remarkable. As observers have noted, Indonesia, at least to the educated, was to the modern and the future what regional ethnic groups were to the feudal and the past (McVey 1996, 14). Subsuming the regional into the national in the Indonesian nationalist imagination did not prove as challenging as it was in the Philippines, where regional loyalties persistently dogged nationalist efforts. Likewise, while the project of modernity in the Philippines was initially identified with nationalism just as in Indonesia, American colonization provided both a clear vision as well as the tangible fruits of the modern. Whatever strength the promise of modernity could lend to the nationalist project, as in Indonesia, was dashed by the American colonial project—yet another illustration of the impact of having had two colonizers. The cosmopolitan, the national, and the regional elements competed or coexisted in shaping Philippine nationalisms.

State-Formation and State-Society Relations

As postcolonial states, the processes of state formation in Indonesia and the Philippines were largely influenced by their colonial experience. It is unclear to what extent the Indonesian postcolonial state built upon its predecessor, but there is no doubt about it in the case of the Philippines where governmental and other political structures—constitution, party-system, system of checks and balances, and so forth—were unashamedly patterned after those of the United States. The explicit “training” in the “art of democratic governance” that the Filipino leaders underwent within the colonial framework ensured this situation.

In a contrasting fashion, Indonesia and the Philippines were declared independent after the Second World War. Whereas Indonesian leaders hastily did so amid confusion in 1945, Filipino leaders took the mantle of leadership
in 1946 after having been “prepared” for it for decades. What happened to Indonesia in 1945, however, had a parallel in the Philippines. After declaring independence from Spain in 1898, Filipinos had to face the might of a new foreign conqueror. Whereas Filipinos fought against a new colonizer, Indonesians confronted their old colonizer. Whereas Indonesians held on to their independence after years of diplomatic and armed struggle against the Dutch, Filipinos lost theirs (or they thought they had lost something they had yet to gain) and had to settle for decades of “democratic tutoring” under the Americans. The repercussions of this difference were far-reaching on the trajectories of the two countries’ postcolonial political development, including nationalism, as pointed out above.

One fundamental difference lay in the decolonization process. Whereas Indonesia succeeded in divesting itself of many legacies of the colonial era—Dutch property ownership, political use of the native aristocracies, and the Dutch language, among others—the neocolonial relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines lingered. As aptly described by McCoy (1981, 23), the Philippines gained “independence without decolonization.” Americans maintained control of vast plantations, military bases, mines, and businesses even as Filipino elites enjoyed preferential access to the U.S. market. This exchange set the frame that shaped the Philippine government’s relationship with its American counterpart in the succeeding decades. Aside from the persistence of American popular culture and American-flavored education, not to mention the control of resources and territories cited above, the continued close collaboration between the two governments became a fulcrum of the anticolonial nationalist backlash. To the consternation of his critics, Marcos was able to surf on the wave of such a backlash and use nationalist rhetoric to justify his authoritarian rule, one clear example being the Tadhana project.

The roads to authoritarianism were different in the two countries. While both underwent forms of “democratic experimentation,” the crucial difference lay in the length of time they spent on it. Whereas parliamentary democracy was crushed just years after it was tried in Indonesia in the 1950s, the Philippines had relatively more time to develop democratic practices and institutions. The establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, the Filipinization as an offshoot of the Jones Law of 1916, the electoral practices that started early on, and the establishment of the Commonwealth government in 1935 all marked a gradual and progressive pattern of increased Filipino participation in the experiment. Within the twenty-five years after independence in 1946, the experiment seemed to be working, notwithstanding the “fiesta” character of the democracy that came out of such an experiment (Paredes 1988; Anderson 1988; Golay 1998). In other words, by the time an authoritarian regime was installed with the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines had already undergone about six decades of (at least nominal) democratic practice—rendering it easy for the dictatorial period between 1972 and 1986 to appear as an anomaly in the otherwise continuous evolution of the experiment.

The authoritarianism of the New Order regime, in contrast, was hardly an anomaly. In many respects it was a continuation of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and it retained the feudal character of the traditional political culture as well as the autocratic features of the Dutch colonial government (Anderson 1983). If anything, the brief parliamentary experiment in the 1950s was what appeared anomalous within the broader historical scheme (Benda 1964/1982). Such a view is reinforced by the tendency of many Indonesian politicians since the Guided Democracy period to use this period as a metaphor for political chaos and ineptitude (Bourchier 1994; 1996, 255–56).

Given the wider democratic latitude the Philippines had enjoyed for a longer period of time, state-civil society relations in the Philippines not surprisingly was more dynamic and confrontational, and the structure of power relations within society more fluid and polyvalent (Hedman 2001). Different interest groups, such as labor unions, church organizations, political parties, and professional associations had ample time to grow, acquire power, and exert influence on the process, if not the outcome, of political struggles within the public sphere. Admittedly, Indonesia had similar experiences but its trajectory was arrested at a specific point. Events in 1965–1966 and subsequent years proved to be pivotal. A reign of terror was installed, which effectively put in place the resilient anticommunist “master narrative” that legitimated the use of “repressive measures geared to intimidate the citizenry” for an indefinite period of time (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005, 267, 270). Years of systematic mass indoctrination followed, most evident in programs such as Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education) and Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa (History of National Struggle Education) (Bourchier 1996, 227–63). Dissent could hardly thrive in such an environment. The lasting and deep impact is manifest in the more difficult democratic transition that Indonesia experienced in the post-Suharto period.
weakness of the opposition, the Marcos regime thrived despite strong and skilful manipulations of competing and complementary forces and interests. The succeeding decades of the 1940s and 1950s saw the publication of historical works whose hagiographic, overly nationalistic character prompted some observers to regard these as prescientific in method and in interpretation (Klooster 1982, 47; Notosusanto 1965, 2). Perhaps Djajadiningrat’s earliest formulations of the nationalist interpretation of Philippine history (Thomas 2002, 147–78; Schumacher 1979). Some of their works were notable for the fairly sophisticated methods (by the standard of the time) employed in the analysis and synthesis of data. Rizal’s Annotations of Morga’s Sucesos de Las Filipinas and de los Reyes’s El Folk-Lore Filipino are good examples. Palma’s Historia de Filipinas (1935), which Agoncillo (2003b, 26) regarded as perhaps the best one-volume survey of Philippine history in the first half of the twentieth century, is another. Although none was a trained historian, these writers laid the foundations upon which future efforts at “modern” nationalist scholarship would be built.

Indonesia would have to wait decades for an at least nominally similar development. Starting from the 1920s and the 1930s, the germ of nationalist historiography was planted through the fictional writings and speeches of Yamin, Sukarno, Sanusi Pane, and other nationalists (Klooster 1982, 54). The succeeding decades of the 1940s and 1950s saw the publication of historical works whose hagiographic, overly nationalist character prompted some observers to regard these as prescientific in method and in interpretation (Klooster 1982, 47; Notosusanto 1965, 2). Perhaps Djajadiningrat’s thesis in 1913, which critically reassessed the sources pertaining to the history of Banten, stands alone in the period prior to the Second World War for observing “modern” historical methods. The theme of this thesis, however, was at best tangential to nationalist historiography. In other words, whereas Filipino historians as early as the period prior to the Second World War already had a foundation to build upon, their Indonesian counterparts had almost nothing. They had to “start from scratch,” as Notosusanto (1965, 2) emphasized in 1965.

Historiography and the History Profession

The early development of nationalist historiography closely followed that of the nationalist movement in general. It is not surprising, therefore, that nationalist historiography in the Philippines took shape earlier than in Indonesia, considering that it was in the former where Southeast Asia saw the rise of the earliest anticolonial nationalist movement. Nationalist historiography here refers to a set of ideas and practices adopted by historians or history enthusiasts in their efforts to write history with the result, intended or not, of recognizing or justifying the existence of a nation-state as well as of defining and maintaining an identity deemed fitting for such a collectivity. The early development of nationalist historiography closely followed that of the nationalist movement in general. It is not surprising, therefore, that
### Selected Filipino and Indonesian historians and their educational backgrounds, 1880s–1980s

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Sources: Abdullah 1975, 123; Camagay 1993; Custodio 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d, 1993e; Gealogo 1993a; Medina 1993; Salamanca 1993, 32; Tanap 2005a, b; Tokohindonesia n.d.
1922, thus acquiring the distinction of being the first Filipino woman with a Ph.D. degree in history. She was well known for writing the critically acclaimed History of Education in the Philippines (1932). She and Leandro Fernandez, who also obtained a doctorate from Columbia University and who wrote The Philippine Republic (1926), are considered to be the Filipino pioneers in employing “scientific” methods in history writing (Agoncillo 2003). Agoncillo, Zafra, and Zaide did not pursue advanced degrees abroad but nevertheless emerged among the most prominent and important historians for the period 1940–1980s, overshadowing many of the foreign-trained historians—which may be suggestive of the quality of training they received from local institutions.

The same thing cannot be said in the case of Indonesia, where the most prominent historians were trained abroad (at least partially), with the notable exception of Adrian Lapian (see table on p. 134). The departments of history, at the University of Indonesia and the University of Gadjah Mada, encountered difficulties in the pursuit of professionalization. These departments were plagued by a severe shortage of teachers during the first decade of their existence; and the teachers were mostly philologists and lawyers, not historians (Abdullah 1975, 123). According to Notosusanto (1965, 3), both of these departments were “on the brink of being closed [for] lack of teachers”—an acute shortage that led students to complain about the lack of courses offered. As a result, some students who were initially interested in history moved to archaeology and other courses. Although the situation was not as bad in the following decade, it was still bad enough to prompt Nugroho Notosusanto to complain in 1965 that the lack of professionally trained historians remained an acute and basic problem. He put the problem this way: “It has been a vicious circle: we want to train a great number of historians because we now have too few; and because we have too few at the present time, we cannot train new historians as quickly as we should like to do” (Notosusanto 1965, 2–3). Kartodirdjo’s (1963, 26) survey of the history profession in Indonesia in the 1960s described it as “still in [its] infancy.” The purge of leftist historians in the wake of the 1965 events further shrank the pool of already limited intellectual resources (Suryo 2005). Local universities did not produce their first doctorate in history until 1977, in the person of Notosusanto himself. Progress was slow from that point on. By Nugroho’s count, by 1980 there were six historians with a Ph.D. degree in Indonesia (Sinar Harapan 1980c), while Abdullah put the number at ten (Kompas 1980b).

Professional organizations of historians were also established much earlier in the Philippines than in Indonesia. In 1941 the Philippine National Historical Society (PNHS) was founded. In 1955 a breakaway group formed another organization called the Philippine Historical Association (PHA). There has been both tacit and open competition between the two groups since then. Another association was formed in 1989 from among the members of UP’s Department of History, called Asosayson ng mga Daluhbasa at may Hilig sa Kasaysayan (Association of History Professionals and Enthusiasts; ADHIKA). Other small groups were formed, but these three are the largest, the most active, and the most established. In Indonesia their lone counterpart, Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia (Association of Historians of Indonesia; MSI), was founded in 1970.

A number of contrasts should be noted. Whereas its Philippine counterparts were either less dependent on or practically independent of the government, the MSI relied on the government for its sustenance. The PHA may have had a fairly close relationship with the government, with the Philippine president invited as the association’s honorary president since its inception in 1955 until the Marcos years (Fabella 1963; de Ocampo 1975). However, the extent of the PHA’s dependence on the state for sustenance was not to the same degree as the MSI’s.

Whereas the MSI has held state-funded national conferences only occasionally (1957, 1970, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1996, and 2001), in the Philippines almost every year the PNHS, the PHA, and ADHIKA hold their respective national conferences in addition to a number of regional ones. Most of these conferences are held with minimal financial support, if any, from the state. The bulk of the funding usually comes from registration and membership fees.

In both countries the government established institutional infrastructures to promote historical consciousness. In the Philippines the National Historical Institute (NHI) was founded in 1972. It traces its history, however, to the Philippine Historical Research and Markers Committee established in 1933, which in 1936 was superseded by the Philippine Historical Committee. These committees focused on identifying, marking, and safeguarding historic sites and antiquities. In 1967 the National Historical Commission replaced the extant committee. In 1972 the commission was reorganized to form the NHI, whose function was not just the marking and preservation of historic sites but also the active promotion of history through education, public campaigns, and research (Gealogo 1993b, 95).
In Indonesia the Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional (Directorate of History and Traditional Values) is the functional equivalent of the NHI. Unlike in the Philippines, however, other government agencies promote historical research and public awareness. These include the Armed Forces History Center, which does not have a parallel in the Philippines, and a section of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia; LIPI), specifically the former National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional; LEK-NAS) and the National Institute of Cultural Studies (Lembaga Research Kebudayaan Nasional; LRKN) (Abdullah 1975, 139). The Armed Forces History Center, founded in 1964, is by far the most active and most productive history-related institution in Indonesia, having published about fifty books by 1972 (ibid.).

Conclusion
While the Philippines and Indonesia share some broad similarities, there have also been considerable differences. The differences are particularly pronounced in the impact of the colonial experience, state-civil society relations, and the development of the historical profession. These contrasting factors have a bearing on the analysis of state-historian relations, in general, and on the Tadhana and SNI projects, in particular.

First, the contrasting patterns of colonial experience in the two countries prefigured forms of nationalism that were more fluid in the Philippines and hegemonic in Indonesia. Such forms of nationalisms simultaneously influenced and were reinforced or affected by the shapes of nationalist history writing and state-historian relations in the two countries. The fluidity of nationalism in the Philippines, for instance, set the frame for the rise of competing “schools” of nationalist historiography, which paved the way for state-historian relations that were both cooperative and oppositional. It thus calls for the analysis of Tadhana that takes this project not simply as a cooptation by the state of the historians; it was at once a cooperation between some historians and the state, and a fierce competition between or among historians who wished to promote not only competing historiographic orientations but also different visions of a Filipino nation. In the case of Indonesia, the emergence of one hegemonic “nation-of-intent” had been reflected in, and was reinforced by, the largely cooperative tenor of the relationship between the state and the historians, as well as among the historians. It did not mean the absence of tensions or conflicts but the fault lines were drawn not along the contours or visions of the Indonesian nation, but on the basis of personal differences along historiographic preferences and political loyalties.

Second, the relationship between the state and civil society was far less constrained in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The polyvalent character of power relations in the Philippines allowed a greater space for different interest groups to operate. In history writing, this situation was reflected in the development and coexistence of different and competing “schools” of nationalist historiography in the Philippines. In Indonesia, with the demise of the leftist vision of history in the wake of 1965–1966 catalysm, there emerged not only an exemplary center of power as exemplified by the New Order regime but also a hegemonic nationalist historiography that effectively sidelined, if not annihilated, all other competing versions.

This situation also set the contrasting tone by which the scholars’ participation in the Tadhana and SNI projects were received in the two countries. On one hand, given the more dialectical state-society relations in the Philippines, the Filipino historians’ participation in Tadhana was bound to be viewed as highly anomalous, even scandalous. In Indonesia of the 1970s, on the other hand, scholars’ cooperation with the state in the SNI project was seen not only as natural but even patriotic. This contextual difference reminds us of the need to temper the common impulse to readily regard scholars who cooperate with the state as “intellectual prostitutes.” The area of more productive inquiry is not to find out whether one is guilty or not of “intellectual prostitution,” but to map out the power relations by determining the enabling sociopolitical and academic contexts that allow one to brand another with such a pejorative name.

Third, the historical profession in the Philippines developed earlier and under a freer environment than in Indonesia. This situation enabled the history profession in the Philippines to acquire greater autonomy and strength as well as a higher level of professionalization than in Indonesia. This meant a much greater sense of professional self-worth and confidence among Filipino historians than among their Indonesian counterparts. By the time a strong, manipulative state emerged in the early 1970s with Marcos’s declaration of martial law, the profession had already reached a relatively high level of advancement. Its Indonesian counterpart, in contrast, had to develop under the aegis of a restrictive state from the Guided Democracy era up to the New Order. To this day it struggles for professional respectability, some-
thing that its Philippine counterpart had already achieved decades back and which historians already took for granted by the 1970s. In other words, the historians in the two countries operated in a contrasting calculus of power relations vis-à-vis the state: a position of relative strength for Filipino historians and relative weakness for their Indonesian counterparts.

Although one might expect that Filipino historians would show greater resilience in the face of political pressure than their Indonesian counterpart, as it turned out the position of strength from which Filipino historians came in their partnership with Marcos did not always provide them a shield against political interests. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Curaming 2006), the high level of their scholarship precisely fed on Marcos’s political agenda. Likewise, the position of weakness of Indonesian historians did not always result in manipulation of historical interpretation. Notwithstanding their position of relative weakness, the first edition of the SNI (1975) was comparatively more resilient to political manipulation than Tadhana.

Finally, although the New Order, on the whole, was more authoritarian than the Marcos regime, and thus was in a stronger position to impose what it wanted, this seemed not to be the case in the early to mid-1970s when the two projects were undertaken. The two regimes were more or less on an equal footing. This situation justifies the analysis of state-historian relations that foregrounds the relative importance of the scholars and historical profession, not the extent of control that the state could impose. By giving due emphasis on the role of the scholars, this approach could serve as a corrective to the common tendency to see the scholars as passive participants in the projects. Such a tendency is counterproductive as it reduces the otherwise dynamic relations and interaction to what is now a commonplace issue of cooptation or manipulation.

Abbreviations Used

ADHIKA Asosasyon ng mga Dalubhása at may Hilig sa Kasaysayan (Association of History Professionals and Enthusiasts)
FIB Fakultas Ilmu Budaya (Faculty of Humanities)
LEKNAS Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional (National Institute of Economic and Social Research), Jakarta
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Jakarta
LBRKB Lembaga Research Kebudayaan Nasional (National Institute of Cultural Studies), Jakarta
MSI Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia (Association of Historians of Indonesia)
n.d. no data
NHI National Historical Institute, Manila
PHA Philippine Historical Association
PNHS Philippine National Historical Society
PSSC Philippine Social Science Council, Quezon City
SNI Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia’s National History)
UI Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia), Jakarta
UGM Universitas Gadjah Mada (University of Gadjah Mada), Yogyakarta
UP University of the Philippines, Quezon City
UST University of Santo Tomas, Manila

Notes

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1. Actually, there were only a few Spaniards in the Philippines. By the 1840s the number hardly exceeded 5,000 out of a population of 5 million, and most of them were in Manila. However, the presence of only one Spanish missionary in a locality was sufficient to create a tremendous impact. See Corpuz 1957, 44.

2. For a comprehensive analysis of the process of national integration in Indonesia, see Drake 1989, 16–59; Kahin 1952, 1–36.

3. The land area of the Philippines is approximately 300,000 square kilometers, compared with Indonesia’s 1.9 million square kilometers (and about 3 million square kilometers of seas).

4. The Ethical Policy was, in theory, an ambitious program in agriculture, education, infrastructure, health, and other areas undertaken by the Dutch starting in the early 1900s. Among its purported aims was to uplift the living conditions of the people who, for decades since the implementation of the Cultivation System in the 1830s–1870s, had been badly exploited.

5. This is with the exception of the Muslim communities in Mindanao. For a standard work on Muslims in the Philippines, see Majul 1973. For the early process of hispanization, see Phelan 1959 and Rafael 1988, among others.
6 In 1971, for instance, a movement for “Philippine Statehood USA” easily gathered millions of members nationwide (Wurfel 1988, 26; McCoy 1981, 61). For one reason for the lingering positive reception among Filipinos of the American colonial project, see Abinales 2002.

7 In an earlier study I looked into the patterns of nationalist discourses discernible in Philippine history textbooks published in the period 1900 to 2000 (Curamig 2001). There are at least five streams of nationalisms: (1) mass or anticolonial nationalism; (2) colonial nationalism; (3) clerico-nationalism; (4) state nationalism; and (5) indigenous nationalism. The term “mass nationalism” refers to the type of nationalism that champions the right of the common people for a fair share in the nation’s power and wealth. It starts from the proposition that the real makers of history are the common people, and thus history must be seen through their eyes and they should be the beneficiaries of the fruits of historical change. This is often directed against the elite and the elite-controlled state and it is heavily influenced by Marxist ideology. It is also closely allied with anticlerical radical nationalism. “Colonial nationalism” refers to a set of thoughts and practices that saw in the colonial experience—its legacies and consequences—sources of things advantageous for the whole nation. It is nationalist in the sense that the welfare of the whole nation takes precedence, but it is colonial for its favorable recognition of the contribution of colonialism. For a slightly different but related conception of colonial nationalism, see Anderson 1983 and Abinales 2002. “Clerico-nationalism” refers to the brand of nationalism that emphasizes the contribution of Catholicism in the development of the Filipino nation. This is closely allied to colonial nationalism and has an uneasy relation with the radicalism of the Marx-inspired mass nationalism. “State nationalism” refers to the type of nationalism espoused by the state for the purpose of justifying or strengthening its position of authority. It was most visible during the American period as well as during the Marcos years. “Indigenous nationalism” eschews the colonial experience as pivotal to the development of Philippine nationalism, and tries to uncover or recover the “truly Filipino” in the deepest past possible.

8 According to Reid (1981, 153): “The major achievement of the Indonesian revolution was the creation of a united nation with an assured sense of its own identity and significance. The national idea has by 1950 become an irresistible myth, sanctified by the blood sacrificed for it.”

9 According to Cribb 2004, the competing nations-of-intent are the Islamist, the communist, the developmental nationalist (the three strands that Sukarno wanted to synthesize into Nasakom) and that of the indigenous aristocracies and the mestizos (what he calls “multietnic nation-of-intent”). The visions of the latter two, and why they failed and are almost forgotten, are the focus of Cribb’s analysis.

10 Indonesia may have been rocked by regional revolts in the 1950s but these revolts still mostly operated within the framework of the Indonesian nation, not as a subversion of it. For a pityful explanation of the sources of unity of the Indonesian nationalist movement, see Cribb and Brown 1995, 9–12.

11 Conflicts and rivalries were hardly absent in the case of Indonesia. Examples include the tension between the advocates of perjuangan (armed struggle) and diplomasi (diplomacy), but it did not undermine unity in the face of the colonizers in the same way as, say, the killings of Bonifacio and Luna in the Philippines.

12 In 1928 a congress attended by Indonesian students adopted a threefold declaration of one people, one motherland, and one language. It became a landmark event in Indonesian history as one of the most important markers of unity and a symbol of Indonesian nationhood. See Foulicher 2000 for a fresh look at this event.

13 Pancasila refers to the five principles of one God, humanitarianism, national unity, consultative democracy, and social justice. It has served as the state ideology of the Indonesian state since the Sukarno period.

14 The process has accelerated since Marcos encouraged labor export starting in the 1970s, but it has been ongoing since the early 1900s, perhaps even earlier.

15 In Ruth McVey’s (1996, 14) words: “Indonesia’s declaration of independence, instead of the high ceremony and ringing statement of goals that we might expect of a revolutionary state, was a bare announcement read before a few people, under the reluctant gaze of the Japanese.”

16 It must be pointed out that the prewar years were characterized by the entrenchment of a small group of the bourgeoisie and oligarchs as political elites in the Philippines. More importantly, only two persons dominated this period: Sergio Osmeña before the 1920s, and Manuel Quezon afterwards. Quezon showed a high level of authoritarianism that only Marcos exceeded later on (McCoy 1988). Nonetheless, the trappings of democracy were there and the foundation of a nominal democratic system was laid. Elections, for example, were held in 1901 (municipal), 1902 (provincial), 1907 (Philippine Assembly), 1916 (Philippine legislature), and 1935 (presidential). Due to restrictive qualifications—literacy and property ownership—the electorate was limited to 1.3 percent of the population in 1907, 10 percent in 1935, and 15.1 percent in 1946. See Manalili 1966, as cited in Sidel 1995, 27.

17 Fiesta democracy refers to democratic practices that may be ephemeral, skin-deep, or just for a show, such as voting during election time. It also refers to the atmosphere of fun and conviviality that accompanies the electoral exercise. One example of this is People Power in 1986; although it was punctuated by gripping fears and tensions, there were aspects that appeared like a spectacular fiesta. In Vincent Boudreau’s (1999, 11) words: “Filipinos moved from dictatorship to democracy with characteristic spectacle—color, music, emotion, and drama.”

18 For a comprehensive and penetrating analysis, see Brillantes 1987.

19 Anderson (1983, 482) suggests that the parliamentary form of government survived until 1957 because, given the weakness of the civil bureaucracy and political parties, “no other form of regime was possible.”

20 For an analysis of the dynamic interpenetration between the “state” and “society” in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965, see Anderson 1983, 480–86. This dynamic relationship culminated in the “triumph” of the state over society as the New Order became entrenched (ibid., 487–93).

21 Heryanto and Hadiz 2005 provide an illuminating three-way comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In their view, the absence of events comparable to the 1965–1966 events in the Philippines and Thailand makes democratization less formidable in those countries. See also Hadiz 2003.

22 For a comparison of the patterns of consolidation and resistance between the Marcos and Suharto regimes, see Boudreau 1999, 4–7.

23 The Marcos diaries (n.d.) contains passages, specifically entries for early January 1970, that show how worried Marcos was about the coalition of these forces.

24 Sukarno and his hordes of loyal supporters, both civilian and military, used to pose a formidable challenge. The events of 1965–1966, however, considerably disempowered Sukarno. With the communists neutralized, and Sukarno sidelined, the military and the regime did not have any effective opposition.
Klooster (1982, 48) defines nationalist historiography as writing history “for the purpose of cultivating love and esteem for the fatherland, by telling stories of common prosperity and adversity in the past from which the common fate of the nation through the ages must be evident. Once this common fate has been clearly demonstrated, the feeling of togetherness which emerges from it can be used also to safeguard unity in the future.” I find this definition too restrictive.

For an analysis of the life and works of de los Santos, see Agoncillo 2003a.

For a rare scholarly analysis of Paterno’s works, see Reyes 2006.

For the life and work of Tavera, see Ocampo 1959.

For an appreciative assessment of the works of Palma, see Zaide 1974.

For a fascinating discussion of the career of de los Reyes as a folklorist, see Anderson 2000.

For instance, when the PSSC initiated the Philippine Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Project, it was quite odd that history would be allotted two volumes, whereas other disciplines had one each. One version was put together by members of the PHA (vol. 1) and the other by the PNHS (vol. 2).

For an analysis of the life and works of de los Santos, see Agoncillo 2003a.

For a one-volume comprehensive and yet penetrating treatment of Rizal’s writings, see Quibuyen 1998. For article-length studies, see Ikehata 1968 and Quibuyen 1998. Anderson (2004, 99) has expressed admiration for Rizal’s writings, especially the two novels, Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo; in his view, Indonesia had to wait more than half a century, with the advent of Pramoedya Ananta Toer on the literary scene, for a comparable example. For an analysis of Rizal’s annotation of Morga, see Ocampo 1998.

For an insightful analysis of de los Reyes’s El Folk-Lore Filipino.

For the life and work of Tavera, see Ocampo 1959.

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